原文信息：
- 标题：1989 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1990-03-02
- 链接：HTML
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：when breath becomes air
- 校译：伴读小兽
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司全体股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1989 was $1.515 billion, or 44.4%. Over the last 25 years (that is, since present management took over) our per-share book value has grown from $19.46 to $4,296.01, or at a rate of 23.8% compounded annually.
本公司1989年的账面价值增加了15.15亿美元，或增长了44.4%(标普31.7%)，自从现任管理层接手的25年以来，每股帐面价值从19.46美元增长到现在的4,296.01美元，年复合增长率约为23.8%。
What counts, however, is intrinsic value - the figure indicating what all of our constituent businesses are rationally worth. With perfect foresight, this number can be calculated by taking all future cash flows of a business - in and out - and discounting them at prevailing interest rates. So valued, all businesses, from manufacturers of buggy whips to operators of cellular phones, become economic equals.
然而真正重要的还是内在价值，这个数字代表组成我们企业所有业务的合理价值，根据精准的远见，这个数字可由企业未来预计的现金流量(包含流进与流出)，并以现行的利率予以折现，不管是马鞭的制造公司或是移动电话的业者都可以在同等的地位上，据以评估其经济价值。
Back when Berkshire's book value was $19.46, intrinsic value was somewhat less because the book value was entirely tied up in a textile business not worth the figure at which it was carried. Now most of our businesses are worth far more than their carrying values. This agreeable evolution from a discount to a premium means that Berkshire's intrinsic business value has compounded at a rate that somewhat exceeds our 23.8% annual growth in book value.
当伯克希尔的帐面价值是19.46美元之时，由于主要的资产属于纺织业务，所以内在价值要低于帐面价值，时至今日，我们多数业务的内在价值却早已较帐面价值多的多，这种令人愉快的从折价到溢价的演变，代表着伯克希尔内在价值增长的速度要比帐面价值每年平均23.8%的复合增长率还要再高一些。
The rear-view mirror is one thing; the windshield is another. A large portion of our book value is represented by equity securities that, with minor exceptions, are carried on our balance sheet at current market values. At yearend these securities were valued at higher prices, relative to their own intrinsic business values, than has been the case in the past. One reason is the buoyant 1989 stock market. More important, the virtues of these businesses have been widely recognized. Whereas once their stock prices were inappropriately low, they are not now.
后视镜是一回事，面向未来又是另外一回事，我们帐面价值大部分是我们所持有的有价证券，除了少数的例外，大多数是以市价列示在资产负债表上，与过去相比，年底这些有价证券市价已大幅超过其内在价值，一方面是因为1989年股市的飙涨，另一方面则是这些有价证券的价值得到大家的认同，也就是说过去他们的股价曾经相当的低估，但这种情况如今已不复存在。
We will keep most of our major holdings, regardless of how they are priced relative to intrinsic business value. This 'til-death-do-us-part attitude, combined with the full prices these holdings command, means that they cannot be expected to push up Berkshire's value in the future as sharply as in the past. In other words, our performance to date has benefited from a double-dip: (1) the exceptional gains in intrinsic value that our portfolio companies have achieved; (2) the additional bonus we realized as the market appropriately "corrected" the prices of these companies, raising their valuations in relation to those of the average business. We will continue to benefit from good gains in business value that we feel confident our portfolio companies will make. But our "catch-up" rewards have been realized, which means we'll have to settle for a single-dip in the future.
我们仍然会保持主要持仓不动，不管相较于内在价值其市价是多少，我们对于他们至死不分离的态度加上这些股票现在的价位，意味者他们在未来可能无法再像先前那样将伯克希尔的净值大幅向上推升。换句话说，我们能有现在的表现主要受惠于量价双击：(1)我们旗下的公司所创造出的内在价值增长，(2)由于市场修正这些公司的股价，他们相对于一般企业的估值大幅提高了，我们又收到了额外的红利。我们将继续受益于公司业务价值的良好增长，但是对于估值修复的回报已经实现，这意味着我们将来只能依靠业绩的增长。
We face another obstacle: In a finite world, high growth rates must self-destruct. If the base from which the growth is taking place is tiny, this law may not operate for a time. But when the base balloons, the party ends: A high growth rate eventually forges its own anchor.
此外我们还面临到另一项挑战，在有限的世界里，任何高成长的事物终将自我毁灭，若是增长的基数相对较小，那么这条定律可能暂时不起作用，但是当基数膨胀到一定程度时，好戏就会结束，高成长终有一天会被自己所束缚。
Carl Sagan has entertainingly described this phenomenon, musing about the destiny of bacteria that reproduce by dividing into two every 15 minutes. Says Sagan: "That means four doublings an hour, and 96 doublings a day. Although a bacterium weighs only about a trillionth of a gram, its descendants, after a day of wild asexual abandon, will collectively weigh as much as a mountain...in two days, more than the sun - and before very long, everything in the universe will be made of bacteria." Not to worry, says Sagan: Some obstacle always impedes this kind of exponential growth. "The bugs run out of food, or they poison each other, or they are shy about reproducing in public."
Carl Sagan曾经开玩笑地解释这种现象，有一种细菌每15分钟可以分裂一次，亦即代表每一小时复制四次，一天可复制96次，虽然单一个细菌其重量只有万亿分之一克，但是只要经过一天无止尽的无性生殖，其重量可能会比一座山还重，经过两天后，甚至会比太阳还重，要不了多久宇宙所有空间都将由这种细菌所组成。不过Sagan又说，大家不必担心，大自然总有一些障碍会阻止其指数成长，有可能是耗尽食物，或是互相毒害，或是羞于在大庭广众之下复制。
Even on bad days, Charlie Munger (Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner) and I do not think of Berkshire as a bacterium. Nor, to our unending sorrow, have we found a way to double its net worth every 15 minutes. Furthermore, we are not the least bit shy about reproducing - financially - in public. Nevertheless, Sagan's observations apply. From Berkshire's present base of $4.9 billion in net worth, we will find it much more difficult to average 15% annual growth in book value than we did to average 23.8% from the $22 million we began with.
即使是在最坏的情况下，查理·芒格与我都不认为伯克希尔会像细菌一样无止境地成长，当然更不可能像细菌那样找到每15分钟就能将净资产翻一番的方法，虽然，我们不会像细菌那般羞于在公开场合进行复制，不过，Sagan的观察仍然适用，相较于刚开始的2,200万，以伯克希尔目前的49亿美元的账面价值基础，我们实在很难像过去那样每年以15%以上的增长率增加。
Our 1989 gain of $1.5 billion was achieved after we took a charge of about $712 million for income taxes. In addition, Berkshire's share of the income taxes paid by its five major investees totaled about $175 million.
事实上，1989年伯克希尔15亿美元的净利润是支付了7.12亿美元所得税后实现的，此外，伯克希尔在五大主要被投资公司缴纳的所得税中所占份额为1.75亿美元。
Of this year's tax charge, about $172 million will be paid currently; the remainder, $540 million, is deferred. Almost all of the deferred portion relates to the 1989 increase in unrealized profits in our common stock holdings. Against this increase, we have reserved a 34% tax.
在今年的所得税费用中，大约有1.72亿美元是马上要支付的，剩下的5.4亿则可以记帐递延处理，大部分是由于1989年我们持有的股票未实现的增值收益，按34%的预估税率计算出来的。
We also carry reserves at that rate against all unrealized profits generated in 1987 and 1988. But, as we explained last year, the unrealized gains we amassed before 1987 - about $1.2 billion - carry reserves booked at the 28% tax rate that then prevailed.
另外我们也为1987年及1988年的未实现资本利得依照前项税率补提准备，但如同去年解释过的，我们在1987年以前所累积的未实现收益约12亿美元，仍依照当时28%的税率提列准备。
A new accounting rule is likely to be adopted that will require companies to reserve against all gains at the current tax rate, whatever it may be. With the rate at 34%, such a rule would increase our deferred tax liability, and decrease our net worth, by about $71 million - the result of raising the reserve on our pre-1987 gain by six percentage points. Because the proposed rule has sparked widespread controversy and its final form is unclear, we have not yet made this change.
新的会计原则有可能会要求，公司将所有的未实现利得以现行的税率估算(不管税率高低)，若以34%来计，这样的规则可能会大幅增加我们帐列递延所得税的数字，并使我们的账面价值减少约7,100万美元(约将税率提高6%，34%-28%)，由于新提出的规定引发相当大的争议，最后的结果尚难定论，所以我们尚未做此反应。
As you can see from our balance sheet on page 27, we would owe taxes of more than $1.1 billion were we to sell all of our securities at year-end market values. Is this $1.1 billion liability equal, or even similar, to a $1.1 billion liability payable to a trade creditor 15 days after the end of the year? Obviously not - despite the fact that both items have exactly the same effect on audited net worth, reducing it by $1.1 billion.
大家可以从资产负债表上看到，若是年底我们一口气将所有的有价证券按市价全部出清，则我们要支付的所得税将高达11亿美元，但这11亿的负债，是否就跟15天后要付给厂商的货款一样或是相近吗？很显然的并非如此，虽然在财务报表上计算的账面价值的方式都一样，只是很简单地减掉11亿美元。
On the other hand, is this liability for deferred taxes a meaningless accounting fiction because its payment can be triggered only by the sale of stocks that, in very large part, we have no intention of selling? Again, the answer is no.
另一方面，这项递延所得税负债是不是一项会计虚构呢？因为它的支付只能通过出售股票来触发，而在很大程度上，我们并不打算出售这些股票。答案很显然也不是。
In economic terms, the liability resembles an interest-free loan from the U.S. Treasury that comes due only at our election (unless, of course, Congress moves to tax gains before they are realized). This "loan" is peculiar in other respects as well: It can be used only to finance the ownership of the particular, appreciated stocks and it fluctuates in size - daily as market prices change and periodically if tax rates change. In effect, this deferred tax liability is equivalent to a very large transfer tax that is payable only if we elect to move from one asset to another. Indeed, we sold some relatively small holdings in 1989, incurring about $76 million of "transfer" tax on $224 million of gains.
就经济实质而言，这种递延所得税负债就好象是美国财政部借给我们的无息贷款，且到期日由我们自己来决定，(当然除非国会在收益实现之前就开始征税)，这种贷款还有一项很奇怪的特点，它只能被用来购买某些特定增值的股票，而且额度会随时市场价格而变动，有时也会因为税率变动而改变，事实上这种递延所得税有点类似于资产移转时所要缴交的转让税，事实上我们在1989年只做了一小部分的变动，总共产生了2.24亿的资本利得，因此发生了7,600万的转让税。
Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor - if successful - has an important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let's look at an extreme comparison.
由于税法运作的方式，如果情况许可的话，我们偏爱李伯大梦式的投资(短篇小说《Rip Van Winkle》)。因为较之疯狂短线进出的方法，它有一个很重要数学优势，让我们举一个很极端的例子来做说明。
Imagine that Berkshire had only $1, which we put in a security that doubled by yearend and was then sold. Imagine further that we used the after-tax proceeds to repeat this process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time. At the end of the 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left with about $25,250. Not bad. If, however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about $692,000.
假设伯克希尔只有1块美金的投资，但它每年却可以有一倍的回报，假设我们将卖掉后所得的资金，用同样的方式再重复19年，结果20年下来，依照34%的税率总共贡献给政府13,000美元，而我们自己则可以拿到25,250美元，看起来还不错。然而，要是我们简单一点，只做一次超棒的投资，同样每年翻一倍，则最后的金额却高达1,048,576美元，在扣除34%即356,500的所得税之后，实得约692,000美元。
The sole reason for this staggering difference in results would be the timing of tax payments. Interestingly, the government would gain from Scenario 2 in exactly the same 27:1 ratio as we - taking in taxes of $356,500 vs. $13,000 - though, admittedly, it would have to wait for its money.
之所以会有如此大的差异唯一的原因就是所得税支付的时点，有趣的是政府将以与我们完全相同的27：1比例从方案2中获益：税收为356500美元，而不是13000美元，当然政府必须等到最后才能拿到这笔税金。
We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring long-term investment commitments because of these mathematics. Indeed, it is possible we could earn greater after-tax returns by moving rather frequently from one investment to another. Many years ago, that's exactly what Charlie and I did.
必须强调的是，我们并不是因为这种简单的算术就倾向采用长期投资的态度。事实上，通过频繁地投资变动，我们有可能获得更高的税后回报。很多年前，查理跟我就是这样在做的。
Now we would rather stay put, even if that means slightly lower returns. Our reason is simple: We have found splendid business relationships to be so rare and so enjoyable that we want to retain all we develop. This decision is particularly easy for us because we feel that these relationships will produce good - though perhaps not optimal - financial results. Considering that, we think it makes little sense for us to give up time with people we know to be interesting and admirable for time with others we do not know and who are likely to have human qualities far closer to average. That would be akin to marrying for money - a mistake under most circumstances, insanity if one is already rich.
现在我们宁愿持股不动，即使这意味着回报率会略低一些。我们的理由很简单： 我们发现，极佳的商业关系是如此的稀缺，如此的令人愉快，以至于我们珍惜我们彼此间所发展出来的一切。这个决定对我们来说特别容易，因为我们相信这样的关系将产生良好的投资成果，尽管它可能不是最佳的。考虑到这一点，我们认为，放弃与我们熟悉欣赏的人，而把时间浪费在我们不认识且人格可能会在水准以下的人身上是没有意义的，就好像一个有钱人竟然还为了金钱而结婚，这未免有些精神错乱。
The table below shows the major sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase-price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. I've explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-price adjustments to be made on a business-by-business basis. The total net earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表列示伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各业务的收益状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之GAAP要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经审计的GAAP数字一致。
Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment section on pages 37-39, and in the Management's Discussion section on pages 40-44. In these sections you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. For information on Wesco's businesses, I urge you to read Charlie Munger's letter, which starts on page 54. In addition, we have reprinted on page 71 Charlie's May 30, 1989 letter to the U. S. League of Savings Institutions, which conveyed our disgust with its policies and our consequent decision to resign.
年报中还有企业个别部门的信息，有关Wesco公司的信息，我强烈建议大家可以看看查理·芒格所写的年报，里头包含查理在1989年5月写给美国储贷联盟的一封公开信，信中传达对于其推行政策的不满并做出辞去在其组织中的职位。
| Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 |
Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 |
Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 税后收益(伯克希尔应占) |
Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 税后收益(伯克希尔应占) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (000s omitted) | 1989 | 1988 | 1989 | 1988 |
| Operating Earnings 经营收益来源: |
||||
| Insurance Group 保险集团: |
||||
| Underwriting 承保收益 |
$ (24,400) | $ (11,081) | $ (12,259) | $ (1,045) |
| Net investment income 净投资收益 |
243,599 | 231,250 | 213,642 | 197,779 |
| Buffalo News 布法罗新闻 |
46,047 | 42,429 | 27,771 | 25,462 |
| Fechheimer 费区海默制服 |
12,621 | 14,152 | 6,789 | 7,720 |
| Kirby 柯比吸尘器 |
26,114 | 26,891 | 16,803 | 17,842 |
| Nebraska Furniture Mart 内布拉斯家具城 |
17,070 | 18,439 | 8,441 | 9,099 |
| Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group 斯科特费泽制造集团 |
33,165 | 28,542 | 19,996 | 17,640 |
| See’s Candies 喜诗糖果 |
34,235 | 32,473 | 20,626 | 19,671 |
| Wesco - other than insurance 西科金融-保险除外 |
13,008 | 16,133 | 9,810 | 10,650 |
| World Book 世界图书 |
25,583 | 27,890 | 16,372 | 18,021 |
| Amortization of Goodwill 商誉摊销 |
(3,387) | (2,806) | (3,372) | (2,806) |
| Other Purchase-Price Accounting Charges 购买法会计-其他费用 |
(5,740) | (6,342) | (6,668) | (7,340) |
| Interest Expense 利息费用* |
(42,389) | (35,613) | (27,098) | (23,212) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions 股东指定捐赠 |
(5,867) | (4,966) | (3,814) | (3,217) |
| Other 其他 |
23,755 | 41,059 | 12,863 | 27,177 |
| Operating Earnings 经营收益合计 |
393,414 | 418,450 | 299,902 | 313,441 |
| Sales of Securities 出售资产和已实现证券收益 |
223,810 | 131,671 | 147,575 | 85,829 |
| Total Earnings - all entities 所有实体-收益合计 |
$ 617,224 | $ 550,121 | $ 447,477 | $ 399,270 |
* Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group and Mutual Savings & Loan.
