原文信息：
- 标题：2013 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：2014-02-28
- 链接：PDF
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：Ponge
- 校译：
Berkshire’s Corporate Performance vs. the S&P 500
| Year | Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Book Value of Berkshire (1) | Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included (2) | Relative Results (1)-(2) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1965 | 23.8 | 10.0 | 13.8 |
| 1966 | 20.3 | (11.7) | 32.0 |
| 1967 | 11.0 | 30.9 | (19.9) |
| 1968 | 19.0 | 11.0 | 8.0 |
| 1969 | 16.2 | (8.4) | 24.6 |
| 1970 | 12.0 | 3.9 | 8.1 |
| 1971 | 16.4 | 14.6 | 1.8 |
| 1972 | 21.7 | 18.9 | 2.8 |
| 1973 | 4.7 | (14.8) | 19.5 |
| 1974 | 5.5 | (26.4) | 31.9 |
| 1975 | 21.9 | 37.2 | (15.3) |
| 1976 | 59.3 | 23.6 | 35.7 |
| 1977 | 31.9 | (7.4) | 39.3 |
| 1978 | 24.0 | 6.4 | 17.6 |
| 1979 | 35.7 | 18.2 | 17.5 |
| 1980 | 19.3 | 32.3 | (13.0) |
| 1981 | 31.4 | (5.0) | 36.4 |
| 1982 | 40.0 | 21.4 | 18.6 |
| 1983 | 32.3 | 22.4 | 9.9 |
| 1984 | 13.6 | 6.1 | 7.5 |
| 1985 | 48.2 | 31.6 | 16.6 |
| 1986 | 26.1 | 18.6 | 7.5 |
| 1987 | 19.5 | 5.1 | 14.4 |
| 1988 | 20.1 | 16.6 | 3.5 |
| 1989 | 44.4 | 31.7 | 12.7 |
| 1990 | 7.4 | (3.1) | 10.5 |
| 1991 | 39.6 | 30.5 | 9.1 |
| 1992 | 20.3 | 7.6 | 12.7 |
| 1993 | 14.3 | 10.1 | 4.2 |
| 1994 | 13.9 | 1.3 | 12.6 |
| 1995 | 43.1 | 37.6 | 5.5 |
| 1996 | 31.8 | 23.0 | 8.8 |
| 1997 | 34.1 | 33.4 | 0.7 |
| 1998 | 48.3 | 28.6 | 19.7 |
| 1999 | 0.5 | 21.0 | (20.5) |
| 2000 | 6.5 | (9.1) | 15.6 |
| 2001 | (6.2) | (11.9) | 5.7 |
| 2002 | 10.0 | (22.1) | 32.1 |
| 2003 | 21.0 | 28.7 | (7.7) |
| 2004 | 10.5 | 10.9 | (0.4) |
| 2005 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 1.5 |
| 2006 | 18.4 | 15.8 | 2.6 |
| 2007 | 11.0 | 5.5 | 5.5 |
| 2008 | (9.6) | (37.0) | 27.4 |
| 2009 | 19.8 | 26.5 | (6.7) |
| 2010 | 13.0 | 15.1 | (2.1) |
| 2011 | 4.6 | 2.1 | 2.5 |
| 2012 | 14.4 | 16.0 | (1.6) |
| 2013 | 18.2 | 32.4 | (14.2) |
| Compounded Annual Gain -- 1965-2013 | 19.7% | 9.8% | 9.9 |
| Overall Gain -- 1964-2013 | 693,518% | 9,841% |
Notes: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31. Starting in 1979, accounting rules required insurance companies to value the equity securities they hold at market rather than at the lower of cost or market, which was previously the requirement. In this table, Berkshire’s results through 1978 have been restated to conform to the changed rules. In all other respects, the results are calculated using the numbers originally reported. The S&P 500 numbers are pre-tax whereas the Berkshire numbers are after-tax. If a corporation such as Berkshire were simply to have owned the S&P 500 and accrued the appropriate taxes, its results would have lagged the S&P 500 in years when that index showed a positive return, but would have exceeded the S&P 500 in years when the index showed a negative return. Over the years, the tax costs would have caused the aggregate lag to be substantial.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
Berkshire’s gain in net worth during 2013 was $34.2 billion. That gain was after our deducting $1.8 billion of charges -- meaningless economically, as I will explain later -- that arose from our purchase of the minority interests in Marmon and Iscar. After those charges, the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock increased by 18.2%. Over the last 49 years (that is, since present management took over), book value has grown from $19 to $134,973, a rate of 19.7% compounded annually.1
2013年，伯克希尔的账面价值增长了342亿美元。这是扣除了购买Marmon和Iscar少数股权产生的18亿美元的费用后的数据，这些费用没有实质上的经济意义，稍后我后面会解释。扣除上述费用后，伯克希尔A/B股票每股账面价值增长了18.2%(标普32.4%)。过去的49年(即从现任的管理层接手以来)，我们的每股账面价值从19美元增长到134,973美元，复合增长率19.7%。(A股=1500*B股)
On the facing page, we show our long-standing performance measurement: The yearly change in Berkshire’s per-share book value versus the market performance of the S&P 500. What counts, of course, is per-share intrinsic value. But that’s a subjective figure, and book value is useful as a rough tracking indicator. (An extended discussion of intrinsic value is included in our Owner-Related Business Principles on pages 103 -- 108. Those principles have been included in our reports for 30 years, and we urge new and prospective shareholders to read them.)
封面上是我们的业绩衡量标准：每年伯克希尔每股账面价值和标普500指数的年度变化比较。当然真正有意义的是每股内在价值。但内在价值是一个主观的数字，每股账面价值则是内在价值一个有用的参考。(关于内在价值和股东相关原则请参考我们的股东手册。30多年来，这些原则一直印在我们的股东手册上，我们希望新加入的以及有兴趣成为股东的投资者都阅读这部分内容。)
As I’ve long told you, Berkshire’s intrinsic value far exceeds its book value. Moreover, the difference has widened considerably in recent years. That’s why our 2012 decision to authorize the repurchase of shares at 120% of book value made sense. Purchases at that level benefit continuing shareholders because per-share intrinsic value exceeds that percentage of book value by a meaningful amount. We did not purchase shares during 2013, however, because the stock price did not descend to the 120% level. If it does, we will be aggressive.
我早就说过，伯克希尔的内在价值远超账面价值。并且两者之间的差距近年来显著扩大。这也是我们在2012年以账面价值120%的价格回购公司股票的原因。在这个价位回购股票有利于继续持有的股东，因为公司的每股内在价值超过了账面价值一大截。2013年我们没有回购股票，原因是股价一直没有掉到账面价值120%的价位。要不然我们会积极回购的。
Charlie Munger, Berkshire’s vice chairman and my partner, and I believe both Berkshire’s book value and intrinsic value will outperform the S&P in years when the market is down or moderately up. We expect to fall short, though, in years when the market is strong -- as we did in 2013. We have underperformed in ten of our 49 years, with all but one of our shortfalls occurring when the S&P gain exceeded 15%.
公司的副董事长兼我的合伙人，查理·芒格和我都相信，在市场下跌或者上涨缓慢的年份，伯克希尔的账面价值和内在价值增速都会战胜标普指数。在市场强势上涨的年份——比如刚刚过去的2013年，我们一般会暂时落后。过去49年里，我们曾有10年跑输市场，其中只有一次标普指数上涨不到15%。
Over the stock market cycle between yearends 2007 and 2013, we overperformed the S&P. Through full cycles in future years, we expect to do that again. If we fail to do so, we will not have earned our pay. After all, you could always own an index fund and be assured of S&P results.
2007-2013年这个5年周期里，我们成功跑赢了标普指数。在未来的周期中，我们也一样会跑赢市场。如果没有做到这一点，我们将愧对于自己的工资。因为大家始终可以买一只指数基金来获得和标普500一样的收益。
On the operating front, just about everything turned out well for us last year -- in certain cases very well. Let me count the ways:
运营方面，过去的一年结果很不错，某些方面甚至非常棒。请看下文：
-
We completed two large acquisitions, spending almost $18 billion to purchase all of NV Energy and a major interest in H. J. Heinz. Both companies fit us well and will be prospering a century from now.
我们完成了两项大型收购，收购了内华达能源公司全部股份(NVEnergy56亿)，以及亨氏(H.J.Heinz)的主要股权，总共耗资180亿美元。两家公司和我们都非常契合，而且它们的生意都还会红火一个世纪。
With the Heinz purchase, moreover, we created a partnership template that may be used by Berkshire in future acquisitions of size. Here, we teamed up with investors at 3G Capital, a firm led by my friend, Jorge Paulo Lemann. His talented associates -- Bernardo Hees, Heinz’s new CEO, and Alex Behring, its Chairman -- are responsible for operations.
在亨氏的收购中，我们创造了一个伯克希尔未来可能还会使用的合作模式。具体来说，我们和3GCapital的投资者合作完成了收购。3G Capital是一家由我的朋友Jorge Paulo Lemann领导的公司(巴西投资银行家，涉足A-B百威、汉堡王的投资，拥有私募股权投资基金3GCapital)。他的天才合伙人，亨氏新任CEO-BernardoHees和董事长AlexBehring将会负责公司未来的运营。
Berkshire is the financing partner. In that role, we purchased $8 billion of Heinz preferred stock that carries a 9% coupon but also possesses other features that should increase the preferred’s annual return to 12% or so. Berkshire and 3G each purchased half of the Heinz common stock for $4.25 billion.
伯克希尔的角色是财务合伙人。我们买下了亨氏80亿美元利率9%的优先股，并且有权利将年回报率提高到12%。同时伯克希尔和3G分别出资42.5亿美元各买下亨氏一半的普通股。
Though the Heinz acquisition has some similarities to a “private equity” transaction, there is a crucial difference: Berkshire never intends to sell a share of the company. What we would like, rather, is to buy more, and that could happen: Certain 3G investors may sell some or all of their shares in the future, and we might increase our ownership at such times. Berkshire and 3G could also decide at some point that it would be mutually beneficial if we were to exchange some of our preferred for common shares (at an equity valuation appropriate to the time).
我们对亨氏的收购看起来和"私募股权"投资的交易非常相似，但是有着本质的不同：伯克希尔不打算卖出公司的任何股份。我们喜欢的是购买更多的股份，而且那很可能发生：3G的部分投资者将来会把他们的股份转让给我们，于是我们可以提高持股比例。另外，伯克希尔和3G资本可能在未来某个时候决定，在对双方都有利的情况下，将我们的优先股转换为普通股(以当时一个合理的估值)。
Our partnership took control of Heinz in June, and operating results so far are encouraging. Only minor earnings from Heinz, however, are reflected in those we report for Berkshire this year: One-time charges incurred in the purchase and subsequent restructuring of operations totaled $1.3 billion. Earnings in 2014 will be substantial.
我们的合作伙伴在去年6月接管了亨氏，迄今为止的业绩非常喜人。但是在伯克希尔的报表上，只反映了亨氏部分收益，这是由于收购和业务重组形成了13亿美元的一次性费用。2014年的业绩将非常可观。
With Heinz, Berkshire now owns 8.5 companies that, were they stand-alone businesses, would be in the Fortune 500. Only 491.5 to go.
有了亨氏以后，伯克希尔已经拥有了8.5家财富500强公司(如果他们是独立企业)。现在还剩491.5家等着我们。
NV Energy, purchased for $5.6 billion by MidAmerican Energy, our utility subsidiary, supplies electricity to about 88% of Nevada’s population. This acquisition fits nicely into our existing electric-utility operation and offers many possibilities for large investments in renewable energy. NV Energy will not be MidAmerican’s last major acquisition.
内华达能源，由我的公用事业子公司中美能源斥资56亿美元收购，为内华达州88%的人口供电。这笔收购和我们现有的电力事业相辅相成，并为可再生能源领域的大规模投资提供了许多机会。内华达能源不会是中美能源的最后一笔大型收购。
-
MidAmerican is one of our “Powerhouse Five” -- a collection of large non-insurance businesses that, in aggregate, had a record $10.8 billion of pre-tax earnings in 2013, up $758 million from 2012. The other companies in this sainted group are BNSF, Iscar, Lubrizol and Marmon.
中美能源是我们非保险业务集团的"五驾马车"之一。2013年这5家公司税前利润合计创纪录地达到108亿美元，比2012年增加7.58亿美元。其他的4架马车分别是BNSF铁路公司、艾斯卡Iscar、路博润Lubrizol和Marmon集团。
Of the five, only MidAmerican, then earning $393 million pre-tax, was owned by Berkshire nine years ago. Subsequently, we purchased another three of the five on an all-cash basis. In acquiring the fifth, BNSF, we paid about 70% of the cost in cash, and, for the remainder, issued shares that increased the number outstanding by 6.1%. In other words, the $10.4 billion gain in annual earnings delivered Berkshire by the five companies over the nine-year span has been accompanied by only minor dilution. That satisfies our goal of not simply growing, but rather increasing per-share results.
五驾马车中，只有中美能源是9年前伯克希尔就已经拥有的，当时它税前利润3.93亿。后来，我们相继以现金收购了另外3家。收购第五家BNSF铁路的时候，我们支付了70%的现金，剩余30%通过增发了6.1%的股份支付。换句话说，现在五驾马车每年贡献给伯克希尔的104亿利润，而我们的股票这9年来却只有轻微的稀释。这与我们不单单追求增长，而是要追求每股价值的增长这一目标相符。
If the U.S. economy continues to improve in 2014, we can expect earnings of our Powerhouse Five to improve also -- perhaps by $1 billion or so pre-tax.
如果2014年美国经济继续恢复，我们预计五驾马车的利润也会随之增长，大致会增加10亿美元左右。
-
Our many dozens of smaller non-insurance businesses earned $4.7 billion pre-tax last year, up from $3. billion in 2012. Here, too, we expect further gains in 2014.
非保险业务里，我们其他小一些的公司税前收益从2012年的39亿增长到今年的47亿。预计2014年它们也会持续增长。
-
Berkshire’s extensive insurance operation again operated at an underwriting profit in 2013 -- that makes 11 years in a row -- and increased its float. During that 11-year stretch, our float -- money that doesn’t belong to us but that we can invest for Berkshire’s benefit -- has grown from $41 billion to $77 billion. Concurrently, our underwriting profit has aggregated $22 billion pre-tax, including $3 billion realized in 2013. And all of this all began with our 1967 purchase of National Indemnity for $8.6 million.
伯克希尔最重要的保险业务在2013年再次实现了承保盈利，这是连续承保盈利的第11个年头了，浮存金还在继续增加。11年来，那些不属于伯克希尔，但是我们可以投资并为伯克希尔赚取收益的浮存金，从410亿增加到了770亿。与此同时，我们累计实现了220亿税前承保盈利，其中2013年30亿。而这一切，都起始于我们1967年以860万美元收购了国民保险公司。
We now own a wide variety of exceptional insurance operations. Best known is GEICO, the car insurer Berkshire acquired in full at yearend 1995 (having for many years prior owned a partial interest). GEICO in 1996 ranked number seven among U.S. auto insurers. Now, GEICO is number two, having recently passed Allstate. The reasons for this amazing growth are simple: low prices and reliable service. You can do yourself a favor by calling 1-800-847-7536 or checking Geico.com to see if you, too, can cut your insurance costs. Buy some of Berkshire’s other products with the savings.
现在我们已经拥有多家各式的专业保险业务。最为人所熟知的是GEICO，1995年伯克希尔完全收购了这家车险公司(在那之前很多年我们就持有它部分权益了)。1996年GEICO在美国车险企业里排名第七。现在它排第二，刚刚超过了Allstate保险(好事达)。它惊人增长的秘密其实非常简单：便宜的价格和可靠的服务。打客服电话1-800-847-7536，或者登录Geico.com，看看GEICO的产品是不是能帮你节省一些保险费用。省下来的钱可以买些其他伯克希尔的产品。
-
While Charlie and I search for elephants, our many subsidiaries are regularly making bolt-on acquisitions. Last year, we contracted for 25 of these, scheduled to cost $3.1 billion in aggregate. These transactions ranged from $1.9 million to $1.1 billion in size.
查理和我一直在猎象，我们的公司也在不断进行补强型收购。去年我们一共有25笔收购，总计31亿美元。这些收购规模从190万到11亿美元不等。
Charlie and I encourage these deals. They deploy capital in activities that fit with our existing businesses and that will be managed by our corps of expert managers. The result is no more work for us and more earnings for you. Many more of these bolt-on deals will be made in future years. In aggregate, they will be meaningful.
