原文信息：
- 标题：1997 Letter to Berkshire Shareholders
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1998-02-27
- 链接：HTML
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：XiaoTao
- 校译：XiaoTao
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司所有股东：
Our gain in net worth during 1997 was $8.0 billion, which increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B stock by 34.1%. Over the last 33 years (that is, since present management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to $25,488, a rate of 24.1% compounded annually. 1
本公司1997年的账面价值增加80亿美元，A/B股每股账面价值增长34.1%(标普33.4%)，自现任管理层接手的33年以来，每股账面价值由当初的19美元成长到目前的25488美元，年复合成长率约为24.1%。
Given our gain of 34.1%, it is tempting to declare victory and move on. But last year's performance was no great triumph: Any investor can chalk up large returns when stocks soar, as they did in 1997. In a bull market, one must avoid the error of the preening duck that quacks boastfully after a torrential rainstorm, thinking that its paddling skills have caused it to rise in the world. A right-thinking duck would instead compare its position after the downpour to that of the other ducks on the pond.
看到我们高达34.1%的超高回报率，大家可能忍不住要高呼胜利口号勇往直前，不过若是考虑到去年股市的状况，任何一个投资人都能可以在股市飙涨中大赚一票。牛市中，大家一定要避免成为暴雨后一只呱呱大叫的骄傲鸭子，以为是自己高超的泳技让他冲上了天。一只拥有理性思维的鸭子反而会在大雨过后，仔细观察池塘里其他的鸭子都在什么位置。
So what's our duck rating for 1997? The table on the facing page shows that though we paddled furiously last year, passive ducks that simply invested in the S&P Index rose almost as fast as we did. Our appraisal of 1997's performance, then: Quack.
那么我们这只鸭子在1997年的表现又如何呢？报表显示虽然去年我们拼命的向前划，不过到最后我们发现其它被动投资标普500指数的鸭子33.4%的表现一点也不比我们差，所以总结我们在1997年的表现是：也就是正常的呱呱叫而已！
When the market booms, we tend to suffer in comparison with the S&P Index. The Index bears no tax costs, nor do mutual funds, since they pass through all tax liabilities to their owners. Last year, on the other hand, Berkshire paid or accrued $4.2 billion for federal income tax, or about 18% of our beginning net worth.
当股市正热时，相较于标普500指数，我们比较吃亏，因为指数或共同基金不必负担税收成本，他们可以直接将税负转嫁到投资人的身上，与之相反的是，伯克希尔去年必须认列高达42亿美元的联邦所得税，这相当于我们年初账面价值的18%。
Berkshire will always have corporate taxes to pay, which means it needs to overcome their drag in order to justify its existence. Obviously, Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice Chairman and my partner, and I won't be able to lick that handicap every year. But we expect over time to maintain a modest advantage over the Index, and that is the yardstick against which you should measure us. We will not ask you to adopt the philosophy of the Chicago Cubs fan who reacted to a string of lackluster seasons by saying, "Why get upset? Everyone has a bad century now and then."
由于伯克希尔必须要负担企业所得税，所以为了要证明我们存在的意义，它就一定要能够克服税负这个先天的障碍，不过很显然，伯克希尔的主要合伙人查理·芒格跟我很难每年都克服这个障碍打败指数，当然就长期而言，预期我们能够打败大盘指数，这也是大家衡量我们表现的最低标准，我想我们应该不会让大家像芝加哥小熊队球迷在面对连续几个战绩不佳的赛季时，自我调侃所说的：有什么好沮丧的？谁都可能有不好过的一世纪。
Gains in book value are, of course, not the bottom line at Berkshire. What truly counts are gains in per-share intrinsic business value. Ordinarily, though, the two measures tend to move roughly in tandem, and in 1997 that was the case: Led by a blow-out performance at GEICO, Berkshire's intrinsic value (which far exceeds book value) grew at nearly the same pace as book value.
帐面价值的增加当然不是经营伯克希尔的最终目标，因为真正重要的是每股内在价值的增长，虽然在伯克希尔通常两者会以相当接近的幅度增长，1997年的情况便是如此：受惠于GEICO保险爆炸性的成长，伯克希尔的内在价值(远高于帐面价值)以接近帐面价值成长的幅度增加。
For more explanation of the term, intrinsic value, you may wish to refer to our Owner's Manual, reprinted on pages 62 to 71. This manual sets forth our owner-related business principles, information that is important to all of Berkshire's shareholders.
有关"内在价值"等名词的解释，请大家参阅股东手册，手册中揭示了本公司经营的宗旨，也包含了许多对伯克希尔股东相当重要的信息。
In our last two annual reports, we furnished you a table that Charlie and I believe is central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key components of value. The first column lists our per-share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents) and the second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting adjustments (discussed on pages 69 and 70), but after all interest and corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the first column. In effect, the columns show what Berkshire would look like were it split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate costs.
在过去两年的年报中，我们提供给各位一张查理跟我认为最能够评估伯克希尔内在价值的表，在下表这个更新版本中，主要有两项跟价值息息相关的指标，第一列是我们平均每股持有的投资金额(包含现金与现金等价物)，第二列则是每股在扣除利息与经营费用之后，来自本业的经营收益(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计调整数)，当然已经扣除了所有来自第一列投资所实现的所有股利收入、利息收入与资本利得，事实上，若是把伯克希尔看成两家公司话，一家是持有所有投资组合的投资性业务，另一家是经营旗下所有业务并负担全部成本的经营性业务。
| Year 年份 |
Investments Per Share 每股投资规模 |
Pre-tax Earnings Per Share Excluding All Income from Investments 税前每股经营收益 |
|---|---|---|
| 1967 | $ 41 | $ 1.09 |
| 1977 | 372 | 12.44 |
| 1987 | 3,910 | 108.14 |
| 1997 | 38,043 | 717.82 |
Pundits who ignore what our 38,000 employees contribute to the company, and instead simply view Berkshire as a de facto investment company, should study the figures in the second column. We made our first business acquisition in 1967, and since then our pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $1 million to $888 million. Furthermore, as noted, in this exercise we have assigned all of Berkshire's corporate expenses -- overhead of $6.6 million, interest of $66.9 million and shareholder contributions of $15.4 million -- to our business operations, even though a portion of these could just as well have been assigned to the investment side.
对于那些无视于我们3.8万名辛勤奉献员工的存在，而武断地将伯克希尔当做是一家投资公司的权威人士，应该要请他们看看第二列的数字，打从1967年我们进行第一次的并购开始，本公司的税前收益已从当时的100万美元成长到现在的8.88亿美元，这还是包含了伯克希尔全部的费用：660万美元的企业营运费用、6,690万美元的利息支出以及1,540万美元的股东指定捐赠款，虽然这其中有一部分是与投资活动相关的支出。
Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:
下表是这两个部门每十年的成长率：
| Decade Ending 十年期 |
Investments Per Share 每股投资规模 |
Pre-tax Earnings Per Share Excluding All Income from Investments 税前每股经营收益 |
|---|---|---|
| 1977 | 24.6% | 27.6% |
| 1987 | 26.5% | 24.1% |
| 1997 | 25.5% | 20.8% |
| Annual Growth Rate, 1967-1997 | 25.6% | 24.2% |
During 1997, both parts of our business grew at a satisfactory rate, with investments increasing by $9,543 per share, or 33.5%, and operating earnings growing by $296.43 per share, or 70.3%. One important caveat: Because we were lucky in our super-cat insurance business (to be discussed later) and because GEICO's underwriting gain was well above what we can expect in most years, our 1997 operating earnings were much better than we anticipated and also more than we expect for 1998.
回顾1997年伯克希尔两个业务部分都缴出漂亮的成绩单，每股投资金额增加了9,543美元，约33.5%；而每股经营收益则增加了296.43美元，约70.3%，需要指出的是，我们的巨灾再保险业务的运气不错(后面还会在详加说明)，同时GEICO保险的表现甚至优于以往，这使得1997年的经营表现超乎当初的预期，甚至超过我们对1998年的预期表现。
Our rate of progress in both investments and operations is certain to fall in the future. For anyone deploying capital, nothing recedes like success. My own history makes the point: Back in 1951, when I was attending Ben Graham's class at Columbia, an idea giving me a $10,000 gain improved my investment performance for the year by a full 100 percentage points. Today, an idea producing a $500 million pre-tax profit for Berkshire adds one percentage point to our performance. It's no wonder that my annual results in the 1950s were better by nearly thirty percentage points than my annual gains in any subsequent decade. Charlie's experience was similar. We weren't smarter then, just smaller. At our present size, any performance superiority we achieve will be minor.
我相信未来不管是投资或经营收益的成长速度一定会向下滑落，对于任何负责资本配置的人而言，成功必然导致衰退，我个人的投资历史说明了这一点，回想当初我在1951年进入哥伦大学拜在格雷厄姆名下时，只要抓住能够赚到1万美元的投资机会就能让我的投资绩效超过100%，不过时至今日，一笔能赚5亿美元的成功投资个案，只能为伯克希尔的业绩增加1%，也难怪个人在1950年代早期的投资绩效会比接下来几十年的年度绩效高出30%，而查理本身的经历也很相似，不是我们变笨了，而是因为我们目前的规模实在是太大了，现在任何一项重大进展都会因为庞大的规模而显得微不足道。
We will be helped, however, by the fact that the businesses to which we have already allocated capital -- both operating subsidiaries and companies in which we are passive investors -- have splendid long-term prospects. We are also blessed with a managerial corps that is unsurpassed in ability and focus. Most of these executives are wealthy and do not need the pay they receive from Berkshire to maintain their way of life. They are motivated by the joy of accomplishment, not by fame or fortune.
当然只要我们运营的子公司以及投资的股票具有长期远景，我们绝对能够因此受益，同时我们有幸拥有一支兼具卓越能力与专注力的经营团队，大家要知道这些经理人本身大多都已经很富有了，根本就不需要靠伯克希尔这份薪水过活，他们不为名利，纯粹是冲着那份成就感。
Though we are delighted with what we own, we are not pleased with our prospects for committing incoming funds. Prices are high for both businesses and stocks. That does not mean that the prices of either will fall -- we have absolutely no view on that matter -- but it does mean that we get relatively little in prospective earnings when we commit fresh money.