* 债务利息科目不包含斯科特费泽与互助储贷的利息费用
We refer you also to pages 45-51, where we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments. These correspond to the way Charlie and I think about the business and should help you calculate Berkshire's intrinsic value. Shown on these pages are balance sheets and earnings statements for: (1) our insurance operations, with their major investment positions itemized; (2) our manufacturing, publishing and retailing businesses, leaving aside certain non-operating assets and purchase-price accounting adjustments; (3) our subsidiaries engaged in finance-type operations, which are Mutual Savings and Scott Fetzer Financial; and (4) an all-other category that includes the non-operating assets (primarily marketable securities) held by the companies in segment (2), all purchase price accounting adjustments, and various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent companies.
在后面我会提到重新将伯克希尔的部门分类为四大项，这是查理跟我认为可以帮助大家计算本公司内在价值的最好方式，以下的资产负债表与损益表就是依此分类表示：(1)保险业务，并将主要投资部位归类，(2)制造、出版与零售业务，扣除非经营性资产与购买法会计调整，(3)金融业务子公司，如互助储贷与斯科特费泽财务公司，(4)其它项目，包含前述非经营性资产(主要是有价证券投资)，购买法调整，还有Wesco与伯克希尔母公司一些其它的资产与债务。
If you combine the earnings and net worths of these four segments, you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements. However, I want to emphasize that this four-category presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors, who in no way bless it.
如果你将这四个部门的收益与账面价值加总，会得到与经会计师依GAAP审计的数字一致，然而我还是必须强调这四类表述方式并未经过会计师的审计，我想他们还是选择不要看的好。
In addition to our reported earnings, we also benefit from significant earnings of investees that standard accounting rules do not permit us to report. On page 15, we list five major investees from which we received dividends in 1989 of about $45 million, after taxes. However, our share of the retained earnings of these investees totaled about $212 million last year, not counting large capital gains realized by GEICO and Coca-Cola. If this $212 million had been distributed to us, our own operating earnings, after the payment of additional taxes, would have been close to $500 million rather than the $300 million shown in the table.
除了报告收益外，实际上，我们还受惠于GAAP不能认列的收益，后面我列出的五家主要被投资公司在1989年收到的税后现金股利收入合计是4,500万美元，然而若依照投资比例我们可以分得的税后收益却高达2.12亿美元，这还不包含我们在GEICO保险与可口可乐身上所获得的资本利得，而若将这应得的2.12亿收益分给我们，则在扣除应付的所得税之后，公司报告的收益可能会大幅增加为5亿美元，而不是现在的3亿美元。
The question you must decide is whether these undistributed earnings are as valuable to us as those we report. We believe they are - and even think they may be more valuable. The reason for this a-bird-in-the-bush-may-be-worth-two-in-the-hand conclusion is that earnings retained by these investees will be deployed by talented, owner-oriented managers who sometimes have better uses for these funds in their own businesses than we would have in ours. I would not make such a generous assessment of most managements, but it is appropriate in these cases.
你必须决定的是，这些未分配的收益是否与我们帐上已经列示的收益具备同样的价值。我们相信他们是，甚至认为可能更有价值。之所以得出"一鸟在林胜于两鸟在手"这个结论是因为，与其把收益交到我们手中，还不如留给才华横溢且以股东利益为导向的经理人继续去运用发挥，通常我不会对一般的经理人有这么高的评价，但以这几家公司来说，的确是实至名归。
In our view, Berkshire's fundamental earning power is best measured by a "look-through" approach, in which we append our share of the operating earnings retained by our investees to our own reported operating earnings, excluding capital gains in both instances. For our intrinsic business value to grow at an average of 15% per year, our "look-through" earnings must grow at about the same pace. We'll need plenty of help from our present investees, and also need to add a new one from time to time, in order to reach this 15% goal.
我们认为，伯克希尔的基本盈利能力可以用透视收益的方法来衡量，也就是我们将被投资公司未分配给我们的收益加到报告的经营收益之上，这两种情况下都不包括资本利得。为了使我们的内在价值平均每年增长15%，我们的透视收益也必须要以同等的速度增加，因此我们相当需要现有的被投资公司给予我们更多的支持，同时也需要时时增加新进的成员才有办法达到这15%的目标。
In the past, we have labeled our major manufacturing, publishing and retail operations "The Sainted Seven." With our acquisition of Borsheim's early in 1989, the challenge was to find a new title both alliterative and appropriate. We failed: Let's call the group "The Sainted Seven Plus One."
在过去我们将主要的制造、出版与零售业昵称为七个圣徒，在1989年波仙珠宝加入后，马上面临的一个问题就是要找到一个贴切又好听的名词，但到目前为止我们还没有想到，现在姑且将他们称为"七加一圣徒"吧。
This divine assemblage - Borsheim's, The Buffalo News, Fechheimer Bros., Kirby, Nebraska Furniture Mart, Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Group, See's Candies, World Book - is a collection of businesses with economic characteristics that range from good to superb. Its managers range from superb to superb.
这神圣的组合：波仙珠宝、布法罗日报、费区海默、柯比吸尘器、内布拉斯加家具、斯科特费泽、喜诗糖果与世界图书公司，可以说是集合了从优秀到精湛的经济特征企业，他们的管理人也可以说是好的不能再好了。
Most of these managers have no need to work for a living; they show up at the ballpark because they like to hit home runs. And that's exactly what they do. Their combined financial statements (including those of some smaller operations), shown on page 49, illustrate just how outstanding their performance is. On an historical accounting basis, after-tax earnings of these operations were 57% on average equity capital. Moreover, this return was achieved with no net leverage: Cash equivalents have matched funded debt. When I call off the names of our managers - the Blumkin, Friedman and Heldman families, Chuck Huggins, Stan Lipsey, and Ralph Schey - I feel the same glow that Miller Huggins must have experienced when he announced the lineup of his 1927 New York Yankees.
大部分的管理人根本就不需要为谋生而工作，他们出现在球场的原因只是为了要击出全垒打，事实上这正是他们所做的。他们合并的财务报表(加上一些较小的业务)，显示他们的表现是如此的优异，以历史投资成本做基准，他们现在每年的税后收益高达平均股东权益的57%。此外，这种回报是在没有财务杠杆的情况下实现的，账上现金就足以清偿所有的借款，当我念到这些管理人的名字：Blumkins，Friedmans，Heldmans，Chuck Huggins，Stan Lipsey，Ralph Schey，这感觉就好象是名教练Miller Huggins在宣布1927纽约洋基队的先发阵容一样。
Let's take a look, business by business:
现在让我们逐一检视：
In its first year with Berkshire, Borsheim's met all expectations. Sales rose significantly and are now considerably better than twice what they were four years ago when the company moved to its present location. In the six years prior to the move, sales had also doubled. Ike Friedman, Borsheim's managing genius - and I mean that - has only one speed: fast-forward.
在波仙珠宝加入伯克希尔的第一年，它达到我们所有的预期目标，营业额大幅成长，较四年前刚搬到现址的时候要好上一倍，事实上在搬来现址的六年前，它的业绩早已成长了一倍，艾克·弗里德曼(Ike Friedman)波仙珠宝的管理天才，只有一种速度，那就是全速前进！
If you haven't been there, you've never seen a jewelry store like Borsheim's. Because of the huge volume it does at one location, the store can maintain an enormous selection across all price ranges. For the same reason, it can hold its expense ratio to about one-third that prevailing at jewelry stores offering comparable merchandise. The store's tight control of expenses, accompanied by its unusual buying power, enable it to offer prices far lower than those of other jewelers. These prices, in turn, generate even more volume, and so the circle goes 'round and 'round. The end result is store traffic as high as 4,000 people on seasonally-busy days.
如果你还没有到过那里，你一定没有看过像波仙那样的珠宝店，由于它在一家门店就销量巨大，所以在那里你可以看到各式各样、各种价格的珠宝可供选择。同样的理由，它的费用率大概只有一般同类型珠宝店的三分之一，对于费用的严格控管，加上优异的采购能力，使得它销售的珠宝要比其它店面要便宜许多，而便宜的价格又吸引更多的顾客上门，良性循环的结果，使得该店在忙季的单日人潮流量高达四千人。
Ike Friedman is not only a superb businessman and a great showman but also a man of integrity. We bought the business without an audit, and all of our surprises have been on the plus side. "If you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler" makes sense whether you are buying the whole business or a tiny diamond.
艾克·弗里德曼不但是个优秀的商人、伟大的推销员，更是品格高尚的人，买下这家店时，我们没有审计，事后所有的意外都是惊喜，有句话说：你不懂珠宝没有关系，但一定要认识珠宝商。这句话真的好有道理，不管是你要买一颗小小的钻石或是要买下一整家店都一样。
A story will illustrate why I enjoy Ike so much: Every two years I'm part of an informal group that gathers to have fun and explore a few subjects. Last September, meeting at Bishop's Lodge in Santa Fe, we asked Ike, his wife Roz, and his son Alan to come by and educate us on jewels and the jewelry business.
有一段故事可以说明为何我个人如此喜爱艾克，每两年我都会参加一个非正式的聚会，大家一起同乐并探索新事物，去年九月，我们在圣塔菲主教度假村聚会，邀请艾克跟他的夫人与儿子过来为大家讲解珠宝。
Ike decided to dazzle the group, so he brought from Omaha about $20 million of particularly fancy merchandise. I was somewhat apprehensive - Bishop's Lodge is no Fort Knox - and I mentioned my concern to Ike at our opening party the evening before his presentation. Ike took me aside. "See that safe?" he said. "This afternoon we changed the combination and now even the hotel management doesn't know what it is." I breathed easier. Ike went on: "See those two big fellows with guns on their hips? They'll be guarding the safe all night." I now was ready to rejoin the party. But Ike leaned closer: "And besides, Warren," he confided, "the jewels aren't in the safe."
艾克为了加深大家的印象，所以特地从奥马哈带了总值超过2,000万美元的各式珠宝，当时我个人有点担心，因为主教度假村并非像福克斯堡军事基地那般坚固，所以当晚在活动开始之前，我特别向艾克表达个人的关切，艾克把我拉到一旁说："看到那保险箱没？下午我们早已掉过包，所以根本没有人可能分得清真或假。"听到这话，我放心多了，艾克接着又说："看到旁边那两个腰配枪枝的彪形大汉没？他们会整晚守护着这只保险箱。"正当我舒口气准备回到宴会中时，艾克小声说到更重要的："真正的珠宝并不在保险箱里！"
How can we miss with a fellow like that - particularly when he comes equipped with a talented and energetic family, Alan, Marvin Cohn, and Don Yale.
我们怎么能够错过这样一号人物呢？尤其是当他背后还有一个兼具才能与活力的家族：艾伦Alan，马文·科恩Marvin Cohn和唐·耶鲁Don Yale。
At See's Candies we had an 8% increase in pounds sold, even though 1988 was itself a record year. Included in the 1989 performance were excellent same-store poundage gains, our first in many years.
尽管1988年已经创纪录，喜诗糖果去年糖果的销售磅数又增加了8%，而且单店的平均销售磅数经过好几年来的下滑，首次呈现正成长。
Advertising played an important role in this outstanding performance. We increased total advertising expenditures from $4 million to $5 million and also got copy from our agency, Hal Riney & Partners, Inc., that was 100% on the money in conveying the qualities that make See's special.
广告在这一出色业绩中扮演着很重要的角色，去年我们的广告预算从原先的400万增加到500万美元，通过我们的广告代理商Hal Riney合伙公司，将钱100%花在传达喜诗糖果之所以能够如此特别的品质之上。
In our media businesses, such as the Buffalo News, we sell advertising. In other businesses, such as See's, we are buyers. When we buy, we practice exactly what we preach when we sell. At See's, we more than tripled our expenditures on newspaper advertising last year, to the highest percentage of sales that I can remember. The payoff was terrific, and we thank both Hal Riney and the power of well-directed newspaper advertising for this result.
在我们的媒体业务，像是布法罗报纸，我们销售广告。在其它的业务，像是喜诗糖果，我们是广告客户，反而变成买主，然而当我们买广告时，我们做事的方式跟我们当初在卖广告的诉求是一致的，去年喜诗糖果在报纸广告上的花费是原来的三倍，这是我印象之中占营业额比例最高的一次，不过所得到的回报却更是惊人，对于能有这样的成绩，我们相当感谢Hal Riney与定向良好的报纸的宣传效果。
See's splendid performances have become routine. But there is nothing routine about the management of Chuck Huggins: His daily involvement with all aspects of production and sales imparts a quality-and-service message to the thousands of employees we need to produce and distribute over 27 million pounds of candy annually. In a company with 225 shops and a massive mail order and phone business, it is no small trick to run things so that virtually every customer leaves happy. Chuck makes it look easy.
喜诗杰出的表现已成为常态，但Chuck Huggins的管理却绝对不是侥幸，每天他都全心全意专注于生产与销售各个环节，将品质与服务的观念传达给公司上上下下几千位员工，每年销售超过2,700万磅的糖果，在一家拥有225家店面，再加上大量邮购与电话购买业务，要让每个客户都能够满心欢喜的离去，实在不是一件简单的事，不过这差事到了Chuck的手上，总是让人感觉轻松自在。
The Nebraska Furniture Mart had record sales and excellent earnings in 1989, but there was one sad note. Mrs. B - Rose Blumkin, who started the company 52 years ago with $500 - quit in May, after disagreeing with other members of the Blumkin family/management about the remodeling and operation of the carpet department.
内布拉斯加家具店的销售额与税前收益在1989年又创新高，但是这伴随着一项坏消息，52年前以500美元创立这家店的B夫人，由于与家族其它成员在地毯部门的改造和营运上意见不合，在五月决定离职。
Mrs. B probably has made more smart business decisions than any living American, but in this particular case I believe the other members of the family were entirely correct: Over the past three years, while the store's other departments increased sales by 24%, carpet sales declined by 17% (but not because of any lack of sales ability by Mrs. B, who has always personally sold far more merchandise than any other salesperson in the store).
B夫人可能是现存美国人中最聪明的生意人，但在这件事上我却必须站在家族其它成员的这一边，过去三年来，当店内其它部门营收平均增长24%之时，地毯销售却减少17%，(这并不是代表B夫人的销售技巧退步，因为她个人卖的商品绝对比店内其它营业员要多的多)。
You will be pleased to know that Mrs. B continues to make Horatio Alger's heroes look like victims of tired blood. At age 96 she has started a new business selling - what else? - carpet and furniture. And as always, she works seven days a week.
大家应该很高兴B夫人让Horatio Alger笔下的英雄看起来像是浴血奋战后的失败者，以96岁的高龄，她却执意再另创新事业，而且还是一样，卖家具跟地毯，同样地，每个礼拜工作七天。
At the Mart Louie, Ron, and Irv Blumkin continue to propel what is by far the largest and most successful home furnishings store in the country. They are outstanding merchants, outstanding managers, and a joy to be associated with. One reading on their acumen: In the fourth quarter of 1989, the carpet department registered a 75.3% consumer share in the Omaha market, up from 67.7% a year earlier and over six times that of its nearest competitor.
在原来的家具店，B夫人的子孙们还是继续支撑这家全美最大也最成功的家具业务，他们实在是相当优秀的生意人，管理者，跟他们一起相处实在是很愉快的一件事。有一件事可以显示他们的聪明才智，在1989年第四季，地毯部门在奥马哈地区的市场占有率从前一年度的67.7%增加到75.3%，相当于第二名竞争者的六倍。
NFM and Borsheim's follow precisely the same formula for success: (1) unparalleled depth and breadth of merchandise at one location; (2) the lowest operating costs in the business; (3) the shrewdest of buying, made possible in part by the huge volumes purchased; (4) gross margins, and therefore prices, far below competitors'; and (5) friendly personalized service with family members on hand at all times.
内布拉斯加家具店与波仙遵循的是相同的成功模式：(1)商品种类齐全、应有尽有(无与伦比的深度和广度)；(2)营运成本极低；(3)精明的采购，大量进货成本低；(4)低毛利，价格远低于同行；(5)亲切的个性化服务与家族式的管理。
Another plug for newspapers: NFM increased its linage in the local paper by over 20% in 1989 - off a record 1988 - and remains the paper's largest ROP advertiser by far. (ROP advertising is the kind printed in the paper, as opposed to that in preprinted inserts.) To my knowledge, Omaha is the only city in which a home furnishings store is the advertising leader. Many retailers cut space purchases in 1989; our experience at See's and NFM would indicate they made a major mistake.