查理和我都支持这些收购。它们把资本用在了契合我们现有业务的地方，并且将由我们优秀的经理人团队管理。结果就是，我们没有更多的工作，但大家却有更多钱赚。未来还会有更多类似的补强型收购。整体而言，它们带来的意义非凡。
-
Last year we invested $3.5 billion in the surest sort of bolt-on: the purchase of additional shares in two wonderful businesses that we already controlled. In one case -- Marmon -- our purchases brought us to the 100% ownership we had signed up for in 2008. In the other instance -- Iscar -- the Wertheimer family elected to exercise a put option it held, selling us the 20% of the business it retained when we bought control in 2006.
去年我们投资了35亿，用于最可靠的补强型投资：购买了两家我们已经拥有控制权公司的剩余股权。第一个是Marmon(15亿)，根据2008年的协议我们获得了100%的权益。另一个是Iscar(20亿)，Wertheimer家族决定行使它的卖出权，将2006年我们获得控制权时保留的20%股份转让给我们。
These purchases added about $300 million pre-tax to our current earning power and also delivered us $800 million of cash. Meanwhile, the same nonsensical accounting rule that I described in last year’s letter required that we enter these purchases on our books at $1.8 billion less than we paid, a process that reduced Berkshire’s book value. (The charge was made to “capital in excess of par value”; figure that one out.) This weird accounting, you should understand, instantly increased Berkshire’s excess of intrinsic value over book value by the same $1.8 billion.
两笔收购让我们增加了3亿的税前利润，带来8亿的现金流。但是去年的信中已经讲过的，"虚幻"的会计准则要求我们以低于支付金额18亿的价格对它入账，于是减少了伯克希尔的账面价值。(这项费用记在"超过账面价值的资本"项目下；一个报表上没有的项目)。大家应该明白，这条怪异的会计要求使得伯克希尔内在价值和账面价值的差距增加了18亿。
-
Our subsidiaries spent a record $11 billion on plant and equipment during 2013, roughly twice our depreciation charge. About 89% of that money was spent in the United States. Though we invest abroad as well, the mother lode of opportunity resides in America.
2013年，伯克希尔子公司在厂房、设备上的花费了创纪录的110亿，几乎是折旧额的2倍。大约89%的钱投在了美国。尽管我们也在国外投资，但是投资机会的源泉是在美国。
-
In a year in which most equity managers found it impossible to outperform the S&P 500, both Todd Combs and Ted Weschler handily did so. Each now runs a portfolio exceeding $7 billion. They’ve earned it.
去年多数投资经理没能战胜标普500，但是 Todd Combs 和 Ted Weschler 轻松做到了。他们各自管理的组合都超过了70亿美元。这是他们应该得到的。
I must again confess that their investments outperformed mine. (Charlie says I should add “by a lot.”) If such humiliating comparisons continue, I’ll have no choice but to cease talking about them.
我不得不坦白，他们的投资业绩超过了我。(查理提醒我应该加上"超过了一大截"。)如果这种令人惭愧的对比继续下去，我就只好闭口不提他俩了。
Todd and Ted have also created significant value for you in several matters unrelated to their portfolio activities. Their contributions are just beginning: Both men have Berkshire blood in their veins.
除了投资组合外，Todd和Ted还在诸多方面创造了重大价值。他们的贡献才刚刚开始：他们都流淌着伯克希尔的血。
-
Berkshire’s yearend employment -- counting Heinz -- totaled a record 330,745, up 42,283 from last year. The increase, I must admit, included one person at our Omaha home office. (Don’t panic: The headquarters gang still fits comfortably on one floor.)
年末伯克希尔的雇员总数(算上亨氏)，达到创纪录的330,745人，比去年增加了42,283人。我得承认，这包括我们奥马哈总部的一人。(别慌：一层楼还是足够公司总部人员舒服使用的。)
-
Berkshire increased its ownership interest last year in each of its “Big Four” investments -- American Express, Coca-Cola, IBM and Wells Fargo. We purchased additional shares of Wells Fargo (increasing our ownership to 9.2% versus 8.7% at yearend 2012) and IBM (6.3% versus 6.0%). Meanwhile, stock repurchases at Coca-Cola and American Express raised our percentage ownership. Our equity in Coca-Cola grew from 8.9% to 9.1% and our interest in American Express from 13.7% to 14.2%. And, if you think tenths of a percent aren’t important, ponder this math: For the four companies in aggregate, each increase of one-tenth of a percent in our share of their equity raises Berkshire’s share of their annual earnings by $50 million.
去年伯克希尔在"四巨头"上的投资比例都上升了——美国运通、可口可乐、IBM和富国银行。我们增持了富国银行(8.7%增至9.2%)和IBM(6.0%增至6.3%)。同时，可口可乐和美国运通的股票回购提高了我们的持股比例。我们在可口可乐的持股比例从8.9%提高到9.1%，美国运通的从13.7%提高到14.2%。如果大家觉得百分之零点几的变动意思不大，那请大家这样估算一下：我们在四大上的投资，每增加0.1%，伯克希尔每年的利润就会增加5000万。
The four companies possess excellent businesses and are run by managers who are both talented and shareholder-oriented. At Berkshire, we much prefer owning a non-controlling but substantial portion of a wonderful company to owning 100% of a so-so business; it’s better to have a partial interest in the Hope diamond than to own all of a rhinestone.
四家公司都拥有出色的业务，并由既有才华又以股东利益为导向的经理人管理。在伯克希尔，我们情愿拥有一家优秀公司非控制性但相当大比例的持股，也不愿拥有一家普通公司的100%；就好像我们宁愿拥有希望之钻的一部分，也不愿要一整颗水钻一样的道理。
Going by our yearend holdings, our portion of the “Big Four’s” 2013 earnings amounted to $4.4 billion. In the earnings we report to you, however, we include only the dividends we receive -- about $1.4 billion last year. But make no mistake: The $3 billion of their earnings we don’t report is every bit as valuable to us as the portion Berkshire records.
以年末的持股份额计算，我们在"四巨头"收益中应占44亿美元。但是在利润表上，我们报告收益中只包括了收到的14亿分红。但是别犯迷糊：没有报告的30亿利润跟我们账上报告的一样有价值。
The earnings that these four companies retain are often used for repurchases of their own stock -- a move that enhances our share of future earnings -- as well as for funding business opportunities that usually turn out to be advantageous. All that leads us to expect that the per-share earnings of these four investees will grow substantially over time. If they do, dividends to Berkshire will increase and, even more important, our unrealized capital gains will, too. (For the four, unrealized gains already totaled $39 billion at yearend.)
这4家公司留存的利润通常被用于回购股票(这将增加未来我们在收益中所占的比例)，以及投资于有利可图的新机会。所以这一切可以预期，我们在"四巨头"上的每股收益将大幅增长。倘若事实的确如此，伯克希尔获得的股息也将随之增加，更重要的是，我们的未实现资本收益也会增长。(截止年底，我们在"四巨头"上的未实现收益累计390亿美元。)
Our flexibility in capital allocation -- our willingness to invest large sums passively in non-controlled businesses -- gives us a significant advantage over companies that limit themselves to acquisitions they can operate. Woody Allen stated the general idea when he said: “The advantage of being bi-sexual is that it doubles your chances for a date on Saturday night.” Similarly, our appetite for either operating businesses or passive investments doubles our chances of finding sensible uses for our endless gusher of cash.
我们愿意被动的将大笔资金投资于我们的非控制企业中，相比于那些将收购仅局限于自己能够经营的业务的公司来说，我们在资本配置方面的灵活性让我们拥有显著的优势。Woody Allen说过，"双性恋的好处就是，周六晚上约会的概率可以提高一倍。"同样，我们即投资可以自己运营的业务又愿意被动投资，于是我们源源不断的现金找寻到合适投资机会的概率也提高了一倍。
Late in 2009, amidst the gloom of the Great Recession, we agreed to buy BNSF, the largest purchase in Berkshire’s history. At the time, I called the transaction an “all-in wager on the economic future of the United States.”
2009年年末，在大衰退的阴影中，我们同意收购BNSF铁路，这是伯克希尔历史上最大的收购。当时我把这笔交易称作是"对美国经济的未来的赌注"。
That kind of commitment was nothing new for us: We’ve been making similar wagers ever since Buffett Partnership Ltd. acquired control of Berkshire in 1965. For good reason, too. Charlie and I have always considered a “bet” on ever-rising U.S. prosperity to be very close to a sure thing.
当然这种收购承诺对我们来说也不是新鲜事了：从1965年巴菲特合伙公司(Buffett Partnership Ltd.)买下伯克希尔控制权以来，我们一直在下类似的赌注。这也是有充分理由的。查理和我一直认为，"赌"美国长盛不衰，几乎是一件板上钉钉的事。
Indeed, who has ever benefited during the past 237 years by betting against America? If you compare our country’s present condition to that existing in 1776, you have to rub your eyes in wonder. And the dynamism embedded in our market economy will continue to work its magic. America’s best days lie ahead.
事实上，在过去的237年里，谁曾因看空美国而获益了？如果把我们现在的国家和1776年进行比较，大家一定不敢相信自己的眼睛。市场经济的内在活力将继续发挥它的魔力，美国的好日子还在前头。
With this tailwind working for us, Charlie and I hope to build Berkshire’s per-share intrinsic value by (1) constantly improving the basic earning power of our many subsidiaries; (2) further increasing their earnings through bolt-on acquisitions; (3) benefiting from the growth of our investees; (4) repurchasing Berkshire shares when they are available at a meaningful discount from intrinsic value; and (5) making an occasional large acquisition. We will also try to maximize results for you by rarely, if ever, issuing Berkshire shares.
趁着顺风，查理和我希望通过以下方式更进一步增加伯克希尔的每股内在价值：1、不断提高各子公司的基本盈利能力；2、通过补强型收购进一步增加它们的收益；3、从我们投资的非控制公司的增长中获益；4、当伯克希尔的股价下跌到相对内在价值有很大折扣时，回购股票；5、偶尔进行大型的收购。少数情况下，我们也可能通过发行伯克希尔的股票来最大化股东的收益。
Those building blocks rest on a rock-solid foundation. A century hence, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy will still be playing major roles in our economy. Insurance will concomitantly be essential for both businesses and individuals -- and no company brings greater human and financial resources to that business than Berkshire.
这些方式都有其坚实的基础。一个世纪内，BNSF铁路和中美能源还将继续在我们的经济中发挥重要作用。保险对企业和个人也依然不可或缺，没有那家企业能够比伯克希尔投入更多的人力和资金。另外，我们依然会保持最高的财务稳健，维持至少200亿的现金及等价物，永远不会产生大量的短期债务。考虑到方方面面的优势，查理和我非常看好公司的未来。能够被你们委托管理这项资产，我们感到非常幸运。
Moreover, we will always maintain supreme financial strength, operating with at least $20 billion of cash equivalents and never incurring material amounts of short-term obligations. As we view these and other strengths, Charlie and I like your company’s prospects. We feel fortunate to be entrusted with its management.
As much as Charlie and I talk about intrinsic business value, we cannot tell you precisely what that number is for Berkshire shares (nor, in fact, for any other stock). In our 2010 annual report, however, we laid out the three elements -- one of them qualitative -- that we believe are the keys to a sensible estimate of Berkshire’s intrinsic value. That discussion is reproduced in full on pages 109 - 110.
尽管查理和我谈论的是企业内在价值，但是我们无法确切告诉大家伯克希尔每股内在价值的准确数字是多少(实际上其他任何股票都不能)。然而在2010年的年报中，我们列出了三个基本要素(其中一个是定性的)，我们相信这些要素是衡量伯克希尔内在价值的关键指标(这些讨论我们完整地收录在年报109-110页)。
Here is an update of the two quantitative factors: In 2013 our per-share investments increased 13.6% to $129,253 and our pre-tax earnings from businesses other than insurance and investments increased 12.8% to $9, 116 per share.
我们两个定量指标的更新：2013年，我们的每股投资增长13.6%至129,253美元，另外除保险和投资业务外，每股税前经营收益增长12.8%至9,116美元。
Since 1970, our per-share investments have increased at a rate of 19.3% compounded annually, and our earnings figure has grown at a 20.6% clip. It is no coincidence that the price of Berkshire stock over the 43-year period has increased at a rate very similar to that of our two measures of value. Charlie and I like to see gains in both sectors, but we will most strongly focus on building operating earnings.
1970年来，我们的每股投资的年化复合增长率为19.3%，同时我们的经营收益的年化复合增长率是20.6%。伯克希尔的股价43年来以一个类似的速度增长并非巧合。查理和我喜欢看到两个部分都获得增长，但是我们将更关注的是经营收益。
Now, let’s examine the four major sectors of our operations. Each has vastly different balance sheet and income characteristics from the others. So we’ll present them as four separate businesses, which is how Charlie and I view them (though there are important and enduring advantages to having them all under one roof). Our goal is to provide you with the information we would wish to have if our positions were reversed, with you being the reporting manager and we the absentee shareholders. (But don’t get any ideas!)
接下来，让我们来看看我们运营的四个主要板块。每个板块都有完全不同的资产负债表和收入特性。所以我们把它们区别对待，这也是查理和我看待它们的方式(尽管把它们放在同一个板块中有着重要且持久的优势)。我们的目标是假设我们角色互换，你是作报告的管理层而我们是股东，提供给我们想要知道的信息。
“Our investment in the insurance companies reflects a first major step in our efforts to achieve a more diversified base of earning power.”
-- 1967 Annual Report
1967年年报："我们对保险业的投资是我们努力实现多元化的收益来源的重要一步。"
Let’s look first at insurance, Berkshire’s core operation and the engine that has consistently propelled our expansion since that 1967 report was published.
让我们先来看看伯克希尔的核心业务保险业，这是自1967年的年报发布以来不断驱动我们扩张的引擎。
Property-casualty (“P/C”) insurers receive premiums upfront and pay claims later. In extreme cases, such as those arising from certain workers’ compensation accidents, payments can stretch over decades. This collect-now, pay-later model leaves P/C companies holding large sums -- money we call “float” -- that will eventually go to others. Meanwhile, insurers get to invest this float for their benefit. Though individual policies and claims come and go, the amount of float an insurer holds usually remains fairly stable in relation to premium volume.
财产意外险公司先收取保费，事后进行理赔支付。在一些极端情况下，比如某些工伤保险，赔付可能长达几十年。这种现在收钱，将来赔付的模式让我们持有大量的"浮存金"，这些浮存金最终会支付到保户手中。同时，保险公司可以使用这些浮存金为自己投资。虽然单笔的保单和索赔有进有出，但保险公司持有的浮存金规模和保费收入维持一个相当稳定的关系。所以，随着我们业务扩张，我们的浮存金规模也在增长。
Consequently, as our business grows, so does our float. And how we have grown, as the following table shows:
我们浮存金的增长情况如下表所示：
| Year | Float (in $ millions) |
|---|---|
| 1970 | $ 39 |
| 1980 | 237 |
| 1990 | 1,632 |
| 2000 | 27,871 |
| 2010 | 65,832 |
| 2013 | 77,240 |
Further gains in float will be tough to achieve. On the plus side, GEICO’s float will almost certainly grow. In National Indemnity’s reinsurance division, however, we have a number of run-off contracts whose float drifts downward. If we do experience a decline in float at some future time, it will be very gradual -- at the outside no more than 3% in any year. The nature of our insurance contracts is such that we can never be subject to immediate demands for sums that are large compared to our cash resources. (In this respect, property-casualty insurance differs in an important way from certain forms of life insurance.)
浮存金进一步增长越来越困难了。积极的一面是，GEICO的浮存金几乎确定会增长。我们国民保险的再保险业务有一些合同会流失，浮存金也将相应下降。即便未来我们出现浮存金的下降，那也会是非常轻微的——每年最多不会超过3%。相较于我们的流动性规模，我们保险合同的特性决定了，我们永远不会受制于任何短期的流动性需求压力。(在这方面，财险业务和某些形式的寿险业务有非常大的区别。寿险可能出现集中退保挤兑。)
If our premiums exceed the total of our expenses and eventual losses, we register an underwriting profit that adds to the investment income our float produces. When such a profit is earned, we enjoy the use of free money -- and, better yet, get paid for holding it.
