原文信息：
- 标题：1975 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1976-03-26
- 链接：PDF
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：Terrellchen
- 校译：Terrellchen
To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Last year, when discussing the prospects for 1975, we stated “the outlook for 1975 is not encouraging.” This forecast proved to be distressingly accurate. Our operating earnings for 1975 were $6,713,592, or $6.85 per share, producing a return on beginning shareholders’ equity of 7.6%. This is the lowest return on equity experienced since 1967. Furthermore, as explained later in this letter, a large segment of these earnings resulted from Federal income tax refunds which will not be available to assist performance in 1976.
去年讨论公司 1975 年的前景时，我们预测今年的前景不是那么令人满意。不幸的是，这个预言成真了。1975 年我们的经营收益为 6,713,592 美元，也就是每股收益 6.85 美元，初始股本回报率为 7.6%。这是自1967 年以来最低的回报率。然而，正如这封信后面分析的那样，经营收益中相当大的一部分来自联邦所得税退税，1976 年将无助于改善业绩。
On balance, however, current trends indicate a somewhat brighter 1976. Operations and prospects will be discussed in greater detail below, under specific industry titles. Our expectation is that significantly better results in textiles, earnings added from recent acquisitions, an increase in equity in earnings of Blue Chip Stamps resulting from an enlarged ownership interest, and at least a moderate improvement in insurance underwriting results will more than offset other possible negatives to produce greater earnings in 1976. The major variable—and by far the most difficult to predict with any feeling of confidence—is the insurance underwriting result. Present very tentative indications are that underwriting improvement is in prospect. If such improvement is moderate, our overall gain in earnings in 1976 likewise will prove moderate. More significant underwriting improvement could give us a major gain in earnings.
但是，总的来说，目前的局势表明 1976 年状况会有所好转。下面几个具体分行业的章节中会有关于运营和前景更详细的分析讨论。我们的预计是：纺织业的业绩会有明显改善，近期的收购会增加收益，所有权权益的扩大会提高蓝筹印花的权益回报，以及保险承保利润至少有适度的改善足以抵消其他的不利影响，1976 年将会产生可观的利润。目前最不确定的，完全没有把握且难以预测的是保险承保业绩。初步迹象表明，承保的前景会有所改善。如果这方面的改善是缓慢的，那我们整体盈利的增加也会很缓慢。保险承保业务如果可以大幅改善，那么我们的经营收益也会大量增加。
During the first half of 1975 sales of textile products were extremely depressed, resulting in major production curtailments. Operations ran at a significant loss, with employment down as much as 53% from a year earlier.
1975 年上半年纺织品的销售低迷，导致主要产品减产。经营亏损显著，开工率比去年同期下降了 53% 。
In contrast with previous cyclical slumps, however, most textile producers quickly reduced production to match incoming orders, thus preventing massive industry‐wide accumulation of inventories. Such cutbacks caused quite prompt reflection at the mill operating level when demand revived at retail. As a result, beginning about midyear business rebounded at a fairly rapid rate. This “V” shaped textile depression, while one of the sharpest on record, also became one of the shortest ones in our experience. The fourth quarter produced an excellent profit for our textile division, bringing results for the year into the black.
然而，与以往的周期性衰退相比，多数纺织品生产商根据订单迅速减少了产量，因此防止了全行业大规模的存货积压。当零售恢复正常需求时，这种低库存在工厂运营层面快速反应，结果，年中业务就开始快速回升。这 "V" 形的纺织业的衰退，是记录中最明显的一次，同时也是持续时间最短的一次。第四季度我们的纺织部门获得了极好的利润，使全年业绩扭亏为盈。
On April 28, 1975 we acquired Waumbec Mills Incorporated and Waumbec Dyeing and Finishing Co., Inc. located in Manchester, New Hampshire. These companies have long sold woven goods into the drapery and apparel trade. Such drapery materials complement and extend the line already marketed through the Home Fabrics Division of Berkshire Hathaway. In the period prior to our acquisition, the company had run at a very substantial loss, with only about 55% of looms in operation and the finishing plant operating at about 50% of capacity. Losses continued on a reduced basis for a few months after acquisition. Outstanding efforts by our manufacturing, administrative and sales people now have produced major improvements, which, coupled with the general revival in textiles, have moved Waumbec into a significant profit position.