另外补充一点，在1989年内布拉斯加家具店增加20%的报纸广告量，打破1988年记录，仍是当地报纸的最大ROP广告客户，(ROP指印在报纸上的广告，而非夹报)，就我所知，奥马哈是唯一一个以家具业者为最大报纸广告客户的地区，许多客户在1989年都消减广告投放，但是就我们在喜诗糖果与内布拉斯加家具店的经验来说，这实在是个天大的错误。
The Buffalo News continued to star in 1989 in three important ways: First, among major metropolitan papers, both daily and Sunday, the News is number one in household penetration - the percentage of local households that purchase it each day. Second, in "news hole" - the portion of the paper devoted to news - the paper stood at 50.1% in 1989 vs. 49.5% in 1988, a level again making it more news-rich than any comparable American paper. Third, in a year that saw profits slip at many major papers, the News set its seventh consecutive profit record.
布法罗新闻报在1989年有三点特别值得一提：首先，在所有主要的都会报纸中(不管是日报或是周末版)，布法罗新闻报的家庭渗透率是最高的(即当地家庭每天订购报纸的户数)；第二，新闻比率为50.1%(报纸所有版面中，新闻所占的比率)，而1988年是49.5%，这比率代表布法罗新闻报的新闻内容要比其它同类型的报纸要丰富许多；第三，在同业获利频频下滑之际，布法罗新闻报连续七年盈利。
To some extent, these three factors are related, though obviously a high-percentage news hole, by itself, reduces profits significantly. A large and intelligently-utilized news hole, however, attracts a wide spectrum of readers and thereby boosts penetration. High penetration, in turn, makes a newspaper particularly valuable to retailers since it allows them to talk to the entire community through a single "megaphone." A low-penetration paper is a far less compelling purchase for many advertisers and will eventually suffer in both ad rates and profits.
从某种程度而言，这三个因素是相关的，虽然很明显的高新闻比率会大幅减少获利，但是精彩丰富的新闻又能够吸引广大的读者，从而增加渗透率。而高的渗透率反过来又会使得报纸对广告商特别有价值，因为这好像让他们通过一个扩音器对整个社区进行宣传，相对的，一家渗透率低的报纸对于广告商的吸引力就大大的降低，到最后一定会使得广告费收入与获利节节下滑。
It should be emphasized that our excellent penetration is neither an accident nor automatic. The population of Erie County, home territory of the News, has been falling - from 1,113,000 in 1970 to 1,015,000 in 1980 to an estimated 966,000 in 1988. Circulation figures tell a different story. In 1975, shortly before we started our Sunday edition, the Courier-Express, a long-established Buffalo paper, was selling 207,500 Sunday copies in Erie County. Last year - with population at least 5% lower - the News sold an average of 292,700 copies. I believe that in no other major Sunday market has there been anything close to that increase in penetration.
必须强调的是，我们的渗透率并不是个意外，也不是自然而然的一件事，以布法罗新闻报的大本营伊利县(Erie)来说，当地的人口数从1970年的111万人一路减少到1980年的101万，再到1988年的96.6万人，但报纸发行量的变化却完全相反，1975年在我们刚准备开始发行周日版之前，一家布法罗当地相当悠久的报纸《信使快报》周日版的发行量约为20.75万份，去年在总人口比当初还少5%的情况下，《布法罗新闻报》的发行份数却有29.27万份。我相信，在美国其它周日版地区，这样的渗透率增长都罕有匹敌。
When this kind of gain is made - and when a paper attains an unequaled degree of acceptance in its home town - someone is doing something right. In this case major credit clearly belongs to Murray Light, our long-time editor who daily creates an informative, useful, and interesting product. Credit should go also to the Circulation and Production Departments: A paper that is frequently late, because of production problems or distribution weaknesses, will lose customers, no matter how strong its editorial content.
能够如此成长同时又得到家乡父老如此的支持，一定有人居功至伟，我想总编辑Murray Light应该是当之无愧，是他日复一日创造出如此发人深省、有用且有趣的产品，当然发行与生产部门也一样功不可没，一家报纸若是因为印刷或配送问题而时常误点，不管他的内容有多精彩丰富，一定会影响客户订阅的意愿的。
Stan Lipsey, publisher of the News, has produced profits fully up to the strength of our product. I believe Stan's managerial skills deliver at least five extra percentage points in profit margin compared to the earnings that would be achieved by an average manager given the same circumstances. That is an amazing performance, and one that could only be produced by a talented manager who knows - and cares - about every nut and bolt of the business.
Stan Lipsey报纸的发行人，他创造的利润完全匹配我们的产品竞争力，我相信，相比普通的经理人，Stan管理能力至少让我们报纸的经营收益增加五个百分点以上，这真是令人赞叹的表现，这只有完全熟悉企业大大小小事物的优秀经理人才有办法做到这样的成绩。
Stan's knowledge and talents, it should be emphasized, extend to the editorial product. His early years in the business were spent on the news side and he played a key role in developing and editing a series of stories that in 1972 won a Pulitzer Prize for the Sun Newspaper of Omaha. Stan and I have worked together for over 20 years, through some bad times as well as good, and I could not ask for a better partner.
Stan的知识与才能也延伸到编辑出版之上，早期他个人的生涯多花在新闻采访之上，曾经花了相当多的时间报导一系列的故事，并在1972年为奥马哈太阳报赢得新闻界的最高荣誉普利策奖。Stan与我已经共事长达20年之久，同风雨共彩虹，实在很难再找到像他这么好的伙伴。
At Fechheimer, the Heldman clan - Bob, George, Gary, Roger and Fred - continue their extraordinary performance. Profits in 1989 were down somewhat because of problems the business experienced in integrating a major 1988 acquisition. These problems will be ironed out in time. Meanwhile, return on invested capital at Fechheimer remains splendid.
费区海默的Heldman's家族(Bob, George, Gary, Roger, Fred)继续表现不凡，1989年的获利因为1988年的一件大的并购案出了点问题而略受影响，所幸问题及时获得解决，所以费区海默的投资报酬还是相当不错。
Like all of our managers, the Heldmans have an exceptional command of the details of their business. At last year's annual meeting I mentioned that when a prisoner enters San Quentin, Bob and George probably know his shirt size. That's only a slight exaggeration: No matter what area of the country is being discussed, they know exactly what is going on with major customers and with the competition.
像我们其它的管理人，Heldmans家族对于其业务的了解巨细靡遗，去年的年度股东会时我曾经半开玩笑的说，只要犯人一进到监狱，Bob就可以马上知道他的身材尺寸是多少。毫不夸张的说：不管你跟他们提到全美哪一个地区，他们都相当清楚当地的市场与竞争对手的状况。
Though we purchased Fechheimer four years ago, Charlie and I have never visited any of its plants or the home office in Cincinnati. We're much like the lonesome Maytag repairman: The Heldman managerial product is so good that a service call is never needed.
虽然我们是在四年之前买下费区海默的，但查理跟我却从来没有去参观过他们的工厂或是位在辛辛那提的总部，我们有点像是无聊的Maytag维修工人，由于Heldman家族出品的管理太好，以致于我们从来就没有接过叫修的电话。
Ralph Schey continues to do a superb job in managing our largest group - World Book, Kirby, and the Scott Fetzer Manufacturing Companies. Aggregate earnings of these businesses have increased every year since our purchase and returns on invested capital continue to be exceptional. Ralph is running an enterprise large enough, were it standing alone, to be on the Fortune 500. And he's running it in a fashion that would put him high in the top decile, measured by return on equity.
拉尔夫·谢伊(Ralph Schey)还是继续发挥他的长才，为我们管理最大的集团：世界百科全书、柯比吸尘器与斯科特费泽制造集团，自从我们买下这些企业以来，他们的税前收益年年都在增加，投入资本回报率ROIC相当可观，Ralph所领导的企业集团真是够大，旗下事业加总起来足以名列世界500强，而若以ROIC的角度来看，大概可以让他排在前十名。
For some years, World Book has operated out of a single location in Chicago's Merchandise Mart. Anticipating the imminent expiration of its lease, the business is now decentralizing into four locations. The expenses of this transition are significant; nevertheless profits in 1989 held up well. It will be another year before costs of the move are fully behind us.
有好几年，世界图书公司只在芝加哥的一个商业广场集中营运，有鉴于租约即将到期，未来它将分散成四个地点，搬迁的费用相当的庞大。尽管如此，1989年的获利还是会增加，再过一年，搬迁的费用才会消失。
Kirby's business was particularly strong last year, featuring large gains in export sales. International business has more than doubled in the last two years and quintupled in the past four; its share of unit sales has risen from 5% to 20%. Our largest capital expenditures in 1989 were at Kirby, in preparation for a major model change in 1990.
柯比的生意去年特别的旺，尤其是在国际出口方面的成长惊人，过去两年来的业绩已成长了一倍，四年来成长了四倍，市场占有率从5%增加到20%。我们1989年最大的资本支出就花在柯比身上，预计在1990年会有一次重大改款。
Ralph's operations contribute about 40% of the total earnings of the non-insurance group whose results are shown on page 49. When we bought Scott Fetzer at the start of 1986, our acquisition of Ralph as a manager was fully as important as our acquisition of the businesses. In addition to generating extraordinary earnings, Ralph also manages capital extremely well. These abilities have produced funds for Berkshire that, in turn, have allowed us to make many other profitable commitments.
Ralph的业务部门所贡献的收益大概占非保险部门的40%左右，当我们在1986年初买下斯科特费泽时，能将Ralph一并挖过来当经理人，跟我们当初买下这家公司一样地重要，除了贡献可观的收益之外，Ralph管理资金也是一把好手。这些能力使得伯克希尔能够获得源源不绝的资金，让我们回头可以再做更多更好的投资。
And that completes our answer to the 1927 Yankees.
以上就是我们的职棒先发阵容！
Shown below is an updated version of our usual table presenting key figures for the property-casualty insurance industry:
下表是财产意外险业的几项重要指数：
| Year 年度 |
Yearly Change in Premiums Written (%) 保费收入增长率 |
Statutory Combined Ratio After Policyholder Dividends 综合比率 |
Yearly Change in Incurred Losses (%) 损失赔付增长率 |
Inflation Rate Measured by GNP Deflator (%) 通货膨胀率 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1981 | 3.8 | 106.0 | 6.5 | 9.6 |
| 1982 | 3.7 | 109.6 | 8.4 | 6.5 |
| 1983 | 5.0 | 112.0 | 6.8 | 3.8 |
| 1984 | 8.5 | 118.0 | 16.9 | 3.8 |
| 1985 | 22.1 | 116.3 | 16.1 | 3.0 |
| 1986 | 22.2 | 108.0 | 13.5 | 2.6 |
| 1987 | 9.4 | 104.6 | 7.8 | 3.1 |
| 1988 | 4.4 | 105.4 | 5.5 | 3.3 |
| 1989 (Est.) | 2.1 | 110.4 | 8.7 | 4.2 |
Source: A.M. Best Co.
资料来源：贝氏评级公司
The combined ratio represents total insurance costs (losses incurred plus expenses) compared to revenue from premiums: A ratio below 100 indicates an underwriting profit, and one above 100 indicates a loss. When the investment income that an insurer earns from holding policyholders' funds ("the float") is taken into account, a combined ratio in the 107-111 range typically produces an overall breakeven result, exclusive of earnings on the funds provided by shareholders.
综合比率代表的是保险的总成本(损失加上费用)占保费收入的比率，100以下代表会有承保收益，100以上代表会有承保损失，若把持有保费收入浮存金(扣除股东权益部分所产生的收益)所产生的投资收益列入考量，损益两平的范围大概是在107-111之间。
For the reasons laid out in previous reports, we expect the industry's incurred losses to grow by about 10% annually, even in years when general inflation runs considerably lower. (Actually, over the last 25 years, incurred losses have grown at a still faster rate, 11%.) If premium growth meanwhile materially lags that 10% rate, underwriting losses will mount, though the industry's tendency to underreserve when business turns bad may obscure their size for a time.
基于前几次年报所说明的理由，即使是通货膨胀在这几年来相对温和，我们预期保险业每年损失增加的比率约在10%左右，若是保费收入增长没有到达10%以上，承保损失将会增加，(事实上过去25年以来，理赔损失系以11%的速度在增长)。不过，保险公司在业务恶化时，会习惯性地降低准备金，可能会暂时掩盖恶化的程度。
Last year we said the climb in the combined ratio was "almost certain to continue - and probably will accelerate - for at least two more years." This year we will not predict acceleration, but otherwise must repeat last year's forecast. Premium growth is running far below the 10% required annually. Remember also that a 10% rate would only stabilize the combined ratio, not bring it down.
去年我们曾说，在未来两年内综合比率肯定会继续上升，甚至还会加速。今年我们不会预测加速度，但必须重复去年的预测。保费收入的增长率远低于最低10%增长的要求，而且大家要记住，10%只表示能抑止综合比率上升的情况，却不能使它下降。
The increase in the combined ratio in 1989 was a little more than we had expected because catastrophes (led by Hurricane Hugo) were unusually severe. These abnormalities probably accounted for about two points of the increase. If 1990 is more of a "normal" year, the combined ratio should rise only minimally from the catastrophe-swollen base of 1989. In 1991, though, the ratio is apt to climb by a greater degree.
1989年综合比率增加的幅度略高于我们的预期，原因在于意外灾害(主要是Hugo雨果飓风)特别严重，这部分造成的影响大约占了2个百分点，假若1990年能够回到正常情况，相较于1989年因灾难升高的基础，综合比率可能只会增加一点点，然而到1991年，可能又会大幅度提高。
Commentators frequently discuss the "underwriting cycle" and speculate about its next turn. If that term is used to connote rhythmic qualities, it is in our view a misnomer that leads to faulty thinking about the industry's fundamental economics.
保险分析师常常会讨论到承保周期并预测它下一次反转的时点，如果那个名词是用来表示节奏性，则我们认为他们是用词不当，把这个产业情况完全搞错了。
The term was appropriate some decades ago when the industry and regulators cooperated to conduct the business in cartel fashion. At that time, the combined ratio fluctuated rhythmically for two reasons, both related to lags. First, data from the past were analyzed and then used to set new "corrected" rates, which were subsequently put into effect by virtually all insurers. Second, the fact that almost all policies were then issued for a one-to three-year term - which meant that it took a considerable time for mispriced policies to expire - delayed the impact of new rates on revenues. These two lagged responses made combined ratios behave much like alternating current. Meanwhile, the absence of significant price competition guaranteed that industry profits, averaged out over the cycle, would be satisfactory.
几十年前，当产业界与政府监管机构合作以卡特尔方式开展业务时，这个词或许还适用。当时，综合比率有节奏波动只因两个原因，两者都与递延性相关。第一，分析过去的数据，并据以订定新的校正费率，并适用于所有的保险业者之上；第二，所有的保单通常是一至三年为期，这代表着一张错误定价的保单到期通常需要相当长时间，所以，新费率的实施影响有其递延性。这两个因素使得综合比率的变化有脉络可循，同时没有明显的价格竞争通常就保证行业利润会在整个周期中得到平滑，并获得满意的回报。
The cartel period is long gone. Now the industry has hundreds of participants selling a commodity-like product at independently-established prices. Such a configuration - whether the product being sold is steel or insurance policies - is certain to cause subnormal profitability in all circumstances but one: a shortage of usable capacity. Just how often these periods occur and how long they last determines the average profitability of the industry in question.
不过卡特尔的年代一去不复返了，现在行业中有几百家公司在销售同一种商品，价格各自独立，在这种情况下，不管所卖的商品是钢铁或是保单，除了产能短缺的情况之外，整体同业的获利一定很可怜。不过这些时期发生的频率，以及它们持续的时间决定了相关行业的平均盈利能力。
In most industries, capacity is described in physical terms. In the insurance world, however, capacity is customarily described in financial terms; that is, it's considered appropriate for a company to write no more than X dollars of business if it has Y dollars of net worth. In practice, however, constraints of this sort have proven ineffective. Regulators, insurance brokers, and customers are all slow to discipline companies that strain their resources. They also acquiesce when companies grossly overstate their true capital. Hence, a company can write a great deal of business with very little capital if it is so inclined. At bottom, therefore, the amount of industry capacity at any particular moment primarily depends on the mental state of insurance managers.