如果我们的保费收入超过了承保费用和最终的赔付支出总和，我们会在利用浮存金投资获得的投资收益之外，还录得承保收益。赚到这种利润的时候，我们是在享受免费使用这些资金投资，更好的是，我们还因为持有资金而获得报酬。(就像去银行贷款，银行还倒贴给你利息)。
Unfortunately, the wish of all insurers to achieve this happy result creates intense competition, so vigorous in most years that it causes the P/C industry as a whole to operate at a significant underwriting loss. This loss, in effect, is what the industry pays to hold its float. For example, State Farm, by far the country’s largest insurer and a well-managed company besides, incurred an underwriting loss in nine of the twelve years ending in 2012 (the latest year for which their financials are available, as I write this). Competitive dynamics almost guarantee that the insurance industry -- despite the float income all companies enjoy -- will continue its dismal record of earning subnormal returns as compared to other businesses.
不幸的是，保险公司实现这个美好结果的强烈愿望导致了激烈的竞争，竞争如此惨烈以至于大多数年份，产险行业整体处在严重的承保亏损中。实质上承保亏损就是整个行业为了获得浮存金而支付的成本。比如，美国最大且管理良好的州立农业保险公司，截止到2012年前的12年里有9年都录得承保亏损(依据我写作本报告时所能获得的最新一年的财务数据)。尽管所有的保险公司都享受了浮存金的投资收益，但动态竞争几乎可以保证整个保险行业将继续保持其低于其他行业的惨淡回报水平。
As noted in the first section of this report, we have now operated at an underwriting profit for eleven consecutive years, our pre-tax gain for the period having totaled $22 billion. Looking ahead, I believe we will continue to underwrite profitably in most years. Doing so is the daily focus of all of our insurance managers who know that while float is valuable, it can be drowned by poor underwriting results.
正如前一部分提到的，我们已经连续11年录得承保盈利，在此期间我们的税前承保收益累计达220亿美元。展望未来，我们相信将在大多数年份继续保持承保盈利。这是我们所有保险经理人每日关注的焦点，他们明白浮存金的价值，但糟糕的承保亏损将会吞噬它的价值。
So how does our float affect intrinsic value? When Berkshire’s book value is calculated, the full amount of our float is deducted as a liability, just as if we had to pay it out tomorrow and could not replenish it. But to think of float as strictly a liability is incorrect; it should instead be viewed as a revolving fund. Daily, we pay old claims -- some $17 billion to more than five million claimants in 2013 -- and that reduces float. Just as surely, we each day write new business and thereby generate new claims that add to float. If our revolving float is both costless and long-enduring, which I believe it will be, the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability.
那么我们的浮存金是如何影响内在价值的呢？当伯克希尔计算账面价值的时候，所有的浮存金都作为负债被扣除了，就好像我们明天就要兑现债务，并且再也无法补充回来。但把浮存金当做一种严格意义上的负债是错误的，它实际上应该被看做一笔循环基金。2013年我们向索赔人支付超过500多万笔总计170亿美元，赔付每天都会减少浮存金。但可以肯定的是，我们每天都承接新保单从而增加浮存金。如果我们循环的浮存金是无成本并且是长期存在的，我相信对伯克希尔来说确实如此，那这项负债的真实价值就远远低于账面负债。
A counterpart to this overstated liability is $15.5 billion of “goodwill” that is attributable to our insurance companies and included in book value as an asset. In very large part, this goodwill represents the price we paid for the float-generating capabilities of our insurance operations. The cost of the goodwill, however, has no bearing on its true value. For example, if an insurance business sustains large and prolonged underwriting losses, any goodwill asset carried on the books should be deemed valueless, whatever its original cost.
在资产账面上与这一被夸大的负债相对应的是归属于我们保险公司的155亿"商誉"，很大程度上，这些商誉代表了我们为保险业务获取浮存金的能力所付出的代价。然而商誉的账面成本与其真实价值无关。比如说一家持续产生大额承保亏损的保险公司，其账面上的任何商誉资产都应该被视为零，无论其历史成本是多少。
Fortunately, that does not describe Berkshire. Charlie and I believe the true economic value of our insurance goodwill -- what we would happily pay to purchase an insurance operation possessing float of similar quality to that we have -- to be far in excess of its historic carrying value. The value of our float is one reason -- a huge reason -- why we believe Berkshire’s intrinsic business value substantially exceeds its book value.
幸运的是，伯克希尔的情况不是那样。查理和我相信，我们保险公司的真实商誉(我们愿意为购买一家能产生类似质量的浮存金的保险公司所支付的价格)，远超过账面上记录的历史成本。浮存金的价值是我们认为伯克希尔的内在价值明显超过账面价值的一个原因，也是一个重要原因。
Berkshire’s attractive insurance economics exist only because we have some terrific managers running disciplined operations that possess strong, hard-to-replicate business models. Let me tell you about the major units.
伯克希尔颇具吸引力的经济特性之所以存在，是因为我们有一群卓越的经理人，他们经营着我们承保纪律严明、拥有强大且难以复制的商业模式的保险业务。让我将给大家介绍一些主要的公司。
First by float size is the Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group, managed by Ajit Jain. Ajit insures risks that no one else has the desire or the capital to take on. His operation combines capacity, speed, decisiveness and, most important, brains in a manner unique in the insurance business. Yet he never exposes Berkshire to risks that are inappropriate in relation to our resources. Indeed, we are far more conservative in avoiding risk than most large insurers. For example, if the insurance industry should experience a $250 billion loss from some mega-catastrophe -- a loss about triple anything it has ever experienced -- Berkshire as a whole would likely record a significant profit for the year because of its many streams of earnings. And we would remain awash in cash, looking for large opportunities if the catastrophe caused markets to go into shock. All other major insurers and reinsurers would meanwhile be far in the red, with some facing insolvency.
首先，浮存金规模排在第一的是伯克希尔再保险集团，由阿吉特·贾因领导。阿吉特对其他人都不愿意承保，或者没有足够资本进行承保的风险进行承保。他的运营以独特的方式结合了能力、速度、果断，以及最重要的保险专业智慧于一身。然而他从未让伯克希尔暴露于与我们的资源不相称的风险之下。实际上，我们比多数大保险公司在规避风险方面都更加谨慎。举例来说，如果保险行业因某项巨灾遭遇了2500亿美元的亏损，这是历史上所发生过最大规模亏损的3倍，伯克希尔作为一个整体，当年依然能够实现盈利，因为它有如此多的利润来源。如果灾难导致市场动荡，我们仍将保持充沛现金，等待巨大的投资机会。与此同时，所有其他主要保险公司和再保险公司都将陷入亏损，有些甚至将面临破产。
From a standing start in 1985, Ajit has created an insurance business with float of $37 billion and a large cumulative underwriting profit, a feat no other insurance CEO has come close to matching. Ajit’s mind is an idea factory that is always looking for more lines of business he can add to his current assortment.
从1985年开始，阿吉特就创建了一家拥有370亿美元浮存金，实现巨额累计承保收益的再保险公司，这是一项任何其他保险公司的CEO都难以望其项背成就。阿吉特的大脑就是一个创意工厂，无时不刻搜寻着任何可以扩展他现有业务的机会。
One venture materialized last June when he formed Berkshire Hathaway Specialty Insurance (“BHSI”). This initiative took us into commercial insurance, where we were instantly accepted by both major insurance brokers and corporate risk managers throughout America. These professionals recognize that no other insurer can match the financial strength of Berkshire, which guarantees that legitimate claims arising many years in the future will be paid promptly and fully.
去年6月阿吉特组建了伯克希尔专业保险公司("BHSI")。这是我们首次进入商业保险领域，全国主要的保险经纪人和企业风险管理人都非常认可我们。这些专业人士明白，在财务稳健方面没有任何其他保险公司可与伯克希尔相比，这保证了它们未来多年的任何合法索赔都会得到及时全额的赔付。
BHSI is led by Peter Eastwood, an experienced underwriter who is widely respected in the insurance world. Peter has assembled a spectacular team that is already writing a substantial amount of business with many Fortune 500 companies and with smaller operations as well. BHSI will be a major asset for Berkshire, one that will generate volume in the billions within a few years. Give Peter a Berkshire greeting when you see him at the annual meeting.
BHSI由Peter Eastwood领导，他是一名经验丰富、广受尊敬的保险人。Peter组建的豪华团队已经为许多世界500强企业提供了大量承保，当然也包括规模较小的一些公司。BHSI将会成为伯克希尔的重要资产之一，几年内将贡献数十亿美元的保费收入。如果大家在年会上碰到Peter的话，向他致以伯克希尔式的问候。
We have another reinsurance powerhouse in General Re, managed by Tad Montross.
我们还有另外一家再保险巨头，由Tad Montross掌管的通用再保险。
At bottom, a sound insurance operation needs to adhere to four disciplines. It must (1) understand all exposures that might cause a policy to incur losses; (2) conservatively assess the likelihood of any exposure actually causing a loss and the probable cost if it does; (3) set a premium that, on average, will deliver a profit after both prospective loss costs and operating expenses are covered; and (4) be willing to walk away if the appropriate premium can’t be obtained.
从根本上说，一个健全的保险公司必须遵守四项承保原则。它必须(1)理解所有可能导致保单形成损失的风险敞口；(2)保守地衡量风险敞口实际形成损失的概率以及可能的损失规模；(3)设定合理的保费，平均来看，要能在覆盖潜在的赔付成本和运营成本后实现承保盈利；(4)在无法获得适当定价时愿意放弃承保。
Many insurers pass the first three tests and flunk the fourth. They simply can’t turn their back on business that is being eagerly written by their competitors. That old line, “The other guy is doing it, so we must as well,” spells trouble in any business, but in none more so than insurance.
很多保险公司顺利通过前三条，但在第四条上不及格。它们根本无法放弃它们竞争对手正在疯抢的的业务。"别人这么干，我也得这么干"，这句老话在很多行业都造成了麻烦，但这在保险行业造成的麻烦尤其多。
Tad has observed all four of the insurance commandments, and it shows in his results. General Re’s huge float has been better than cost-free under his leadership, and we expect that, on average, to continue. We are particularly enthusiastic about General Re’s international life reinsurance business, which has grown consistently and profitably since we acquired the company in 1998.
Tad遵守了所有的四条保险戒律，这在他的业绩中得到了体现。在他的领导下，通用再保险的巨额浮存金比免费的资金还要诱人，并且我们预计，平均而言这种情况将继续下去。我们尤其对通用再保险的国际人寿再保险业务充满热情，自1998年我们收购通用再保险公司以来，这项业务持续增长并不断盈利。
It can be remembered that soon after we purchased General Re, the company was beset by problems that caused commentators -- and me as well, briefly -- to believe I had made a huge mistake. That day is long gone. General Re is now a gem.
当初我们买下通用再保险时，公司问题缠身，许多评论员(包括我在内)短暂的认为我犯了一个巨大的错误。不过那一天早就过去很久了。现在，通用再保险是一块宝石。
Finally, there is GEICO, the insurer on which I cut my teeth 63 years ago. GEICO is managed by Tony Nicely, who joined the company at 18 and completed 52 years of service in 2013. Tony became CEO in 1993, and since then the company has been flying.
最后还有GEICO保险，63年前我就是从这家保险公司开始入行的。GEICO由托尼·莱斯利掌管，他18岁就加入了公司，到2013年，已经服役52年。1993年Tony当上了CEO，公司从那一刻开始起飞。
When I was first introduced to GEICO in January 1951, I was blown away by the huge cost advantage the company enjoyed compared to the expenses borne by the giants of the industry. That operational efficiency continues today and is an all-important asset. No one likes to buy auto insurance. But almost everyone likes to drive. The insurance needed is a major expenditure for most families. Savings matter to them -- and only a low-cost operation can deliver these.
1951年1月我第一次接触到GEICO时，就被其相对于业界巨头所享有的无与伦比的成本优势所震撼。这项优势至今依旧保持，并且是公司最最重要的资产。没人喜欢买车险。但几乎人人都喜欢开车。必不可少的车险成了大多数家庭的主要开支。便宜对他们来说非常重要，而只有低成本的保险公司能为他们提供这样的车险。
GEICO’s cost advantage is the factor that has enabled the company to gobble up market share year after year. Its low costs create a moat -- an enduring one -- that competitors are unable to cross. Meanwhile, our little gecko continues to tell Americans how GEICO can save them important money. With our latest reduction in operating costs, his story has become even more compelling.
GEICO的成本优势是其市场份额年年上升的原因。它的低成本优势是其它竞争对手难以逾越的、持久的护城河。我们的小蜥蜴一直在宣传GEICO如何为大家省钱。最近公司进行了新一轮的运营成本削减，它的传说还将继续引人注目。
In 1995, we purchased the half of GEICO that we didn’t already own, paying $1.4 billion more than the net tangible assets we acquired. That’s “goodwill,” and it will forever remain unchanged on our books. As GEICO’s business grows, however, so does its true economic goodwill. I believe that figure to be approaching $20 billion.
1995年，我们买下GEICO剩余的一半尚未拥有的股份时，比我们收购的净有形资产多花了14亿美元。这被记作"商誉"，并且在财报上的数值一直不变。但是随着GEICO的业务增长，其真实的经济商誉也在不断增长。我认为这个数值现在接近200亿。
In addition to our three major insurance operations, we own a group of smaller companies, most of them plying their trade in odd corners of the insurance world. In aggregate, these companies are a growing operation that consistently delivers an underwriting profit. Moreover, as the table below shows, they also provide us with substantial float. Charlie and I treasure these companies and their managers.
除了我们的三大保险业务外，我们还有一些规模较小的保险公司，它们的大部分专注于保险行业的一些细分领域。整体上，这些公司是一个不断增长的业务，并一直为我们贡献承保收益。另外，如下表所示，它们也为我们提供了大量浮存金。查理和我非常珍视这些公司和经理人。
| Insurance Operations | Underwriting Profit 2013 (in millions) | Underwriting Profit 2012 (in millions) | Yearend Float 2013 (in millions) | Yearend Float 2012 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BH Reinsurance | $ 1,294 | $ 304 | $ 37,231 | $ 34,821 |
| General Re | 283 | 355 | 20,013 | 20,128 |
| GEICO | 1,127 | 680 | 12,566 | 11,578 |
| Other Primary | 385 | 286 | 7,430 | 6,598 |
| $ 3,089 | $ 1,625 | $ 77,240 | $ 73,125 |
Simply put, insurance is the sale of promises. The “customer” pays money now; the insurer promises to pay money in the future if certain events occur.
简单的说，保险出售的是对未来的承诺。"客户"现在付钱，保险公司承诺未来某些事件发生时付款。
Sometimes, the promise will not be tested for decades. (Think of life insurance bought by those in their 20s.) Therefore, both the ability and willingness of the insurer to pay -- even if economic chaos prevails when payment time arrives -- is all-important.
有时，这一承诺需要几十年才会得到检验。(想想那些20来岁时买的寿险。)因此，保险公司的支付赔付的能力和意愿就至关重要，即使在支付赔款时刚好赶上经济危机。
Berkshire’s promises have no equal, a fact affirmed in recent years by the actions of the world’s largest and most sophisticated insurers, some of which have wanted to shed themselves of huge and exceptionally long-lived liabilities, particularly those involving asbestos claims. That is, these insurers wished to “cede” their liabilities to a reinsurer. Choosing the wrong reinsurer, however -- one that down the road proved to be financially strapped or a bad actor -- would put the original insurer in danger of getting the liabilities right back in its lap.
伯克希尔的信誉是无与伦比的，最近几年的事实更加证明了一点，一些全球最大、最富经验的保险公司正在试图摆脱它们巨额其长期的赔付责任，尤其涉及到石棉索赔的保单。它们希望将这些负债转移给再保险公司。但是如果选择了错误的再保险公司，也就是那些将会陷入财务困境或者运营不良的再保险公司，对原保险公司来说意味着将面临重新承担赔付责任的风险。
Almost without exception, the largest insurers seeking aid came to Berkshire. Indeed, in the largest such transaction ever recorded, Lloyd’s in 2007 turned over to us both many thousands of known claims arising from policies written before 1993 and an unknown but huge number of claims from that same period sure to materialize in the future. (Yes, we will be receiving claims decades from now that apply to events taking place prior to 1993.)