1975 年 4 月 28 日，我们收购了位于曼彻斯特新罕布什尔的 Waumbec Mills 公司和 Waumbec Dyeingand Finishing Co. 公司。这些公司长期以来一直在窗帘和服装行业销售梭织产品。这种窗帘材料补充和延伸了伯克希尔哈撒韦公司家用织物部门已经销售的产品线。在我们收购之前，该公司的亏损非常严重，只有约 55% 的织机在运行，染制厂只以 50% 的产能在运营。收购之后的几个月内亏损仍在继续，但是稍有减少。通过我们的制造商、管理人员和销售人员的杰出努力，情况已经有了很大的改进，同时也伴随着整个纺织业的复苏，Waumbec 公司现在已扭亏为盈了。
We expect a good level of profits from textiles in 1976. Continued progress is being made in the movement of Waumbec goods into areas of traditional marketing strength of Berkshire Hathaway, productivity should improve in both the weaving and finishing areas at Manchester, and textile demand continues to firm at decent prices.
我们预计 1976 年纺织部门会有不错的利润。持续性的项目已取得进展，曼彻斯特的 Waumbec 公司开始转产伯克希尔公司传统上营销具备优势领域的产品，并提升了织造和染整领域的生产效率，纺织品的持续需求态势，价格将稳定在合理的水平上。
We have great confidence in the ability of Ken Chace and his team to maximize our strengths in textiles. Therefore, we continue to look for ways to increase further our scale of operations while avoiding major capital investment in new fixed assets which we consider unwise, considering the relatively low returns historically earned on large scale investment in new textile equipment.
我们对 Ken Chace 及其团队在纺织品领域发挥其最大优势的能力充满信心。因此，我们将继续寻找方法以壮大经营规模，同时也避免对新的固定资产的资本投资，考虑到过去大规模投资新纺织设备所获得的资本回报相对较低，我们认为是不明智的。(收购代替建设)
The property and casualty insurance industry had its worst year in history during 1975. We did our share -- unfortunately, even somewhat more. Really disastrous results were concentrated in auto and long‐tail (contracts where settlement of loss usually occurs long after the loss event) lines.1
1975 年是有史以来财产和意外险行业表现最差的一年。我们也不能例外，不幸的是，我们的表现甚至比整个行业还要糟。真正灾难性的承保亏损都集中在汽车保险和长尾保险方面(通常在损失事件发生后很久才进行损失结算的合同)。1
Economic inflation, with the increase in cost of repairing humans and property far outstripping the general rate of inflation, produced ultimate loss costs which soared beyond premium levels established in a different cost environment. “Social” inflation caused the liability concept to be expanded continuously, far beyond limits contemplated when rates were established—in effect, adding coverage beyond what was paid for. Such social inflation increased significantly both the propensity to sue and the possibility of collecting mammoth jury awards for events not previously considered statistically significant in the establishment of rates. Furthermore, losses to policyholders which otherwise would result from mushrooming insolvencies of companies inadequately reacting to these problems are divided through Guaranty Funds among remaining solvent insurers. These trends will continue, and should moderate any optimism which otherwise might be justified by the sharply increased rates now taking effect.2
由于人身和财产的赔付成本增长远远超过一般通货膨胀率，经济通货膨胀导致最终损失成本飙升，超过了在不同成本环境下确定的保费水平。"社会通货膨胀"导致责任概念不断扩大，远远超出了最初确定费率时预期的赔付上限，还增加了超过保险合同赔偿范围的项目。这种概念还大大增加了起诉的倾向，也增加了为以前在拟定费率时不在统计范围内的事件获得陪审团巨额裁决的可能性。此外，由于对这些问题反应迟钝的保险公司迅速出现破产，而其保单持有人的损失则通过担保基金，分配给其他剩余的有偿付能力的保险公司。这些趋势将继续下去，而且应该缓和目前生效的大幅提高的费率可能带来的任何乐观情绪。2
Berkshire Hathaway’s insurance subsidiaries have a disproportionate concentration of business in precisely the lines which produced the worst underwriting results in 1975. Such lines produce unusually high investment income and, therefore, have been particularly attractive to us under previous underwriting conditions. However, our “mix” has been very disadvantageous during the past two years and it well may be that we will remain positioned in the more difficult part of the insurance spectrum during the inflationary years ahead.3