在大部分的产业，产能是以具体的事物来呈现，不过在保险的世界里，产能所代表的却是指财务数字，亦即假设一家公司的账面价值有Y，那么他只能承接不超过X的保单。就实务而言，做这样的限制其实效果相当有限，主管机关、保险中介与客户对于资本紧张的保险公司的反应都很慢，而且，当公司严重夸大其资本时他们仍默许。因此，一家资本规模不大的保险公司，只要他们愿意，照样可以接下一大堆保单。归根结底，整个保险业的供给产能，主要还是视保险公司经理人本身的心态而定。
All this understood, it is not very difficult to prognosticate the industry's profits. Good profits will be realized only when there is a shortage of capacity. Shortages will occur only when insurers are frightened. That happens rarely - and most assuredly is not happening now.
在了解内情之后，大家不难预知这个产业未来的获利情况，获利要好只有当供给短缺时才有可能发生，而供给短缺只有当保险业者感到害怕时才有可能发生，而偏偏这种情况又很少见，且可以确定短期之内不会出现。
Some analysts have argued that the more onerous taxes recently imposed on the insurance industry and 1989's catastrophes - Hurricane Hugo and the California earthquake - will cause prices to strengthen significantly. We disagree. These adversities have not destroyed the eagerness of insurers to write business at present prices. Therefore, premium volume won't grow by 10% in 1990, which means the negative underwriting trend will not reverse.
有些分析师认为，最近刚实施的保险业新税法过于繁重，同时加上雨果飓风与加州大地震，将会使保险费率大幅提高。我们并不认同这样的看法，因为这些负面的因素并不会抑制同业以现在的价格承接保单的渴望，因此1990年的保费收入应该无法增长10%以上，也就是说，整体的承保亏损可能还会继续恶化。
The industry will meantime say it needs higher prices to achieve profitability matching that of the average American business. Of course it does. So does the steel business. But needs and desires have nothing to do with the long-term profitability of industries. Instead, economic fundamentals determine the outcome. Insurance profitability will improve only when virtually all insurers are turning away business despite higher prices. And we're a long way from that point.
业者同时也会宣称保险业需要调高价格才能维持一般美国企业的获利水平。当然事实确是如此，钢铁业也一样，但需求与欲望，和产业长期的获利并无绝对相关，反而是经济实质现况才是决定结果的关键因素。只有当价格不上涨，保险同业就不接生意时，保险业的获利能力才会提高，但现在离那样的情况还很远。
Berkshire's premium volume may drop to $150 million or so in 1990 (from a high of $1 billion in 1986), partly because our traditional business continues to shrink and partly because the contract under which we received 7% of the business of Fireman's Fund expired last August. Whatever the size of the drop, it will not disturb us. We have no interest in writing insurance that carries a mathematical expectation of loss; we experience enough disappointments doing transactions we believe to carry an expectation of profit.
伯克希尔1990年的保费收入可能会降至1.5亿美元左右，从1986年的10亿保费收入一路跌下来。一方面是因为我们传统的业务持续在萎缩，一方面是消防员退休基金这项业务在去年8月已到期。但不管业务量下降多少，都不会影响到我们，我们完全没有兴趣去接那种明显会赔钱的保单，光是那些看起来有赚头的生意就够我们受的了。
However, our appetite for appropriately-priced business is ample, as one tale from 1989 will tell. It concerns "CAT covers," which are reinsurance contracts that primary insurance companies (and also reinsurers themselves) buy to protect themselves against a single catastrophe, such as a tornado or hurricane, that produces losses from a large number of policies. In these contracts, the primary insurer might retain the loss from a single event up to a maximum of, say, $10 million, buying various layers of reinsurance above that level. When losses exceed the retained amount, the reinsurer typically pays 95% of the excess up to its contractual limit, with the primary insurer paying the remainder. (By requiring the primary insurer to keep 5% of each layer, the reinsurer leaves him with a financial stake in each loss settlement and guards against his throwing away the reinsurer's money.)
然而我们对于价格合理的生意胃口却很足，1989年有一件事可以说明这一点，它那就是巨灾再保险业务(Super-Catastrophe)，也就是直接保险公司(也包含再保公司本身)购买的再保合约，以保护自己免受像是龙卷风或是飓风等单一灾难事件所可能引发巨额损失的风险。在这些再保合约中，原始的保险公司可能会保留一个单一的损失上限，如1000万美金，然后在此之上买进好几层的再保险。当损失超过自留的部分时，再保公司依规定就要支付超过的部分，最高比例可达95%，(之所以要求保险公司本身每层保留5%，是为了让保险公司与再保公司站在同一阵线，避免保险公司慷再保公司之慨)。
CAT covers are usually one-year policies that also provide for one automatic reinstatement, which requires a primary insurer whose coverage has been exhausted by a catastrophe to buy a second cover for the balance of the year in question by paying another premium. This provision protects the primary company from being "bare" for even a brief period after a first catastrophic event. The duration of "an event" is usually limited by contract to any span of 72 hours designated by the primary company. Under this definition, a wide-spread storm, causing damage for three days, will be classified as a single event if it arises from a single climatic cause. If the storm lasts four days, however, the primary company will file a claim carving out the 72 consecutive hours during which it suffered the greatest damage. Losses that occurred outside that period will be treated as arising from a separate event.
CAT保险的保单通常是一年期，一般可以自动延期一年，这样的条款主要是保护保险公司避免因为重大灾害发生后投保出现空窗期，事件发生的持续期间通常由合约限定在72小时以内，在这种定义之下，一场持续三天的大风暴所造成的损害，可被归类为单一事件。要是大风暴持续四天以上，则保险公司可以切割出其受害最惨重的72小时，超过的部分则必须视为另一个独立的事件。
In 1989, two unusual things happened. First, Hurricane Hugo generated $4 billion or more of insured loss, at a pace, however, that caused the vast damage in the Carolinas to occur slightly more than 72 hours after the equally severe damage in the Caribbean. Second, the California earthquake hit within weeks, causing insured damage that was difficult to estimate, even well after the event. Slammed by these two - or possibly three - major catastrophes, some primary insurers, and also many reinsurers that had themselves bought CAT protection, either used up their automatic second cover or became uncertain as to whether they had done so.
1989年有两件特殊的事件发生，第一，雨果飓风给南卡罗莱纳州造成40亿美元的损失，这是在加勒比海发生相同规模的灾害之后仅仅72小时多一点；第二，几个礼拜之后，加州大地震又接连发生，造成难以估计的保险损失。受到两次或有可能是三次重大灾难冲击，许多有买CAT保险的直接保险公司及再保险公司，要么自动使用了第二次投保权，要么不确定是否自己这样做了。
At that point sellers of CAT policies had lost a huge amount of money - perhaps twice because of the reinstatements - and not taken in much in premiums. Depending upon many variables, a CAT premium might generally have run 3% to 15% of the amount of protection purchased. For some years, we've thought premiums of that kind inadequate and have stayed away from the business.
在当时许多卖CAT保单的业者亏了一屁股，尤其是第二次自动投保部分，根本收不到足够多的保费。由于有许多变量，保费通常会是保额的3-15%不等。几年来，我们一直认为这种保费是不够的，所以没有介入这个市场。
But because the 1989 disasters left many insurers either actually or possibly bare, and also left most CAT writers licking their wounds, there was an immediate shortage after the earthquake of much-needed catastrophe coverage. Prices instantly became attractive, particularly for the reinsurance that CAT writers themselves buy. Just as instantly, Berkshire Hathaway offered to write up to $250 million of catastrophe coverage, advertising that proposition in trade publications. Though we did not write all the business we sought, we did in a busy ten days book a substantial amount.
但是1989年的大灾害，使得许多CAT业者穷于填补保险客户的伤口，使得地震灾后保单供给发生短缺，保费价格很快地就回到相当吸引人的水准，尤其是CAT保险公司本身为自己所买的再保保单。立竿见影的是，伯克希尔主动提出可以承保价值高达2.5亿美元的灾难保单，并在行业刊物上登了广告宣传。虽然没有达到我们预期的额度，但我们忙碌了十天下来，所签的保单金额也是相当可观。
Our willingness to put such a huge sum on the line for a loss that could occur tomorrow sets us apart from any reinsurer in the world. There are, of course, companies that sometimes write $250 million or even far more of catastrophe coverage. But they do so only when they can, in turn, reinsure a large percentage of the business with other companies. When they can't "lay off" in size, they disappear from the market.
世界上再没有其它再保公司会像我们一样，愿意一口气接受如此大金额的投保，当然也有保险公司偶尔会愿意接下2.5亿美金的灾害理赔保险，但前提是能向其它保险公司分保出去，当他们找不到分散风险的再保公司时，他们会马上退出市场。
Berkshire's policy, conversely, is to retain the business we write rather than lay it off. When rates carry an expectation of profit, we want to assume as much risk as is prudent. And in our case, that's a lot.
相反，伯克希尔的政策则是保留保额，而不是把他们分保出去，当保险费率看起来有利可图，我们很愿意承担更多的风险，以外界的标准而言，那应该是个大数字。
We will accept more reinsurance risk for our own account than any other company because of two factors: (1) by the standards of regulatory accounting, we have a net worth in our insurance companies of about $6 billion - the second highest amount in the United States; and (2) we simply don't care what earnings we report quarterly, or even annually, just as long as the decisions leading to those earnings (or losses) were reached intelligently.
我们之所以愿意承担比一般保险公司更多的风险，主要有两个原因：(1)以监管标准，我们的保险公司账面价值高达60亿美金，位居全美第二；(2)我们并不在乎每季或每年的短期收益数字，只要长期而言，这些决策是基于稳健获利的立场所作的明智决定。
Obviously, if we write $250 million of catastrophe coverage and retain it all ourselves, there is some probability that we will lose the full $250 million in a single quarter. That probability is low, but it is not zero. If we had a loss of that magnitude, our after-tax cost would be about $165 million. Though that is far more than Berkshire normally earns in a quarter, the damage would be a blow only to our pride, not to our well-being.
很明显的如果我们承保2.5亿保额的巨灾再保险，并全部保留下来，很有可能我们会在一个季度内损失2.5亿，这种机率虽然很低，却并不表示没有可能，若真的发生那样的损失，我们的税后损失大概会是1.65亿，尽管这大大超过伯克希尔一个季度所赚的收益，但这只会让我们丢了面子，还不至于失了里子。
This posture is one few insurance managements will assume. Typically, they are willing to write scads of business on terms that almost guarantee them mediocre returns on equity. But they do not want to expose themselves to an embarrassing single-quarter loss, even if the managerial strategy that causes the loss promises, over time, to produce superior results. I can understand their thinking: What is best for their owners is not necessarily best for the managers. Fortunately Charlie and I have both total job security and financial interests that are identical with those of our shareholders. We are willing to look foolish as long as we don't feel we have acted foolishly.
这种姿态在保险业界来说实在是少之又少，典型的做法是，保险公司愿意接下很多的保单以确保公司每年可以获得一个平庸的收益，但他们却不愿意公司在某一个单季发生大额的损失，即使这种导致短期损失的策略可以获致更长远的利益。我想我能够体谅他们的立场，对股东最有利的事并不一定对经理人最有利。幸运的是，查理和我的工作保障与身家利益与所有的股东皆一致，我们愿意被人当作是傻子，只要我们自己知道我们不是个傻子。
Our method of operation, incidentally, makes us a stabilizing force in the industry. We add huge capacity when capacity is short and we become less competitive only when capacity is abundant. Of course, we don't follow this policy in the interest of stabilization - we follow it because we believe it to be the most sensible and profitable course of action. Nevertheless, our behavior steadies the market. In this case, Adam Smith's invisible hand works as advertised.
事实上我们这样的经营策略让我们成为市场上的稳定力量，当供给短缺时，我们可以马上进场满足大家的需求，而当市场过于饱和时，我们又会立即退出市场观望，当然我们这样的做法并不只是为了达到市场的稳定而已，我们之所以会这样做是因为我们认为这样才是最合理、对大家最有利的做法，当然这样的做法间接达到稳定市场的效果，在这种情况下，亚当·斯密所说的市场"看不见的手"确实起作用了。
Currently, we hold an exceptional amount of float compared to premium volume. This circumstance should produce quite favorable insurance results for us during the next few years as it did in 1989. Our underwriting losses should be tolerable and our investment income from policyholder funds large. This pleasant situation, however, will gradually deteriorate as our float runs off.
现阶段，相较于保费收入，我们浮存金规模相当大，这样的情形应该可以让我们往后几年获得像1989年那样不错的结果。承保损失应该也可以接受，相较之下我们靠投资所赚得的收益却更为惊人，只是这种好现象可能会随着浮存金的流失而渐渐光芒不再。
At some point, however, there will be an opportunity for us to write large amounts of profitable business. Mike Goldberg and his management team of Rod Eldred, Dinos Iordanou, Ajit Jain, Phil Urban, and Don Wurster continue to position us well for this eventuality.
不过在某个时点，还是有机会能够让我们找到大额且有利可图的生意，Mike Goldberg与其经营团队(Rod Eldred,Dinos Iordanou,Ajit Jain,Phil Urban,Don Wurster)，长期而言可以为我们创造有利的地位。
In selecting marketable securities for our insurance companies, we generally choose among five major categories: (1) long-term common stock investments, (2) medium-term fixed income securities, (3) long-term fixed income securities, (4) short-term cash equivalents, and (5) short-term arbitrage commitments.
在为我们的保险业务选择有价证券投资之时，我们主要有五种选择：(1)长期股票投资；(2)长期固定收益债券；(3)中期固定收益债券；(4)短期现金等价物；(5)短期套利交易。
We have no particular bias when it comes to choosing from these categories; we just continuously search among them for the highest after-tax returns as measured by "mathematical expectation," limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand. Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings; our goal, rather, is to maximize eventual net worth.
对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的税后回报率，以预计的数学期望值衡量，并且仅限于我们自认为理解并熟悉的投资上，我们无意让与短期的报告收益好看，我们的目标是让长期的账面价值极大化。
Below we list our common stock holdings having a value of over $100 million. A small portion of these investments belongs to subsidiaries of which Berkshire owns less than 100%.
下表是我们市值超过一亿美元以上的普通股投资，一部分的投资系属于伯克希尔关系企业所持有。
| No of Shares 股份数量 |
Company 公司名称 |
Cost 成本(000s omitted) |
Market 市值(000s omitted) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3,000,000 | Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. 大都会/美国广播公司 |
$ 517,500 | $ 1,692,375 |
| 23,350,000 | The Coca-Cola Co. 可口可乐 |
1,023,920 | 1,803,787 |
| 2,400,000 | Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. 房地美优先股 |
71,729 | 161,100 |
| 6,850,000 | GEICO Corp. 盖可保险 |
45,713 | 1,044,625 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company 华盛顿邮报 |
9,731 | 486,366 |
This list of companies is the same as last year's and in only one case has the number of shares changed: Our holdings of Coca-Cola increased from 14,172,500 shares at the end of 1988 to 23,350,000.
表上的投资组合与去年几乎相同，只有一项投资的持股有变动，我们将可口可乐的持股数由去年的1,417万股提高到今年的2,335万股。
This Coca-Cola investment provides yet another example of the incredible speed with which your Chairman responds to investment opportunities, no matter how obscure or well-disguised they may be. I believe I had my first Coca-Cola in either 1935 or 1936. Of a certainty, it was in 1936 that I started buying Cokes at the rate of six for 25 cents from Buffett & Son, the family grocery store, to sell around the neighborhood for 5 cents each. In this excursion into high-margin retailing, I duly observed the extraordinary consumer attractiveness and commercial possibilities of the product.
这次的可口可乐投资，提供了一个机会来证明你们的董事长对投资机会的反应是多么的快速，不管这些机会是如何的不明确或是被隐藏。我记得我是在1935年或1936年第一次喝到可口可乐的，不过可以确定的是，我从1936年开始以25分钱半打从巴菲特父子杂货店批货后，在以每罐5分钱卖给邻居街坊，作为我个人从事高毛利零售业的开端，我也深深观察到这项产品给消费者特殊的吸引力及背后所代表庞大的商机。
I continued to note these qualities for the next 52 years as Coke blanketed the world. During this period, however, I carefully avoided buying even a single share, instead allocating major portions of my net worth to street railway companies, windmill manufacturers, anthracite producers, textile businesses, trading-stamp issuers, and the like. (If you think I'm making this up, I can supply the names.) Only in the summer of 1988 did my brain finally establish contact with my eyes.