无一例外，所有寻求帮助的最大保险公司都会联系伯克希尔。实际上，2007年Lloyd's将数千笔1993年前投保的已知索赔以及同一时期未知但数量巨大的索赔(这些索赔必定会出现)的保单出售给了我们，这是一笔创纪录的交易。(是的，我们将会收到适用于1993年之前发生的事件的索赔。)
Berkshire’s ultimate payments arising from the Lloyd’s transaction are today unknowable. What is certain, however, is that Berkshire will pay all valid claims up to the $15 billion limit of our policy. No other insurer’s promise would have given Lloyd’s the comfort provided by its agreement with Berkshire. The CEO of the entity then handling Lloyd’s claims said it best: “Names [the original insurers at Lloyd’s] wanted to sleep easy at night, and we think we’ve just bought them the world’s best mattress.”
伯克希尔因Lloyd's的交易最终的赔付规模今天还不得而知。但是可以确定的是，伯克希尔一定会赔付上限为150亿内的一切有效索赔。没有任何其他保险公司的承诺能给予Lloyd's伯克希尔所提供的安心。当时负责处理Lloyd's保单索赔的公司CEO说得好："这些人(Lloyd's的原承保人)希望晚上能睡个安稳觉，我们想我们已经给他送去了世界上最好的床垫。"
Berkshire’s great managers, premier financial strength and a variety of business models possessing wide moats form something unique in the insurance world. The combination is a huge asset for Berkshire shareholders that will only get more valuable with time.
伯克希尔优秀的经理人团队，卓越的财务实力，以及多元化的保险业务线，构成了它在保险行业独一无二的宽阔护城河。这样的组合是伯克希尔股东们的巨大财富，并且随着时间推移，它会变得越来越有价值。
“Though there are many regulatory restraints in the utility industry, it’s possible that we will make additional commitments in the field. If we do, the amounts involved could be large.”
-- 1999 Annual Report
1999年年报："虽然公用事业存在许多监管限制，但我们还是有机会在这一领域做出更多投资。一旦我们决定投资，一定是大手笔。"
We have two major operations, BNSF and MidAmerican Energy, that share important characteristics distinguishing them from our other businesses. Consequently, we assign them their own section in this letter and split out their combined financial statistics in our GAAP balance sheet and income statement.
这一板块有两家公司：BNSF铁路公司和中美能源，它们有一些重要共同特点区别于我们其他的公司。所以，我们在这里把它们单独归为一类进行讨论，并在GAAP合并资产负债表和利润表中单独列示。
A key characteristic of both companies is their huge investment in very long-lived, regulated assets, with these partially funded by large amounts of long-term debt that is not guaranteed by Berkshire. Our credit is in fact not needed because each company has earning power that even under terrible economic conditions will far exceed its interest requirements. Last year, for example, BNSF’s interest coverage was 9:1. (Our definition of coverage is pre-tax earnings/interest, not EBITDA/interest, a commonly-used measure we view as seriously flawed.)
两家公司的一个重要特征是，它们对长期受监管的资产进行了巨额投资，这些资产部分资金来自伯克希尔不提供担保的大额长期债务。它们实际上并不需要我们的信用支持，因为它们具备良好的盈利能力，即使在恶劣的经济环境下也能覆盖它们的债务利息要求。比如去年BNSF的利息覆盖倍数是9:1。(我们对覆盖倍数的定义是税前收入/利息，而不是EBITDA/利息，我们认为这个被普遍使用的指标存在严重的缺陷。)
At MidAmerican, meanwhile, two factors ensure the company’s ability to service its debt under all circumstances. The first is common to all utilities: recession-resistant earnings, which result from these companies exclusively offering an essential service. The second is enjoyed by few other utilities: a great diversity of earnings streams, which shield us from being seriously harmed by any single regulatory body. Now, with the acquisition of NV Energy, MidAmerican’s earnings base has further broadened. This particular strength, supplemented by Berkshire’s ownership, has enabled MidAmerican and its utility subsidiaries to significantly lower their cost of debt. This advantage benefits both us and our customers.
与此同时，在中美能源有两个因素确保它在各种情形下都具有偿还债务的能力。第一个因素是所有公用事业企业共有的：抗周期的盈利能力，这源于公司垄断地提供社会必需的基本服务。第二个因素是少数公用事业公司享有的：多元化的利润来源，这保护我们免受任一地区监管机构的伤害。现在，随着收购NVEnergy，中美能源的利润来源进一步扩大了。这在特殊的优势加上伯克希尔的股东背景，中美能源和它的分支机构可以以显著的降低债务成本。这种优势使我们和我们的客户都受益。
Every day, our two subsidiaries power the American economy in major ways:
每天，我们的两家子公司都在主要领域驱动着美国的经济：
-
BNSF carries about 15% (measured by ton-miles) of all inter-city freight, whether it is transported by truck, rail, water, air, or pipeline. Indeed, we move more ton-miles of goods than anyone else, a fact establishing BNSF as the most important artery in our economy’s circulatory system. Its hold on the number-one position strengthened in 2013.
BNSF承担了全国城际间货运量的15%(以吨英里衡量)，包括公路、铁路、水路、航空以及管道运输。事实上，BNSF的货运量超过其他任何公司，这个事实意味着BNSF是全国经济循环系统最重要的大动脉。2013年它的龙头地位得到了加强。
BNSF, like all railroads, also moves its cargo in an extraordinarily fuel-efficient and environmentally friendly way, carrying a ton of freight about 500 miles on a single gallon of diesel fuel. Trucks taking on the same job guzzle about four times as much fuel.
和其他铁路公司一样，BNSF还以一种非常节能和环保的方式在运输着货物，它运输一吨货物500英里只需一加仑柴油。卡车实现同样的运力大约要使用4倍的能源。
-
MidAmerican’s utilities serve regulated retail customers in eleven states. No utility company stretches further. In addition, we are the leader in renewables: From a standing start nine years ago, MidAmerican now accounts for 7% of the country’s wind generation capacity, with more on the way. Our share in solar -- most of which is still in construction -- is even larger.
中美能源受监管的电力设施为11个州的零售客户服务。没有任何公用事业公司服务范围比我们更广。另外，我们是可再生能源领域的领导者：从9年前开始，中美能源现在已经占全国风力发电量的7%，未来还会更多。我们在太阳能发电领域上的份额甚至更高(虽然大部分还在建设当中)。
MidAmerican can make these investments because it retains all of its earnings. Here’s a little known fact: Last year MidAmerican retained more dollars of earnings -- by far -- than any other American electric utility. We and our regulators see this as an important advantage -- one almost certain to exist five, ten and twenty years from now.
中美能源之所以能进行上述投资是因为它保留了所有利润。事实上：迄今为止中美能源累计留存的利润超过美国任何其他电力公司。我们和监管部门都把这看作一项重要的优势，可以确定的是，这一优势还会持续5年、10年、20年。
When our current projects are completed, MidAmerican’s renewables portfolio will have cost $15 billion. We relish making such commitments as long as they promise reasonable returns. And, on that front, we put a large amount of trust in future regulation.
等我们的在建项目完工后，中美能源的可再生能源投资将达到150亿。只要监管承诺这些投资合理的回报，我们就乐于做出这样的投资。在这方面，我们对未来的监管抱有极大的信任。
Our confidence is justified both by our past experience and by the knowledge that society will forever need massive investments in both transportation and energy. It is in the self-interest of governments to treat capital providers in a manner that will ensure the continued flow of funds to essential projects. It is meanwhile in our self-interest to conduct our operations in a way that earns the approval of our regulators and the people they represent.
我们的信心来源于过往的经验，也来源于社会在交通和能源方面会一直需要大量投资的认识。政府为了自身利益将会合理对待资本提供者，以保证有持续的资金来满足必须的公共项目。同时，获取监管机构及其代表的人民的认可和批准的方式开展业务，也符合我们自身的利益。
Tangible proof of our dedication to that duty was delivered last year in a poll of customer satisfaction covering 52 holding companies and their 101 operating electric utilities. Our MidAmerican group ranked number one, with 95.3% of respondents giving us a “very satisfied” vote and not a single customer rating us “dissatisfied.” The bottom score in the survey, incidentally, was a dismal 34.5%.
去年一份涵盖52家控股公司及其101家电力运营公司的客户满意度调查结果，是我们投资于未来这一决心的有力证明。我们的中美能源排名第一，95.3%的被调查者表示"非常满意"，并且没有一个被调查者表示"不满意"。顺便说一句，调查中的最低分仅有34.5%的满意度。
All three of our companies were ranked far lower by this measure before they were acquired by MidAmerican. The extraordinary customer satisfaction we have achieved is of great importance as we expand: Regulators in states we hope to enter are glad to see us, knowing we will be responsible operators.
在被中美能源收购以前，我们有三家公司调查排名远低于现在。优异的消费者满意度在我们扩张的时候发挥着重要作用：我们希望进入地区的监管部门愿意看到我们的到来，因为他们知道我们是负责任的公司。
Our railroad has been diligent as well in anticipating the needs of its customers. Whatever you may have heard about our country’s crumbling infrastructure in no way applies to BNSF or railroads generally. America’s rail system has never been in better shape, a consequence of huge investments by the industry. We are not, however, resting: BNSF spent $4 billion on the railroad in 2013, double its depreciation charge and a single-year record for any railroad. And, we will spend considerably more in 2014. Like Noah, who foresaw early on the need for dependable transportation, we know it’s our job to plan ahead.
我们的铁路公司也在努力预测客户需求增长。你听说的任何关于我们国家基础设施建设落后的怨言，都不适用于BNSF和铁路行业。美国的铁路系统从未有过今天这样良好的状态，这是行业巨额投资的成果。当然我们也没闲着：2013年BHSF在铁路上投资了40亿美元，是折旧额的两倍多，创下任一铁路的最高单年投资记录。而且，我们将在2014年投入更多。就像很早预见到可靠交通需求的诺亚一样，我们明白必须未雨绸缪。
Leading our two capital-intensive companies are Greg Abel, at MidAmerican, and the team of Matt Rose and Carl Ice at BNSF. The three are extraordinary managers who have my gratitude and deserve yours as well. Here are the key figures for their businesses:
领导我们两家资本密集型公司的是中美能源的Greg Abel，还有BNSF的Matt Rose和Carl Ice团队。他们三人都是卓越的经理人，应该受到我和大家的感谢。下表是他们业务的关键数据：
| MidAmerican (89.8% owned) | Earnings 2013 (in millions) | Earnings 2012 (in millions) | Earnings 2011 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| U.K. utilities | $ 362 | $ 429 | $ 469 |
| Iowa utility | 230 | 236 | 279 |
| Western utilities | 982 | 737 | 771 |
| Pipelines | 385 | 383 | 388 |
| HomeServices | 139 | 82 | 39 |
| Other (net) | 4 | 91 | 36 |
| Operating earnings before corporate interest and taxes | 2,102 | 1,958 | 1,982 |
| Interest | 296 | 314 | 336 |
| Income taxes | 170 | 172 | 315 |
| Net earnings | $ 1,636 | $ 1,472 | $ 1,331 |
| Earnings applicable to Berkshire | $ 1,470 | $ 1,323 | $ 1,204 |
| BNSF | Earnings 2013 (in millions) | Earnings 2012 (in millions) | Earnings 2011 (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 22,014 | $ 20,835 | $ 19,548 |
| Operating expenses | 15,357 | 14,835 | 14,247 |
| Operating earnings before interest and taxes | 6,657 | 6,000 | 5,301 |
| Interest (net) | 729 | 623 | 560 |
| Income taxes | 2,135 | 2,005 | 1,769 |
| Net earnings | $ 3,793 | $ 3,372 | $ 2,972 |
Ron Peltier continues to build HomeServices, MidAmerican’s real estate brokerage subsidiary. Last year his operation made four acquisitions, the most significant being Fox & Roach, a Philadelphia-based company that is the largest single-market realtor in the country.
RonPeltire在继续打造家庭服务公司(HomeServices)，它是中美能源的房地产经纪业务子公司。去年他进行了四次收购，最主要的是对Fox&Roach的收购，一家总部位于费城、全国最大的地区性经纪公司。
HomeServices now has 22,114 agents (listed by geography on page 112), up 38% from 2012. HomeServices also owns 67% of the Prudential and Real Living franchise operations, which are in the process of rebranding their franchisees as Berkshire Hathaway HomeServices. If you haven’t yet, many of you will soon be seeing our name on “for sale” signs.
住宅服务公司现在有22,114名经纪人，比2012年增加38%。它还拥有Prudential&Real Living公司67%的特许经营权业务，它正在更名为伯克希尔住宅服务公司。大家很快就会在"待售"的房产广告上看到我们的名字。
“See that store,” Warren says, pointing at Nebraska Furniture Mart. “That’s a really good business.”
"看看那间商场"，沃伦指着内布拉斯加家具商场(NFM)说，"那真是一个非常好的生意。"
“Why don’t you buy it?” I said.
"那你为什么不买下它？"我说。
“It’s privately held,” Warren said.
“Oh,” I said.
“I might buy it anyway,” Warren said. “Someday.”
"它是家私人企业，不管怎样我一定会买下它的。"沃伦说。
-- Supermoney by Adam Smith (1972)
《超级金钱》(Supermoney1972)，作者Adam Smith(此时巴菲特手中的资本还不足以买下NFM，奋力攒钱中)
Our activities in this part of Berkshire cover the waterfront. Let’s look, though, at a summary balance sheet and earnings statement for the entire group.
我们在这部分的业务种类繁多。让我们来看看整个集团的的资产负债表和利润表关键数据。
Balance Sheet 12/31/13 (in millions)
| Assets | Items | Liabilities and Equity | Items |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents | $ 6,625 | Notes payable | $ 1,615 |
| Accounts and notes receivable | 7,749 | Other current liabilities | 8,965 |
| Inventory | 9,945 | Total current liabilities | 10,580 |
| Other current assets | 716 | ||
| Total current assets | 25,035 | ||
| Deferred taxes | 5,184 | ||
| Goodwill and other intangibles | 25,617 | Term debt and other liabilities | 4,405 |
| Fixed assets | 19,389 | Non-controlling interests | 456 |
| Other assets | 4,274 | Berkshire equity | 53,690 |
| $ 74,315 | $ 74,315 |
Earnings Statement (in millions)
| 2013 | 2012 | 2011 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenues | $ 95,291 | $ 83,255 | $ 72,406 |
| Operating expenses | 88,414 | 76,978 | 67,339 |
| Interest expense | 135 | 146 | 130 |
| Pre-tax earnings | 6,742 | 6,131 | 5,037 |
| Income taxes and non-controlling interests | 2,512 | 2,432 | 1,998 |
| Net earnings | $ 4,230 | $ 3,699 | $ 3,039 |
Our income and expense data conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) is on page 29. In contrast, the operating expense figures above are non-GAAP and exclude some purchase-accounting items (primarily the amortization of certain intangible assets). We present the data in this manner because Charlie and I believe the adjusted numbers more accurately reflect the true economic expenses and profits of the businesses aggregated in the table than do GAAP figures.
符合GAAP准则的收入和支出数据列示在29页。上表中的运营成本剔除了一些购买法会计调整项目(主要是某些无形资产的摊销)，这是不符合GAAP准则的。我们列示这些数据是因为查理和我认为调整后的数字比GAAP下显示的数字更准确地反映了整块业务真实的成本和利润。
I won’t explain all of the adjustments -- some are tiny and arcane -- but serious investors should understand the disparate nature of intangible assets: Some truly deplete over time while others in no way lose value. With software, for example, amortization charges are very real expenses. Charges against other intangibles such as the amortization of customer relationships, however, arise through purchase-accounting rules and are clearly not real costs. GAAP accounting draws no distinction between the two types of charges. Both, that is, are recorded as expenses when earnings are calculated -- even though from an investor’s viewpoint they could not be more different.
我不打算逐一解释所有的调整(有些是细微并且晦涩的)，但是认真的投资者必须要理解无形资产的本质区别：有些无形资产的价值随时间消耗殆尽，而另一些则不会贬值。比如说软件，其摊销费用是真实的成本支出。但对于某些无形资产，例如对客户关系，购买法会计下的摊销则显然不是真实的成本。GAAP会计准则并不对这两者进行区分。尽管从投资者的角度看，它们完全不同，但在会计上计算利润是它们都会被记作成本。
In the GAAP-compliant figures we show on page 29, amortization charges of $648 million for the companies included in this section are deducted as expenses. We would call about 20% of these “real,” the rest not. This difference has become significant because of the many acquisitions we have made. It will almost certainly rise further as we acquire more companies.