伯克希尔的保险子公司的业务过于集中于 1975 年承保业绩最差的业务线上。这些业务线产生异常高的投资收入，因此，在以前的承保标准下，对我们特别有吸引力。然而，我们的这种保险结构在过去两年中处于非常不利的境地，在未来几年通胀高企的年代中，保险行业将进入更为困难的阶段，我们的这种不利地位很有可能会继续维持下去。3
The only segment to show improved results for us during 1975 was the “home state” operation, which has made continuous progress under the leadership of John Ringwalt. Although still operating at a significant underwriting loss, the combined ratio improved from 1974. Adjusted for excess costs attributable to operations still in the start‐up phase, underwriting results are satisfactory. Texas United Insurance Company, a major problem a few years ago, has made outstanding progress since George Billing has assumed command. With an almost totally new agency force, Texas United was the winner of the “Chairman’s Cup” for achievement of the lowest loss ratio among the home state companies. Cornhusker Casualty Company, oldest and largest of the home state companies, continues its outstanding operation with major gains in premium volume and a combined ratio slightly under 100. Substantial premium growth is expected at the home state operation during 1976; the measurement of success, however, will continue to be the achievement of a low combined ratio.
1975 年保险业唯一值得一提的部门是住宅保险业务 (Home-State)，在 John Ringwalt 的领导下取得了持续的进展。尽管承保损失依然很大，但是综合比率还是比 1974 年有所改善。调整了仍处于启动阶段的运营所产生的超额成本，承保结果令人满意。德州联合保险公司 (Texas United Insurance) 是几年前的一个棘手的难题，自 George Billing 接手以来，取得了显著的进展。在凭借一支几乎全新的代理队伍，得克萨斯联合保险公司在 Home-State 保险公司中，以损失率最低的成绩赢得了 Chairman's Cup 冠军。内布拉斯加意外险公司 (Cornhusker Casualty) 是 Home-State 业务中历史最久规模最大的，继续以它优良的运营能力获得了大量的承保收益，综合比率略低于 100。 1976 年该业务的保费收入预计还是可以大量增加的，然而，衡量成功的标准仍将是实现较低的综合比率。
Our traditional business at National Indemnity Company, representing well over half of our insurance volume, had an extraordinarily bad underwriting year in 1975. Although rates were increased frequently and significantly, they continually lagged loss experience throughout the year. Several special programs instituted in the early 1970s have caused significant losses, as well as a heavy drain on managerial time and energies. Present indications are that premium volume will show a major increase in 1976, and we hope that underwriting results will improve.
我们在国民保险公司的传统业务，占我们保险业务量的一半以上，但 1975 年承保结果却异常糟糕。尽管费率频繁地大额提升，但是他们全年仍在持续地亏损。 70 年代早期设立的几个特殊的项目造成了重大损失，同时也消耗了我们大量的管理时间和精力。目前迹象表明，1976 年保费会有所增加，我们希望承保业绩也能有所改善。
Reinsurance suffered the same problems as our direct business during 1975. The same remedial efforts were attempted. Because reinsurance contract settlements lag those of direct business, it well may be that any upturn in results from our direct insurance business will precede those of the reinsurance segment.
再保险业务在 1975 年遇到了和直接保险业务相同的问题，我们尝试了相同的补救措施。由于再保险合同的清算滞后于那些直接的业务合同，因此我们直接保险业务的业绩好转，很可能会先于再保险部门。
At our Home and Automobile Insurance Company subsidiary, now writing auto business only in the Cook County area of Illinois, experience continued very bad in 1975 resulting in a management change in October. John Seward was made President at that time, and has energetically and imaginatively implemented a completely revamped underwriting approach.