在往后的52年内当可口可乐席卷全世界的同时，我也持续地注意到这种特质，然而在同一时间，由于我个人过于小心谨慎以致于竟然连一股都没有买，反而将大部分的个人资产投注在有轨电车公司、风车公司、煤炭公司与邮票公司之类的股票之上，(如果你认为这是我编造的笑话，我可以再告诉大家确实的公司名称)，直到1988年的夏天，我的大脑才与眼睛建立了联系。
What I then perceived was both clear and fascinating. After drifting somewhat in the 1970's, Coca-Cola had in 1981 become a new company with the move of Roberto Goizueta to CEO. Roberto, along with Don Keough, once my across-the-street neighbor in Omaha, first rethought and focused the company's policies and then energetically carried them out. What was already the world's most ubiquitous product gained new momentum, with sales overseas virtually exploding.
一时之间，我的观感与眼界大开，经过1970年代一度委靡不振之后，可口可乐在1981年新任CEO郭思达的带领下，焕然一新，郭思达加上唐·基奥(Don Keough曾经是我在奥马哈的对街邻居)，经过思考并聚焦了公司的政策后，切实地加以执行，使得本来就已是全世界最无处不在的产品又平添新动力，尤其是来自海外的营收更呈现爆炸性的成长。
Through a truly rare blend of marketing and financial skills, Roberto has maximized both the growth of his product and the rewards that this growth brings to shareholders. Normally, the CEO of a consumer products company, drawing on his natural inclinations or experience, will cause either marketing or finance to dominate the business at the expense of the other discipline. With Roberto, the mesh of marketing and finance is perfect and the result is a shareholder's dream.
利用其罕见的营销与财务方面的技能，郭思达将可口可乐产品的成长与股东的利益极大化，通常一家消费性商品的CEO，基于个人过去的经验与个性，会偏向公司的营销或财务一边而牺牲其他方面，但是郭思达却能够将两者调和到极致的境界，这样的结果实在是股东们前世修来的好福气。
Of course, we should have started buying Coke much earlier, soon after Roberto and Don began running things. In fact, if I had been thinking straight I would have persuaded my grandfather to sell the grocery store back in 1936 and put all of the proceeds into Coca-Cola stock. I've learned my lesson: My response time to the next glaringly attractive idea will be slashed to well under 50 years.
当然我们应该在郭思达与唐开始接掌公司时，就早点买进该公司的股票，事实上，要是我有足够的远见，早在1936年我就应该说服我爷爷干脆卖掉杂货店，然后将钱全部用来买进可口可乐的股票，我已经吸取了教训：我对下一个具有明显吸引力的想法的反应时间将缩短到50年以下。1
As I mentioned earlier, the yearend prices of our major investees were much higher relative to their intrinsic values than theretofore. While those prices may not yet cause nosebleeds, they are clearly vulnerable to a general market decline. A drop in their prices would not disturb us at all - it might in fact work to our eventual benefit - but it would cause at least a one-year reduction in Berkshire's net worth. We think such a reduction is almost certain in at least one of the next three years. Indeed, it would take only about a 10% year-to-year decline in the aggregate value of our portfolio investments to send Berkshire's net worth down.
就像是我上次所提到的，相较于过去，我们这些被投资公司的股价已高于其内在价值，虽然目前这种价位还没有高到令人流鼻血，但难免会受到大盘波动的影响，当然股价下挫一点都不会造成我们的困扰，甚至反而对我们有利，但不可避免地可能会造成伯克希尔年度账面价值的减少。我们认为，至少在未来三年中有一年，这种减少几乎是肯定会发生。事实上，只要我们的投资组合总市值同比下降10%左右，伯克希尔的净资产就会下降。
We continue to be blessed with extraordinary managers at our portfolio companies. They are high-grade, talented, and shareholder-oriented. The exceptional results we have achieved while investing with them accurately reflect their exceptional personal qualities.
我们持续受惠于这些被投资公司经理人，他们高品格、能力佳且设身处地为股东着想，我们能够有这么好的投资绩效，可以说是完全仰赖这些经理人不凡的人格特质。
We told you last year that we expected to do little in arbitrage during 1989, and that's the way it turned out. Arbitrage positions are a substitute for short-term cash equivalents, and during part of the year we held relatively low levels of cash. In the rest of the year we had a fairly good-sized cash position and even so chose not to engage in arbitrage. The main reason was corporate transactions that made no economic sense to us; arbitraging such deals comes too close to playing the greater-fool game. (As Wall Streeter Ray DeVoe says: "Fools rush in where angels fear to trade.") We will engage in arbitrage from time to time - sometimes on a large scale - but only when we like the odds.
去年我曾向各位报告，1989年可能会减少在套利投资方面的活动，结果正是如此，套利投资是短期资金的替代去处，有时我们手头上没有太多的现金，就算是有我们也宁愿选择不参与套利，主要的原因是因为最近这些企业活动实在是没有太大的经济意义，从事这类套利交易就好象是在玩博傻游戏，正如华尔街人士Ray DeVoe所说，天使回避的地方傻瓜却趋之若骛。我们三不五时会从事大型的套利交易，但只有当我们觉得胜算颇大时，才会考虑进场。
Leaving aside the three convertible preferreds discussed in the next section, we substantially reduced our holdings in both medium- and long-term fixed-income securities. In the long-terms, just about our only holdings have been Washington Public Power Supply Systems (WPPSS) bonds carrying coupons ranging from low to high. During the year we sold a number of the low-coupon issues, which we originally bought at very large discounts. Many of these issues had approximately doubled in price since we purchased them and in addition had paid us 15%-17% annually, tax-free. Our prices upon sale were only slightly cheaper than typical high-grade tax-exempts then commanded. We have kept all of our high-coupon WPPSS issues. Some have been called for redemption in 1991 and 1992, and we expect the rest to be called in the early to mid-1990s.
除了后面会提到的三项可转换优先股投资之外，我们大幅减少在中长期的固定收益债券部位，尤其是长期部分，唯一持有的就是华盛顿公用电力系统WPPSS债券，其息票从低到高不等。去年我们处分了部分当初以相当低折价买进的低息债券，处分价格只比高级免税债券略低，是原始投资成本的一倍，外加每年15-17%的免税利息收益。保留了WPPSS高息债券，有些即将在1991年或1992年到期，剩下的则会在1990年中到期时赎回。
We also sold many of our medium-term tax-exempt bonds during the year. When we bought these bonds we said we would be happy to sell them - regardless of whether they were higher or lower than at our time of purchase - if something we liked better came along. Something did - and concurrently we unloaded most of these issues at modest gains. Overall, our 1989 profit from the sale of tax-exempt bonds was about $51 million pre-tax.
年内还卖了不少中期的免税债券，当初买下这些债券时就曾说过，只要时机成熟找到更好的投资标的，我们会很高兴地把他们给处分掉，不管届时的价格是高于或是低于我们的投资成本，如今时机确实成熟了，所以我们便将大部分的债券出清，所得的报酬还算不错，总结下来我们1989年从出售免税债券所获得的税前收益大概在5,100万左右。
The proceeds from our bond sales, along with our excess cash at the beginning of the year and that generated later through earnings, went into the purchase of three convertible preferred stocks. In the first transaction, which took place in July, we purchased $600 million of The Gillette Co. preferred with an 8 3/4% dividend, a mandatory redemption in ten years, and the right to convert into common at $50 per share. We next purchased $358 million of USAir Group, Inc. preferred stock with mandatory redemption in ten years, a dividend of 9 1/4%, and the right to convert into common at $60 per share. Finally, late in the year we purchased $300 million of Champion International Corp. preferred with mandatory redemption in ten years, a 9 1/4% dividend, and the right to convert into common at $38 per share.
我们将出售债券所得的收入连同期初帐上的现金与年中所赚取的收益，通通买进三种可转换优先股，第一种是在7月，我们投资吉列公司优先股6亿美金，年息8.75%，十年强制赎回，并有权以50美元的价格转换为普通股；之后，我们又投资全美航空优先股3.58亿美金，年息9.25%，十年强制赎回，并有权以60美元的价格转换为普通股；最后在年底，我们又投资造纸公司冠军国际集团优先股3亿美金，年息9.25%，十年强制赎回，并有权以38美元的价格转换为普通股。
Unlike standard convertible preferred stocks, the issues we own are either non-salable or non-convertible for considerable periods of time and there is consequently no way we can gain from short-term price blips in the common stock. I have gone on the board of Gillette, but I am not on the board of USAir or Champion. (I thoroughly enjoy the boards I am on, but can't handle any more.)
与标准可转换优先股不同，这次我们所拥有的是在限定时间内不得出售或转换的，所以，我们无法从普通股的短期价格波动中获利。并且我已经加入吉列的董事会，至于美国航空或是冠军公司则没有，(我很喜欢现有加入的董事会，但由于分身乏术可能无法再加入其它公司的董事会)。
Gillette's business is very much the kind we like. Charlie and I think we understand the company's economics and therefore believe we can make a reasonably intelligent guess about its future. (If you haven't tried Gillette's new Sensor razor, go right out and get one.) However, we have no ability to forecast the economics of the investment banking business (in which we have a position through our 1987 purchase of Salomon convertible preferred), the airline industry, or the paper industry. This does not mean that we predict a negative future for these industries: we're agnostics, not atheists. Our lack of strong convictions about these businesses, however, means that we must structure our investments in them differently from what we do when we invest in a business appearing to have splendid economic characteristics.
吉列的业务与我们喜爱的类型非常相近，查理跟我都熟悉这个产业的经济状况，因此我们相信可以对这家公司的未来做一个合理的预估，(若是没有试过吉列新的感应式刮胡刀，赶紧去买一个来试试！)，但是我们就没法预测投资银行业、航空业或是造纸业的未来经济前景，(我们在1987年买下所罗门公司的可转换债券)。当然这并不表示他们的未来就是悲观的，基本上我们是不可知论者，而不是无神论者。所以，由于我们对这些业务缺乏强而有力的论点支撑，因此我们在这些产业上所采的投资方式就必须与那些显而易见的好公司好产业有所不同。
In one major respect, however, these purchases are not different: We only want to link up with people whom we like, admire, and trust. John Gutfreund at Salomon, Colman Mockler, Jr. at Gillette, Ed Colodny at USAir, and Andy Sigler at Champion meet this test in spades.
不过有一点很重要，我们只跟我们喜欢、欣赏且信任的人打交道，像是所罗门的John Gutfreund、吉列的Colman Mockler Jr.、全美航空的Ed Colodny与冠军国际的Andy Sigler都符合我们的标准。
They in turn have demonstrated some confidence in us, insisting in each case that our preferreds have unrestricted voting rights on a fully-converted basis, an arrangement that is far from standard in corporate finance. In effect they are trusting us to be intelligent owners, thinking about tomorrow instead of today, just as we are trusting them to be intelligent managers, thinking about tomorrow as well as today.
同时他们对我们也相当的信任，坚持让我们的优先股在可完全转换的基础上拥有不受限制的投票权，这在一般美国大企业融资案里头并不多见，事实上他们相信我们是聪明的老板，看的是未来而不是现在，就像我们相信他们是聪明的经理人一样，不但会看未来同时也会顾及现在。
The preferred-stock structures we have negotiated will provide a mediocre return for us if industry economics hinder the performance of our investees, but will produce reasonably attractive results for us if they can earn a return comparable to that of American industry in general. We believe that Gillette, under Colman's management, will far exceed that return and believe that John, Ed, and Andy will reach it unless industry conditions are harsh.
这种可转换优先股的投资方式可以确保，即便是我们被投资的公司面临产业前景不佳的环境时，仍能确保我们可以得到普通的回报。但如果它们能够获得与美国工业普遍水平相当的回报，我们将获得确实诱人的结果。我们相信吉列在Colman的领导之下，吉列将远远超过这一水平。另外即使是面临产业不佳的前景，John与Andy应该也不会让我们失望。
Under almost any conditions, we expect these preferreds to return us our money plus dividends. If that is all we get, though, the result will be disappointing, because we will have given up flexibility and consequently will have missed some significant opportunities that are bound to present themselves during the decade. Under that scenario, we will have obtained only a preferred-stock yield during a period when the typical preferred stock will have held no appeal for us whatsoever. The only way Berkshire can achieve satisfactory results from its four preferred issues is to have the common stocks of the investee companies do well.
不管在任何情况之下，我们预期这些可转换优先股都可以让我们收回本金加上股利无虞，然而若是我们真的只能收回这些，那么这样的结果将是相当令人失望的，因为我们必须被迫牺牲流动性，这有可能让我们在往后的十年内错失更好的投资机会。在这种情况下，在一般的优先股对我们没有任何吸引力的时期里，我们将只能获得优先股股息。所以，唯一对伯克希尔有利的是，我们的被投资公司本身的普通股也能有优异的表现。
Good management and at least tolerable industry conditions will be needed if that is to happen. But we believe Berkshire's investment will also help and that the other shareholders of each investee will profit over the years ahead from our preferred-stock purchase. The help will come from the fact that each company now has a major, stable, and interested shareholder whose Chairman and Vice Chairman have, through Berkshire's investments, indirectly committed a very large amount of their own money to these undertakings. In dealing with our investees, Charlie and I will be supportive, analytical, and objective. We recognize that we are working with experienced CEOs who are very much in command of their own businesses but who nevertheless, at certain moments, appreciate the chance to test their thinking on someone without ties to their industry or to decisions of the past.
这需要靠好的经营团队再加上可以忍受的产业环境，不过我们相信，伯克希尔对这四家公司的资金投入，也能够对这些公司与其股东的长远利益有所帮助，这是由于，他们可以确信，这些公司的背后，现在有一个稳定又关心公司的大股东在默默地支持他们。在与被投资对象打交道时，查理和我将给予支持、提供分析帮助，并立场客观。我们认识到，我们正在与经验丰富的首席执行官合作，他们能充分掌控自己的业务，但我想，他们应该也会很珍惜，我们这些与产业背景完全不相关的客观人士所给予他们的经验交流。
As a group, these convertible preferreds will not produce the returns we can achieve when we find a business with wonderful economic prospects that is unappreciated by the market. Nor will the returns be as attractive as those produced when we make our favorite form of capital deployment, the acquisition of 80% or more of a fine business with a fine management. But both opportunities are rare, particularly in a size befitting our present and anticipated resources.
这些可转换优先股的回报，当然比不上那些具有经济优势却还没被市场发现的好股票，或许也比不上那些我们可以买下80%以上股权的，拥有优秀管理层的优良企业并购案，但大家要知道后面这两种投资机会相当的稀少，实在是可遇不可求，尤其是以我们现在的资金规模，实在是很难找的到适合的投资标的。
In summation, Charlie and I feel that our preferred stock investments should produce returns moderately above those achieved by most fixed-income portfolios and that we can play a minor but enjoyable and constructive role in the investee companies.
总而言之，查理跟我认为这类的可转换优先股投资应该可以让我们获得比一般固定收益债券更好的投资收益，同时我们也可以在这些被投资公司中扮演一种次要的但富有乐趣和建设性的角色。
In September, Berkshire issued $902.6 million principal amount of Zero-Coupon Convertible Subordinated Debentures, which are now listed on the New York Stock Exchange. Salomon Brothers handled the underwriting in superb fashion, providing us helpful advice and a flawless execution.
去年九月，伯克希尔发行了9亿美元的零息可转换次级债券，目前已在纽约证券交易所挂牌交易，由所罗门公司负责本次的债券承销工作，提供了我们宝贵的建议与完美无缺的执行结果。
Most bonds, of course, require regular payments of interest, usually semi-annually. A zero-coupon bond, conversely, requires no current interest payments; instead, the investor receives his yield by purchasing the security at a significant discount from maturity value. The effective interest rate is determined by the original issue price, the maturity value, and the amount of time between issuance and maturity.
大部分的债券当然需要按时支付利息，通常是每半年一次，但是零息债券却不须要马上支付利息，而是由投资人在以相当大的折价幅度在取得债券时预先扣除，实质的利率则取决于发行的债券价格、到期面值与发行时间的长短而定。
In our case, the bonds were issued at 44.314% of maturity value and are due in 15 years. For investors purchasing the bonds, that is the mathematical equivalent of a 5.5% current payment compounded semi-annually. Because we received only 44.31 cents on the dollar, our proceeds from this offering were $400 million (less about $9.5 million of offering expenses).