在29页列示的GAAP会计准则的数据下，该部门6.48亿美元的摊销费用被计入了成本。我们大致认为其中的20%是"真实"的(这也是我们上面的表格包括的部分)，其他的则不是。这种差别因为我们做了非常多的收购而变得影响巨大。未来随着我们收购更多的公司，这样的差别还会越来越大。
Eventually, of course, the non-real charges disappear when the assets to which they’re related become fully amortized. But this usually takes 15 years and -- alas -- it will be my successor whose reported earnings get the benefit of their expiration.
当然，最终对应的资产完全被摊销完之后，相应的非真实的成本也就没有了。但这通常需要15年，到时我的接班人才能享受到摊销完之后报表上增加的利润了。
Every dime of depreciation expense we report, however, is a real cost. And that’s true at almost all other companies as well. When Wall Streeters tout EBITDA as a valuation guide, button your wallet.
但是，我们报告的每一分钱折旧，都是真正的成本支出。对其他任何公司来说也是这样。当华尔街人士用EBITDA作为估值指标时，要捂紧你的钱包。
Our public reports of earnings will, of course, continue to conform to GAAP. To embrace reality, however, remember to add back most of the amortization charges we report.
当然我们公开的财报依然会遵循GAAP会计准则。但是为了认清现实，请记得把我们报告的大部分摊销费用加回来。
The crowd of companies in this section sells products ranging from lollipops to jet airplanes. Some of these businesses, measured by earnings on unleveraged net tangible assets, enjoy terrific economics, producing profits that run from 25% after-tax to far more than 100%. Others generate good returns in the area of 12% to 20%. A few, however, have very poor returns, a result of some serious mistakes I made in my job of capital allocation. I was not misled: I simply was wrong in my evaluation of the economic dynamics of the company or the industry in which it operated.
这个板块的公司销售的产品从棒棒糖到喷气式飞机，无所不包。其中有些公司有非常好的经济特性，它们无杠杆的净有形资产税后回报率从25%到100%多。其他一些公司的回报率介于12-20%。但也有少数公司回报率很糟糕，这是我在资产配置上所犯下的一些严重错误。我并没有受到误导：我只是错误地估计了公司或者其所在行业的经济形势。
Fortunately, my blunders usually involved relatively small acquisitions. Our large buys have generally worked out well and, in a few cases, more than well. I have not, however, made my last mistake in purchasing either businesses or stocks. Not everything works out as planned.
幸运的是我犯得错误一般是些小型的收购。我们的大型收购总体都运营良好，少数甚至是非常好。但以上不会是我犯得最后一个错误。并非事事都如我所料。
Viewed as a single entity, the companies in this group are an excellent business. They employed an average of $25 billion of net tangible assets during 2013 and, with large quantities of excess cash and little leverage, earned 16.7% after-tax on that capital.
把整个板块看作一个公司的话，这家公司业务非常优秀。2013年它们平均使用了250亿的净有形资产，由于大量的现金和极低的杠杆，实现了16.7%的税后收益率。
Of course, a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if the purchase price is excessive. We have paid substantial premiums to net tangible assets for most of our businesses, a cost that is reflected in the large figure we show for goodwill. Overall, however, we are getting a decent return on the capital we have deployed in this sector. Furthermore, the intrinsic value of these businesses, in aggregate, exceeds their carrying value by a good margin. Even so, the difference between intrinsic value and carrying value in the insurance and regulated-industry segments is far greater. It is there that the truly big winners reside.
当然，如果收购价过高，买入一些经济特性优秀的公司也可能成为一笔糟糕的投资。我们为大多数业务的净有形资产都支付了大量溢价，这些成本反映在财报巨额的商誉资产中。不过总体来说，我们收获了与投资额相称的可观回报。此外，总的来说这些业务的内在价值远超其账面价值。即便如此，在保险行业和受管制的行业，其内在价值和账面价值之间的差距更加巨大。那里才是真正的大赢家所在之处。
We have far too many companies in this group to comment on them individually. Moreover, both current and potential competitors read this report. In a few of our businesses we might be disadvantaged if they knew our numbers. So, in some of our operations that are not of a size material to an evaluation of Berkshire, we only disclose what is required. You can find a good bit of detail about many of our operations, however, on pages 80-84.
这个集团的公司太多，我们不能一一道来。而且它们现有和潜在的竞争对手都能看到这份报告。公开某些公司的数据将会对它们不利。所以，对伯克希尔来说，规模不是非常大的公司我们仅按要求披露信息。不过，你可以在后文找到更多详细内容。
I can’t resist, however, giving you an update on Nebraska Furniture Mart’s expansion into Texas. I’m not covering this event because of its economic importance to Berkshire -- it takes more than a new store to move the needle on Berkshire’s $225 billion equity base. But I’ve now worked 30 years with the marvelous Blumkin family, and I’m excited about the remarkable store -- truly Texas-sized -- it is building at The Colony, in the northern part of the Dallas metropolitan area.
我还是忍不住要向大家汇报一下内布拉斯加家具商场在德克萨斯扩张的最新进展。我把它拿出来说，并不是因为它对伯克希尔的业绩有什么重要性，毕竟要推动伯克希尔2250亿的资产规模，这一家店微不足道。但我现在已经和Blumkin家族合作30多年了，我为这家位于达拉斯市北Colony区的新店而兴奋，这是一家真正覆盖德克萨斯州的商场。
When the store is completed next year, NFM will have -- under one roof, and on a 433-acre site -- 1.8 million square feet of retail and supporting warehouse space. View the project’s progress at http://www.nfm.com/texas. NFM already owns the two highest-volume home furnishings stores in the country (in Omaha and Kansas City, Kansas), each doing about $450 million annually. I predict the Texas store will blow these records away. If you live anywhere near Dallas, come check us out.
明年商城建成以后，NFM将会在433英亩的地面上拥有180万平方英尺的零售和仓储空间。可以在www.nfm.com/texas查询项目的进展情况。NFM已经拥有全国销售额最大的两家店铺了(分别位于奥马哈和堪萨斯市)，两家的年销售额分别达到4.5亿左右。我预计德克萨斯的新店将会刷新上述纪录。如果大家住在达拉斯附近，欢迎大家来看看。
I think back to August 30, 1983 -- my birthday -- when I went to see Mrs. B (Rose Blumkin), carrying a 1.25-page purchase proposal for NFM that I had drafted. (It’s reproduced on pages 114 - 115.) Mrs. B accepted my offer without changing a word, and we completed the deal without the involvement of investment bankers or lawyers (an experience that can only be described as heavenly). Though the company’s financial statements were unaudited, I had no worries. Mrs. B simply told me what was what, and her word was good enough for me.
回想起1983年8月30日，那天刚好是我的生日，我拿着自己起草的1页多点的收购提案去见B夫人(Rose Blumkin)。B夫人在没有改动一个字，在没有投资银行家和律师在场的情况下接受我的收购协议(这是专业人士觉得在天堂才会发生的事)。虽然公司的财务报告并没有经过审计，我也毫不担心。B夫人简单告诉我实际情况，她的话对我来说足够好了。
Mrs. B was 89 at the time and worked until 103 -- definitely my kind of woman. Take a look at NFM’s financial statements from 1946 on pages 116 - 117. Everything NFM now owns comes from (a) that $72,264 of net worth and $50 – no zeros omitted -- of cash the company then possessed, and (b) the incredible talents of Mrs. B, her son, Louie, and his sons Ron and Irv.
那时候B夫人89岁了，后来一直工作到103，这绝对是我们风格的女强人。大家看一看后文附上的NFM在1946年的财报。NFM现在所有的一切都从当初72,264美元净资产、50美元的现金，以及B夫人、她的儿子Louie、孙子Ron和Irv难以置信的天才衍化而来。
The punch line to this story is that Mrs. B never spent a day in school. Moreover, she emigrated from Russia to America knowing not a word of English. But she loved her adopted country: At Mrs. B’s request, the family always sang God Bless America at its gatherings.
故事里最妙的地方是，B夫人从来没上过学。而且她从俄国移民到美国时甚至连英文都不会说。但是她热爱这个接纳它的国家：家庭聚会时他们经常应B夫人的要求合唱上帝保佑美国。
Aspiring business managers should look hard at the plain, but rare, attributes that produced Mrs. B’s incredible success. Students from 40 universities visit me every year, and I have them start the day with a visit to NFM. If they absorb Mrs. B’s lessons, they need none from me.
有抱负的企业经理人应该好好学习让B夫人成功的那些朴素却稀有的品质。每年都有超过40所大学的学生们来拜访我，我以带领他们参观FM作为开场。如果他们吸收了B夫人的经验，他们不需要向我学任何东西。
“Clayton’s loan portfolio will likely grow to at least $5 billion in not too many years and, with sensible credit standards in place, should deliver significant earnings.”
-- 2003 Annual Report
2003年年报："Clayton的贷款组合几年内将增长到50亿美元，如果信贷标准合理，将会带来可观利润。"
This sector, our smallest, includes two rental companies, XTRA (trailers) and CORT (furniture), as well as Clayton Homes, the country’s leading producer and financer of manufactured homes. Aside from these 100%-owned subsidiaries, we also include in this category a collection of financial assets and our 50% interest in Berkadia Commercial Mortgage.
这是我们最小的业务板块，包括两家租赁公司，XTRA(拖车租赁)和CORT(家具租赁)，以及ClaytonHome，国内领先的预制房生产商和金融租赁商。除了这些100%拥有的子公司外，我们还有其他一些金融资产以及Berkadia商业抵押贷款公司50%的权益。
Clayton is placed in this section because it owns and services 326,569 mortgages, totaling $13.6 billion. In recent years, as manufactured home sales plummeted, a high percentage of Clayton’s earnings came from this mortgage business.
Clayton之所以被归入这个版块，是因为它有326,569笔抵押贷款，合计136亿美元。近几年，由于预制房销量的下跌，公司大部分的盈利都来自于抵押贷款业务。
In 2013, however, the sale of new homes began to pick up and earnings from both manufacturing and retailing are again becoming significant. Clayton remains America’s number one homebuilder: Its 2013 output of 29,547 homes accounted for about 4.7% of all single-family residences built in the country. Kevin Clayton, Clayton’s CEO, has done a magnificent job of guiding the company through the severe housing depression. Now, his job -- definitely more fun these days -- includes the prospect of another earnings gain in 2014.
但是2013年，新房的销售开始回升，制造和零售部分的利润再次变得可观。Clayton依然是美国最大的房屋建筑商：2013年它建造了29,457套房屋，占全国新建住宅总数的4.7%。公司的CEO-Kevin Clayton成功领导公司度过了房地产市场的严重衰退。现在他的工作一定比之前有趣多了，预计2014年的前景将实现盈利增长。
CORT and XTRA are leaders in their industries as well. And Jeff Pederson and Bill Franz will keep them on top. We are backing their plans through purchases of equipment that enlarge their rental potential.
CORT和XTRA也是各自行业中的佼佼者。Jeff Pederson和Bill Franz依然会保持它们的领先地位。我们支持他们购置设备扩大租赁规模的计划。
Here’s the pre-tax earnings recap for this sector:
下面是这个板块的税前收益(不包括资本损益)：
| 2013 (in millions) | 2012 (in millions) | 2011 (in millions) | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Berkadia | $ 80 | $ 35 | $ 25 |
| Clayton | 416 | 255 | 154 |
| CORT | 40 | 42 | 29 |
| XTRA | 125 | 106 | 126 |
| Net financial income* | 324 | 410 | 440 |
| $ 985 | $ 848 | $ 774 |
*Excludes capital gains or losses
“Our stock portfolio... was worth approximately $17 million less than its carrying value [cost]...it is our belief that, over a period of years, the overall portfolio will prove to be worth more than its cost.”
-- 1974 Annual Report
1974年年报："我们的股票投资组合……大约比账面价值(投资成本)要低1700万美元……但我们相信，几年以后，整个组合的价值将会远超投资成本。"
Below we list our fifteen common stock investments that at yearend had the largest market value.
下面列出了我们年末市值最大的15项普通股投资：
| Shares** | Company | 12/31/13 Percentage of Company Owned (in millions) | 12/31/13 Cost (in millions)* | 12/31/13 Market (in millions) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 151,610,700 | American Express Company | 14.2 | $ 1,287 | $ 13,756 |
| 400,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company | 9.1 | 1,299 | 16,524 |
| 22,238,900 | DIRECTV | 4.2 | 1,017 | 1,536 |
| 41,129,643 | Exxon Mobil Corp | 0.9 | 3,737 | 4,162 |
| 13,062,594 | The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc | 2.8 | 750 | 2,315 |
| 68,121,984 | International Business Machines Corp | 6.3 | 11,681 | 12,778 |
| 24,669,778 | Moody’s Corporation | 11.5 | 248 | 1,936 |
| 20,060,390 | Munich Re | 11.2 | 2,990 | 4,415 |
| 20,668,118 | Phillips 66 | 3.4 | 660 | 1,594 |
| 52,477,678 | The Procter & Gamble Company | 1.9 | 336 | 4,272 |
| 22,169,930 | Sanofi | 1.7 | 1,747 | 2,354 |
| 301,046,076 | Tesco plc | 3.7 | 1,699 | 1,666 |
| 96,117,069 | U.S. Bancorp | 5.3 | 3,002 | 3,883 |
| 56,805,984 | Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. | 1.8 | 2,976 | 4,470 |
| 483,470,853 | Wells Fargo & Company | 9.2 | 11,871 | 21,950 |
| Others | 11,281 | 19,894 | ||
| Total Common Stocks Carried at Market | $ 56,581 | $ 117,505 |
* This is our actual purchase price and also our tax basis; GAAP “cost” differs in a few cases because of write-ups or write-downs that have been required under its rules.
** Excludes shares held by Berkshire subsidiary pension funds.
Berkshire has one major equity position that is not included in the table: We can buy 700 million shares of Bank of America at any time prior to September 2021 for $5 billion. At yearend these shares were worth $10.9 billion. We are likely to purchase the shares just before expiration of our option. In the meantime, it is important for you to realize that Bank of America is, in effect, our fifth largest equity investment and one we value highly.
伯克希尔有一项重要的股票投资没有列在表上：在2021年9月前的任何时候，我们都可以以50亿美元的价格购买美国银行7亿股股票。截至年底，这些股票价值109亿。我们倾向于在购买权到期前行权购买。大家应该了解，实际上美国银行是我们的第五大股票投资，并且我们非常看好。
In addition to our equity holdings, we also invest substantial sums in bonds. Usually, we’ve done well in these. But not always.
除了股票以外，我们也会大额投资债券。通常我们业绩都不错。但也并非时时如此。
Most of you have never heard of Energy Future Holdings. Consider yourselves lucky; I certainly wish I hadn’t. The company was formed in 2007 to effect a giant leveraged buyout of electric utility assets in Texas. The equity owners put up $8 billion and borrowed a massive amount in addition. About $2 billion of the debt was purchased by Berkshire, pursuant to a decision I made without consulting with Charlie. That was a big mistake.
大家应该没有听说过Energy Future Holdings这家公司。你们应该感到幸运；因为我也宁愿没听到过这家公司。它是2007年为杠杆收购一家德克萨斯的电力公司而成立的。权益投资者投入80亿美元同时借入大量债务完成收购。伯克希尔购买了大约20亿美元的债务，我是在没有咨询查理的情况下做的决定。这真是个巨大的错误。
Unless natural gas prices soar, EFH will almost certainly file for bankruptcy in 2014. Last year, we sold our holdings for $259 million. While owning the bonds, we received $837 million in cash interest. Overall, therefore, we suffered a pre-tax loss of $873 million. Next time I’ll call Charlie.
除非天然气价格飙升，EFH几乎注定要在2014年申请破产。去年我们以2.59亿卖出了我们的债权。持有债权期间，我们收到了8.37亿现金利息。所以我们税前一共亏了8.73亿。下次我一定会先给查理打电话。
A few of our subsidiaries -- primarily electric and gas utilities -- use derivatives in their operations. Otherwise, we have not entered into any derivative contracts for some years, and our existing positions continue to run off. The contracts that have expired have delivered large profits as well as several billion dollars of medium-term float. Though there are no guarantees, we expect a similar result from those remaining on our books.