虽然对于现有的投资组合感到相当满意，但是我们也对于陆续进来的资金找不到理想的去处而感到忧心，目前不管是整家公司或是单一股票的市场价格都过高，但我并不是要预言股价将会下跌，我们从来就不对股市发表任何看法，这样说的意思只是要提醒大家未来新投入资金的预期回报将会大大减少。
Under these circumstances, we try to exert a Ted Williams kind of discipline. In his book The Science of Hitting, Ted explains that he carved the strike zone into 77 cells, each the size of a baseball. Swinging only at balls in his "best" cell, he knew, would allow him to bat .400; reaching for balls in his "worst" spot, the low outside corner of the strike zone, would reduce him to .230. In other words, waiting for the fat pitch would mean a trip to the Hall of Fame; swinging indiscriminately would mean a ticket to the minors.
在这种情况下，我们试着学习职棒传奇明星Ted Williams的作法，他在《击球的科学》一书中解释说，他把打击区域划分为77个球区，每个球区相当于一个棒球的大小，只有当球进入最佳的球区时，他才挥棒击球，因为只有这样做，他才能维持40%的超高打击率，反之要是勉强去挥击较差的球区，将会使得他的打击率骤降到23%以下，换句话说，只有耐心等待超甜的好球，才是通往名人堂的大道，好坏球照单全收的人，迟早会面临被降到小联盟的命运。
If they are in the strike zone at all, the business "pitches" we now see are just catching the lower outside corner. If we swing, we will be locked into low returns. But if we let all of today's balls go by, there can be no assurance that the next ones we see will be more to our liking. Perhaps the attractive prices of the past were the aberrations, not the full prices of today. Unlike Ted, we can't be called out if we resist three pitches that are barely in the strike zone; nevertheless, just standing there, day after day, with my bat on my shoulder is not my idea of fun.
目前迎面朝我们而来的投资机会大多只在好球带边缘，如果我们选择挥棒，则得到的成绩可能会不太理想，但要是我们选择放弃不打，则没有人敢跟你保证下一球会更好，或许过去那种吸引人的超低价格已不复存在，所幸我们不必像Ted Williams一样，可能因为连续三次不挥棒而遭三振出局，只是光是扛着棒子站在那里，日复一日，也不是一件令人感到愉快的事。
When we can't find our favorite commitment -- a well-run and sensibly-priced business with fine economics -- we usually opt to put new money into very short-term instruments of the highest quality. Sometimes, however, we venture elsewhere. Obviously we believe that the alternative commitments we make are more likely to result in profit than loss. But we also realize that they do not offer the certainty of profit that exists in a wonderful business secured at an attractive price. Finding that kind of opportunity, we know that we are going to make money -- the only question being when. With alternative investments, we think that we are going to make money. But we also recognize that we will sometimes realize losses, occasionally of substantial size.
有时我们的资金不一定能够找到最理想的去处，也就是那些经营良好、价格合理的企业，这时我们就会将资金投入到一些期间较短但品质不错的投资工具上，虽然我们很明白这样的做法可能无法像我们买进好公司那样稳健的盈利，甚至在少数的状况下有可能赔大钱，不过总的来说我们相信赚钱的机率还是远高于赔钱，唯一的关键在于其盈利何时能够实现。
We had three non-traditional positions at yearend. The first was derivative contracts for 14.0 million barrels of oil, that being what was then left of a 45.7 million barrel position we established in 1994-95. Contracts for 31.7 million barrels were settled in 1995-97, and these supplied us with a pre-tax gain of about $61.9 million. Our remaining contracts expire during 1998 and 1999. In these, we had an unrealized gain of $11.6 million at yearend. Accounting rules require that commodity positions be carried at market value. Therefore, both our annual and quarterly financial statements reflect any unrealized gain or loss in these contracts. When we established our contracts, oil for future delivery seemed modestly underpriced. Today, though, we have no opinion as to its attractiveness.
截至年底，我们总共有三项异于往常的投资，首先是1400万桶的原油期货合约，这是我们在1994-1995年间所建立4570万桶原油的剩余部位，预计在1998-1999年陆续到期，目前未实现盈利约有1160万美元，而已经结仓的3170万桶原油合约总共贡献我们6190万美元的盈利，会计原则规定期货合约必须依市场价格评价，因此这些合约所有未实现的损益皆已反应在我们年度或每季的财务报表上，当初我们之所以会建立这些部位，主要考量当时的石油期货价位有些低估，至于现在的市场状况我们则没有任何意见。
Our second non-traditional commitment is in silver. Last year, we purchased 111.2 million ounces. Marked to market, that position produced a pre-tax gain of $97.4 million for us in 1997. In a way, this is a return to the past for me: Thirty years ago, I bought silver because I anticipated its demonetization by the U.S. Government. Ever since, I have followed the metal's fundamentals but not owned it. In recent years, bullion inventories have fallen materially, and last summer Charlie and I concluded that a higher price would be needed to establish equilibrium between supply and demand. Inflation expectations, it should be noted, play no part in our calculation of silver's value.
至于第二项非常规投资是白银，去年我们一口气买进总共1.112亿盎司的白银(约10亿美元)，以目前的市价计算，1997年总共贡献9740万美元的税前利益，某个角度来说，这仿佛又让我回到过去，记得在30年前，我因为预期美国政府货币将自由化(美元黄金脱钩)而买进白银，自此之后，我便一直追踪贵金属的基本面，只是并没有其它的买进动作，直到最近这几年，银锭的库存突然大幅下滑，查理跟我得到一个结论，那就是白银的价格应该要稍微向上调整以维持供需平衡，需要指出的是，通货膨胀的预期不在我们计算白银价值的考虑范围之内。
(每年白银市场供应缺口1.5亿盎司，市场需求约8亿盎司，但只有5亿盎司是矿山生产的，而且还是冶炼的副产品，另有1.5亿回收，主要是来自照相工业，几年前10-20亿盎司白银库存以及消耗殆尽，白银作为副产品，供应没有弹性，而需求刚性，白银供需缺口已经足够大，价格必定上涨弥补供应不足)
Finally, our largest non-traditional position at yearend was $4.6 billion, at amortized cost, of long-term zero-coupon obligations of the U.S. Treasury. These securities pay no interest. Instead, they provide their holders a return by way of the discount at which they are purchased, a characteristic that makes their market prices move rapidly when interest rates change. If rates rise, you lose heavily with zeros, and if rates fall, you make outsized gains. Since rates fell in 1997, we ended the year with an unrealized pre-tax gain of $598.8 million in our zeros. Because we carry the securities at market value, that gain is reflected in yearend book value.
第三项也是最大的非常规投资是46亿美元以帐面摊销的长期美国零息债券，这些债券不支付利息，相反的是以通过折价发行的方式向债券持有人提供回报，因此这类债券的价格会因市场利率变动而大幅波动，如果利率上升，持有零息债券的人可能损失惨重，反之若利率下跌，投资人就可能因此大赚一笔，而因为1997年的利率大幅下滑，所以1997年我们的未实现利益就高达5.98亿美元，由于我们以市场价格认列这些证券，因此这些利益已全数反应在公司年底的帐上。
In purchasing zeros, rather than staying with cash-equivalents, we risk looking very foolish: A macro-based commitment such as this never has anything close to a 100% probability of being successful. However, you pay Charlie and me to use our best judgment -- not to avoid embarrassment -- and we will occasionally make an unconventional move when we believe the odds favor it. Try to think kindly of us when we blow one. Along with President Clinton, we will be feeling your pain: The Munger family has more than 90% of its net worth in Berkshire and the Buffetts more than 99%.
当然不好好持有现金类投资而去投资零息债券不是没有风险的，这种基于宏观经济分析的投资绝对不敢保证100%成功，不过查理跟我绝对会运用我们最佳的判断能力，大家可不是请我们来混日子，当我们认为胜算颇大时，我们就会大胆地去做一些非常规的投资，当然万一不小心失败时，还请大家多多包含，就如同克林顿总统一样，我们绝对与各位感同身受，因为芒格家族有90%的资产放在伯克希尔，而巴菲特家族更高达99%。
A short quiz: If you plan to eat hamburgers throughout your life and are not a cattle producer, should you wish for higher or lower prices for beef? Likewise, if you are going to buy a car from time to time but are not an auto manufacturer, should you prefer higher or lower car prices? These questions, of course, answer themselves.
小测试：如果你打算一辈子吃汉堡维生，自己又不养牛，那么你是希望牛肉价格上涨或是下跌呢？同样的要是你会频繁换车，自己又不是卖车的，你会希望车子的价格上涨或是下跌呢？这些问题的答案很显然显而易见。
But now for the final exam: If you expect to be a net saver during the next five years, should you hope for a higher or lower stock market during that period? Many investors get this one wrong. Even though they are going to be net buyers of stocks for many years to come, they are elated when stock prices rise and depressed when they fall. In effect, they rejoice because prices have risen for the "hamburgers" they will soon be buying. This reaction makes no sense. Only those who will be sellers of equities in the near future should be happy at seeing stocks rise. Prospective purchasers should much prefer sinking prices.
最后我再问各位一个问题：假设你预估未来五年内可以存一笔钱，那么你希望这期间的股票市场是涨还是跌？这时许多投资人对于这个问题的答案就可能是错的，虽然他们在未来的期间内会陆续买进股票，不过当股价涨时他们会感到高兴，股价跌时反而觉得沮丧，这种感觉相当于当你去买汉堡吃时，看到汉堡涨价却欣喜若狂，这样的反应实在是没有什么道理，只有在短期间准备卖股票的人才应该感到高兴，准备买股票的人应该期待的是股价的下滑。
For shareholders of Berkshire who do not expect to sell, the choice is even clearer. To begin with, our owners are automatically saving even if they spend every dime they personally earn: Berkshire "saves" for them by retaining all earnings, thereafter using these savings to purchase businesses and securities. Clearly, the more cheaply we make these buys, the more profitable our owners' indirect savings program will be.
对于不希望卖出股票的伯克希尔股东来说，这样的选择再明显也不过了，首先就算他们将赚来的每一分钱都花掉，伯克希尔也会自动帮他们存钱，因为伯克希尔会通过将所赚得的收益再投资于其它的生意和股票，所以只要我们买进这些投资标的的成本越低，他们将来间接所获得的回报自然而然就越高。
Furthermore, through Berkshire you own major positions in companies that consistently repurchase their shares. The benefits that these programs supply us grow as prices fall: When stock prices are low, the funds that an investee spends on repurchases increase our ownership of that company by a greater amount than is the case when prices are higher. For example, the repurchases that Coca-Cola, The Washington Post and Wells Fargo made in past years at very low prices benefitted Berkshire far more than do today's repurchases, made at loftier prices.