以我们这次发行的债券来说，发行价是面额的44.314%，15年到期，对于买下这次债券的投资人，约可获得相当于5.5%的年回报率，因为我们只拿到44.31美分，所以这次扣除950万美元的发行费用，我们实得的款项是4亿美元。
The bonds were issued in denominations of $10,000 and each bond is convertible into .4515 shares of Berkshire Hathaway. Because a $10,000 bond cost $4,431, this means that the conversion price was $9,815 per Berkshire share, a 15% premium to the market price then existing. Berkshire can call the bonds at any time after September 28, 1992 at their accreted value (the original issue price plus 5.5% compounded semi-annually) and on two specified days, September 28 of 1994 and 1999, the bondholders can require Berkshire to buy the securities at their accreted value.
这次发行的债券面额是1万美元，每张债券可以申请转换为0.4515股的伯克希尔股份，因为每张债券的发行价大约是4,431美元，所以代表转换为伯克希尔的价格大概是9,815美元，比市价有15%的溢价，同时伯克希尔有权在1992年9月28日以后加计利息(5.5%的年利率)赎回这些债券，至于债券持有人也有权在1994年和1999年的9月28日，要求公司加计利息赎回其所持有的债券。
For tax purposes, Berkshire is entitled to deduct the 5.5% interest accrual each year, even though we make no payments to the bondholders. Thus the net effect to us, resulting from the reduced taxes, is positive cash flow. That is a very significant benefit. Some unknowable variables prevent us from calculating our exact effective rate of interest, but under all circumstances it will be well below 5.5%. There is meanwhile a symmetry to the tax law: Any taxable holder of the bonds must pay tax each year on the 5.5% interest, even though he receives no cash.
就税负的观点而言，虽然没有马上支付利息，但伯克希尔每年仍可享受5.5%利息支出的所得税扣抵，由于减少了税负支出，所以就现金流量的角度而言，我们每年还有现金净流入，这是一项不错的好处，当然一些不可知的变量，使我们无法确定这次发行真正的资金成本，但不管怎样，应该都低于5.5%，而相对的债券持有人每年还是要支付5.5%的利息所得税，虽然他们根本没有收到任何的现金利息收入。
Neither our bonds nor those of certain other companies that issued similar bonds last year (notably Loews and Motorola) resemble the great bulk of zero-coupon bonds that have been issued in recent years. Of these, Charlie and I have been, and will continue to be, outspoken critics. As I will later explain, such bonds have often been used in the most deceptive of ways and with deadly consequences to investors. But before we tackle that subject, let's travel back to Eden, to a time when the apple had not yet been bitten.
去年我们与其它公司所发行的类似债券(尤其是Loews与摩托罗拉公司)，与这几年盛行的零息债券有相当大的差异，对于后者，查理跟我一直有相当的意见，后面我会再详加说明，我们认为这些债券隐藏着欺骗行为，对买下他们的投资人有相当不利的影响，不过在谈论这个话题之前，让我们把时光回溯到亚当还未引诱夏娃啃下苹果之前的时代。
If you're my age you bought your first zero-coupon bonds during World War II, by purchasing the famous Series E U. S. Savings Bond, the most widely-sold bond issue in history. (After the war, these bonds were held by one out of two U. S. households.) Nobody, of course, called the Series E a zero-coupon bond, a term in fact that I doubt had been invented. But that's precisely what the Series E was.
如果你像我这样的年纪，曾在二次世界大战期间买了第一批最有名的E系列美国储蓄零息债券，这种广为流传的债券是有史以来发行量最大的债券，几乎每两个家庭就会有一个家庭持有，当然，在当时没有人会把它当作是零息债券的一种，因为这名词当时还未出现，但基本上它就是一种零息债券。
These bonds came in denominations as small as $18.75. That amount purchased a $25 obligation of the United States government due in 10 years, terms that gave the buyer a compounded annual return of 2.9%. At the time, this was an attractive offer: the 2.9% rate was higher than that generally available on Government bonds and the holder faced no market-fluctuation risk, since he could at any time cash in his bonds with only a minor reduction in interest.
这种债券的面额最小的只有18.75美元，买下10年后美国政府必须偿还25美元，投资人大概可以获得2.9%的年投资回报率，在当时这是相当不错的一项投资，2.9%的年利率远高于普通的政府债券利率，且持有人不必担心利率波动的风险，而且他可以随时予以变现，利息不会被打折太多。
A second form of zero-coupon U. S. Treasury issue, also benign and useful, surfaced in the last decade. One problem with a normal bond is that even though it pays a given interest rate - say 10% - the holder cannot be assured that a compounded 10% return will be realized. For that rate to materialize, each semi-annual coupon must be reinvested at 10% as it is received. If current interest rates are, say, only 6% or 7% when these coupons come due, the holder will be unable to compound his money over the life of the bond at the advertised rate. For pension funds or other investors with long-term liabilities, "reinvestment risk" of this type can be a serious problem. Savings Bonds might have solved it, except that they are issued only to individuals and are unavailable in large denominations. What big buyers needed was huge quantities of "Savings Bond Equivalents."
第二种形式的美国零息国债。出现在十几年前，也相当的不错，一般的债券有一个很大的问题，那就是虽然它的票面是10%，但持有人却不一定能够保证就能得到10%的回报率，因为要能获得10%的话就必须把收到的利息按10%回报率再投资出去才行，若是所得的利息之后只能得到6%或7%的报酬，则最后结算的回报率可能没有办法达到10%的预定回报，这对于退休基金或是其它具有长期负债的投资者来说(保险公司)，这种"再投资风险"可能是一个很严重的问题。储蓄债券则可以解决这样的问题，只可惜它只能发行给个人而且面额都不大，对于大买家来说，它们需要的是类似这种储蓄债券的替代品。
Enter some ingenious and, in this case, highly useful investment bankers (led, I'm happy to say, by Salomon Brothers). They created the instrument desired by "stripping" the semi-annual coupons from standard Government issues. Each coupon, once detached, takes on the essential character of a Savings Bond since it represents a single sum due sometime in the future. For example, if you strip the 40 semi-annual coupons from a U. S. Government Bond due in the year 2010, you will have 40 zero-coupon bonds, with maturities from six months to 20 years, each of which can then be bundled with other coupons of like maturity and marketed. If current interest rates are, say, 10% for all maturities, the six-month issue will sell for 95.24% of maturity value and the 20-year issue will sell for 14.20%. The purchaser of any given maturity is thus guaranteed a compounded rate of 10% for his entire holding period. Stripping of government bonds has occurred on a large scale in recent years, as long-term investors, ranging from pension funds to individual IRA accounts, recognized these high-grade, zero-coupon issues to be well suited to their needs.
这时创意十足的银行家就适时出现了，(我很高兴的向各位报告那就是所罗门兄弟公司)，它们从标准的政府债券中，分拆出大家所想要的零息债券，每一张债券都跟储蓄债券一样，在未来的某一天到期后可以拿回完整的一笔钱，举例来说如果你可以将20年期每半年付息的债券，分拆成40张到期日分别为半年到20年不等的零息债券，之后再将到期日相同的债券并起来对外出售，假设现行的收益率为10%，半年期的价格大概是95.24%，20年期的则只有14.20%，如此一来所有购买这种债券的投资者就可以明确的确保它可以获得的回报率，分拆债券这几年因符合长期的退休基金与IRA个人退休帐户投资者需求，广受欢迎而大量流行。
But as happens in Wall Street all too often, what the wise do in the beginning, fools do in the end. In the last few years zero-coupon bonds (and their functional equivalent, pay-in-kind bonds, which distribute additional PIK bonds semi-annually as interest instead of paying cash) have been issued in enormous quantities by ever-junkier credits. To these issuers, zero (or PIK) bonds offer one overwhelming advantage: It is impossible to default on a promise to pay nothing. Indeed, if LDC governments had issued no debt in the 1970's other than long-term zero-coupon obligations, they would now have a spotless record as debtors.
但就像是华尔街经常会发生的，不管什么好东西到最后都会变质，最近几年来零息债券，以及功能类似的实物支付债券(pay-in-kind债券，每半年发放一次PIK债券作为股息取代支付现金)，有一大部分是垃圾债券等级。对这些发行公司来说，零息债券有一个很大的好处，因为在发行后直到到期日前根本就不必付出任何资金，所以根本就不会出现无法偿付的违约情况。事实上，如果最不发达国家的政府在1970年代，除了长期零息债券之外就没有发行过其它债券，那么它们作为债务人的记录到现在将一尘不染。
This principle at work - that you need not default for a long time if you solemnly promise to pay nothing for a long time - has not been lost on promoters and investment bankers seeking to finance ever-shakier deals. But its acceptance by lenders took a while: When the leveraged buy-out craze began some years back, purchasers could borrow only on a reasonably sound basis, in which conservatively-estimated free cash flow - that is, operating earnings plus depreciation and amortization less normalized capital expenditures - was adequate to cover both interest and modest reductions in debt.
这原则实在是管用，如果你郑重承诺在很长一段时间内不支付任何费用，你就不必长期违约。这一原则并没有被寻求为更不稳定的交易融资的发起人和投资银行家所忽视。不过债权人也花好长一段时间才接受了这种做法：当杠杆并购热潮开始之前，投资者只敢在合理的基础上借款，因为债权人会保守地估计其未来的现金流量，即经营收益加上折旧与摊销再扣除常态化的资本支出，必须要能够确保未来的利息支出与本金的支付。
Later, as the adrenalin of deal-makers surged, businesses began to be purchased at prices so high that all free cash flow necessarily had to be allocated to the payment of interest. That left nothing for the paydown of debt. In effect, a Scarlett O'Hara "I'll think about it tomorrow" position in respect to principal payments was taken by borrowers and accepted by a new breed of lender, the buyer of original-issue junk bonds. Debt now became something to be refinanced rather than repaid. The change brings to mind a New Yorker cartoon in which the grateful borrower rises to shake the hand of the bank's lending officer and gushes: "I don't know how I'll ever repay you."
之后随着肾上腺素升高，并购价格持续飙高使得所有的预估现金流量都必须被分配用来支付利息，没有留下任何东西来偿还本金。接着放款人对于本金偿还的态度就变得像乱世佳人中的郝思佳一样，"管他的，明天再说吧！"，而更离谱的是偏偏就有放款人愿意吃这一套，那就是专门买垃圾债券的投资者，债务从此以后只要再融资即可，根本就不用考虑要偿还，这种心态的转变在《纽约客》的一幅漫画中描写的最贴切，一个借款人痛哭零涕地握着银行贷款员的手说到，"我实在不知道该如何报答你。"
Soon borrowers found even the new, lax standards intolerably binding. To induce lenders to finance even sillier transactions, they introduced an abomination, EBDIT - Earnings Before Depreciation, Interest and Taxes - as the test of a company's ability to pay interest. Using this sawed-off yardstick, the borrower ignored depreciation as an expense on the theory that it did not require a current cash outlay.
很快，借款人发现即使是新的宽松标准也具有难以忍受的约束力。为了诱使金主为更离谱的交易提供资金，这群人又引进了一个令人憎恶的新名词，叫EBDIT(息税折旧摊销前利润)，来衡量一家公司偿债的能力，利用这种较低的标准，借款人故意忽略了折旧也是一种费用，因为它当前不需要支付现金。
Such an attitude is clearly delusional. At 95% of American businesses, capital expenditures that over time roughly approximate depreciation are a necessity and are every bit as real an expense as labor or utility costs. Even a high school dropout knows that to finance a car he must have income that covers not only interest and operating expenses, but also realistically-calculated depreciation. He would be laughed out of the bank if he started talking about EBDIT.
这样的态度摆明了就是掩耳盗铃，95%的美国企业，长期而言，大概与累积折旧费用相当的资本支出是必须的，其所花的每一分钱都与日常的劳工薪资或水电成本一样真实存在，即使是中学的辍学生也知道，养一台车子不只是要负担利息与日常油钱保养费用而已，还必须精确地考量到每月实际摊销的折旧，若是他跑到银行摆出EBDIT这一套说法，保证一下子就会被轰出来。
Capital outlays at a business can be skipped, of course, in any given month, just as a human can skip a day or even a week of eating. But if the skipping becomes routine and is not made up, the body weakens and eventually dies. Furthermore, a start-and-stop feeding policy will over time produce a less healthy organism, human or corporate, than that produced by a steady diet. As businessmen, Charlie and I relish having competitors who are unable to fund capital expenditures.
当然，在任何一个给定月份，一个企业的资本支出可以暂时不考虑，就像是一个人可以一天或甚至一个礼拜不吃东西。但是，如果这种情况变成一种坏习惯的话，身体很快就会吃不消，甚至有死亡的危险，此外，饥一顿饱一顿的进食比起稳定的进食习惯，更可能使得一个健康的人身体机能变差，不管是人体或是企业都是如此，身为一个生意人，查理跟我对于竞争对手可能没有资金进行资本支出感到欣喜。
You might think that waving away a major expense such as depreciation in an attempt to make a terrible deal look like a good one hits the limits of Wall Street's ingenuity. If so, you haven't been paying attention during the past few years. Promoters needed to find a way to justify even pricier acquisitions. Otherwise, they risked - heaven forbid! - losing deals to other promoters with more "imagination."
或许你会认为，排除一项主要的费用诸如折旧等，使得原本一桩很烂的交易变成不错的交易，是华尔街聪明才智发挥到极致的表现，那你可能完全没有注意到华尔街过去几年的发展，支持者必须再找到一个更有看头的做法，来合理解释价格更离谱的并购案，不然的话，他们就必须冒着被扫地出门的风险，被其它更有"想象力"的支持者把生意抢走。
So, stepping through the Looking Glass, promoters and their investment bankers proclaimed that EBDIT should now be measured against cash interest only, which meant that interest accruing on zero-coupon or PIK bonds could be ignored when the financial feasibility of a transaction was being assessed. This approach not only relegated depreciation expense to the let's-ignore-it corner, but gave similar treatment to what was usually a significant portion of interest expense. To their shame, many professional investment managers went along with this nonsense, though they usually were careful to do so only with clients' money, not their own. (Calling these managers "professionals" is actually too kind; they should be designated "promotees.")
因此，通过镜子进入仙境后，发起人与其投资银行宣称EBDIT现在应该只根据现金利息来衡量，这意味着，在评估一项投资案的时候，那些记帐不须马上支付的利息(零息债券和PIK债券)根本就不必纳入考量，这样的方式不但是把折旧归到没人注意的角落，还将占利息费用很大部分的费用也给予同样的方式对待，可耻的是，许多专业投资银行家竟然昧着良心附和，反正只要确定这是客户而不是他们自己的钱就好，(称呼这群人为专业人士实在是太恭维他们了，他们应该被归类为抬轿者)。
Under this new standard, a business earning, say, $100 million pre-tax and having debt on which $90 million of interest must be paid currently, might use a zero-coupon or PIK issue to incur another $60 million of annual interest that would accrue and compound but not come due for some years. The rate on these issues would typically be very high, which means that the situation in year 2 might be $90 million cash interest plus $69 million accrued interest, and so on as the compounding proceeds. Such high-rate reborrowing schemes, which a few years ago were appropriately confined to the waterfront, soon became models of modern finance at virtually all major investment banking houses.
在这种新的标准之下，一家公司假设税前有1亿美元的获利，同时最近一年有9千万的利息支出，大可以运用发行零息债券或是PIK债券来额外负担6千万只要记帐却不须马上支付利息与本金，这些利息将累积和复利，而这种债券的利率通常非常高。到了第二年，公司可能要承担9千万的付现息与6,900万的记帐息，之后由于复利，记帐息持续增加，而这种高利率的融资计划，在刚开始几年还能获得有效控制，但不久之后就变成所有大型投资银行必备推荐给客户的标准融资工具。
When they make these offerings, investment bankers display their humorous side: They dispense income and balance sheet projections extending five or more years into the future for companies they barely had heard of a few months earlier. If you are shown such schedules, I suggest that you join in the fun: Ask the investment banker for the one-year budgets that his own firm prepared as the last few years began and then compare these with what actually happened.
当投资银行推出这些融资产品时，银行家们展现出他们幽默的一面，他们为几个月前几乎从未听说过的公司提供未来五年或更长时间的利润和资产负债表预测。我想如果你那天碰到这种预估表，我建议你可以参与这样的游戏：跟这位投资银行家要一份他们自己公司的过去几年的年度预算，然后跟他们实际的结果比较一下，你就知道是什么回事了。
Some time ago Ken Galbraith, in his witty and insightful The Great Crash, coined a new economic term: "the bezzle," defined as the current amount of undiscovered embezzlement. This financial creature has a magical quality: The embezzlers are richer by the amount of the bezzle, while the embezzlees do not yet feel poorer.
