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SUMMARY.md

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* [Kleros Juror Tutorial](products/court/kleros-juror-tutorial.md)
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* [Famous Kleros Cases](products/court/famous-kleros-cases.md)
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* [What happens during a dispute?](products/court/what-happens-during-a-dispute.md)
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* [Answers to common Kleros criticism](products/court/answers-to-common-criticism.md)
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* [Proof of Humanity](products/proof-of-humanity/README.md)
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* [Proof of Humanity Tutorial \(Register & Vouch\)](products/proof-of-humanity/proof-of-humanity-tutorial.md)
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* [Proof Humanity Tutorial \(Remove & Challenge\)](products/proof-of-humanity/proof-humanity-tutorial-remove-and-challenge.md)
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---
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description: >-
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People discovering Kleros will often come up with the same doubts and
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questions about the system.
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---
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# Answers to common Kleros criticism
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## Kleros is live and demonstrably working
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### I only believe in systems that are in production and running, is Kleros even live?
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_\(As of June 2021\)_ Kleros Court has been live since 2018 on Ethereum mainnet without any bug or downtime. It has handled and ruled on more than 865 different cases and has a community of more than 760 active jurors staking in 23 different courts \(Source: [KlerosBoard](http://klerosboard.com/)\). Kleros Court has ruled fairly on several controversial cases where millions of dollars were at stake \(cf. [Famous Kleros Cases](https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/products/court/famous-kleros-cases)\). It is trusted as an unbiased and transparent arbitration layer by multiple Dapps of the ecosystem in different fields \(Prediction Markets, Insurance, DEX, Sybil-Resistance, Marketplaces,... check all those integrations [here](https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/integrations/live-and-upcoming-integrations)\).
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## Pseudonimity of jurors
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### If parties can also be jurors, doesn't this pose a conflict of interest?
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## Kleros can not be gamed and controlled by whales
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### Is Kleros a court where rich people have more rights than ordinary folks?
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### How can you expect fairness from a court that is controlled by a bunch of rich whales?
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### Can't someone just buy a lot of Kleros tokens and 51% attack the Kleros Court?
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In order for a "whale" attacker to flood the juror pool and try to "control the court", they would need to buy enough PNK so that they are selected enough times to be a juror for the same case in order to change the outcome. Generally, this means that the attacks need 51% of the total staked tokens.
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An attacker may get lucky in rare circumstances and be selected for two of three juror spots with only a minority of the PNK. However, in order to maintain the attack through the appeal process, it would need to be selected for the majority of the juror spots on larger and larger juries, which will only be possible if the attacker actually has a majority of the PNK. Hence, substantial economic resources in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars would be required to perform a 51% attack.
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_**If a "whale" tries to buy 51% of all staked PNK:**_ The PNK market liquidity will dry up. As the attacker buys PNK, it will start to become scarce and each additional PNK will cost more and more. The attacker may not even be able to find 51% of PNK for sale on the open market at any given time and it will progressively cost so much that the attack would not be economically viable.
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_**If a malicious attacker did manage somehow to buy a majority of staked PNK:**_ The community would realize that it is under attack, particularly if the attacker uses his new PNK to commit obvious miscarriages of justice. In this case, Kleros would lose credibility as an arbitration platform and the value of PNK would decrease. Then the attacker would take a substantial loss on the PNK she bought, representing a high economic cost to carry out the attack.
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_**If a malicious attacker made a successful 51% attack:**_ The community would perform a last-ditch defense by forking the system to remove the attackers’ holdings. Then the market would sort out which version of PNK should be used going forward. This is similar to the [ultimate appeal mechanism of Augur](https://medium.com/kleros/kleros-and-augur-keeping-people-honest-on-ethereum-through-game-theory-56210457649c).
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![](../../.gitbook/assets/pnk.png)
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On the left, an attacker has managed a 51% attack and starts carrying out obvious miscarriages of justice. The community decides to fork the token removing the attackers’ holdings, and most of the users migrate to the new version of PNK.
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More details [here](https://kleros.gitbook.io/docs/pnk-token).
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###
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###
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🚧👷 IN PROGRESS 👷🚧
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