此外，伯克希尔许多重要的投资公司都持续不断地买回自家公司的股份，在这种情况下，股票价格越低对我们越有利，因为这代表同样的一笔钱可以买进更多的股份，从而间接提高我们持股的比例，举例来说，过去几年可口可乐、华盛顿邮报与富国银行皆以非常低的价格大量买回自家股票，其所带来的效益要比在现在的高价再进行有利的多。
At the end of every year, about 97% of Berkshire's shares are held by the same investors who owned them at the start of the year. That makes them savers. They should therefore rejoice when markets decline and allow both us and our investees to deploy funds more advantageously.
每年度结束，大约有97%的伯克希尔股东会选择继续持有本公司的股份，这些人都是储蓄爱好者(股票收藏爱好者)，所以每当股市下跌时，他们都会感到高兴，因为这代表我们以及被投资公司的资金可以作更好的运用。
So smile when you read a headline that says "Investors lose as market falls." Edit it in your mind to "Disinvestors lose as market falls -- but investors gain." Though writers often forget this truism, there is a buyer for every seller and what hurts one necessarily helps the other. (As they say in golf matches: "Every putt makes someone happy.")
所以，当你看到"投资人在股市暴跌中损失巨大"的新闻头条时，你的脑海应该将其改成"股市暴跌不投资的人损失巨大而投资的人赚翻了"，虽然记者常常忘记这样的真理，不过只要有卖方就代表会有买方，一方损失就代表有另一方会得利，就像他们在高尔夫比赛常讲的：每一个柏忌推杆，都会有人在暗自高兴。
We gained enormously from the low prices placed on many equities and businesses in the 1970s and 1980s. Markets that then were hostile to investment transients were friendly to those taking up permanent residence. In recent years, the actions we took in those decades have been validated, but we have found few new opportunities. In its role as a corporate "saver," Berkshire continually looks for ways to sensibly deploy capital, but it may be some time before we find opportunities that get us truly excited.
当初我们靠着在1970-1980年代股价低迷时所做的一些投资，确实让我们赚了不少，这是一个对股市短暂过客不利却对股市长期住户有利的市场，近几年来，我们在那个年代所做的一些投资决策陆续获得了验证，不过现在我们却找不到类似的机会，身为企业资金的积蓄者，伯克希尔致力于寻找资金合理运用的方法，不过以现在的状况来看，我们可能还需要一段时间才能再找到真正让我们感到兴奋的投资机会。
What does excite us, however, is our insurance business. GEICO is flying, and we expect that it will continue to do so. Before we expound on that, though, let's discuss "float" and how to measure its cost. Unless you understand this subject, it will be impossible for you to make an informed judgment about Berkshire's intrinsic value.
真正令我们感到兴奋的是保险业务，GEICO保险正处于爆炸性的成长阶段，而且这种情况预期还会继续维持下去，在进一步说明之前，让我们先解释一下何谓浮存金，以及如何来衡量它的取得成本，因为除非你对于这个课题有所了解，否则你根本就不可能有办法对伯克希尔实际的价值做合理的判断。
To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In an insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years. During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay. That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float. An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for money.
首先在保险公司的营运中，浮存金是一项我们持有但不属于我们的资金，浮存金的产生原因在于，保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以覆盖最后支付出去的相关赔付与运营费用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得浮存金成本，长期而言低于从其它渠道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价值，否则一旦保险业务取得浮存金的成本若远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一颗酸柠檬。
A caution is appropriate here: Because loss costs must be estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to calculate a company's true cost of float. Estimating errors, usually innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.
需要特别注意的是，由于损失成本必须依靠估算，所以保险公司对于承保结果有相当大的自由度，这使得投资人很难正确地衡量一家保险公司真正的浮存金成本。估计错误，通常是无心，但有时却是故意，与真实的结果往往会有很大的差距，而这种结果直接反映在公司的损益表上，有经验的行家通常可以经由公司的准备提列情形发现重大的错误，但对于一般投资大众来说，除了被迫接受财务报表的数字之外，别无他法，而我个人常常被这些经过各大会计师事务所背书的财务报告所吓到，至于就伯克希尔本身而言，查理跟我在编列财务报表时，都尽量采取最保守的做法，因为就我们个人的经验而言，保险业所发生的意外，通常都不是什么好消息。
As the numbers in the following table show, Berkshire's insurance business has been a huge winner. For the table, we have calculated our float -- which we generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume -- by adding net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then subtracting agents' balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. Our cost of float is determined by our underwriting loss or profit. In those years when we have had an underwriting profit, such as the last five, our cost of float has been negative. In effect, we have been paid for holding money.
不过如同下表中的数字所显示的，伯克希尔的保险业务可说是大获全胜，表中的浮存金，系将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付并购成本以及相关再保递延费用等。相对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金规模算是相当大的，至于浮存金的成本则决定于所发生的承保损益而定，在某些年度，就像是最近五年，由于我们有承保收益，所以换句话说，我们的资金成本甚至是负的，光是持有这些资金我们就已经开始让我们赚钱了。
| Year 年份 |
Underwriting Loss (1) (In $ Millions) 承受损失 |
Average Float (2) (In $ Millions) 平均浮存金规模 |
Approximate Cost of Funds (Ratio of 1 to 2) 浮存金近似成本 |
Yearend Yield on Long-Term Govt. Bonds 长期政府债劵收益率 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1967 | profit | $ 17.3 | less than zero | 5.50 |
| 1968 | profit | 19.9 | less than zero | 5.90% |
| 1969 | profit | 23.4 | less than zero | 6.79% |
| 1970 | $ 0.37 | 32.4 | 1.14% | 6.25% |
| 1971 | profit | 52.5 | less than zero | 5.81% |
| 1972 | profit | 69.5 | less than zero | 5.82% |
| 1973 | profit | 73.3 | less than zero | 7.27% |
| 1974 | 7.36 | 79.1 | 9.30% | 8.13% |
| 1975 | 11.35 | 87.6 | 12.96% | 8.03% |
| 1976 | profit | 102.6 | less than zero | 7.30% |
| 1977 | profit | 139.0 | less than zero | 7.97% |
| 1978 | profit | 190.4 | less than zero | 8.93% |
| 1979 | profit | 227.3 | less than zero | 10.08% |
| 1980 | profit | 237.0 | less than zero | 11.94% |
| 1981 | profit | 228.4 | less than zero | 13.61% |
| 1982 | 21.56 | 220.6 | 9.77% | 10.64% |
| 1983 | 33.87 | 231.3 | 14.64% | 11.84% |
| 1984 | 48.06 | 253.2 | 18.98% | 11.58% |
| 1985 | 44.23 | 390.2 | 11.34% | 9.34% |
| 1986 | 55.84 | 797.5 | 7.00% | 7.60% |
| 1987 | 55.43 | 1,266.7 | 4.38% | 8.95% |
| 1988 | 11.08 | 1,497.7 | 0.74% | 9.00% |
| 1989 | 24.40 | 1,541.3 | 1.58% | 7.97% |
| 1990 | 26.65 | 1,637.3 | 1.63% | 8.24% |
| 1991 | 119.59 | 1,895.0 | 6.31% | 7.40% |
| 1992 | 108.96 | 2,290.4 | 4.76% | 7.39% |
| 1993 | profit | 2,624.7 | less than zero | 6.35% |
| 1994 | profit | 3,056.6 | less than zero | 7.88% |
| 1995 | profit | 3,607.2 | less than zero | 5.95% |
| 1996 | profit | 6,702.0 | less than zero | 6.64% |
| 1997 | profit | 7,093.1 | less than zero | 5.92% |
Since 1967, when we entered the insurance business, our float has grown at an annual compounded rate of 21.7%. Better yet, it has cost us nothing, and in fact has made us money. Therein lies an accounting irony: Though our float is shown on our balance sheet as a liability, it has had a value to Berkshire greater than an equal amount of net worth would have had.
自从1967年我们进军保险业以来，我们的浮存金规模71亿，每年以21.7%复合成长率增加，更棒的是，这些资金完全没有成本，事实上还让我们赚了钱。讽刺的是，就会计原则而言，浮存金在会计报表上属于负债，但实际上，这些负债对于伯克希尔而言，其价值远高于列在帐上的其它股东权益。
The expiration of several large contracts will cause our float to decline during the first quarter of 1998, but we expect it to grow substantially over the long term. We also believe that our cost of float will continue to be highly favorable.
虽然在1998第一季几项重大合约到期后，我们拥有的浮存金会略微减少，但就长期而言，我们还是预期浮存金会大幅成长，同时我们也相信取得浮存金的成本仍然会继续维持这种令人满意的态势。
Occasionally, however, the cost of our float will spike severely. That will occur because of our heavy involvement in the super-cat business, which by its nature is the most volatile of all insurance lines. In this operation, we sell policies that insurance and reinsurance companies purchase in order to limit their losses when mega-catastrophes strike. Berkshire is the preferred market for sophisticated buyers: When the "big one" hits, the financial strength of super-cat writers will be tested, and Berkshire has no peer in this respect.
然而有时候我们浮存金的成本也会突然大幅上扬，主要的原因在于我们从事的巨灾再保险业务，本身属于保险业中变动最大的一种险种。从事这类业务，我们将保单卖给其它保险公司与再保公司，以分散他们面临超大型意外灾害所可能承担的风险，事实上，伯克希尔是有经验的公司最喜爱往来的对象，因为他们深深知道当有"大事"真正发生时，所有巨灾保险的承保业者都会面临财务实力的严峻挑战，而伯克希尔无疑的是同业之最。
Since truly major catastrophes are rare occurrences, our super-cat business can be expected to show large profits in most years -- and to record a huge loss occasionally. In other words, the attractiveness of our super-cat business will take a great many years to measure. What you must understand, however, is that a truly terrible year in the super-cat business is not a possibility -- it's a certainty. The only question is when it will come.