许久以前Ken Galbraith在他的名著《1929年大崩盘》中，发明了一个新的经济名词：黑金Bezzle，用来代表现有未被发现的贪污舞弊。这种金融现象有一个很奇特的特质，那就是贪污舞弊者因为贪污舞弊而发大财，但问题是受害者却一点也没有觉得被剥夺变穷了。
Professor Galbraith astutely pointed out that this sum should be added to the National Wealth so that we might know the Psychic National Wealth. Logically, a society that wanted to feel enormously prosperous would both encourage its citizens to embezzle and try not to detect the crime. By this means, "wealth" would balloon though not an erg of productive work had been done.
Galbraith教授敏锐地指出，这笔钱应该加进国民财富当中，从而我们可以知道心理上的国民财富为多少。理论上，一个社会若想要觉得自己经济繁荣发展，就应该多多鼓励人民去贪污舞弊，并试着不要去揭发它。通过这种方式，一个国家的财富可以大幅地增长，虽然实际上它什么有生产力的事都没做。
The satirical nonsense of the bezzle is dwarfed by the real-world nonsense of the zero-coupon bond. With zeros, one party to a contract can experience "income" without his opposite experiencing the pain of expenditure. In our illustration, a company capable of earning only $100 million dollars annually - and therefore capable of paying only that much in interest - magically creates "earnings" for bondholders of $150 million. As long as major investors willingly don their Peter Pan wings and repeatedly say "I believe," there is no limit to how much "income" can be created by the zero-coupon bond.
黑金这种充满荒唐讽刺的属性，在现实社会中却被零息债券给比了下去。利用这些零息债券，一家公司可以大大方方靠着一纸合同，享受利用借款所带来的收入，但另外一方面却不必承担支付的痛苦。以我们先前提到的例子，一家每年可以赚1亿美元的公司，利用这种方法，在债券投资人面前，却可以膨胀到1.5亿美元，只要投资人愿意充当彼得潘，不断地说"我相信你"，只要你愿意，零息债券所创造的收入是没有上限的。
Wall Street welcomed this invention with the enthusiasm less-enlightened folk might reserve for the wheel or the plow. Here, finally, was an instrument that would let the Street make deals at prices no longer limited by actual earning power. The result, obviously, would be more transactions: Silly prices will always attract sellers. And, as Jesse Unruh might have put it, transactions are the mother's milk of finance.
华尔街以热情拥抱这项新发明工具，而那些不那么开明的人可能宁愿把这种热情留给更原始的工具如轮子或犁。终于有一种工具，可以让华尔街以不再受实际盈利能力限制的价格进行交易。结果很明显，当然就会有更多的生意上门，离谱的价格一定有卖家愿意出，就像Jesse Unruh说的一句话，交易就像是喂养金融世界的母乳。
The zero-coupon or PIK bond possesses one additional attraction for the promoter and investment banker, which is that the time elapsing between folly and failure can be stretched out. This is no small benefit. If the period before all costs must be faced is long, promoters can create a string of foolish deals - and take in lots of fees - before any chickens come home to roost from their earlier ventures.
此外零息与PIK债券还有一项特点使得支持者与银行家更愿意推行，就是东窗事发的时间可以再延长，这点可是相当的重要，如果交易所产生的后果要很长一段时间才会浮现，那么支持者就可以在这段期间做更多的交易，从中赚取更多的手续费，直到事件东窗事发。
But in the end, alchemy, whether it is metallurgical or financial, fails. A base business can not be transformed into a golden business by tricks of accounting or capital structure. The man claiming to be a financial alchemist may become rich. But gullible investors rather than business achievements will usually be the source of his wealth.
不过到最后，炼金术，不管是冶金的或是财务上的，终究会失败。一个烂公司不可能只靠着会计或财务技巧而摇身一变成为好公司，那个宣称金融炼金术的人或许会发大财，但他靠的却是容易上当的投资人而不是企业经营成就。
Whatever their weaknesses, we should add, many zero-coupon and PIK bonds will not default. We have in fact owned some and may buy more if their market becomes sufficiently distressed. (We've not, however, even considered buying a new issue from a weak credit.) No financial instrument is evil per se; it's just that some variations have far more potential for mischief than others.
不管这些债券有多少缺点，我们却必须承认许多零息与PIK债券应该不会还不出钱来，事实上我们自己也投资了一些，如果债券市场变得更糟，我们可能还会购买更多，(当然我们从来就不会考虑去买那些新发行债信又差的垃圾债券)，任何金融工具本身不是邪恶的，只是有一些变种比其他更具作恶潜力。
The blue ribbon for mischief-making should go to the zero-coupon issuer unable to make its interest payments on a current basis. Our advice: Whenever an investment banker starts talking about EBDIT - or whenever someone creates a capital structure that does not allow all interest, both payable and accrued, to be comfortably met out of current cash flow net of ample capital expenditures - zip up your wallet. Turn the tables by suggesting that the promoter and his high-priced entourage accept zero-coupon fees, deferring their take until the zero-coupon bonds have been paid in full. See then how much enthusiasm for the deal endures.
所有罪过应该归咎于是那些不能按时支付利息的零息债券发行人，我们的建议是，每当有投资银行家开始提到EBDIT时，或是有人在对你提供一个可以不支付任何利息(包括应付利息和应计利息)，以舒适地满足不扣除的资本支出的现金流金融工具时，请赶快捂住你的钱包。在零息债券完全兑付以前不要让他们拿走佣金，然后看看他们对这笔生意的热情还能支撑多久。
Our comments about investment bankers may seem harsh. But Charlie and I - in our hopelessly old-fashioned way - believe that they should perform a gatekeeping role, guarding investors against the promoter's propensity to indulge in excess. Promoters, after all, have throughout time exercised the same judgment and restraint in accepting money that alcoholics have exercised in accepting liquor. At a minimum, therefore, the banker's conduct should rise to that of a responsible bartender who, when necessary, refuses the profit from the next drink to avoid sending a drunk out on the highway. In recent years, unfortunately, many leading investment firms have found bartender morality to be an intolerably restrictive standard. Lately, those who have traveled the high road in Wall Street have not encountered heavy traffic.
我们对于这些投资银行家的批判或许是激烈了一点，但查理和我以一贯的保守作风认为他们确实应该做好把关工作，保护投资人免于这些推销者的过度引诱，因为推销者对于佣金的饥渴就像是酗酒者对于酒精的沉溺一样。因此，投资银行家最起码也要肩负起吧台调酒师的角色，必要的时候，就算少赚一杯酒钱，也要劝客户少喝一点，以免将一个醉汉送上高速公路。不幸的是，最近几年来，不少主要的投资公司已经发现酒保的道德观是一种无法忍受的限制标准，他们解释说，近来，那些已经在华尔街的高速公路上行驶过的人还没有遇上重大的交通事故。
One distressing footnote: The cost of the zero-coupon folly will not be borne solely by the direct participants. Certain savings and loan associations were heavy buyers of such bonds, using cash that came from FSLIC-insured deposits. Straining to show splendid earnings, these buyers recorded - but did not receive - ultra-high interest income on these issues. Many of these associations are now in major trouble. Had their loans to shaky credits worked, the owners of the associations would have pocketed the profits. In the many cases in which the loans will fail, the taxpayer will pick up the bill. To paraphrase Jackie Mason, at these associations it was the managers who should have been wearing the ski masks.
最后还有一个令人不平的附带说明：零息债券的愚蠢代价并不只由直接参与者承担，一些储贷机构由于是这些垃圾债券的大买家，使用来自FSLIC保险存款的现金。为了尽量美化报告收益数字，这些单位将这些即使还没有收到的超高利息收入全部认列为利润。许多储贷机构因此陷入困境，若是他们那些债信不佳的债务人能偿付本金，当然状况就可以顺利解决，但问题是通常他们都付不出本金，最后还必须由纳税义务人来买单。套句Jackie Mason的话，应该是由这些储贷机构的经理人来戴上滑雪面罩。
To quote Robert Benchley, "Having a dog teaches a boy fidelity, perseverance, and to turn around three times before lying down." Such are the shortcomings of experience. Nevertheless, it's a good idea to review past mistakes before committing new ones. So let's take a quick look at the last 25 years.
套用Robert Benchley的名言："养狗能教会男孩忠诚、忍耐，并在躺下前先转三圈。"这就是经验传承的难处。尽管如此，在犯下一个错误之前，最好能够先反省一下以前的那些错误，所以让我们花点时间回顾一下过去25年的经验。
My first mistake, of course, was in buying control of Berkshire. Though I knew its business - textile manufacturing - to be unpromising, I was enticed to buy because the price looked cheap. Stock purchases of that kind had proved reasonably rewarding in my early years, though by the time Berkshire came along in 1965 I was becoming aware that the strategy was not ideal.
首先我所犯的第一个错误，就是买下伯克希尔纺织的控制权，虽然我很清楚纺织这个产业没什么前景，却因为它的价格实在很便宜而受其所引诱，虽然在早期投资这样的股票确实让我获利颇丰，但在1965年投资伯克希尔后，我就开始发现这终究不是个理想的投资模式。
If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term performance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit.
如果你以很低的价格买进一家公司的股票，应该很容易有机会以不错的获利出脱了结，虽然长期而言这家公司的经营结果可能很糟糕，我将这种投资方法称之为"烟蒂"投资法，在路边随地可见的香烟头捡起来可以让你吸一口，解一解烟瘾，但"廉价购买"将使这最后一口也利润不菲。
Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces - never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advantage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns. For example, if you buy a business for $8 million that can be sold or liquidated for $10 million and promptly take either course, you can realize a high return. But the investment will disappoint if the business is sold for $10 million in ten years and in the interim has annually earned and distributed only a few percent on cost. Time is the friend of the wonderful business, the enemy of the mediocre.
除非你是清算人2，否则买下这类公司实在是属于傻瓜行径。第一，长期而言，原来看起来划算的价格到最后可能一点都不便宜。在经营艰困的企业中，通常一个问题才刚解决，另外一个问题就又冒出来，厨房里绝不会只有一只蟑螂。第二，先前的价差优势很快地就会被企业赚取的低回报绩效所侵蚀。例如你用800万美元买下一家清算价值达1,000万美元的公司，若你能马上把这家公司给处理掉，不管是出售或是清算都好，换算下来你的报酬可能会很可观。但是若这家公司要花上你十年的时间才有办法把它给处理掉，而在这之前你只能拿回一点点可怜的股利的话，那么这项投资将会令人失望。时间是好公司的朋友，但却是烂公司最大的敌人。
You might think this principle is obvious, but I had to learn it the hard way - in fact, I had to learn it several times over. Shortly after purchasing Berkshire, I acquired a Baltimore department store, Hochschild Kohn, buying through a company called Diversified Retailing that later merged with Berkshire. I bought at a substantial discount from book value, the people were first-class, and the deal included some extras - unrecorded real estate values and a significant LIFO inventory cushion. How could I miss? So-o-o - three years later I was lucky to sell the business for about what I had paid. After ending our corporate marriage to Hochschild Kohn, I had memories like those of the husband in the country song, "My Wife Ran Away With My Best Friend and I Still Miss Him a Lot."
或许你会认为这道理再简单不过了，不过我却必须经历惨痛的教训才真正的学习到。在买下伯克希尔不久之后，我又买了巴尔的摩一家百货公司：科恩百货(Hochschild Kohn)，通过多元零售公司收购的(后来与伯克希尔合并，1987年将联合零售商店售出Joseph Noban)，我以账面价值相当高的折扣买下这家公司，经营的人也属一流，整个交易甚至还包括一些额外的东西：未实现的房地产增值收益与后进先出法的存货会计原则。这我怎会错过？还好三年之后，算我走运，能够以成本左右的价格脱身，在跟科恩百货结束商业关系后，我只有一个感想，就像一首乡村歌曲的歌词所述的，"我的老婆跟我最要好的朋友跑了，然而我还是十分怀念我的朋友。"
I could give you other personal examples of "bargain-purchase" folly but I'm sure you get the picture: It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements.
我可以给各位其他廉价购买的愚蠢例子，但我相信你已经明白：以合理的价格买下一家好公司，要比用便宜的价格买下一家普通的公司要好的多。查理老早就明白这个道理，我的反应则比较慢，不过现在当我们投资公司或股票时，我们不但选择最好的公司，同时这些公司还要有好的经理人。
That leads right into a related lesson: Good jockeys will do well on good horses, but not on broken-down nags. Both Berkshire's textile business and Hochschild, Kohn had able and honest people running them. The same managers employed in a business with good economic characteristics would have achieved fine records. But they were never going to make any progress while running in quicksand.
从这里我们又学到了一课：好骑师也要骑好马才能有好成绩，骑劣马也不行。像伯克希尔纺织与科恩百货也都有才能兼具的人在管理，很不幸的他们所面临的是流沙般的困境，若受雇于体质更好的公司，相信他们应该会有更好的成绩。
I've said many times that when a management with a reputation for brilliance tackles a business with a reputation for bad economics, it is the reputation of the business that remains intact. I just wish I hadn't been so energetic in creating examples. My behavior has matched that admitted by Mae West: "I was Snow White, but I drifted."
我曾说过好几次：当一个绩效卓著的经理人遇到一家恶名昭彰的企业，通常会是后者占上风，但愿我再也没有那么多精力来创造新的例子，我以前的行为就像是Mae West曾说的︰"我曾经是白雪公主，但我迷失了方向。"3
A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buying and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them. To the extent we have been successful, it is because we concentrated on identifying one-foot hurdles that we could step over rather than because we acquired any ability to clear seven-footers.
另外还学到一个教训：选容易的事做。25年来，查理和我一直在购买和管理各种各样的业务，但我们还是没能学会如何去解决难题，不过我们倒学会了如何去避免问题。从某种程度上说，我们之所以能够成功，是因为我们专注于识别一英尺的跨栏，而不是因为我们获得了跨越七英尺的能力。
The finding may seem unfair, but in both business and investments it is usually far more profitable to simply stick with the easy and obvious than it is to resolve the difficult. On occasion, tough problems must be tackled as was the case when we started our Sunday paper in Buffalo. In other instances, a great investment opportunity occurs when a marvelous business encounters a one-time huge, but solvable, problem as was the case many years back at both American Express and GEICO. Overall, however, we've done better by avoiding dragons than by slaying them.
这项发现看起来似乎不太公平，但在商业和投资领域，简单地坚持简单而显而易见的做法，通常比解决困难要好得多。当然，有时也必须去解决棘手的难题，就像是我们刚开始在布法罗创办周末版一样。在其他时候，当一家好公司遇到可以一次性解决的暂时难关，也会出现绝佳的投资机会，就像是以前美国运通与GEICO保险都曾经一度发生状况。不过总的来说，我们尽量做到回避妖龙，而不是冒险去屠龙。
My most surprising discovery: the overwhelming importance in business of an unseen force that we might call "the institutional imperative." In business school, I was given no hint of the imperative's existence and I did not intuitively understand it when I entered the business world. I thought then that decent, intelligent, and experienced managers would automatically make rational business decisions. But I learned over time that isn't so. Instead, rationality frequently wilts when the institutional imperative comes into play.
我最意外的发现是：一股看不见的力量在商业中发挥着压倒性的重要性。我们称之为"制度迫力"，在学校时没有人告诉我这种迫力的存在，而我进入商业世界时也没有直观地理解它。我当时以为，任何正直、聪明有经验的经理人都会很自动的做出理性决策，但慢慢地我发现，事实并非如此。相反，当制度迫力发挥影响时，理性往往会变质。
For example: (1) As if governed by Newton's First Law of Motion, an institution will resist any change in its current direction; (2) Just as work expands to fill available time, corporate projects or acquisitions will materialize to soak up available funds; (3) Any business craving of the leader, however foolish, will be quickly supported by detailed rate-of-return and strategic studies prepared by his troops; and (4) The behavior of peer companies, whether they are expanding, acquiring, setting executive compensation or whatever, will be mindlessly imitated.
举例来说：(1)就好象是受牛顿第一运动定律支配，任何一个组织机构都会抵抗对现有方向做任何的改变(一致性)，(2)就像我们会用工作来填满所有的时间那样，企业的项目计划或并购案永远有足够的理由将资金耗尽，(3)管理层的商业欲望，不管有多离谱，他的团队永远可以找到可以支持其理论的投资评估分析报告，(4)同业的举动，不管是做扩张、并购、设定高管薪酬还是其他什么，都会被盲目模仿。
Institutional dynamics, not venality or stupidity, set businesses on these courses, which are too often misguided. After making some expensive mistakes because I ignored the power of the imperative, I have tried to organize and manage Berkshire in ways that minimize its influence. Furthermore, Charlie and I have attempted to concentrate our investments in companies that appear alert to the problem.