Home & Auto 家庭汽车保险公司现在只在伊利诺伊州的库克县地区经营汽车保险业务，1975 年的业绩持续恶化，导致了 10 月份管理层的变动。当时 John Seward 被任命为总裁，并积极而富有想象力地实施了一项彻底改革的承保方法。
Overall, our insurance operation will produce a substantial gain in premium volume during 1976. Much of this will reflect increased rates rather than more policies. Under normal circumstances such a gain in volume would be welcome, but our emotions are mixed at present. Underwriting experience should improve—and we expect it to—but our confidence level is not high. While our efforts will be devoted to obtaining a combined ratio below 100, it is unlikely to be attained during 1976.
总体来讲，1976 年我们保险业务的保费收入会增加很多。很大程度上是因为费率的提高而不是政策的改变。在正常的情况下，如此的增长很令人欣慰，但是我们现在的情绪却喜忧参半。保险承保的业绩仍需改善，我们希望是这样，但我们的信心不足。尽管我们会致力于使综合成本率达到 100 以下，但这在 1976 年几乎是不可能的。
Gains in investment income were moderate during 1975 because premium volume remained flat and underwriting losses reduced funds available for investment. Invested assets, measured at cost at yearend, were close to identical with the level at the beginning of the year.
1975 年保险投资的收益不是很多，因为保费收入不多并且承保损失导致可投资资金不足。年底以成本计的投资资产，大概与年初的水平一致。
At the end of 1974 the net unrealized loss in the stock section of our portfolio amounted to about $17 million, but we expressed the opinion, nevertheless, that this portfolio overall represented good value at its carrying value of cost. During 1975 a net capital loss of $2,888,000 before tax credits was realized, but our present expectation is that 1976 will be a year of realized capital gain. On March 31, 1976 our net unrealized gains applicable to equities amounted to about $15 million. Our equity investments are heavily concentrated in a few companies which are selected based on favorable economic characteristics, competent and honest management, and a purchase price attractive when measured against the yardstick of value to a private owner.
1974 年底，我们投资组合中股票部分的未实现净损失约为 1700 万美元，但是我们坚信，不论如何，这个组合整体的账面价值相对于其投资成本而言，还是有着良好的投资价值的。 1975 年税收抵免前的投资净损失是 288.8 万美元，但是目前我们预计 1976 年会实现资本性盈利。 1976 年 3 月 31 日，我们普通股未变现的盈利总计约 1500 万美元。
When such criteria are maintained, our intention is to hold for a long time; indeed, our largest equity investment is 467,150 shares of Washington Post “B” stock with a cost of $10.6 million, which we expect to hold permanently.
我们股权投资主要集中于少数几家此种类型的公司：有着良好的经济护城河，称职且诚实的管理层，并且以私人所有者的价值尺度来衡量，购买价格很有吸引力。当这些要素都具备了，我们就打算长期持有；实际上，我们最大的股权投资是投资了 467,150 股 Washington Post 华盛顿邮报 B 股，成本约 1063 万美元，我们期望永久持有。
With this approach, stock market fluctuations are of little importance to us—except as they may provide buying opportunities—but business performance is of major importance. On this score we have been delighted with progress made by practically all of the companies in which we now have significant investments.
通过这种方法，股市的波动对我们的影响无关紧要，除非出现购买机会，但是公司的经营业绩仍旧是最重要的。在这方面，我们对几乎所有我们现在有重大投资的公司所取得的进展感到高兴。
We have continued to maintain a strong liquid position in our insurance companies. In last year’s annual report we explained how variations of 1/10 of 1% in interest rates result in million dollar swings in market value of our bonds. We consider such market fluctuation of minor importance as our liquidity and general financial strength make it highly improbable that bonds will have to be sold at times other than those of our choice.