而由于真正重大的灾害并不是每年都发生，所以我们的巨灾业务极有可能在连续几年赚大钱后，突然又发生重大的损失，换句话说，我们这项巨灾保险业务到底有多吸引人可能要花上好几年才有办法看得清，不过大家必须明了，所谓的重大损失的年头不是可能会发生，而是肯定会发生，唯一的问题是它什么时候会发生。
Last year, we were very lucky in our super-cat operation. The world suffered no catastrophes that caused huge amounts of insured damage, so virtually all premiums that we received dropped to the bottom line. This pleasant result has a dark side, however. Many investors who are "innocents" -- meaning that they rely on representations of salespeople rather than on underwriting knowledge of their own -- have come into the reinsurance business by means of purchasing pieces of paper that are called "catastrophe bonds." The second word in this term, though, is an Orwellian misnomer: A true bond obliges the issuer to pay; these bonds, in effect, are contracts that lay a provisional promise to pay on the purchaser.
去年我们在巨灾业务的表现还算不错，全世界一整年都没有发生足以造成重大损失的大型灾害，也就是说基本上一整年收到的所有保费都自动落到我们的口袋里。只是事情并不如想象中完美，有许多不知情的投资人，并非基于本身对于保险承保的认识，而是在业务人员的怂恿推销之下，进场买进一种叫做"巨灾债券"的有价证券，事实上这根本就是一个误导性的名词，真正的债券是指到期后发行人有义务支付债券款，然而这种债券，本质上其实是一种给予买方一种附有条件限制的承诺支付合约。
This convoluted arrangement came into being because the promoters of the contracts wished to circumvent laws that prohibit the writing of insurance by entities that haven't been licensed by the state. A side benefit for the promoters is that calling the insurance contract a "bond" may also cause unsophisticated buyers to assume that these instruments involve far less risk than is actually the case.
这种拐弯抹角的做法，主要是推销人为了规避，禁止未经政府许可的实体从事承保业务，而衍生出来的产品，而业者之所以将它取名叫做债券的原因在于这样的做法可以吸引不知情的投资人，承担远比其表面上还高的许多的风险。
Truly outsized risks will exist in these contracts if they are not properly priced. A pernicious aspect of catastrophe insurance, however, makes it likely that mispricing, even of a severe variety, will not be discovered for a very long time. Consider, for example, the odds of throwing a 12 with a pair of dice -- 1 out of 36. Now assume that the dice will be thrown once a year; that you, the "bond-buyer," agree to pay $50 million if a 12 appears; and that for "insuring" this risk you take in an annual "premium" of $1 million. That would mean you had significantly underpriced the risk. Nevertheless, you could go along for years thinking you were making money -- indeed, easy money. There is actually a 75.4% probability that you would go for a decade without paying out a dime. Eventually, however, you would go broke.
这些商品若未经过仔细的价格核算的话，很可能会形成极高的风险，更严重的是灾害保险通常还有一个特点，那就是问题要经过许久之后才会慢慢地浮现。我举个例来说明，2颗骰子要掷出12点的机率约为1/36，现在假设我们一年只掷一次，每次可以收取100万的赌注，但一旦掷出12点时身为庄家的你必须支付5千万美元，或许刚开始你会以为这100万美元得来全不费工夫，甚至有75.4%的机率保证你在前十年都不必付出一毛钱，但最后你会发现就长期而言，接受这样的赌注对庄家来说实际上是亏大了，甚至有可能让你倾家荡产。
In this dice example, the odds are easy to figure. Calculations involving monster hurricanes and earthquakes are necessarily much fuzzier, and the best we can do at Berkshire is to estimate a range of probabilities for such events. The lack of precise data, coupled with the rarity of such catastrophes, plays into the hands of promoters, who typically employ an "expert" to advise the potential bond-buyer about the probability of losses. The expert puts no money on the table. Instead, he receives an up-front payment that is forever his no matter how inaccurate his predictions. Surprise: When the stakes are high, an expert can invariably be found who will affirm -- to return to our example -- that the chance of rolling a 12 is not 1 in 36, but more like 1 in 100. (In fairness, we should add that the expert will probably believe that his odds are correct, a fact that makes him less reprehensible -- but more dangerous.)
在玩这种骰子游戏时，其机率还很容易计算，但是要说到估算大型飓风与地震的发生机率的难度就高出的多了，我们自己能做的最多也只是估计一个大约的范围，然而缺乏详细的信息，加上大型的灾害本来就很少发生，正好让一些有心人士有机可乘，通常他们会雇用一些砖家对有意投资这类债券的客户讲解其发生损失的可能性，而这些所谓的砖家玩得根本就是一种无本生意，因为不论他估算的到底准不准，事先都可以拿到一笔定金，更令人讶异的是，回到前面的主题，你会发现无论赌注有多高，专家永远会告诉你掷出12点的机率不是1/36，而是1/100。平心而论，我们必须强调这些砖家可能真的认为自己的看法是对的，这虽然让人不忍予以苛责但却更加凸显他们的危险性。
The influx of "investor" money into catastrophe bonds -- which may well live up to their name -- has caused super-cat prices to deteriorate materially. Therefore, we will write less business in 1998. We have some large multi-year contracts in force, however, that will mitigate the drop. The largest of these are two policies that we described in last year's report -- one covering hurricanes in Florida and the other, signed with the California Earthquake Authority, covering earthquakes in that state. Our "worst-case" loss remains about $600 million after-tax, the maximum we could lose under the CEA policy. Though this loss potential may sound large, it is only about 1% of Berkshire's market value. Indeed, if we could get appropriate prices, we would be willing to significantly increase our "worst-case" exposure.
越来越多的资金涌入投资这类巨灾债券，使得巨灾的投保费率大幅下滑，其结果可能真如其名，终将导致巨大的灾害，为此我们大幅减少1998年在这方面的业务量，还好我们先前已签了好几件长期的合约使得冲击相对减小，其中最大的两件在去年的年报中已向各位报告过，一件是佛罗里达的飓风险，另一个是与加州地震局CEA签订的加州地震险，在最坏的状况下，我们必须承受的损失是税后6亿美元，这也是CEA保单规定的上限，虽然这个数字看起来很大，但占伯克希尔市值的比例也不过只有1%，当然我必须再强调的是，只要保费合理，我们很愿意大幅提高最坏状况的风险上限。
Our super-cat business was developed from scratch by Ajit Jain, who has contributed to Berkshire's success in a variety of other ways as well. Ajit possesses both the discipline to walk away from business that is inadequately priced and the imagination to then find other opportunities. Quite simply, he is one of Berkshire's major assets. Ajit would have been a star in whatever career he chose; fortunately for us, he enjoys insurance.
伯克希尔的巨灾保险业务在阿吉特·贾恩的努力下，从无到有，对伯克希尔可谓贡献良多，阿吉特一方面有拒绝价格不合理保单的勇气，一方面又有创造力去开创新的业务，他可以称得上是伯克希尔最珍贵的资产之一，我觉得他不论从事什么行业都可以成为那一行的明星，还好他对于保险业还算是相当有兴趣。
Last year I wrote about GEICO's Tony Nicely and his terrific management skills. If I had known then what he had in store for us in 1997, I would have searched for still greater superlatives. Tony, now 54, has been with GEICO for 36 years and last year was his best. As CEO, he has transmitted vision, energy and enthusiasm to all members of the GEICO family -- raising their sights from what has been achieved to what can be achieved.
去年年报我提到GEICO保险的托尼·莱斯利(Tony Nicely)以及他优异的管理技能，不过我要是早知道他在1997年的表现，我可能会试着去用更好的形容词，现年54岁的Tony在GEICO保险服务已有36年之久，在去年更达到个人事业的巅峰，身为公司的CEO，他将远景、能量与热情传递给公司上上下下的每一个人，激励他们不断地超越巅峰。
We measure GEICO's performance by first, the net increase in its voluntary auto policies (that is, not including policies assigned us by the state) and, second, the profitability of "seasoned" auto business, meaning policies that have been with us for more than a year and are thus past the period in which acquisition costs cause them to be money-losers. In 1996, in-force business grew 10%, and I told you how pleased I was, since that rate was well above anything we had seen in two decades. Then, in 1997, growth jumped to 16%.
我们运用好几种方法来衡量GEICO保险的表现，首先是自愿性加入汽车保单数量的净增加数(也就是不包含州政府强制分配给我们的保单数)。第二，长期汽车保单业务的盈利状况，是指那些持续一年以上，已经过了初次取得成本而开始赚钱的保单，1996年有效保单的数量成长了10%，当时我曾告诉大家这是相当令人兴奋的一件事，因为这是20年来的新高，不过到了1997年，有效保单数量的成长率又大幅跃升为16%！
Below are the new business and in-force figures for the last five years:
下表是新加入自愿性保单以及有效保单数量的统计：
| Years 年度 |
New Voluntary Auto Policies 新加入自愿性保单 |
Voluntary Auto Policies in Force 有效保单数量 |
|---|---|---|
| 1993 | 354,882 | 2,011,055 |
| 1994 | 396,217 | 2,147,549 |
| 1995 | 461,608 | 2,310,037 |
| 1996 | 617,669 | 2,543,699 |
| 1997 | 913,176 | 2,949,439 |
Of course, any insurer can grow rapidly if it gets careless about underwriting. GEICO's underwriting profit for the year, though, was 8.1% of premiums, far above its average. Indeed, that percentage was higher than we wish it to be: Our goal is to pass on most of the benefits of our low-cost operation to our customers, holding ourselves to about 4% in underwriting profit. With that in mind, we reduced our average rates a bit during 1997 and may well cut them again this year. Our rate changes varied, of course, depending on the policyholder and where he lives; we strive to charge a rate that properly reflects the loss expectancy of each driver.
当然任何一家保险公司都可以不顾承保品质而快速的成长，然而GEICO保险本年度的承保利润却是保费收入的8.1%，这数字远优于一般同业水准，确实这数字也远高于我们本身的预期，我们原先的目标是将低成本营运所贡献的盈利回馈给我们的客户，仅保留4%利润率，基于这样的信念，我们将1997年的保险费率再度略微调降，同时在明年有可能也会采取相同的做法，当然最后的费率还须参酌保户本身状况以及居住的地区，我们最终还是希望费率的改变可以合理地反映每位驾驶人发生损失的预期概率。
GEICO is not the only auto insurer obtaining favorable results these days. Last year, the industry recorded profits that were far better than it anticipated or can sustain. Intensified competition will soon squeeze margins very significantly. But this is a development we welcome: Long term, a tough market helps the low-cost operator, which is what we are and intend to remain.