我们的一些子公司(主要是电力和天然气公用事业公司)，在经营中会使用衍生品对冲工具。此外，我们近年来都没有投资衍生品，原有的头寸也逐步到期。已经到期的衍生品给我们带来了巨额利润和数十亿美元的中等期限的浮存金。虽然不是百分之百确定，我们预计账面上剩余的衍生品也会得到类似的结果。
Investment is most intelligent when it is most businesslike.
-- The Intelligent Investor by Benjamin Graham
最聪明的投资，是把它当做生意一样看待。——《聪明的投资者》本杰明·格雷厄姆
It is fitting to have a Ben Graham quote open this discussion because I owe so much of what I know about investing to him. I will talk more about Ben a bit later, and I will even sooner talk about common stocks. But let me first tell you about two small non-stock investments that I made long ago. Though neither changed my net worth by much, they are instructive.
引用格雷厄姆的话作为本节开头非常恰当，因为我对投资的理解很多都归功于Ben。稍后我更多谈论Ben，我还会讲到股票投资。但是让我先讲两个很早以前非股票投资的投资的例子吧。虽然两笔投资对我个人财富的影响并不大，但它们却具有启发意义。
This tale begins in Nebraska. From 1973 to 1981, the Midwest experienced an explosion in farm prices, caused by a widespread belief that runaway inflation was coming and fueled by the lending policies of small rural banks. Then the bubble burst, bringing price declines of 50% or more that devastated both leveraged farmers and their lenders. Five times as many Iowa and Nebraska banks failed in that bubble’s aftermath than in our recent Great Recession.
事情发生在内布拉斯加州。1973-1981年间，中西部经历了农场价格的爆炸式增长，原因是人们普遍认为失控的通货膨胀即将到来，而一些小型农村银行宽松的贷款政策又起到了推波助澜的作用。后来泡沫破灭了，导致农场价格下跌超过50%，这摧毁了借债的农场主和他们的债权人。那次泡沫中爱荷华州和内布拉斯加州倒闭的银行数量是最近的经济大衰退中倒闭的五倍。
In 1986, I purchased a 400-acre farm, located 50 miles north of Omaha, from the FDIC. It cost me $280,000, considerably less than what a failed bank had lent against the farm a few years earlier. I knew nothing about operating a farm. But I have a son who loves farming and I learned from him both how many bushels of corn and soybeans the farm would produce and what the operating expenses would be. From these estimates, I calculated the normalized return from the farm to then be about 10%. I also thought it was likely that productivity would improve over time and that crop prices would move higher as well. Both expectations proved out.
1986年，我从联邦存款保险公司FDIC买下了奥马哈北边50英里处的一个400英亩的农场。花了我28万美元，比几年前一家倒闭银行贷给农场的金额要少的多。我对经营农场一窍不通。但是我儿子喜欢农场，我从他那里了解到玉米和大豆的产量，还有对应的运营成本。根据这些估计，我计算出农场的正常回报率约10%。我还认为随着时间的推移，生产效率会逐步提高，农作物的价格也会上涨。两个预期后来都被证明是对的。
I needed no unusual knowledge or intelligence to conclude that the investment had no downside and potentially had substantial upside. There would, of course, be the occasional bad crop and prices would sometimes disappoint. But so what? There would be some unusually good years as well, and I would never be under any pressure to sell the property. Now, 28 years later, the farm has tripled its earnings and is worth five times or more what I paid. I still know nothing about farming and recently made just my second visit to the farm.
我并不需要任何特别的知识就可以得出这样的结论：这项投资下有保底，而且很可能有大幅上涨的空间。当然偶尔会出现欠收，而且价格有时会令人失望。但这又怎么样呢？同样也会有异常好的年份，我永远不会面临被迫出售资产的压力。现在，28年过去了，农场的利润翻了三倍，价值是我们当初投资额的五倍甚至更多。我依然对农场一窍不通，而且最近才第二次去到那片农场。
In 1993, I made another small investment. Larry Silverstein, Salomon’s landlord when I was the company’s CEO, told me about a New York retail property adjacent to NYU that the Resolution Trust Corp. was selling. Again, a bubble had popped -- this one involving commercial real estate -- and the RTC had been created to dispose of the assets of failed savings institutions whose optimistic lending practices had fueled the folly.
1993年，我做了另外一小笔投资。在我担任Salomon的CEO的时候，所罗门的房东Larry Silverstein告诉我，ResolutionTrust公司(RTC)正在出售纽约大学旁边的一处零售物业。同样，泡沫再次破裂了(这一次涉及商业地产)，RTC的成立是为了处置破产的储贷机构的资产，它们当初乐观的贷款政策助长了其愚蠢的放贷行为。
Here, too, the analysis was simple. As had been the case with the farm, the unleveraged current yield from the property was about 10%. But the property had been undermanaged by the RTC, and its income would increase when several vacant stores were leased. Even more important, the largest tenant -- who occupied around 20% of the project’s space -- was paying rent of about $5 per foot, whereas other tenants averaged $70. The expiration of this bargain lease in nine years was certain to provide a major boost to earnings. The property’s location was also superb: NYU wasn’t going anywhere.
这里的分析同样简单。和农场的情况类似，该物业当时无杠杆的收益率是10%。但是考虑到RTC糟糕的物业管理，那些空置的店铺出租以后，利润还会增加。更重要的是，它最大的租户占了20%左右的出租面积，但仅仅支付每平方尺5美元的租金，而其他租客的平均租金是70美元。它的廉价租约将在9年内到期，到时必然大幅提高租金。物业的位置也是非常理想的：纽约大学绝不会搬走。
I joined a small group, including Larry and my friend Fred Rose, that purchased the parcel. Fred was an experienced, high-grade real estate investor who, with his family, would manage the property. And manage it they did. As old leases expired, earnings tripled. Annual distributions now exceed 35% of our original equity investment. Moreover, our original mortgage was refinanced in 1996 and again in 1999, moves that allowed several special distributions totaling more than 150% of what we had invested. I’ve yet to view the property.
包括Larry和我的朋友FredRose联合买下了这个物业。Fred是一位经验丰富，高水准的房地产投资者，他和家人将会管理这个物业。他们做到了。随着旧租约到期后，利润翻了三倍。年租金回报现在达到了当初投资额的35%。另外，我们最初的抵押贷款在1996年和1999年两次进行了重置，这让我们获得了相当于初始投资额150%的特别租金回报。我至今还没去看过这块物业。
Income from both the farm and the NYU real estate will probably increase in the decades to come. Though the gains won’t be dramatic, the two investments will be solid and satisfactory holdings for my lifetime and, subsequently, for my children and grandchildren.
农场和纽约大学物业的收入未来几十年还会继续增加。虽然他们的收入不会突然激增，但两笔投资都是我和我的孩子、孙子可以一辈子持有的稳固并且令人满意的投资。
I tell these tales to illustrate certain fundamentals of investing:
我讲这两个故事是为了阐明投资的基本原理：
-
You don’t need to be an expert in order to achieve satisfactory investment returns. But if you aren’t, you must recognize your limitations and follow a course certain to work reasonably well. Keep things simple and don’t swing for the fences. When promised quick profits, respond with a quick “no.”
获取令人满意的投资回报不需要成为专家。但如果你不是专家，那就要认识到自己的局限性(能力圈)，并遵从事物合理的发展规律。保持简单，不要越雷池一步。当有人承诺让你赚笔快钱时，立即答复"不行"。
-
Focus on the future productivity of the asset you are considering. If you don’t feel comfortable making a rough estimate of the asset’s future earnings, just forget it and move on. No one has the ability to evaluate every investment possibility. But omniscience isn’t necessary; you only need to understand the actions you undertake.
关注你正考虑投资资产的未来盈利能力。如果你感觉不能估计一项资产的未来收益，那就放弃它，继续看下一个。没有人有能力评估所有投资的可能性。但无所不知不是必须的；你只需要理解你所采取的行为就可以。
-
If you instead focus on the prospective price change of a contemplated purchase, you are speculating. There is nothing improper about that. I know, however, that I am unable to speculate successfully, and I am skeptical of those who claim sustained success at doing so. Half of all coin-flippers will win their first toss; none of those winners has an expectation of profit if he continues to play the game. And the fact that a given asset has appreciated in the recent past is never a reason to buy it.
如果你转而关注资产的预期购买的价格变化上，那么你就是在投机。投机并没有什么不好。但是我知道我无法总是投机成功，我对那些声称自己可以持续投机成功的人持怀疑态度，掷硬币时第一轮有一半人会赢；但是这些人如果继续不断玩下去都不会有赢家。另外，一项特定资产近来持续升值的事实，从来不是买入的理由。
-
With my two small investments, I thought only of what the properties would produce and cared not at all about their daily valuations. Games are won by players who focus on the playing field -- not by those whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard. If you can enjoy Saturdays and Sundays without looking at stock prices, give it a try on weekdays.
在我的两笔小额投资中，我只考虑这些资产将产出什么，根本不关心它们每天的估值。比赛最后的赢家是那些专注于赛场的球员赢得的，而不是那些眼睛紧盯着计分板的球员。如果你周末不看股价的时候可以放轻松，那么试着工作日的时候也这样做。
-
Forming macro opinions or listening to the macro or market predictions of others is a waste of time. Indeed, it is dangerous because it may blur your vision of the facts that are truly important. (When I hear TV commentators glibly opine on what the market will do next, I am reminded of Mickey Mantle’s scathing comment: “You don’t know how easy this game is until you get into that broadcasting booth.”)
总结宏观观点，或听信别人的宏观或市场预测都是浪费时间。实际上这是危险的，因为它可能会模糊你对真正重要事实的看法。(每当我听到电视评论员油嘴滑舌地分析市场的下一步走势时，我就会想起Mickey Mantle犀利的评论，"你不坐到直播间里去，都不知道原来棒球比赛有这么简单"。)
-
My two purchases were made in 1986 and 1993. What the economy, interest rates, or the stock market might do in the years immediately following -- 1987 and 1994 -- was of no importance to me in making those investments. I can’t remember what the headlines or pundits were saying at the time. Whatever the chatter, corn would keep growing in Nebraska and students would flock to NYU.
我的两笔投资分别在1986年和1993年做出。紧接着1987和1994年的经济、利率、或者股市会如何发展对两笔投资都没有影响。我已经不记得当时的报纸头条和专家的意见。不管有什么新闻，内布拉斯加农场的庄稼会继续生长，学生会继续来纽约大学。
There is one major difference between my two small investments and an investment in stocks. Stocks provide you minute-to-minute valuations for your holdings whereas I have yet to see a quotation for either my farm or the New York real estate.
我的两笔投资和股票投资有一个重要的区别。股票会每分钟为你提供报价，而我至今也没有见过我的农场和纽约大学物业的市场报价。
It should be an enormous advantage for investors in stocks to have those wildly fluctuating valuations placed on their holdings -- and for some investors, it is. After all, if a moody fellow with a farm bordering my property yelled out a price every day to me at which he would either buy my farm or sell me his -- and those prices varied widely over short periods of time depending on his mental state -- how in the world could I be other than benefited by his erratic behavior? If his daily shout-out was ridiculously low, and I had some spare cash, I would buy his farm. If the number he yelled was absurdly high, I could either sell to him or just go on farming.
疯狂波动的股价本该成为股票投资者的一项巨大优势，对少数投资者来说确实如此。毕竟如果有一个喜怒无常的人每天给我报价，他要么买下要么卖出农场，而这些价格在短期内随着他的情绪忽上忽下，那我不就可以从它疯狂的行动中赚钱吗？如果他的报价低的可笑，而我又有些闲钱，那我就会买下他的农场。如果他的报价高的要命，我要么卖给他，要么继续种地。
Owners of stocks, however, too often let the capricious and often irrational behavior of their fellow owners cause them to behave irrationally as well. Because there is so much chatter about markets, the economy, interest rates, price behavior of stocks, etc., some investors believe it is important to listen to pundits -- and, worse yet, important to consider acting upon their comments.
然而，股票投资者往往会让被其他投资者反复无常且通常不理性的行为所影响，导致他们的行为也失去理性。因为有太多关于市场、经济、利率和股价走势的评论，一些投资者认为应该听听专家的建议，更糟糕的是，认为应该根据他们的建议采取买卖行动。
Those people who can sit quietly for decades when they own a farm or apartment house too often become frenetic when they are exposed to a stream of stock quotations and accompanying commentators delivering an implied message of “Don’t just sit there, do something.” For these investors, liquidity is transformed from the unqualified benefit it should be to a curse.
那些拥有农场或房产时可以安静持有几十年的人，当他们接触到一连串的股票报价，并伴随着评论员们发出"别光坐着，你得做点什么"的鼓动时，往往会变得头脑发热。对这些投资者来说，流动性已经从一项绝对的优势变成了诅咒。
A “flash crash” or some other extreme market fluctuation can’t hurt an investor any more than an erratic and mouthy neighbor can hurt my farm investment. Indeed, tumbling markets can be helpful to the true investor if he has cash available when prices get far out of line with values. A climate of fear is your friend when investing; a euphoric world is your enemy.
"闪电暴跌"或者其他一些市场的极端波动并不会伤害投资者，就好像一个反复无常、口若悬河的邻居不会影响我的农场投资一样。事实上，当价格与价值严重脱节时，如果真正的投资者有现金可用，那么暴跌的市场反而会对他的投资有所帮助。在投资时，恐惧的市场是投资者的朋友；疯狂的市场才是投资者的敌人。
During the extraordinary financial panic that occurred late in 2008, I never gave a thought to selling my farm or New York real estate, even though a severe recession was clearly brewing. And, if I had owned 100% of a solid business with good long-term prospects, it would have been foolish for me to even consider dumping it. So why would I have sold my stocks that were small participations in wonderful businesses? True, any one of them might eventually disappoint, but as a group they were certain to do well. Could anyone really believe the earth was going to swallow up the incredible productive assets and unlimited human ingenuity existing in America?
在2008年发生的非常严重的金融危机恐慌期间，我从没想过要卖掉我的农场或者纽约大学的物业，即便是严重的经济衰退即将到来。而且，如果我拥有一项良好长期前景的业务100%的权益，光是考虑卖掉它的想法都是非常愚蠢的。那我为什么要考虑卖掉那些优秀业务的小额持股呢？确实，它们中一些会令人失望，但是作为组合整体而言它回报会非常不错。真的有人相信美国无与伦比的生产性资本和无限的人力资本将会毁于一旦吗？
When Charlie and I buy stocks -- which we think of as small portions of businesses -- our analysis is very similar to that which we use in buying entire businesses. We first have to decide whether we can sensibly estimate an earnings range for five years out, or more. If the answer is yes, we will buy the stock (or business) if it sells at a reasonable price in relation to the bottom boundary of our estimate. If, however, we lack the ability to estimate future earnings -- which is usually the case -- we simply move on to other prospects. In the 54 years we have worked together, we have never foregone an attractive purchase because of the macro or political environment, or the views of other people. In fact, these subjects never come up when we make decisions.
查理和我买股票的时候，我们认为股票是企业的一小部分，我们的分析与我们买下整个企业时所使用的分析非常类似。首先我们必须决定，是否可以合理的估计公司未来5年或者更长时间的收益范围。如果答案是可以，我们将在股票以相对于我们估计下限的合理价格买入。如果我们不具备估计未来盈利的能力(通常是这样)，那我们就会转向其他投资。在我们合作的54年里，我们从来没有因为宏观或者政治环境的因素，或者因为其他人的看法而放弃过有吸引力的投资。事实上，这些都不是我们做投资决策时会考虑的因素。
It’s vital, however, that we recognize the perimeter of our “circle of competence” and stay well inside of it. Even then, we will make some mistakes, both with stocks and businesses. But they will not be the disasters that occur, for example, when a long-rising market induces purchases that are based on anticipated price behavior and a desire to be where the action is.
然而至关重要的是，我们要认清自己"能力圈"的边界，并保持呆在自己的能力圈里面。即便如此，有时我们还是会在买卖股票和企业收购方面犯一些错误。但是这样不会引发灾难，例如，当一个持续上涨的牛市引发大家基于价格趋势购买股票，或者希望有所行动的欲望而购买股票。
Most investors, of course, have not made the study of business prospects a priority in their lives. If wise, they will conclude that they do not know enough about specific businesses to predict their future earning power.