我们将在保险公司里继续保持强大的流动性头寸。去年年报我们解释过利率仅仅变化 1‰ 如何导致我们债券的市值出现百万美元波动的。我们认为这样的市场波动并不重要，因为我们强大的资本流动性和健康的财务优势，使不得不卖出债券的可能性几乎为零。
It is difficult to find adjectives to describe the performance of Eugene Abegg, Chief Executive of Illinois National Bank and Trust of Rockford, Illinois, our banking subsidiary.
任何言辞都难以赞扬我们的伊利诺伊国民银行首席执行官 Gene Abegg 的卓越表现。
In a year when many banking operations experienced major troubles, Illinois National continued its outstanding record. Against average loans of about $65 million, net loan losses were $24,000, or .04%. Unusually high liquidity is maintained with obligations of the U. S. Government and its agencies, all due within one year, at yearend amounting to about 75% of demand deposits. Maximum rates of interest are paid on all consumer savings instruments which make up more than half of the deposit base. Yet, despite the maintenance of premier liquidity and the avoidance of “stretching” for high yield loans, the Illinois National continues as about the most profitable bank of its size, or larger, in the country.
在许多银行经营出现重大困难的一年里，伊利诺伊国民银行继续保持着出色的业绩。相对于 6500 万美元的平均贷款，净贷款损失仅 2.4 万美元，或 0.04% 的损失。在美国政府和其机构的要求下，它保持着极高的资本流动性，年底时所有一年内到期的定期存款占了 75%。所有超过 200 万美元的消费者储蓄账户都支付最高法定利率，然而，尽管伊利诺伊国民银行保持了极高的流动性，并避免 "展期"高收益贷款，但它仍然是全国同规模或更大的银行中最赚钱的银行。
In 1975 the thirty largest banks in the United States earned an average of .5% on total assets. The Illinois National earned about four times that much. These same thirty largest banks carried down 7% of operating revenues to net income. Without counting any tax benefits from consolidation, Illinois National carried down 27%.
1975 年，美国最大的 30 家银行的平均总资产收益率为 0.5%。伊利诺伊国民银行的收益大约是这个数字的四倍。这三十家大型银行中，将 7% 的营业收入转化为净收入。而伊利诺伊国家银行在不考虑合并所带来的任何税收优惠的情况下，将 27% 的营业收入转化为净收入。
Gene Abegg opened the doors of the Illinois National Bank in 1931 with paid-in capital of $250,000. In 1932, its first full year of operation, it earned $8,782. No additional capital has been paid in, and we recommend reading its financial statements on pages 28-34 to see what a truly outstanding manager has built in 44 years at the helm.
吉恩-阿贝格于 1931 年开办了伊利诺伊国民银行，实收资本为 25 万美元。1932 年，即开业后的第一个完整年度，该银行赚取了 8782 美元。此后没有进行额外的资本注入，我们建议您阅读第 28-34 页的财务报表，看看这位真正杰出的管理者在 44 年的掌舵生涯中创造了怎样的业绩。
Under the present interest rate structure, it is expected that earnings of the Bank will be off somewhat during 1976 but still will remain at a highly satisfactory level.
在目前的利率结构下，预计 1976 年该银行的收益将略有下降，但仍将保持在非常令人满意的水平上。
During 1975 our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps remained at 25.5 of that company’s outstanding shares. However, early in 1976 our holdings were increased to 31.5%. We expect some increase in our equity in Blue Chip’s earnings in 1976 because of this increased ownership.
1975 年，我们持有的蓝筹印花公司股票仍占该公司已发行股份的 25.5%。但在 1976 年初，我们的持股比例增加到 31.5%。由于持股比例的增加，我们预计 1976 年我们在蓝筹印花公司收益中的权益会有一定程度的增加。
The stamp business continues its precipitous decline with volume in the year ended February 28, 1976 amounting to only one-sixth that of the peak year ended February 28, 1970. Don Koeppel and Bill Ramsey have done an extraordinary job of cost-cutting, which has served to moderate operating problems resulting from this evaporation of business. In addition, the acquisition of See’s Candies in 1972 has proven a real winner. Chuck Huggins’s management has been outstanding, and profits have moved up dramatically during the past several years.