GEICO保险并不是近年来唯一取得好成绩汽车保险业者，去年整个产业获得高于原先预期的盈利能力，但这种好光景很难维持下去，因为来自同业激烈的竞争很快地就会压缩盈利的空间，然而面对可能的发展，我们胸有成竹，就长期而言，艰困的市场环境有利于低成本营运的业者生存，这也是一直以来我们努力维持的竞争优势。
Last year I told you about the record 16.9% profit-sharing contribution that GEICO's associates had earned and explained that two simple variables set the amount: policy growth and profitability of seasoned business. I further explained that 1996's performance was so extraordinary that we had to enlarge the chart delineating the possible payouts. The new configuration didn't make it through 1997: We enlarged the chart's boundaries again and awarded our 10,500 associates a profit-sharing contribution amounting to 26.9% of their base compensation, or $71 million. In addition, the same two variables -- policy growth and profitability of seasoned business -- determined the cash bonuses that we paid to dozens of top executives, starting with Tony.
去年我也曾跟各位报告过，GEICO保险员工为自己挣得高达年薪16.9%的奖金，同时也解释只有两项简单的参数计算出这个比例，那就是保单的成长率与长期业务的盈利状况，我还说由于1996年的表现实在是超乎预期以致于原先预估支付奖金的图表，因不够使用而必须加大，不过到了今年新的图表竟然又不够用，为此我们再度提高上限，总计全公司上上下下的10,500名员工，一共可以领到相当于年薪26.9%的奖金，总金额高达7100万美元，当然这两项参数，同时也适用于包含Tony在内的数十位高级经理人的奖金红利。
At GEICO, we are paying in a way that makes sense for both our owners and our managers. We distribute merit badges, not lottery tickets: In none of Berkshire's subsidiaries do we relate compensation to our stock price, which our associates cannot affect in any meaningful way. Instead, we tie bonuses to each unit's business performance, which is the direct product of the unit's people. When that performance is terrific -- as it has been at GEICO -- there is nothing Charlie and I enjoy more than writing a big check.
在GEICO保险，我们支付薪资红利的方式很能够获得劳资双方的认同，我们颁发的是红利奖章而不是乐透彩券，伯克希尔旗下的子公司员工的薪资回报与母公司的股价一点关系都没有，因为前者并没有能力直接影响后者，相反地，我们将子公司的薪资与各部门的各自表现完全绑在一起，因为后者的成败必须由前者负全部的责任，当某业务部门的表现杰出时，就像GEICO保险去年的情况一样，查理跟我乐于签发大额支票。
GEICO's underwriting profitability will probably fall in 1998, but the company's growth could accelerate. We're planning to step on the gas: GEICO's marketing expenditures this year will top $100 million, up 50% from 1997. Our market share today is only 3%, a level of penetration that should increase dramatically in the next decade. The auto insurance industry is huge -- it does about $115 billion of volume annually -- and there are tens of millions of drivers who would save substantial money by switching to us.
不过GEICO保险1998年的承保利润很可能会下滑，但是保单数量应该还会继续成长，我们已准备好加紧油门，GEICO保险今年预计的营销费用将突破一亿美元的大关，这数字比起1997年要增加50%以上，截至目前为止，我们的市场占有率约为3%，预计在未来的十年内还会大幅增加，整个汽车保险市场的大饼相当可观，每年约有1150亿美元的市场规模，预估将有上千万的驾驶人因为将保单转移到我们这边而节省相当可观的保费。
In the 1995 report, I described the enormous debt that you and I owe to Lorimer Davidson. On a Saturday early in 1951, he patiently explained the ins and outs of both GEICO and its industry to me -- a 20-year-old stranger who'd arrived at GEICO's headquarters uninvited and unannounced. Davy later became the company's CEO and has remained my friend and teacher for 47 years. The huge rewards that GEICO has heaped on Berkshire would not have materialized had it not been for his generosity and wisdom. Indeed, had I not met Davy, I might never have grown to understand the whole field of insurance, which over the years has played such a key part in Berkshire's success.
在1995年的年报中，我曾经提到我们欠Lorimer Davidson一个大人情，1951年初的某个周六，一个20岁的毛头小子不请自来，招呼都没打就冒冒失失闯入GEICO保险公司总部，他深入浅出地介绍GEICO保险以及行业的来龙去脉。Davy后来也成为该公司的CEO，并与我维持长达47年亦师亦友的情谊，没有他的慷慨和智慧，伯克希尔也没有办法靠着GEICO保险的成功而获得巨大回报。事实上，如果我没有遇到Davy，我可能永远也不会了解整个保险行业。多年来，保险业务在伯克希尔的成功中发挥了如此关键的作用。
Davy turned 95 last year, and it's difficult for him to travel. Nevertheless, Tony and I hope that we can persuade him to attend our annual meeting, so that our shareholders can properly thank him for his important contributions to Berkshire. Wish us luck.
Davy去年已高龄95岁，旅途奔波对他来说是一件很辛苦的事，不过Tony跟我还是会尽量说服他参加今年的股东大会，好让大家能够藉这个机会好好地感谢他对伯克希尔所做的贡献，希望我们能够如愿。
Though they are, of course, far smaller than GEICO, our other primary insurance operations turned in results last year that, in aggregate, were fully as stunning. National Indemnity's traditional business had an underwriting profit of 32.9% and, as usual, developed a large amount of float compared to premium volume. Over the last three years, this segment of our business, run by Don Wurster, has had a profit of 24.3%. Our homestate operation, managed by Rod Eldred, recorded an underwriting profit of 14.1% even though it continued to absorb the expenses of geographical expansion. Rod's three-year record is an amazing 15.1%. Berkshire's workers' compensation business, run out of California by Brad Kinstler, had a modest underwriting loss in a difficult environment; its three-year underwriting record is a positive 1.5%. John Kizer, at Central States Indemnity, set a new volume record while generating good underwriting earnings. At Kansas Bankers Surety, Don Towle more than lived up to the high expectations we had when we purchased the company in 1996.
当然，我们其它直接保险业务，虽然规模比GEICO保险小得多，但去年缴出来的成绩单同样惊人，国民保险传统业务的承保利润率高达32.9%，同时也贡献出相较于保费收入高比例的浮存金。累计过去三年，这个由Don Wurster领导的保险部门平均利润率为24.3%。另外在由Rod Eldred领导的住宅保险业务(Home-State)，在必须吸收地区业务扩大的运营费用下，仍然缴出14.1%的承保利润率，累计最近三年的利润率为15.1%。此外，伯克希尔的工伤赔偿保险业务在加州的Brad Kinstler主持下，虽然面临困难的环境，但产生承保损失的程度相对轻微，平均三年的承保成绩是正的1.5%。还有由John Kizer领导的中部州保险在保费收入缔造新高的同时，也贡献相当不错的承保盈利。最后是我们在1996年收购的堪萨斯银行家保险，Don Towle的表现甚至超过我们当初设立的高标准。
In aggregate, these five operations recorded an underwriting profit of 15.0%. The two Dons, along with Rod, Brad and John, have created significant value for Berkshire, and we believe there is more to come.
总计下来，这五家保险子公司平均的承保利润率是15.0%，两位Dons加上Rod、Brad及John，为伯克希尔创造了可观的收益，而且我们也相信后势可期。
The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire's reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on pages 69 and 70, this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements.
下表显示伯克希尔报告收益的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的收益状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计师查核的数字一致。
| Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 |
Pre-Tax Earnings 税前收益 |
Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 税后收益（伯克希尔应占） |
Berkshire's Share of Net Earnings (after taxes and minority interests) 税后收益（伯克希尔） |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (in millions) 以百万美金计 |
1997 | 1996 | 1997 | 1996 |
| Operating Earnings: | ||||
| Insurance Group: | ||||
| Underwriting -- Super-Cat 保险承保：巨灾再保险 |
$ 283.0 | $ 167.0 | $ 182.7 | $ 107.4 |
| Underwriting -- Other Reinsurance 保险承保：其他再保险 |
(155.2) | (174.8) | (100.1) | (112.4) |
| Underwriting -- GEICO 保险承保：GEICO |
280.7 | 171.4 | 181.1 | 110.2 |
| Underwriting -- Other Primary 保险承保：其他直保 |
52.9 | 58.5 | 34.1 | 37.6 |
| Net investment income 保险投资：净投资收益 |
882.3 | 726.2 | 703.6 | 593.1 |
| Buffalo News 布法罗新闻 |
55.9 | 50.4 | 32.7 | 29.5 |
| Finance Businesses 金融业务 |
28.1 | 23.1 | 18.0 | 14.9 |
| FlightSafety 飞安公司 |
139.5 | 3.1(1) | 84.4 | 1.9(1) |
| Home Furnishings 家具业务 |
56.8(2) | 43.8 | 32.2(2) | 24.8 |
| Jewelry 珠宝业务 |
31.6 | 27.8 | 18.3 | 16.1 |
| Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation) Scott Fetzer+Kirby+图书 |
118.9 | 121.7 | 77.3 | 81.6 |
| See’s Candies 喜诗糖果 |
58.6 | 51.9 | 35.0 | 30.8 |
| Shoe Group 鞋业集团 |
48.8 | 61.6 | 32.2 | 41.0 |
| Purchase-Accounting Adjustments 购买法会计调整 |
(104.9) | (75.7) | (97.0) | (70.5) |
| Interest Expense(3) 利息费用 |
(106.6) | (94.3) | (67.1) | (56.6) |
| Shareholder-Designated Contributions 股东指定捐赠 |
(15.4) | (13.3) | (9.9) | (8.5) |
| Other 其他（制服） |
60.7 | 73.0 | 37.0 | 42.2 |
| Operating Earnings 经营收益 |
1,715.7 | 1,221.4 | 1,194.5 | 883.1 |
| Capital Gains from Investments 出售资产和已实现证劵收益 |
1,111.9 | 2,484.5 | 707.1 | 1,605.5 |
| Total Earnings - All Entities 所有实体-收益合计 |
$ 2,827.6 | $ 3,705.9 | $ 1,901.6 | $ 2,488.6 |
(1) From date of acquisition, December 23, 1996.
(1)飞安公司从1996年12月23日取得之时算起
(2) Includes Star Furniture from July 1, 1997.
(2)家具业务包含明星家具1997年7月1日以后的收益
(3) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.