当然，多数的投资者并没有把研究商业前景作为他们生活中的优先事项。如果他们明智的话会得出这样一个结论：他们对特定业务的了解并不足以预测它们未来的盈利能力。
I have good news for these non-professionals: The typical investor doesn’t need this skill. In aggregate, American business has done wonderfully over time and will continue to do so (though, most assuredly, in unpredictable fits and starts). In the 20th Century, the Dow Jones Industrials index advanced from 66 to 11,497, paying a rising stream of dividends to boot. The 21st Century will witness further gains, almost certain to be substantial. The goal of the non-professional should not be to pick winners -- neither he nor his “helpers” can do that -- but should rather be to own a cross-section of businesses that in aggregate are bound to do well. A low-cost S&P 500 index fund will achieve this goal.
我有一个好消息告诉这些非专业人士：普通投资者并不需要那些技能。总体而言，美国企业长期以来都表现很好，并将继续欣欣向荣(当然一定会有起起伏伏)。在整个20世纪，道琼斯指数从66点涨到了11,497点，股息不断提高。21世纪将见证进一步的巨额回报。非专业投资者的目标不应该是挑选出优胜企业，他和他的"顾问"都做不到，而应该拥有一个整体而言必定表现良好的跨行业组合。低费率的标普500指数基金将实现这一目标。
That’s the “what” of investing for the non-professional. The “when” is also important. The main danger is that the timid or beginning investor will enter the market at a time of extreme exuberance and then become disillusioned when paper losses occur. (Remember the late Barton Biggs’ observation: “A bull market is like sex. It feels best just before it ends.”) The antidote to that kind of mistiming is for an investor to accumulate shares over a long period and never to sell when the news is bad and stocks are well off their highs. Following those rules, the “know-nothing” investor who both diversifies and keeps his costs minimal is virtually certain to get satisfactory results. Indeed, the unsophisticated investor who is realistic about his shortcomings is likely to obtain better long-term results than the knowledgeable professional who is blind to even a single weakness.
这就是非专业人士投资的"目的"。"何时做"也同样重要。主要的风险是，胆小的投资者或投资新手会在市场极度繁荣的时候入场，并且在出现浮亏时幻想破灭。记住巴顿·比格斯(Barton Biggs，多次被《机构投资者》杂志评选为"美国第一投资策略师"，著有《对冲基金风云录》。)的观察："牛市就像性爱一样，在结束之前达到高潮"。解决时间问题的办法是，长期分批买入，并且市场不好股价暴跌时永远不要卖出。遵守这些规则，"无知"的投资者既能保持投资分散，又能将成本保持在最低水平，几乎肯定会取得令人满意的回报。实际上，相比那些对对自己缺点视而不见的投资者，认识到自身缺点并持现实态度的纯粹投资者，长期将会取得更好的投资结果。
If “investors” frenetically bought and sold farmland to each other, neither the yields nor prices of their crops would be increased. The only consequence of such behavior would be decreases in the overall earnings realized by the farm-owning population because of the substantial costs it would incur as it sought advice and switched properties.
即使"投资者"疯狂地相互买卖他们的农场，庄稼的产量和价格也不会增加。唯一的后果就是农场主的最终收益由于咨询费和交易费而显著下降。
Nevertheless, both individuals and institutions will constantly be urged to be active by those who profit from giving advice or effecting transactions. The resulting frictional costs can be huge and, for investors in aggregate, devoid of benefit. So ignore the chatter, keep your costs minimal, and invest in stocks as you would in a farm.
尽管如此，那些收取咨询费或交易费的中介会不断怂恿机构和个人不停地交易。由此产生的摩擦成本可能是巨大的，而且对投资者来说，它吞噬了利润没有任何好处。所以，忽略那些投资建议吧，保持最低的交易成本，并且像投资农场那样投资股票。
My money, I should add, is where my mouth is: What I advise here is essentially identical to certain instructions I’ve laid out in my will. One bequest provides that cash will be delivered to a trustee for my wife’s benefit. (I have to use cash for individual bequests, because all of my Berkshire shares will be fully distributed to certain philanthropic organizations over the ten years following the closing of my estate.) My advice to the trustee could not be more simple: Put 10% of the cash in short-term government bonds and 90% in a very low-cost S&P 500 index fund. (I suggest Vanguard’s.) I believe the trust’s long-term results from this policy will be superior to those attained by most investors -- whether pension funds, institutions or individuals -- who employ high-fee managers.
我的钱将会投到指数基金里，因此我还得再为此说两句：我在这里所建议的和已经写在遗嘱中的内容基本是一致的。一份遗赠规定，现金将被交付到我妻子设立的信托中。(我必须使用现金进行个人遗赠，因为我所持有的全部伯克希尔股票将在我去世后的十年内会分配给一些慈善组织。)我对受托人的要求非常简单：将10%的现金投资于短期政府债券，其余90%投资于低费率的标普500指数基金上。(个人推荐先锋集团的基金Vanguard。)我相信，这个策略的信托长期业绩将战胜大多数投资者，包括聘请了高费率管理人的养老金、机构还是个人。
And now back to Ben Graham. I learned most of the thoughts in this investment discussion from Ben’s book The Intelligent Investor, which I bought in 1949. My financial life changed with that purchase.
现在回到本·格雷厄姆。本次讨论中大多数的投资思想都是从Ben写的《聪明的投资者》当中学到的。1949年我买到这本书，从此我的投资生涯完全改变。
Before reading Ben’s book, I had wandered around the investing landscape, devouring everything written on the subject. Much of what I read fascinated me: I tried my hand at charting and at using market indicia to predict stock movements. I sat in brokerage offices watching the tape roll by, and I listened to commentators. All of this was fun, but I couldn’t shake the feeling that I wasn’t getting anywhere.
在阅读本的书以前，我在投资的世界四处游荡，狼吞虎咽地阅读投资界的所有文章，尝试每一种投资方法。我读到的很大东西都曾让我着迷：我试着用图标和市场指标预测股价走势。也曾坐在交易大厅里盯着交易纸带滚过，听市场评论员的评论。所有这一切都很有趣，但是我始终无法摆脱那种毫无进展的感觉。
In contrast, Ben’s ideas were explained logically in elegant, easy-to-understand prose (without Greek letters or complicated formulas). For me, the key points were laid out in what later editions labeled Chapters 8 and 20. (The original 1949 edition numbered its chapters differently.) These points guide my investing decisions today.
相比之下，Ben的思想用优雅通俗易懂的散文进行了逻辑解释(没有任何希腊字母或者复杂的公式)。对我而言，最重要的观点在新版本的第8章和第20章。(1949年原版章节划分和后来不同)。正是这些观点指导着我今天的投资决策。
A couple of interesting sidelights about the book: Later editions included a postscript describing an unnamed investment that was a bonanza for Ben. Ben made the purchase in 1948 when he was writing the first edition and -- brace yourself -- the mystery company was GEICO. If Ben had not recognized the special qualities of GEICO when it was still in its infancy, my future and Berkshire’s would have been far different.
这本书还有另外一些有意思的事：后来的版本包括一篇后记，描述了一项让Ben大赚一笔的未具名投资。Ben在1948年写第一版的时候进行了这项投资(拥抱自己吧)，这家神秘的公司就是GEICO保险。如果Ben没有在GEICO还是起步阶段就意识到它的特殊品质，我和伯克希尔的未来都会大不相同。
The 1949 edition of the book also recommended a railroad stock that was then selling for $17 and earning about $10 per share. (One of the reasons I admired Ben was that he had the guts to use current examples, leaving himself open to sneers if he stumbled.) In part, that low valuation resulted from an accounting rule of the time that required the railroad to exclude from its reported earnings the substantial retained earnings of affiliates.
该书1949年版还推荐了一家铁路公司，每股售价17美元而每股收益10美元。(我敬佩本的原因之一是，他敢使用当前的例子，如果未来并不如他所言他可能会被嘲笑。)如此低的估值在一定程度上是由于，当时的会计准则要求铁路公司将其附属公司的大量留存利润从报告的利润中剔除。
The recommended stock was Northern Pacific, and its most important affiliate was Chicago, Burlington and Quincy. These railroads are now important parts of BNSF (Burlington Northern Santa Fe), which is today fully owned by Berkshire. When I read the book, Northern Pacific had a market value of about $40 million. Now its successor (having added a great many properties, to be sure) earns that amount every four days.
被推荐的股票就是北太平洋铁路公司，它最重要的附属公司是芝加哥、柏林顿和昆西铁路。这些铁路如今是伯克希尔全资拥有的BNSF铁路的主要组成部分。当我读到这本书时，北太平洋铁路公司市值约4000万美元。现在，它的继承者(当然增加了很多资产)每4天就能赚4000万。
I can’t remember what I paid for that first copy of The Intelligent Investor. Whatever the cost, it would underscore the truth of Ben’s adage: Price is what you pay, value is what you get. Of all the investments I ever made, buying Ben’s book was the best (except for my purchase of two marriage licenses).
我已经不记得买第一本《聪明的投资者》花了多少钱。不管是多少，它都证明了Ben的格言：价格是你付的数字，价值才是你所得到的。在我所有的投资当中，买这本书应该是最好的一笔(不包括我的两次结婚证)。
Local and state financial problems are accelerating, in large part because public entities promised pensions they couldn’t afford. Citizens and public officials typically under-appreciated the gigantic financial tapeworm that was born when promises were made that conflicted with a willingness to fund them. Unfortunately, pension mathematics today remain a mystery to most Americans.
地方和州的财政问题正在加剧，很大程度上是由于政府承诺了它们负担不起的养老金。公民和政府官员通常低估了巨大的金融绦虫，它是承诺和和支付能力之间的冲突导致的财务困境。不幸的是，养老金的计算至今对大多数美国人来说都是一个迷。
Investment policies, as well, play an important role in these problems. In 1975, I wrote a memo to Katharine Graham, then chairman of The Washington Post Company, about the pitfalls of pension promises and the importance of investment policy. That memo is reproduced on pages 118 - 136.
养老金的投资策略也是造成上述问题的重要原因之一。1975年，我写了一份备忘录给时任华盛顿邮报董事长的Katharine Graham，当中讲到了养老金承诺的缺陷和投资策略的重要性。
During the next decade, you will read a lot of news -- bad news -- about public pension plans. I hope my memo is helpful to you in understanding the necessity for prompt remedial action where problems exist.
在接下来的十年里，你会读到很多关于公共养老金计划的坏消息。我希望我的备忘录有助于你理解在存在问题的情况下立即采取补救措施的必要性。
The annual meeting will be held on Saturday, May 3rd at the CenturyLink Center. Carrie Sova, our talented ringmaster, will be in charge, and all of our headquarters group will pitch in to help her. Our gang both does a better job than professional event planners would and -- yes -- saves us money.
年度股东大会将于5月3号(周六)在Century Link中心举行。我们天才的总导演Carrie Sova主持。我们总部所有人员都会全力支持她；我们的团队比专业活动策划者做得更好，当然，也更省钱。
CenturyLink’s doors will open at 7 a.m., and at 7:30 we will have our third International Newspaper Tossing Challenge. Our target will be a Clayton Home porch, precisely 35 feet from the throwing line. I tossed about 500,000 papers when I was a teenager, so I think I’m pretty good. Challenge me: I’ll buy a Dilly Bar for anyone who lands his or her throw closer to the doorstep than I do. The papers will be 36 to 42 pages, and you must fold them yourself (no rubber bands allowed).
早上7点大门敞开，7点半我们将举行第3届报纸投掷国际挑战赛。投掷目标将是克莱顿公司制造的移动房屋的门廊，到投掷线的精确距离为35英尺。我少年时代做报童时，曾经投掷过50万份报纸，所以我自认为自己投掷报纸的功夫非常好。来向我挑战吧：任何人只要把报纸投掷得比我离门口更近，我就会给他买一个DillyBar冰激凌。比赛用的报纸有36至42页厚，你必须自己折叠(不准橡皮筋捆绑)。
At 8:30, a new Berkshire movie will be shown. An hour later, we will start the question-and-answer period, which (with a break for lunch at CenturyLink’s stands) will last until 3:30. After a short recess, Charlie and I will convene the annual meeting at 3:45. If you decide to leave during the day’s question periods, please do so while Charlie is talking.
伯克希尔最新制作的年会电影8点半开始放映。一个小时后我们将开始进行提问回答，并将一直持续到下午3点半为止(中间短暂休息在CenturyLink中心的摊位上有午餐供应)。问答环节结束之后，短暂休息一下，我和芒格在3:45将正式召集大家召开年度股东大会。如果你要在提问环节离开会场的话，请在芒格讲话的时候离开。
The best reason to exit, of course, is to shop. We’ll assist you by filling the 194,300-square-foot hall that adjoins the meeting area with products from dozens of Berkshire subsidiaries. Last year, you did your part, and most locations racked up record sales. In a nine-hour period, we sold 1,062 pairs of Justin boots (that’s a pair every 32 seconds), 12,792 pounds of See’s candy, 11,162 Quikut knives (21 knives per minute) and 6,344 pairs of Wells Lamont gloves, always a hot item. This year, Charlie and I will have competing ketchup bottles for sale. Naturally, the one with Charlie’s picture will be heavily discounted. But, if you help, my bottle will outsell his. This is important, so don’t let me down.
当然，离开会场的最好理由是去购物。为了帮助各位更好地进行购物，与股东年会会场相邻的194,300平方英尺的大厅里，我们摆满了伯克希尔子公司生产的各种商品。2012年年会期间各位股东做得很棒，很多产品的销售都创下历史新高。在去年年会召开的9个小时里，我们销售了1062双Justin靴子(每32秒卖出1双靴子)，12,792磅喜诗巧克力，11,162把Quikut小刀(每分钟销售21把)，以及6,344双WellsLamont手套，这些都是热门商品。今年，查理和我将要比赛销售瓶装番茄酱。自然，有查理头像的瓶装番茄酱将会大幅打折促销。但是，如果你捧场的话，有我头像的瓶装番茄酱还会卖得比他多。这对我很重要，千万不要让我丢面子。
Brooks, our running-shoe company, will again have a special commemorative shoe to offer at the meeting. After you purchase a pair, wear them the next day at our second annual “Berkshire 5K,” an 8 a.m. race starting at the CenturyLink. Full details for participating will be included in the Visitor’s Guide that you will receive with your tickets for the meeting. Entrants will find themselves running alongside many of Berkshire’s managers, directors and associates.
我们下属的跑鞋公司Brooks，将会再次为伯克希尔股东年会推出一款特制纪念版跑鞋，仅在年会上供应。买好这款跑鞋，第二天就穿上，参加我们的"伯克希尔5公里"长跑活动，时间是周日早上8点，从CenturyLink中心开始起跑。参赛的所有细节包含在你将与股东入场门票一起收到的参会指南。参加长跑的人将会发现自己身边跑的人群中有很多是伯克希尔公司的公司经理人、董事、员工。
GEICO will have a booth in the shopping area, staffed by a number of its top counselors from around the country. Stop by for a quote. In most cases, GEICO will be able to give you a shareholder discount (usually 8%). This special offer is permitted by 44 of the 51 jurisdictions in which we operate. (One supplemental point: The discount is not additive if you qualify for another, such as that given certain groups.) Bring the details of your existing insurance and check out whether we can save you money. For at least half of you, I believe we can.
GEICO将在购物区设置一个展台，由来自全美最优秀的保险顾问为您服务，顺便来看看你的报价。在大多数情况下，GEICO将会给您一个股东特别折扣(通常是8%)。我们开展业务的51个行政区域中有44个都批准了这个特别优惠。(额外提示：这个折扣不可以与其他优惠累加使用，比如给予特定群体的优惠)。把你现有保险的详细情况带过来，看看我们能否帮你多省点钱。我相信，我们至少可以帮助你们中一半人省下更多的保险费。
Be sure to visit the Bookworm. It will carry about 35 books and DVDs, among them a couple of new titles. One is Max Olson’s compilation of Berkshire letters going back to 1965. The book includes an index that I find particularly useful, specifying page numbers for individuals, companies and subject matter. I also recommend Forty Chances by my son, Howard. You’ll enjoy it.
