GitBook: [master] 62 pages modified

Author: jrag0x

products/court/answers-to-common-criticism.md

@@ -8,39 +8,39 @@ description: >-
 
 ## Kleros is live and demonstrably working
 
-### I only believe in systems that are in production and running, is Kleros even live?
+### FUD \#1 - I only believe in systems that are in production and running, is Kleros even live?
 
 _\(As of June 2021\)_ Kleros Court has been live since 2018 on Ethereum mainnet without any bug or downtime. It has handled and ruled on more than 865 different cases and has a community of more than 760 active jurors staking in 23 different courts \(Source: [KlerosBoard](http://klerosboard.com/)\). Kleros Court has ruled fairly on several controversial cases where millions of dollars were at stake \(cf. [Famous Kleros Cases](https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/products/court/famous-kleros-cases)\). It is trusted as an unbiased and transparent arbitration layer by multiple Dapps of the ecosystem in different fields \(Prediction Markets, Insurance, DEX, Sybil-Resistance, Marketplaces,... check all those integrations [here](https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/integrations/live-and-upcoming-integrations)\). 
 
 ## Kleros is a fair dispute resolution system
 
-### Why should I trust a court with pseudonymous jurors?
+### FUD \#2 - Why should I trust a court with pseudonymous jurors?
 
 Since decisions made in Kleros affect the allocation of resources, there is an incentive for parties to try to bribe or intimidate the tribunal. Pseudonymity is intended to protect jurors from bribing attempts, intimidation, and retaliation. It favors their functional independence \(ability to freely give their judgement\). It also simplifies the process of users becoming jurors and avoids the costs of identity verification. By providing a secure environment and simplifying the selection process, Kleros greatly enlarges the pool of potential jurors. This results in lower arbitration costs and the democratization of access to justice.
 
-### If parties can also be jurors, doesn't this pose a conflict of interest? / How can you ensure the jurors are perfectly impartial?
+### FUD \#3 - If parties can also be jurors, doesn't this pose a conflict of interest? / How can you ensure the jurors are perfectly impartial?
 
 The procedure for random selection of jurors among those who staked tokens in a subcourt makes it extremely hard to be selected on purpose as a juror for a case you are involved in.
 
 It is extremely hard for a juror to be able to be drawn into a court where he has a vested interest. In practice, it would be extremely unlikely for jurors having a vested interest in a case to compose a significant part of the drawn jurors and, even if that were to happen one, the appeal system would allow correcting the ruling;
 
 It is possible that internal biases still exist in jurors. There are some ways within Kleros to present information in such a way that it minimizes this bias. However, it could be also argued that no system can be completely free of biases. For an in depth discussion about this, read [this article](https://medium.com/kleros/kleros-and-mob-justice-can-the-wisdom-of-the-crowd-go-wrong-ef311209ea36).
 
-### How can Kleros know jurors have specific expertise if they are pseudonymous?
+### FUD \#4  - How can Kleros know jurors have specific expertise if they are pseudonymous?
 
 Kleros jurors self-select into the subcourt where they wish to conduct arbitration. Kleros does not ask for the jurors' real identity or to prove they are qualified to arbitrate disputes in the subcourt where they want to work.
 
 The expertise requirement is conducted via economic incentives. Kleros generates for users the incentive to self-select for the subcourts where they have expertise. Users who self-select into the courts for which they have the right skills will, on average, make money over time. Users who self-select into courts where they don't have the right skills will lose money and tend to abandon the system.
 
 Even though, in theory, jurors may not have subject matter expertise \(anyone can participate in the subcourt\), in practice, users without adequate expertise would suffer an economic loss and exit the subcourt \(unless they wish to lose money while they work, in order to gain those skills\). This works similarly to Wikipedia in the sense that a user who does not have expertise in a field to which an article edited by him relates, may still edit the article but will likely be sanctioned by Wikipedia.
 
-### How can I follow the dispute resolution process and be sure it has not been tampered with?
+### FUD \#5 - How can I follow the dispute resolution process and be sure it has not been tampered with?
 
 Kleros protocol is committed to full transparency. Its cases are completely open and can be monitored by any person with access to an internet connection. The entire history of cases is also available and published on-chain for reference. Kleros dispute resolution procedure is documented in many places. All cryptoeconomic research is public and the code is open source. A fully working version of Kleros could be replicated in a matter of minutes by anyone with technical skills in blockchain. 
 
 ## Kleros can not be gamed and controlled by whales
 
-### Is Kleros a court where rich people have more rights than ordinary folks \(because appeals are more affordable for the rich\)?
+### FUD \#6 - Is Kleros a court where rich people have more rights than ordinary folks \(because appeals are more affordable for the rich\)?
 
 Anyone can appeal a dispute ruling in Kleros. Most of the time both sides will be asked to contribute fees for the next round of voting to ensure jurors are rewarded and that that the losing side is reimbursed of its paid fees. This appeal system ensures that the final decision of jurors will always converge to the truth and that jurors in initial rounds of voting vote coherently from the start not to be penalized. 
 
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@ This usually leads to some critics saying that one of the parties with much grea
 
 People are thus incentivized to look at current appealed cases to spot obvious incorrect rulings and help crowdfund the other side to earn all or part of the rewards. This has been proven effective to deter "rich" parties from trying to win just by appealing several times. Learn more about it [here](https://blog.kleros.io/kleros-decentralized-token-listing-appeal-fees/).
 
-### How can you expect fairness from a court that is controlled by a bunch of rich whales?
+### FUD \#7 - How can you expect fairness from a court that is controlled by a bunch of rich whales?
 
-### Can't someone just buy a lot of Kleros tokens and 51% attack the Kleros Court?
+### FUD \#8 - Can't someone just buy a lot of Kleros tokens and 51% attack the Kleros Court?
 
 In order for a "whale" attacker to flood the juror pool and try to "control the court", they would need to buy enough PNK so that they are selected enough times to be a juror for the same case in order to change the outcome. Generally, this means that the attacks need 51% of the total staked tokens.
 
@@ -71,12 +71,12 @@ On the left, an attacker has managed a 51% attack and starts carrying out obviou
 
 More details [here](https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/pnk-token).
 
+### Questions in progress
+
 "Kleros is broken and unfair because jurors look at policies and do not empathize with people involved in disputes”
 
 "Jurors will give whatever ruling brings them more cases in the future"
 
-"Kleros courts logic/game theory relies on appeals, but appeals are only affordable by the rich”
-
 “Game theory is just a basic simplification of real life, therefore Kleros is broken"
 
 🚧👷 IN PROGRESS 👷🚧