制度迫力，而非腐败或愚蠢，推动企业走上这些道路。由于我忽略了这种习惯性的力量，我犯了一些代价高昂的错误，我试图以尽量减少其影响的方式组织和管理伯克希尔，同时查理跟我也试着将我们的投资集中在对于这种问题有相当警觉的公司之上。
After some other mistakes, I learned to go into business only with people whom I like, trust, and admire. As I noted before, this policy of itself will not ensure success: A second-class textile or department-store company won't prosper simply because its managers are men that you would be pleased to see your daughter marry. However, an owner - or investor - can accomplish wonders if he manages to associate himself with such people in businesses that possess decent economic characteristics. Conversely, we do not wish to join with managers who lack admirable qualities, no matter how attractive the prospects of their business. We've never succeeded in making a good deal with a bad person.
在犯下其它几个错误之后，我学会了只与我们所欣赏喜爱与信任的人往来。就像是我之前曾提到的，这种原则本身不会保证你一定成功，二流的纺织工厂或是百货公司，不会只因为管理人员是那种你会想把女儿嫁给他的人就会成功的，然而公司的老板或是投资人却可以因为与那些真正具有商业头脑的人打交道而获益良多，相反地我们不愿意跟那些不具令人尊敬特质的人为伍，不管他的公司有多吸引人都一样。永远不会想着与坏人做成一笔好生意。
Some of my worst mistakes were not publicly visible. These were stock and business purchases whose virtues I understood and yet didn't make. It's no sin to miss a great opportunity outside one's area of competence. But I have passed on a couple of really big purchases that were served up to me on a platter and that I was fully capable of understanding. For Berkshire's shareholders, myself included, the cost of this thumb-sucking has been huge.
我犯下的一些更为严重的错误却没有那么明显：一些明明我很熟悉了解的股票或公司，却因故没有投资。错失一些能力圈之外的大好机会当然没有罪，但是我却白白错过一些自动送上门，应该把握却没有好好把握的好生意，对于伯克希尔的股东，当然包括我自己在内，这种损失是难以估计的。
Our consistently-conservative financial policies may appear to have been a mistake, but in my view were not. In retrospect, it is clear that significantly higher, though still conventional, leverage ratios at Berkshire would have produced considerably better returns on equity than the 23.8% we have actually averaged. Even in 1965, perhaps we could have judged there to be a 99% probability that higher leverage would lead to nothing but good. Correspondingly, we might have seen only a 1% chance that some shock factor, external or internal, would cause a conventional debt ratio to produce a result falling somewhere between temporary anguish and default.
另外，我们一贯采取保守的财务政策可能也是一种错误。不过在我看来，事实却并非如此。回想起来，很明显的，我们只要能够再多用一点财务杠杆 (虽然较之他人还是很保守)，就可以得到远比现在每年平均23.8%还要高的投资回报率。即使是在1965年，我们也可以99%地确定，高一点的财务杠杆绝对只有好处没有坏处，但同时我们可能会有1%的机会，不管是从内部或是外部所引发令人异想不到的因素，而让我们面临极大的风险。
We wouldn't have liked those 99:1 odds - and never will. A small chance of distress or disgrace cannot, in our view, be offset by a large chance of extra returns. If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds - though we have learned to live with those also.
我们不想要那种99：1的赔率，将来也不会。在我看来，挫败或侮辱的小机会永远不能被额外回报的大好机会所弥补。只要你的行为是明智的，就一定能够得到好的结果。在大部分的状况下，财务杠杆顶多只会让你发展的更快。查理跟我从来都不会着急，我们享受过程的快乐更甚于收益，虽然我们也学会与收益共存。
We hope in another 25 years to report on the mistakes of the first 50. If we are around in 2015 to do that, you can count on this section occupying many more pages than it does here.
我们希望25年后还能向各位报告伯克希尔头50年所犯的错误，我想公元2015年的年报，大家应该可以确定这一部分将占据更多的版面。
We hope to buy more businesses that are similar to the ones we have, and we can use some help. If you have a business that fits the following criteria, call me or, preferably, write.
我们希望能够买进更多像我们现在拥有一样的企业，当然我们可以通过大家的协助，如果你拥有符合以下条件的企业，记得打电话或者是写信告诉我。
Here's what we're looking for:
我们想要找的企业条件：
(1) Large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),
(1) 具有一定的规模，税后净利润至少达到1000万美元，
(2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor are "turnaround" situations),
(2) 表现出持续稳定的盈利能力，我们对美好前景或困境反转的公司没有兴趣，
(3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,
(3) 企业在很少或没有负债的情况下，取得了良好的股本回报率ROE，
(4) management in place (we can't supply it),
(4) 公司具备强大的管理团队，我们不参与管理，
(5) simple businesses (if there's lots of technology, we won't understand it),
(5) 简单的容易理解的商业模式，我们对复杂的高科技一无所知，
(6) an offering price (we don't want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).
(6) 合理的价格，在价格不确定前，我们不希望浪费双方太多时间。
We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers. We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether we're interested. We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuing stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.
我们不会进行敌意的并购，并承诺完全保密并尽快答复是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟)，我们倾向采现金交易，除非我们所换得的内在价值跟我们付出的一样多，否则不考虑发行股份。
Our favorite form of purchase is one fitting the Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman mold. In cases like these, the company's owner-managers wish to generate significant amounts of cash, sometimes for themselves, but often for their families or inactive shareholders. At the same time, these managers wish to remain significant owners who continue to run their companies just as they have in the past. We think we offer a particularly good fit for owners with such objectives. We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.
我们最喜欢的交易对象之一是像Blumkin-Friedman-Heldman家族那样，公司经营者希望能马上有一大笔现金，不管是给自己、家人或是其它股东，最好这些经营者如往常一样能够继续留在公司，我想我们可以提供具有以上想法的经营者，一个满意的方式，我们也欢迎可能的卖方与那些过去与我们合作过的对象打听。
Charlie and I frequently get approached about acquisitions that don't come close to meeting our tests: We've found that if you advertise an interest in buying collies, a lot of people will call hoping to sell you their cocker spaniels. Our interest in new ventures, turnarounds, or auction-like sales can best be expressed by a Goldwynism: "Please include me out."
另一方面查理跟我也常常接到一些不符合我们条件的询问，包括新创事业、转机股、拍卖案以及最常见的中介案。我们发现如果你登广告要买牧羊犬，结果却有一大堆人打电话来要卖你长耳猎犬，在此重申我们对这些交易，只有戈德温的另一句话可以形容，请把我排除在外。
Besides being interested in the purchase of businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock comparable to those we hold in Capital Cities, Salomon, Gillette, USAir and Champion. Last year we said we had a special interest in large purchases of convertible preferreds. We still have an appetite of that kind, but it is limited since we now are close to the maximum position we feel appropriate for this category of investment.
除了以上买下整家公司的并购案外，我们也会考虑买进一大部分不具控制权的股份，就像我们在大都会、所罗门、吉列、美国航空与冠军国际这几个例子一样的公司，去年我曾告诉各位我们对于买进大笔金额的可转换优先股相当有兴趣，到现在这种态度还是没改变，只不过由于目前这部分的部位已经接近我们认为适当的水位。
Two years ago, I told you about Harry Bottle, who in 1962 quickly cured a major business mess at the first industrial company I controlled, Dempster Mill Manufacturing (one of my "bargain" purchases) and who 24 years later had reappeared to again rescue me, this time from problems at K&W Products, a small Berkshire subsidiary that produces automotive compounds. As I reported, in short order Harry reduced capital employed at K&W, rationalized production, cut costs, and quadrupled profits. You might think he would then have paused for breath. But last year Harry, now 70, attended a bankruptcy auction and, for a pittance, acquired a product line that is a natural for K&W. That company's profitability may well be increased 50% by this coup. Watch this space for future bulletins on Harry's triumphs.
两年前，我曾跟各位提到Harry Bottle这个人，他在1962年曾帮我解决我个人所控制的第一家公司邓普斯特(Dempster)风车制造公司(便宜的烟蒂股)一个大难题，接着在24年后又重出江湖来拯救我，那次换做K&W公司，一家伯克希尔旗下专门生产自动机件的小公司，就像我曾提到的，在很短的时间里，Harry减少了K&W的资本占用，使生产合理化，大砍成本使获利翻倍。你或许认为任务完成后，他铁定要休息一下喘口气，但是去年高龄70岁的他，又参与一家破产公司的拍卖，以微小的代价收购了一条符合K&W使用的产品线，经过这次变革，公司的获利能力很可能将增加50%以上，请大家好好拭目以待，这个专门替Harry准备的专栏。
With more than a year behind him of trading Berkshire's stock on the New York Stock Exchange, our specialist, Jim Maguire of Henderson Brothers, Inc. ("HBI"), continues his outstanding performance. Before we listed, dealer spreads often were 3% or more of market price. Jim has maintained the spread at 50 points or less, which at current prices is well under 1%. Shareholders who buy or sell benefit significantly from this reduction in transaction costs.
Henderson兄弟公司的Jim Maguire是纽交所专门帮我们买卖伯克希尔股票的交易员，一年下来他的表现相当称职，在伯克希尔上市挂牌之前，公司股份买卖的价差多在3%甚至以上，但Jim却能将价差维持在50点以下，这使得股东在买卖本公司股份的交易成本降到1%以下。
Because we are delighted by our experience with Jim, HBI and the NYSE, I said as much in ads that have been run in a series placed by the NYSE. Normally I shun testimonials, but I was pleased in this instance to publicly compliment the Exchange.
因为我们与Jim、NYSE与纽交所这次合作愉快的经验，使我尽可能在纽约证交所安排的活动中免费帮他们打广告，通常这种场合我会回避，但这次我很高兴能够公开地赞扬交易所的表现。
Last summer we sold the corporate jet that we purchased for $850,000 three years ago and bought another used jet for $6.7 million. Those of you who recall the mathematics of the multiplying bacteria on page 5 will understandably panic: If our net worth continues to increase at current rates, and the cost of replacing planes also continues to rise at the now-established rate of 100% compounded annually, it will not be long before Berkshire's entire net worth is consumed by its jet.
去年夏天我们把三年前85万美元买的公司专机卖掉了，另外又以670万美元买了一架二手喷气飞机，大家只要想到前文我提过的细胞复制的数字游戏就会觉得很惊讶，如果我们公司的净值持续以相同速度增长，而更换飞机的成本同样也以每年100%的速度上升，大家会发现，伯克希尔庞大的净值很快就会被这架飞机给吃光光。
Charlie doesn't like it when I equate the jet with bacteria; he feels it's degrading to the bacteria. His idea of traveling in style is an air-conditioned bus, a luxury he steps up to only when bargain fares are in effect. My own attitude toward the jet can be summarized by the prayer attributed, apocryphally I'm sure, to St. Augustine as he contemplated leaving a life of secular pleasures to become a priest. Battling the conflict between intellect and glands, he pled: "Help me, Oh Lord, to become chaste - but not yet."
查理对于我将飞机比喻成细菌的做法不太高兴，他认为这样岂不污辱了细菌，他个人最理想的旅行方式是坐有空调冷气的巴士，这还是当车票有打折时才有的奢侈做法。对于这架专机我个人一贯的态度是圣奥古斯丁(St Augustine)当初想要脱离世俗的富裕生活出家去当教士一样，在理智与荣耀的中间天人交战，他乞求上天，救救我吧，让我成为一个圣洁的人，不过不是现在！
Naming the plane has not been easy. I initially suggested "The Charles T. Munger." Charlie countered with "The Aberration." We finally settled on "The Indefensible."
替这架飞机命名可不是一件简单的事，一开始我建议取名叫做查理·芒格号，查理反击说应该叫神经失常号，最后双方妥协决定称它为"无可辩解号"。
About 96.9% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1989 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made through the program were $5.9 million, and 2,550 charities were recipients.
大约有96.9%的有效股权参与1989年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约590万美元捐出的款项分配给2,550家慈善机构。
We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 52-53. If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1990 will be ineligible for the 1990 program.
我们敦促新加入的股东，仔细阅读年报上有关股东捐赠计划的详细内容，如果在未来年度内，你想要参加这类的计划，我们强烈建议你将股份登记在自己而不是受托人的名下，必须在1990年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1990年的计划。
The annual meeting this year will take place at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, April 30, 1990. Attendance grew last year to about 1,000, very close to the seating capacity of the Witherspoon Hall at Joslyn Museum. So this year's meeting will be moved to the Orpheum Theatre, which is in downtown Omaha, about one-quarter of a mile from the Red Lion Hotel. The Radisson-Redick Tower, a much smaller but nice hotel, is located across the street from the Orpheum. Or you may wish to stay at the Marriott, which is in west Omaha, about 100 yards from Borsheim's. We will have buses at the Marriott that will leave at 8:30 and 8:45 for the meeting and return after it ends.
今年的股东会预计在1990年4月30日，周一早上9点30分举行，去年股东年会参加人数突破1000人，差点超过开会场地的座位容量，所以今年的会场将会移到奥马哈市中心的奥芬剧院(OrpheumTheater)，对街有一家不错的旅馆叫Radisson-Redick，另外距离红狮旅馆约有1英理远，当然你也可以选择离波仙珠宝店100米远的万豪酒店Marriott，届时将会有巴士接送大家往返股东会会场。
Charlie and I always enjoy the meeting, and we hope you can make it. The quality of our shareholders is reflected in the quality of the questions we get: We have never attended an annual meeting anywhere that features such a consistently high level of intelligent, owner-related questions.
查理跟我一直都很喜欢开股东会，我也希望大家能够来参加，我们股东的素质可由大家所提出的问题看得出来，我们参加过很多股东会，但从来没有别的公司的股东像伯克希尔的股东一样，有如此多高水准且充满智慧，与股东相关的问题。
An attachment to our proxy material explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. Because weekday parking can be tight around the Orpheum, we have lined up a number of nearby lots for our shareholders to use. The attachment also contains information about them.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所需的识别证，因为开会当天会场不好停车，我们特地为大家预留了一些位置，附件也有相关说明供大家参考。
As usual, we will have buses to take you to Nebraska Furniture Mart and Borsheim's after the meeting and to take you to downtown hotels or to the airport later. I hope that you will allow plenty of time to fully explore the attractions of both stores. Those of you arriving early can visit the Furniture Mart any day of the week; it is open from 10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Saturdays, and from noon to 5:30 p.m. on Sundays.
一如往常，会后我们备有巴士带大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场，我希望大家能有多一点的时间好好探索这两家店的奥妙，当然早几天到的股东也可利用假日逛逛家具店，周六从早上10点到下午5点30分，周日则从中午开到下午5点30分。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday, but we will open for shareholders and their guests from noon to 6 p.m. on Sunday, April 29th. Ike likes to put on a show, and you can rely on him to produce something very special for our shareholders.
波仙周日通常不开门营业，但在股东会期间特别破例，4月29日周日从中午开到下午6点，艾克特地为股东们准备了一场秀，相信他一定可以让大家见识到一些特别的东西。
In this letter we've had a lot to say about rates of compounding. If you can bear having your own rate turn negative for a day - not a pretty thought, I admit - visit Ike on the 29th.
今年我们提到很多次有关复利的事，若是你能忍受个人净值暂时倒退一天的话，虽然不建议常常这样做，记得在29号去看看艾克的秀吧！
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事长
March 2, 1990
1990.03.02
Footnotes
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By 伴读小兽 @20231101
原文：I've learned my lesson: My response time to the next glaringly attractive idea will be slashed to well under 50 years.
共读版翻译：这次我终于吸取了教训，不过照这种情况看来，距离下一次我灵光一现的时间，可能要再等上个50年以上吧！
修改为：我已经吸取了教训：我对下一个具有明显吸引力的想法的反应时间将缩短到50年以下。 ↩
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By 伴读小兽 @20231101
原文：Unless you are a liquidator,
共读版翻译：不过除非你是清算专家，
修改为：除非你是清算人，（清算人是有能力清算的人，而清算专家只是拥有这方面的技能的人） ↩
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By 伴读小兽 @20231101
原文： "I was Snow White, but I drifted."
共读版翻译："曾经我是个白雪公主，不过如今我已不再清白。"
修改为：“我曾经是白雪公主，但我迷失了方向。”（双关语。drifted这个词在1990年股东信中写1970年代可口可乐的那段也有。） ↩