(3)利息费用扣除金融业务利息支出。
Overall, our operating businesses continue to perform exceptionally well, far outdoing their industry norms. We are particularly pleased that profits improved at Helzberg's after a disappointing 1996. Jeff Comment, Helzberg's CEO, took decisive steps early in 1997 that enabled the company to gain real momentum by the crucial Christmas season. In the early part of this year, as well, sales remained strong.
总的来说，我们旗下的运营业务的表现远优于一般的同业，尤其是Helzberg钻石在渡过令人失望的1996年之后，盈利状况大幅提升，Helzberg公司的总裁Jeff Comment在1997年初断然地采取各项措施，带领整个公司在重要的圣诞旺季大有斩获，而截至今年上半年为止，销售状况依旧强劲。
Casual observers may not appreciate just how extraordinary the performance of many of our businesses has been: If the earnings history of, say, Buffalo News or Scott Fetzer is compared to the records of their publicly-owned peers, their performance might seem to have been unexceptional. But most public companies retain two-thirds or more of their earnings to fund their corporate growth. In contrast, those Berkshire subsidiaries have paid 100% of their earnings to us, their parent company, to fund our growth.
一般人可能没有意识到我们众多旗下业务的表现是多么的杰出，虽然相较于其他已上市的同业，布法罗新闻报或是斯科特费泽的盈利表现看起来并不突出，不过大家要了解，大部分的上市公司通常会将2/3以上的收益保留不分配以帮助企业保持成长，但是伯克希尔大部分的子公司却将所赚取的收益100%的送回总部，以促进伯克希尔进一步的成长。
In effect, the records of the public companies reflect the cumulative benefits of the earnings they have retained, while the records of our operating subsidiaries get no such boost. Over time, however, the earnings these subsidiaries have distributed have created truly huge amounts of earning power elsewhere in Berkshire. The News, See's and Scott Fetzer have alone paid us $1.8 billion, which we have gainfully employed elsewhere. We owe their managements our gratitude for much more than the earnings that are detailed in the table.
事实上，这些上市公司的收益对于其盈利表现有累积效果，相较之下，我们的子公司却没有这方面的帮助，然而就长期而言，这些子公司上缴的资金对于伯克希尔在其它地方的盈利能力却有极大的贡献，布法罗新闻、喜诗糖果与斯科特费泽三家公司，这几年来上缴的收益总计高达18亿美元，而我们也得以好好地运用这些资金，所以我们对于这些经理人的感谢绝不仅止于帐面上所看到的那些收益数字而已。
Additional information about our various businesses is given on pages 36 - 50, where you will also find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 55 - 61, we have rearranged Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the company. Our intent is to supply you with the financial information that we would wish you to give us if our positions were reversed.
在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制各个业务部门详细的信息，另外你还可以找到经过重编，依照伯克希尔四大部门的信息，这是查理跟我能够完整呈现伯克希尔现况的模式，我们的目的是希望能够换位思考，提供大家所有，假如我们作为投资者想看到的必要信息。
Reported earnings are a poor measure of economic progress at Berkshire, in part because the numbers shown in the table presented earlier include only the dividends we receive from investees -- though these dividends typically represent only a small fraction of the earnings attributable to our ownership. Not that we mind this division of money, since on balance we regard the undistributed earnings of investees as more valuable to us than the portion paid out. The reason is simple: Our investees often have the opportunity to reinvest earnings at high rates of return. So why should we want them paid out?
我们认为报告收益很难表现伯克希尔实际的营运状况，部分原因在于列示在本公司帐上的股利收入，事实上仅占被投资公司收益的一小部分，其实我们并不要求收益一定要分配，对我们而言，我们更重视未分配的那一部分，因为他们极可能为我们创造出更高的价值，原因很简单，因为我们的被投资公司往往有机会以更高回报率再投资，既然如此又何必一定要强迫他们把收益分配回来呢？
To depict something closer to economic reality at Berkshire than reported earnings, though, we employ the concept of "look-through" earnings. As we calculate these, they consist of: (1) the operating earnings reported in the previous section, plus; (2) our share of the retained operating earnings of major investees that, under GAAP accounting, are not reflected in our profits, less; (3) an allowance for the tax that would be paid by Berkshire if these retained earnings of investees had instead been distributed to us. When tabulating "operating earnings" here, we exclude purchase-accounting adjustments as well as capital gains and other major non-recurring items.
为了要更真实的反应伯克希尔实际的经营状况，于是乎我们运用了透视收益的概念，这个数字总共包含(1)前段所提到的报告收益，加上(2)主要被投资公司的保留收益，按一般公认会计原则未反应在我们公司帐上的收益，扣除(3)若这些未反应的收益分配给我们时，估计可能要缴的所得税。在这里我们所谓的经营收益系已扣除资本利得、特别会计调整以及其它非经常性的项目。
The following table sets forth our 1997 look-through earnings, though I warn you that the figures can be no more than approximate, since they are based on a number of judgment calls. (The dividends paid to us by these investees have been included in the operating earnings itemized on page 11, mostly under "Insurance Group: Net Investment Income.")
各位可以从下表看出我们是如何计算出1997年透视收益的，不过我还是要提醒各位这些数字只不过是估计数，很多都是基于简单的判断，(被投资公司所分配的股利收入已经包含在保险业务的净投资收益项下)。
| Berkshire's Major Investees 伯克希尔主要投资公司 |
Berkshire's Approximate Ownership at Yearend(1) 伯克希尔应占所有权 |
Berkshire's Share of Undistributed Operating Earnings (in millions)(2) 伯克希尔应占未分配收益 |
|---|---|---|
| American Express Company 美国运通 |
10.7% | $ 161 |
| The Coca-Cola Company 可口可乐 |
8.1% | 216 |
| The Walt Disney Company 迪士尼 |
3.2% | 65 |
| Freddie Mac 房地美 |
8.6% | 86 |
| The Gillette Company 吉列公司 |
8.6% | 82 |
| The Washington Post Company 华盛顿邮报 |
16.5% | 30 |
| Wells Fargo & Company 富国银行 |
7.8% | 103 |
| Berkshire's share of undistributed earnings of major investees 伯克希尔主要投资未分配收益合计 |
743 | |
| Hypothetical tax on these undistributed investee earnings(3) 对未分配收益的假设税 |
(105) | |
| Reported operating earnings of Berkshire 伯克希尔报告的经营收益 |
1,292 | |
| Total look-through earnings of Berkshire 伯克希尔透视收益合计 |
$ 1,930 |
(1) Does not include shares allocable to minority interests
(1)不包括可分配给少数股东权益的股份
(2) Calculated on average ownership for the year
(2)以年平均持有股权比例计算
(3) The tax rate used is 14%, which is the rate Berkshire pays on the dividends it receives
(3)通用的税率为14%，这里是伯克希尔收到现金股利时的平均税率
In 1997, we agreed to acquire Star Furniture and International Dairy Queen (a deal that closed early in 1998). Both businesses fully meet our criteria: They are understandable; possess excellent economics; and are run by outstanding people.
1997年我们同意买下明星家具(Star Furniture)与国际冰雪皇后(Dairy Queen在1998年初完成)，两家公司都完全符合我们的标准：业务易于理解、拥有绝佳的竞争优势，并且由杰出的经理人管理。
The Star transaction has an interesting history. Whenever we buy into an industry whose leading participants aren't known to me, I always ask our new partners, "Are there any more at home like you?" Upon our purchase of Nebraska Furniture Mart in 1983, therefore, the Blumkin family told me about three outstanding furniture retailers in other parts of the country. At the time, however, none was for sale.
明星家具的交易有个相当有趣的故事，每当我们跨足一个原本我们不熟悉的产业，我都会习惯性地问一问新加入的合作伙伴：除了你们以外，还有没有像你们一样的企业？早在1983年我们买下内布拉斯加家具店时，我就问过Blumkin家族这个问题，当时她告诉我全美其它地方还有三家不错的家具零售商可以考虑，不过很可惜在当时没有任何一家有出售的意愿。
Many years later, Irv Blumkin learned that Bill Child, CEO of R.C. Willey -- one of the recommended three -- might be interested in merging, and we promptly made the deal described in the 1995 report. We have been delighted with that association -- Bill is the perfect partner. Furthermore, when we asked Bill about industry standouts, he came up with the remaining two names given me by the Blumkins, one of these being Star Furniture of Houston. But time went by without there being any indication that either of the two was available.
多年后，Blumkin家族的Irv Blumkin得知当初获得推荐的三家公司之一R.C.Willey威利家具CEO比尔·柴尔德(Bill Child)有意出售，我们立刻把握良机促成交易，这项收购在1995年的年报已向各位报告过，事后我们对这笔交易也很满意，Bill是完美的合作伙伴，当然我也不忘问问Bill相同的问题，请他推荐其它杰出的同业，结果得到的答案与B夫人所说的一致，其中一家就是位于休斯顿的明星家具，只是随着时光的流逝没有一家有意愿出售。
On the Thursday before last year's annual meeting, however, Bob Denham of Salomon told me that Melvyn Wolff, the long-time controlling shareholder and CEO of Star, wanted to talk. At our invitation, Melvyn came to the meeting and spent his time in Omaha confirming his positive feelings about Berkshire. I, meanwhile, looked at Star's financials, and liked what I saw.
而就在去年年度股东会的前一个周四，所罗门公司的董事长鲍勃·德纳姆(Bob Denham)告诉我明星家具的大股东兼CEO梅尔文·沃尔夫(Melvyn Wolff)想跟我谈谈，应我们的邀请，Melvyn光临奥马哈参加了年会，并且对于伯克希尔的印象不错，而于此同时，我也看了明星家具的财务报表，一切正如我所预期。
A few days later, Melvyn and I met in New York and made a deal in a single, two-hour session. As was the case with the Blumkins and Bill Child, I had no need to check leases, work out employment contracts, etc. I knew I was dealing with a man of integrity and that's what counted.
几天后，Melvyn与我再度在纽约碰面，前后只花了两个钟头的会谈就达成了交易，而如同先前与Blumkin家族及Bill Child的经历一样，我不需要再去查核租约、员工雇用合约等，我知道我正在和一位具有正直人格的人打交道，这样就足够了。
Though the Wolff family's association with Star dates back to 1924, the business struggled until Melvyn and his sister Shirley Toomin took over in 1962. Today Star operates 12 stores -- ten in Houston and one each in Austin and Bryan -- and will soon move into San Antonio as well. We won't be surprised if Star is many times its present size a decade from now.