你一定要到书虫书店的展区看看，这家书店将会提供超过35种的图书和DVD，有几本是最新出版的。其中一本新书是MaxOlson编辑的1965开始的伯克希尔股东的信(Berkshire Hathaway Letters to Shareholders)。这本书包括一个索引，我觉得特别有用，按照人名、公司、主题分别注明页码。我还要推荐我儿子霍华德写的新书《四十次机会》(Forty chances : finding hope in a hungry world)。你一定会喜欢这本书的。
If you are a big spender -- or aspire to become one -- visit Signature Flight Support on the east side of the Omaha airport between noon and 5 p.m. on Saturday. There, we will have a fleet of NetJets aircraft sure to set your pulse racing. Come by bus; leave by private jet. Live a little.
如果您是一个会花大钱的大款，或者渴望成为这样一个大款，请在周六中午到下午五点参观位于奥马哈机场东侧的Signature航空馆。那里将会展出我们下属的NetJets公司的私人专机编队，肯定会让您心跳加速。坐着大巴来，坐着私人飞机回。享受一下生活。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the credential you will need for admission to the meeting and other events. Airlines have sometimes jacked up prices for the Berkshire weekend. If you are coming from far away, compare the cost of flying to Kansas City versus Omaha. The drive between the two cities is about 2.5 hours, and it may be that Kansas City can save you significant money, particularly if you had planned to rent a car in Omaha. Spend the savings with us.
随同附上的股东大会资料中有个附件，告诉您如何获取参加会议和其他活动所需的凭证。在伯克希尔股东大会召开的周末，航空公司有时会提高机票价格。如果你从很远的地方过来，可以比较一下飞到堪萨斯与奥马哈的价格。两个城市之间车程只需要2个半小时左右，也许这样可以帮你省掉一大笔钱，尤其是你本来就打算在奥马哈租车的话。省下来的钱，一定要在会场上购物花掉噢。
At Nebraska Furniture Mart, located on a 77-acre site on 72nd Street between Dodge and Pacific, we will again be having “Berkshire Weekend” discount pricing. Last year in the week surrounding the meeting, the store did $40.2 million of business, breaking its previous record by 12%. It also set a single day record of $8.2 million on Saturday, selling nearly $1 million of mattresses alone.
内布拉斯加家具商场位于72街上，在Dodge街和Pacific街之间，占地77英亩，在这里我们将会再次举办"伯克希尔周末专场"特惠促销活动。这家商场在2013年年会期间销售收入为4020万美元，打破了以前的历史最高记录，增长了12%。同时也在周六创下了820万美元的最高单日销售记录，卖出了接近100万美元床垫。
To obtain the Berkshire discount at NFM, you must make your purchases between Tuesday, April 29th and Monday, May 5th inclusive, and also present your meeting credential. The period’s special pricing will even apply to the products of several prestigious manufacturers that normally have ironclad rules against discounting but which, in the spirit of our shareholder weekend, have made an exception for you. We appreciate their cooperation. NFM is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. Monday through Saturday, and 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Sunday. On Saturday this year, from 5:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., NFM is having a picnic to which you are all invited.
要得到伯克希尔股东的特别优惠，你必须在4月29日周二到5月5日周一之间购买，并出示参会凭证。这次特惠促销包括了几个非常著名的超级大牌厂家的产品，他们都有严格的折扣规定，但考虑到这是一个我们股东的周末特别活动，为你特别破例，我们特别感谢他们的支持。内布拉斯加家具商城在周一至周六早上10点到晚上9点营业，周日是早上10点到晚上6点营业。周六下午5点半到晚上8点，内布拉斯加家具商城将会举行野餐会，邀请所有参会人士加入。
At Borsheims, we will again have two shareholder-only events. The first will be a cocktail reception from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m. on Friday, May 2nd. The second, the main gala, will be held on Sunday, May 4th, from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. On Saturday, we will be open until 6 p.m. In recent years, our three-day volume has far exceeded sales in all of December, normally a jeweler’s best month.
在波仙珠宝店，我们将会再次召开两场股东专场优惠活动。第一个活动将是一场鸡尾酒会，在5月2日周五下午6点到晚上9点举行。第二个活动是一个大型售卖活动，在5月5日周日早上9点到下午4点举行。周六，我们将会一直营业到下午6点。最近几年，我们在股东年会期间三天的销售额就远远超过整个12月份的销售额，而12月份通常是珠宝店生意最好的一个月。
About 1:15 p.m. on Sunday, I will begin clerking at Borsheims. Ask for my “Crazy Warren” quote on the item of your choice. As I get older, my pricing gets ever more ridiculous. Come take advantage of me.
在周日下午1点15分，我本人将会亲自在波仙担任售货员。不管你选择什么商品，都可以向我要求一个"疯狂巴菲特"特别优惠价格。随着我变得越来越老，我给的价格也越来越荒谬可笑。所以请大家快来占我的便宜吧。
We will have huge crowds at Borsheims throughout the weekend. For your convenience, therefore, shareholder prices will be available from Monday, April 28th through Saturday, May 10th. During that period, please identify yourself as a shareholder by presenting your meeting credentials or a brokerage statement that shows you are a Berkshire holder.
整个周末波仙珠宝商店都会人群拥挤。因此为了你的方便考虑，股东优惠价格将会从4月28日(周一)一直持续5月10日(周六)。在此期间，请出示你的股票年会入场凭证或券商出具的持股证明，以证明你本人是伯克希尔公司的股东。
On Sunday, in the mall outside of Borsheims, a blindfolded Patrick Wolff, twice U.S. chess champion, will take on all comers -- who will have their eyes wide open -- in groups of six. Nearby, Norman Beck, a remarkable magician from Dallas, will bewilder onlookers. Additionally, we will have Bob Hamman and Sharon Osberg, two of the world’s top bridge experts, available to play bridge with our shareholders on Sunday afternoon. Don’t play them for money.
在波仙外面的商场里，美国两届象棋比赛冠军PatrickWolff将会蒙上双眼，接受所有人的挑战，当然挑战者们不用蒙眼，而且他是一个人一次同时和6个人进行对奕。就在附近，著名的达拉斯魔术师NormanBeck将进行精彩表演。另外，我们将邀请两位世界级桥牌顶尖高手BobHamman和SharonOsberg，在周日下午与我们的股东们进行比赛。千万别和他们俩赌钱。
My friend, Ariel Hsing, will be in the mall as well on Sunday, taking on challengers at table tennis. Last year, she made Americans -- and especially me -- proud with her performance at the Olympics.
我的朋友邢延华(Ariel Hsing)将会再次出现在波仙外面的商场里，接受乒乓球挑战，去年她在奥运会乒乓球比赛场面的表现让所有美国人尤其是我本人感到骄傲。
I met Ariel when she was nine and even then I was unable to score a point against her. Now, she’s a freshman at Princeton and the U.S. Women’s Champion. If you don’t mind embarrassing yourself, test your skills against her, beginning at 1 p.m. Bill Gates and I will lead off and try to soften her up.
我第一次遇见刑延华，她只有9岁，但是那时我跟他打乒乓球一分都拿不到。现在她已经是普林斯顿大学的大一新生，也是美国女子乒乓球比赛冠军。如果你不介意让自己感到难堪，就来和她打上一盘，检验一下你的球技如何。比赛将在下午一点钟开始。我和比尔·盖茨带头挑战，我们要努力让她手下留情。
Gorat’s and Piccolo’s will again be open exclusively for Berkshire shareholders on Sunday, May 4th. Both will be serving until 10 p.m., with Gorat’s opening at 1 p.m. and Piccolo’s opening at 4 p.m. These restaurants are my favorites, and I will eat at both of them on Sunday evening. Remember: To make a reservation at Gorat’s, call 402-551-3733 on April 1st ( but not before ) and for Piccolo’s call 402-342-9038. At Piccolo’s order a giant root beer float for dessert. Only sissies get the small one.
5月4日，周六，Gorat's餐厅和Piccolo's餐厅将会再次仅对伯克希尔公司股东开放。Gorat's餐厅会从下午1点营业到晚上10点，Piccolo's餐厅将会从下午4点营业到晚上10点。这两家都是我特别喜欢的餐厅，周日晚上我会在两家餐厅都吃上一顿。请记住，要在Gorat's订餐，请在5月1日(但不要提前)拨打电话402-551-3733。要在Piccolo's订餐，电话是402-342-9038。在Piccolo's餐厅，要显得你有品位，就得要上一大杯根啤作为甜点，要小杯不是男子汉。
We will again have the same three financial journalists lead the question-and-answer period at the meeting, asking Charlie and me questions that shareholders have submitted to them by e-mail. The journalists and their e-mail addresses are: Carol Loomis, of Fortune, who may be e-mailed at [email protected]; Becky Quick, of CNBC, at [email protected]; and Andrew Ross Sorkin, of The New York Times, at [email protected].
今年我们将再次邀请同样的三位财经记者主持年会问答环节，他们通过电子邮件收集股东提交给他们的问题，向查理和我进行提问。这三位记者和他们的电子邮件地址分别是：财富杂志Carol Loomis： [email protected]；CNBC的Becky Quick： [email protected]；纽约时报Andrew Ross Sorkin： [email protected]。
From the questions submitted, each journalist will choose the six he or she decides are the most interesting and important. The journalists have told me your question has the best chance of being selected if you keep it concise, avoid sending it in at the last moment, make it Berkshire-related and include no more than two questions in any e-mail you send them. (In your e-mail, let the journalist know if you would like your name mentioned if your question is selected.)
每一个记者将会从邮件收集到的众多问题中进行筛选，选出6个他(她)认为最有趣和最重要的问题来现场提问。他们告诉我，如果你的问题符合以下条件：十分简洁，不是最后一刻才提交，问题和伯克希尔相关，且每封电子邮件提出的问题不超过两个，那么符合以上条件的问题被选中的机会最大。(在你的邮件中，请告诉记者，如果你提出的问题被他们选中，您是否希望提到你的名字。)
We will also have a panel of three analysts who follow Berkshire. This year the insurance specialist will be Jay Gelb of Barclays. Questions that deal with our non-insurance operations will come from Jonathan Brandt of Ruane, Cunniff & Goldfarb.
2012年我们邀请了一个由三名追踪伯克希尔公司的分析师组成的提问团队。今年的保险行业分析专家将是巴克莱银行Barclays的Jay Gelb。负责提问与我们非保险业务相关的问题将是来自Ruane, Cunniff&Goldfarb 红杉基金公司的 Jonathan Brandt。
And we will again have a credentialed bear on Berkshire. We would like to hear from applicants who are short Berkshire (please include evidence of your position). The three analysts will bring their own Berkshire-specific questions and alternate with the journalists and the audience in asking them.
我们希望能够再次在分析师团队中加入一位公认看空伯克希尔公司的分析师。我们希望那些看空并做空伯克希尔股票的分析师来信申请(请附上你的做空持仓证明)。这三位分析师将会各自提出他们自已对关于伯克希尔的问题，分析师、记者和听众将会交替提问。
Charlie and I believe that all shareholders should have access to new Berkshire information simultaneously and should also have adequate time to analyze it. That’s why we try to issue financial information late on Fridays or early on Saturdays and why our annual meeting is held on Saturdays. We do not talk one-on-one to large institutional investors or analysts, but rather treat all shareholders the same. Our hope is that the journalists and analysts will ask questions that further educate our owners about their investment.
查理和我认为，所有股东都应该同时知悉伯克希尔的最新信息，也应该有足够的时间进行分析，这也是我们为什么总是努力安排在周五股市收盘之后或者周六早晨才公布公司财务信息的原因，这也是我们为什么选择在周六召开股东年会的原因。我们不会与大型机构投资者或分析师进行一对一交流，而是对所有股东一视同仁。我们希望记者和分析师们将会提出一些好的问题，能够让我们的股东们更加充分了解自己所投资的公司。
Neither Charlie nor I will get so much as a clue about the questions to be asked. We know the journalists and analysts will come up with some tough ones, and that’s the way we like it. All told, we expect at least 54 questions, which will allow for six from each analyst and journalist and 18 from the audience. If there is some extra time, we will take more from the audience. Audience questioners will be determined by drawings that will take place at 8:15 a.m. at each of the 15 microphones located in the arena and main overflow room.
查理和我事先不会得到任何关于问题的线索。我们知道记者和分析师会选择一些棘手的问题，而这正是我们所喜欢的方式。总的来说，我们希望至少能够回答54个问题，三个记者和三个分析师每个人提问6个问题，现场听众提问18个问题。如果还有一些剩余的时间，我们将会回答现场听众更多的问题。听众提问者将会在8:15进行抽签决定，15个提问用的话筒分别放置在会场不同的区域和主要的分会场。
For good reason, I regularly extol the accomplishments of our operating managers. They are truly All-Stars, who run their businesses as if they were the only asset owned by their families. I believe the mindset of our managers to be as shareholder-oriented as can be found in the universe of large publicly-owned companies. Most have no financial need to work; the joy of hitting business “home runs” means as much to them as their paycheck.
出于充分的理由，我经常高度赞扬我们经营经理人取得的成就。他们都是真正的全明星，他们经营自己的企业就好像是他们家族唯一拥有的资产一样。我相信我们的经理人的心态是以股东利益为导向，和那些大型上市公司管理层完全相同。大多数经理人根本没有任何工作的经济需求；他们在企业经营上打出本垒打得到的快乐完全不亚于收到一大笔薪酬支票。
Equally important, however, are the 24 men and women who work with me at our corporate office. This group efficiently deals with a multitude of SEC and other regulatory requirements, files a 23,000-page Federal income tax return as well as state and foreign returns, responds to countless shareholder and media inquiries, gets out the annual report, prepares for the country’s largest annual meeting, coordinates the Board’s activities -- and the list goes on and on.
然而同样非常重要的是，在总部办公室和我一起工作的23名男女同事。这个只有23人的团队高效处理各种事务：美国证监会和其他监管部门要求提供的大量文件，制作多达23000页的联邦收入所得税申报文件，还有州收入所得税和海外收入所得税相关申报文件，回应股东和媒体的无数个询问，寄送年度报告，筹备全美规模最大的上市公司股东年度大会，协调董事会活动，他们的活动名单还可以列举出来很多很多其它活动。
They handle all of these business tasks cheerfully and with unbelievable efficiency, making my life easy and pleasant. Their efforts go beyond activities strictly related to Berkshire: Last year they dealt with the 40 universities (selected from 200 applicants) who sent students to Omaha for a Q&A day with me. They also handle all kinds of requests that I receive, arrange my travel, and even get me hamburgers and French fries (smothered in ketchup, of course) for lunch. No CEO has it better; I truly do feel like tap dancing to work every day.
他们态度愉悦地处理这些企业事务，而且效率之高简直令人难以置信，让我倍感轻松和快乐。他们的努力并不仅局限于伯克希尔公司相关的活动，去年他们与40所大学打交道(从200名申请大学中筛选出来的)，每年这些大校将会选送一些学生到奥马哈，与我一起参加问答日活动。他们还要处理我收到的各种请求，安排我的旅行，甚至还要去帮我买午餐的汉堡包和炸薯条(当然要沾上番茄酱)。没有一个CEO像我做得这么舒服了；我真的感觉像是天天跳着踢踏舞去上班。
In closing, I think it’s become appropriate to ignore our “no pictures” policy and let you view our remarkable home-office crew. Below is a photo from our Christmas lunch. Two people couldn’t make it; otherwise you are looking at all of those who staff Berkshire’s headquarters. They are truly miracle-workers.
在这封信就要结束时，我认为应该忽略掉我们年报"不要任何图片"的一贯原则，让大家看一看我们这些非常出色的家庭办公室工作人员。下面这张照片是我们圣诞午餐的合影，只有2个人没入镜，否则你会看到伯克希尔总部所有员工，他们是真正创造奇迹的工作者。
Next year’s letter will review our 50 years at Berkshire and speculate a bit about the next 50. In the meantime, come to Omaha on May 3rd and enjoy our Woodstock for Capitalists.
明年致股东的信我们将会回顾伯克希尔公司过去的50年，并且展望未来的50年。与此同时，请于5月3日来到奥马哈，参加我们为资本家准备的Woodstock大聚会。
February 28, 2014
Warren E. Buffett
Chairman of the Board
Footnotes
-
All per-share figures used in this report apply to Berkshire’s A shares. Figures for the B shares are 1/1500th of those shown for A. ↩