印花业务继续急剧下降，截至 1976 年 2 月 28 日的一年中，印花业务量仅为截至 1970 年 2 月 28 日的高峰年的六分之一。唐-科佩尔（Don Koeppel）和比尔-拉姆齐（Bill Ramsey）出色地完成了削减成本的工作，从而缓解了业务流失带来的经营问题。此外，1972 年对 See's 糖果公司的收购也被证明是一个真正的赢家。查克-哈金斯（Chuck Huggins）的管理非常出色，在过去几年里，利润大幅增长。
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. desiring the current annual report of Blue Chip Stamps should write Mr. Robert H. Bird, Secretary, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.
伯克希尔哈撒韦公司的股东如需蓝筹印花公司的最新年度报告，请致函蓝筹印花公司秘书 Robert H. Bird 先生，地址：5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040。
In reading our earnings statement you will notice a significant amount of Federal income taxes paid in earlier years are now recoverable because of the net operating loss, as computed for tax purposes, sustained in 1975. Such loss results from the exclusion from income of 100% of interest from state and local issues, and 85% of dividends from domestic corporations. We have exhausted our reservoir of available tax recoveries and, therefore, a repeat of our overall operating performance in 1976 would produce much smaller net earnings. While we do not expect this result, it is important that you are aware of the absence of this cushion in the event that operating losses, as calculated for Federal tax purposes, should continue.
在阅读我们的损益表时，你会注意到，由于 1975 年持续的净营业亏损(按税收目的计算)，早期支付的大量联邦所得税现在可以收回。这种亏损是由于 100% 的州和地方债券利息以及 85% 的国内公司股息被排除在收入之外。我们已经耗尽了可用的税款回收储备，因此，如果我们 1976 年的总体经营业绩重蹈覆辙，净利润将大大减少。虽然我们并不期望出现这种结果，但重要的是，您要意识到，如果按照联邦税收目的计算的经营亏损继续存在，就不会有这种缓冲。
In addition to the 1975 Waumbec acquisition, we acquired for cash and notes on January 6, 1978, 100% of the assets of K & W Products, including its insurance subsidiaries. The insurance operations are minor in scope, representing business already associated with National Indemnity Company. K & W Products manufactures specialty automotive chemicals for use in automobile maintenance, such as radiator and block sealants, gasket compounds and fuel and oil additives. The company has extensive trademark or trade name protection for its products, which it manufactures at plants in California and Indiana. Although relatively small, with sales of a little over $2 million, it consistently has generated favorable earnings. Positioned as we now are with respect to income taxes, the addition of a solid source of taxable income is particularly welcome.
除了 1975 年对 Waumbec 公司的收购外，我们还于 1978 年 1 月 6 日以现金和票据收购了 K & W Products 公司 100% 的资产，包括其保险子公司。这些保险业务规模较小，是已经与国民保险公司相关联的业务。K & W 产品公司生产用于汽车维护的特种汽车化学品，如散热器和缸体密封剂、垫片粘合剂以及燃油和机油添加剂。该公司在加利福尼亚州和印第安纳州的工厂生产的产品拥有广泛的商标或商号保护。虽然公司规模相对较小，销售额略高于 200 万美元，但却一直保持着良好的收益。鉴于我们目前在所得税方面的处境，增加一个可靠的应税收入来源尤其值得欢迎。
Your present management assumed responsibility at Berkshire Hathaway in May, 1965. At the end of the prior fiscal year (September, 1964) the net worth of the Company was $22.1 million, and 1,137,778 common shares were outstanding, with a resulting book value of $19.46 per share. Ten years earlier, Berkshire Hathaway’s net worth had been $53.4 million. Dividends and stock repurchases accounted for over $21 million of the decline in company net worth, but aggregate net losses of $9.8 million had been incurred on sales of $595 million during the decade.