虽然Wolff家族与明星家具的关系可以追溯到1924年以前，但是该公司直到Melvyn跟他妹妹雪莉·图明(Shirly Toomin在广告设计方面特长帮助明星家具在竞争中脱颖而出)在1962年接手经营后才有起色，时至今日，星辰总共有12家分店，其中10家在休斯顿、另外2家在奥斯丁与布莱恩，还有一家新店即将在圣安东尼奥开业，我想十年后明星家具规模是现在数倍我一点都不会感到意外。
Here's a story illustrating what Melvyn and Shirley are like: When they told their associates of the sale, they also announced that Star would make large, special payments to those who had helped them succeed -- and then defined that group as everyone in the business. Under the terms of our deal, it was Melvyn and Shirley's money, not ours, that funded this distribution. Charlie and I love it when we become partners with people who behave like that.
下面的一则故事充分说明Melvyn与Shirley是怎么样的人：当明星家具正式宣布出售公司时，他们同时也公布将支付一笔大额的红利给所有帮助公司成功的人士，范围包含公司上上下下所有的员工，而根据交易的合约内容，这笔钱将由Melvyn与Shirley自掏腰包，查理跟我相当赞赏即将与我们共事的合伙人能有这样的举动。
The Star transaction closed on July 1. In the months since, we've watched Star's already-excellent sales and earnings growth accelerate further. Melvyn and Shirley will be at the annual meeting, and I hope you get a chance to meet them.
明星家具的交易案在7月1日正式完成，而在之后的几个月，明星家具本来已经表现相当不错的营收又继续大幅成长，Melvyn与Shirley将会出席今年的股东年会，届时希望大家能够前来与他们见见面。
Next acquisition: International Dairy Queen. There are 5,792 Dairy Queen stores operating in 23 countries -- all but a handful run by franchisees -- and in addition IDQ franchises 409 Orange Julius operations and 43 Karmelkorn operations. In 190 locations, "treat centers" provide some combination of the three products.
另一个并购案：国际冰雪皇后DQ，总共有5792家门店，分布在全球的23个国家，除了34家是自营店外，其余皆为加盟，此外还有409家Orange Julius加盟店与43家Karmelkorn店，其中有190家门店同时提供三种甜品选择。
For many years IDQ had a bumpy history. Then, in 1970, a Minneapolis group led by John Mooty and Rudy Luther took control. The new managers inherited a jumble of different franchising agreements, along with some unwise financing arrangements that had left the company in a precarious condition. In the years that followed, management rationalized the operation, extended food service to many more locations, and, in general, built a strong organization.
期冰雪皇后的命运多舛，在1970年代，来自明尼阿波利斯集团(Minneapolis Group)的约翰·穆蒂(John Mooty)与鲁迪·路德(Rudy Luther)接手了该公司，新的管理层面对的是由前任遗留下来混乱的加盟合约以及不合理的融资计划所造成岌岌可危的窘况，所幸在接下来的几年内，新管理层导正了这种乱象，并且对外扩张新增了许多营业点，让公司经营逐渐步入正轨。
Last summer Mr. Luther died, which meant his estate needed to sell stock. A year earlier, Dick Kiphart of William Blair & Co., had introduced me to John Mooty and Mike Sullivan, IDQ's CEO, and I had been impressed with both men. So, when we got the chance to merge with IDQ, we offered a proposition patterned on our FlightSafety acquisition, extending selling shareholders the option of choosing either cash or Berkshire shares having a slightly lower immediate value. By tilting the consideration as we did, we encouraged holders to opt for cash, the type of payment we by far prefer. Even then, only 45% of IDQ shares elected cash.
去年夏天Luther先生过世，他的股份因而必须对外出售，而在这之前经由威廉布莱尔公司(William Blair)的CEO迪克·基普哈特(Dick Kiphart)的介绍，使我得以结识John Mooty与冰雪皇后的CEO迈克·沙利文(Mike Sullivan)，且这两人让我印象相当深刻，也因此伯克希尔可以趁此机会与冰雪皇后合并，而我们也提出与之前并购飞安国际公司时相同的条件，提供冰雪皇后股东换成现金或股票两种不同的选择(1997年10月DQ股价约24美元，合并对价为27美元现金或26美元BRK股票，合计5.85亿美元，1997年Q3财报DQ净资产1.95亿，净利润折合全年约0.4亿，每股收益1.76，收购估值PE=15，PB=3。过去十年DQ收入年化增长7.7%，净利润年化9.6%，毛利率30%，净利率9%)，其中换成伯克希尔股份的条件略低于现金，因为我们更倾向于大家尽量选择现金，不过即便如此，总共也只有45%的股东决定领取现金。
Charlie and I bring a modicum of product expertise to this transaction: He has been patronizing the Dairy Queens in Cass Lake and Bemidji, Minnesota, for decades, and I have been a regular in Omaha. We have put our money where our mouth is.
在这次的交易中，查理跟我稍微发挥了一下对于产品的知识，查理他几十年来固定光顾位于明尼苏达州卡斯湖与贝米吉的冰雪皇后，而我则是奥马哈冰雪皇后的常客，我们等于是"把钱花在嘴巴上"。
I've mentioned that we strongly prefer to use cash rather than Berkshire stock in acquisitions. A study of the record will tell you why: If you aggregate all of our stock-only mergers (excluding those we did with two affiliated companies, Diversified Retailing and Blue Chip Stamps), you will find that our shareholders are slightly worse off than they would have been had I not done the transactions. Though it hurts me to say it, when I've issued stock, I've cost you money.
我已经提到，我们在收购中强烈倾向于使用现金，而不是伯克希尔股票。一项对记录的研究会告诉你原因，如果把我们所有使用股票的并购案加在一起(扣除早期的多元零售与蓝筹印花两个案子不算)，你会发现我们的股东所得的结果可能比我们不做这些交易还要糟糕。虽然说出来让我很伤心，不过我还是必须承认，每当我发行股票，就等于是让股东们亏钱。
Be clear about one thing: This cost has not occurred because we were misled in any way by sellers or because they thereafter failed to manage with diligence and skill. On the contrary, the sellers were completely candid when we were negotiating our deals and have been energetic and effective ever since.
不过有一点要澄清的是，之所以会如此绝对不是因为我们遭到卖方的误导或是在被买下后不用心经营，相反的，这些卖方在交易谈判当时皆坦诚布公，同时也很努力经营事业。
Instead, our problem has been that we own a truly marvelous collection of businesses, which means that trading away a portion of them for something new almost never makes sense. When we issue shares in a merger, we reduce your ownership in all of our businesses -- partly-owned companies such as Coca-Cola, Gillette and American Express, and all of our terrific operating companies as well. An example from sports will illustrate the difficulty we face: For a baseball team, acquiring a player who can be expected to bat .350 is almost always a wonderful event -- except when the team must trade a .380 hitter to make the deal.
主要的问题在于，我们原本就已经拥有的绝佳企业组合，因此不论拿什么新的东西来换都不划算，也就是说每当我们发行新股用来并购新的企业时，就等于是间接减少我们原本拥有的绝佳企业的股权比例，不论是只有部分股权的可口可乐、吉列刮胡刀及美国运通，或者是旗下所有的经营业务皆是如此。在运动场上有一个例子可以充分说明我们所面临的难题，对一只棒球队来说，挖到一位打击率高达35%的选手肯定是件令人欣喜的事，除非是你必须被迫用一个打击率高达38%的球员去交换。
Because our roster is filled with .380 hitters, we have tried to pay cash for acquisitions, and here our record has been far better. Starting with National Indemnity in 1967, and continuing with, among others, See's, Buffalo News, Scott Fetzer and GEICO, we have acquired -- for cash -- a number of large businesses that have performed incredibly well since we bought them. These acquisitions have delivered Berkshire tremendous value -- indeed, far more than I anticipated when we made our purchases.
正因为目前我们的球员名单已布满了打击率38%的高手，所以我们总是希望尽量用现金来进行并购，而事实证明我们的成绩远高于预期，从1967年的国民保险公司开始，接着是喜诗糖果、布法罗新闻报、斯科特费泽以及GEICO保险等等，这些企业在我们用现金买下之后的表现非常出色，它们也为伯克希尔带来了巨大的价值，这实在是远高于我们当初的预期。
We believe that it is almost impossible for us to "trade up" from our present businesses and managements. Our situation is the opposite of Camelot's Mordred, of whom Guenevere commented, "The one thing I can say for him is that he is bound to marry well. Everybody is above him." Marrying well is extremely difficult for Berkshire.
我们相信实在是很难将我们现在拥有的业务与其管理层交换出去，我们现在的处境与圆桌骑士团成员Camelot Mordred刚好相反，王后Guenevere说他一定可以找到理想的伴侣，因为世上所有人的条件都比他还要好，但是对伯克希尔来说，要找到足以匹配的伴侣实在是难上加难。
So you can be sure that Charlie and I will be very reluctant to issue shares in the future. In those cases when we simply must do so -- when certain shareholders of a desirable acquiree insist on getting stock -- we will include an attractive cash option in order to tempt as many of the sellers to take cash as is possible.
所以，大家可以预见的是，在未来查理跟我将会越来越不愿意以发行新股的方式进行并购，要是遇到非如此不可的情况时，也就是被并购者坚持要拿股票的时候，我们也会附带提供一个比较优越的现金对价，以促使更多的股东选择领取现金。
Merging with public companies presents a special problem for us. If we are to offer any premium to the acquiree, one of two conditions must be present: Either our own stock must be overvalued relative to the acquiree's, or the two companies together must be expected to earn more than they would if operated separately. Historically, Berkshire has seldom been overvalued. In this market, moreover, undervalued acquirees are almost impossible to find. That other possibility -- synergy gains -- is usually unrealistic, since we expect acquirees to operate after we've bought them just as they did before. Joining with Berkshire does not normally raise their revenues nor cut their costs.