目前的管理层是于 1965 年 5 月接管伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的。上一财年 (1964 年 9 月) 结束时，公司的净资产是 2210 万美元，流通在外的普通股有 1,137,778 股，每股账面价值是 19.46 美元。十年之前的 1955 年，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的净资产已是 5340 万美元。股息和股票回购占账面价值减少额的 2100 万美元以上，但是这十年期间，5.95 亿美元的销售却产生了 980 万美元的净损失。
In 1965, two New England textile mills were the company’s only sources of earning power and, before Ken Chace assumed responsibility for the operation, textile earnings had been erratic and, cumulatively, something less than zero subsequent to the merger of Berkshire Fine Spinning and Hathaway Manufacturing. Since 1964, net worth has been built to $92.9 million, or $94.92 per share. We have acquired total, or virtually total ownership of six businesses through negotiated purchases for cash (or cash and notes) from private owners, started four others, purchased a 31.5% interest in a large affiliate enterprise and reduced the number of outstanding shares of Berkshire Hathaway to 979,569. Overall, equity per share has compounded at an annual rate of slightly over 15%.
1965 年，新英格兰地区的两个纺织厂是公司的唯一盈利来源，在 Ken Chace 接管这项业务之前，纺织利润是不稳定的，在伯克希尔精纺公司和哈撒韦制造公司合并之后收入累计是亏损的。自 1964 年以来，公司净资产已累积到 9290 万美元，即每股 94.92 美元。我们通过谈判从私营业主那用现金(或者是现金和支票)收购六家公司的全部或几乎全部所有权(联合零售，国民保险，伊利诺伊银行，喜诗糖果，蓝筹印花，威斯科金融)，整合成四家(保险，银行，零售，蓝筹印花)，又购买一家关联公司约 31.5% 的股份 (GEICO)，并将伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司的在外流通股减少至 979,569 股。总体而言，每股权益的年复利率略高于 15%。
While 1975 was a major disappointment, efforts will continue to develop growing and diversified sources of earnings. Our objective is a conservatively financed and highly liquid business—possessing extra margins of balance sheet strength consistent with the fiduciary obligations inherent in the banking and insurance industries—which will produce a long term rate of return on equity capital exceeding that of American industry as a whole.
尽管 1975 年的业绩令人大失所望，但是我们会继续致力于壮大公司规模并使得盈利来源多元化。我们的目标是维持保守的融资和资本的高流动性，保持资产负债表的额外盈利优势，同时坚守银行及保险行业固有的信托责任，这样会使得我们长期的股权资本回报率高于美国整体行业的水平。
Warren E. Buffett, Chairman
沃伦·巴菲特 董事长
Footnotes
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By Terrellchen @20231010
原文： We did our share—unfortunately, even somewhat more. Really disastrous results were concentrated in auto and long‐tail (contracts where settlement of loss usually occurs long after the loss event) lines.
芒格书院共读群友：我们拥有市场份额，不幸地是还有很多。真正灾难性的承保亏损都集中在汽车和长尾线上(通常在损失事件发生后很久才进行损失结算的合同)。
参照张志雄版，修改为：我们也不能例外，不幸的是，我们的表现甚至比整个行业还要糟。真正灾难性的承保亏损都集中在汽车保险和长尾保险方面(通常在损失事件发生后很久才进行损失结算的合同)。 ↩ ↩2
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By Terrellchen @20231010
原文：These trends will continue, and should moderate any optimism which otherwise might be justified by the sharply increased rates now taking effect.
芒格书院共读群友：破产的趋势将继续下去，并且应该会缓和任何对赔付乐观的情绪，否则，已经生效的那些大幅增加赔偿金的案例，可能会证明这种赔付乐观的情绪是合理的。
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By Terrellchen @20231010
原文：However, our “mix” has been very disadvantageous during the past two years and it well may be that we will remain positioned in the more difficult part of the insurance spectrum during the inflationary years ahead.
芒格书院共读群友：然而，在过去两年中，我们的"投资组合"非常不利，很可能在未来的通胀年份，我们仍将处于保险业务范围中更困难的部分。
修改为张志雄版：然而，我们的这种保险结构在过去两年中处于非常不利的境地，在未来几年通胀高企的年代中，保险行业将进入更为困难的阶段，我们的这种不利地位很有可能会继续维持下去。 ↩ ↩2