此外当我们并购上市公司还会遇到另一项问题，那就是如果我们提供被并购者任何溢价的话，必须要能够符合以下两项条件其中之一，要么就是相对于对方伯克希尔的股价被高估；要么就是两家公司合并后所赚得的收益高于两家独立营运时的收益。关于这个问题，就过去的经验，伯克希尔的股价很少被高估，相对地以目前的市场状况，实在很难再找到其它股价相对被低估的公司。至于另外一个可能性，也就是所谓的协同效应，通常都很不切实际，我们顶多能期望被并购的事业在被买下之后的表现跟之前一样好就不错了，因为加入伯克希尔不代表营收就能够自动增加或成本就能够自动地减少。
Indeed, their reported costs (but not their true ones) will rise after they are bought by Berkshire if the acquiree has been granting options as part of its compensation packages. In these cases, "earnings" of the acquiree have been overstated because they have followed the standard -- but, in our view, dead wrong -- accounting practice of ignoring the cost to a business of issuing options. When Berkshire acquires an option-issuing company, we promptly substitute a cash compensation plan having an economic value equivalent to that of the previous option plan. The acquiree's true compensation cost is thereby brought out of the closet and charged, as it should be, against earnings.
事实上，被收购方还有一些以股票期权充当薪资补充方案的公司，在我们买下之后，其帐列成本往往会暴增(但并不会影响实际真实的成本)，在这种情况下，被收购方过去的盈利被高估了，因为他们所采取的完全忽略期权发行成本的会计惯例，在我们看来是完全错误的。因此，当伯克希尔买下一家有股票期权的公司时，我们会立刻将其更换为与原来股票期权相当的现金补偿方案，如此一来，被收购方真实的薪资成本方能显露出来，以反应公司真实的盈利状况。
The reasoning that Berkshire applies to the merger of public companies should be the calculus for all buyers. Paying a takeover premium does not make sense for any acquirer unless a) its stock is overvalued relative to the acquiree's or b) the two enterprises will earn more combined than they would separately. Predictably, acquirers normally hew to the second argument because very few are willing to acknowledge that their stock is overvalued. However, voracious buyers -- the ones that issue shares as fast as they can print them -- are tacitly conceding that point. (Often, also, they are running Wall Street's version of a chain-letter scheme.)
伯克希尔在并购上市公司所采用的原则也是所有买家必须考量的因素，支付收购溢价对任何收购方都没有意义，除非是以下特殊的情况：a)相对于被收购方，其股价被高估；b)两家企业合并后所赚取的利润高于原先单独的利润。可以预见的是，收购方通常会坚持第二种观点，因为很少有人愿意承认自己的股票估值过高。然而贪得无厌的收购方，以比印钞票还快的速度印股票的这群人，最后却默认了自己的股价确实被高估。通常他们玩的就像华尔街版的连锁信游戏。
In some mergers there truly are major synergies -- though oftentimes the acquirer pays too much to obtain them -- but at other times the cost and revenue benefits that are projected prove illusory. Of one thing, however, be certain: If a CEO is enthused about a particularly foolish acquisition, both his internal staff and his outside advisors will come up with whatever projections are needed to justify his stance. Only in fairy tales are emperors told that they are naked.
有些合并案确实可以发挥协同效应，但通常买家所付出的代价过高。在另一些合并中，预期节省的成本与营收增加的效益最后被证明是一场空。不过有一点可以确定的是，不管这个并购案多么的不合理，只要CEO有强烈的意愿，其内部的员工与外部的专家顾问都能够拿出一份看似合理的评估报告来支持其立场，只有在童话中才有人敢大胆地告诉国王他没有穿衣服。
Below we present our common stock investments. Those with a market value of more than $750 million are itemized.
下表是伯克希尔市价超过7.5亿美元以上的股票投资。
| Shares 股份数量 |
Company 公司名称 |
Cost* 12/31/97 (dollars in millions) 成本 |
Market 12/31/97 (dollars in millions) 市值 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 49,456,900 | American Express Company 美国运通 |
$ 1,392.7 | $ 4,414.0 |
| 200,000,000 | The Coca-Cola Company 可口可乐 |
1,298.9 | 13,337.5 |
| 21,563,414 | The Walt Disney Company 迪士尼-微减 |
381.2 | 2,134.8 |
| 63,977,600 | Freddie Mac 房地美 |
329.4 | 2,683.1 |
| 48,000,000 | The Gillette Company 吉列 |
600.0 | 4,821.0 |
| 23,733,198 | Travelers Group Inc. 旅行者集团-所罗门转股 |
604.4 | 1,278.6 |
| 1,727,765 | The Washington Post Company 华盛顿邮报 |
10.6 | 840.6 |
| 6,690,218 | Wells Fargo & Company 富国银行 |
412.6 | 2,270.9 |
| Others 其他 |
2,177.1 | 4,467.2 | |
| Total Common Stocks 合计 |
$ 7,206.9 | $ 36,247.7 |
*\ Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.8 billion less than GAAP cost.
注：成本以税务为基础，比GAAP的账面成本少18亿美元。
We made net sales during the year that amounted to about 5% of our beginning portfolio. In these, we significantly reduced a few of our holdings that are below the $750 million threshold for itemization, and we also modestly trimmed a few of the larger positions that we detail. Some of the sales we made during 1997 were aimed at changing our bond-stock ratio moderately in response to the relative values that we saw in each market, a realignment we have continued in 1998.
今年我们大概减持了5%左右仓位的投资组合，大幅减持了一些市值未达到披露门槛的股票(卖出麦当劳)，此外也适度减持了一部分详细披露的股票仓位，主要是为了调整债券与股票投资之间的比例，以响应我们在每个市场看到的相对价值的认知，1998年将继续这种调整。
Our reported positions, we should add, sometimes reflect the investment decisions of GEICO's Lou Simpson. Lou independently runs an equity portfolio of nearly $2 billion that may at times overlap the portfolio that I manage, and occasionally he makes moves that differ from mine.
不过有一点必须强调的是，报表上显示的投资部位，有部分是GEICO保险保险公司Lou Simpson所做的决策，Lou独自管理将近20亿美元的股票投资组合，当然其中有些部位与我重叠，但通常他的投资动作与我有别。
Though we don't attempt to predict the movements of the stock market, we do try, in a very rough way, to value it. At the annual meeting last year, with the Dow at 7,071 and long-term Treasury yields at 6.89%, Charlie and I stated that we did not consider the market overvalued if 1) interest rates remained where they were or fell, and 2) American business continued to earn the remarkable returns on equity that it had recently recorded. So far, interest rates have fallen -- that's one requisite satisfied -- and returns on equity still remain exceptionally high. If they stay there -- and if interest rates hold near recent levels -- there is no reason to think of stocks as generally overvalued. On the other hand, returns on equity are not a sure thing to remain at, or even near, their present levels.
虽然我们从来不去试图预测股市走势，但我们确实试着大约评估其合理价位。记得在去年的股东会时，道琼指数约为7071点，长期国债的利率为6.89%，查理跟我就曾公开表示，如果符合以下两点条件，则股市并未高估：1)利率维持不变或继续下滑，以及2)美国企业继续维持现有的高股东权益回报率。现在看起来，利率确实又继续下滑，这一点算是符合条件，另一方面，股东权益回报率仍旧维持在高位，换句话说，若这种情况继续维持下去，同时利率也能够维持现状，则一般来说没有理由认为现在的股市过于高估，不过从保守角度来看，股东权益回报率实在很难永远维持在现有的这种荣景。
In the summer of 1979, when equities looked cheap to me, I wrote a Forbes article entitled "You pay a very high price in the stock market for a cheery consensus." At that time skepticism and disappointment prevailed, and my point was that investors should be glad of the fact, since pessimism drives down prices to truly attractive levels. Now, however, we have a very cheery consensus. That does not necessarily mean this is the wrong time to buy stocks: Corporate America is now earning far more money than it was just a few years ago, and in the presence of lower interest rates, every dollar of earnings becomes more valuable. Today's price levels, though, have materially eroded the "margin of safety" that Ben Graham identified as the cornerstone of intelligent investing.
记得1979年的夏天，当时的股票市场便宜的股票垂手可得，为此我特地在福布斯写了一篇文章，名为《当市场一片欢腾时，你将付出高昂的价格 》，当时市场弥漫着怀疑与悲观的情绪，不过当时我的观点认为这种现象投资人应该要感到高兴才对，因为悲观的情绪使得许多公司的股价跌到相当吸引人的价位，不过现在看来我们似乎已经快要达到乐观的共识了，当然这不代表现在就不能买股票，近年来美国企业的盈利大增，现在的利率水准不断下降，企业赚取的每一美元收益比起过去都更有价值。然而，现在股票的价格水平，已经严重地脱离的格雷厄姆一再强调的安全边际，这是聪明投资哲学的基石。
In last year's annual report, I discussed Coca-Cola, our largest holding. Coke continues to increase its market dominance throughout the world, but, tragically, it has lost the leader responsible for its outstanding performance. Roberto Goizueta, Coke's CEO since 1981, died in October. After his death, I read every one of the more than 100 letters and notes he had written me during the past nine years. Those messages could well serve as a guidebook for success in both business and life.
去年年报我花了相当多的篇幅谈到我们最大的持股可口可乐，虽然目前可口可乐仍然继续扩大其在全世界饮料市场的霸主地位，不过很不幸的是，该公司总裁Roberto Goizueta却在去年十月因肺癌过世，因为他的存在，可口可乐才有如此出色的表现。在他死后，我逐一阅读了他过去九年来给我写的上百篇的书信笔记，这些书信确实可以做为如何成功经营企业与人生的最佳教材。
In these communications, Roberto displayed a brilliant and clear strategic vision that was always aimed at advancing the well-being of Coke shareholders. Roberto knew where he was leading the company, how he was going to get there, and why this path made the most sense for his owners -- and, equally important, he had a burning sense of urgency about reaching his goals. An excerpt from one handwritten note he sent to me illustrates his mind-set: "By the way, I have told Olguita that what she refers to as an obsession, you call focus. I like your term much better." Like all who knew Roberto, I will miss him enormously.
在这些书信中，Roberto展现出高瞻远瞩的见识，总是将重点放在如何增进可口可乐股东的权益，Roberto很清楚他要将公司带往何处，以及要如何才能到达目的地，同时了解为何这样的方法最适合所有的股东，当然更重要的是他对于达成这样目标抱持着强烈的渴望，有一张他手写给我的字条最能充分说明当时他的心境(对了，我跟Olguita提到有关于她常常讲的"痴迷"，我个人比较喜欢你的说法"专注")。就像是所有认识Roberto的人一样，我会永远怀念他！
Consistent with his concern for the company, Roberto prepared for a seamless succession long before it seemed necessary. Roberto knew that Doug Ivester was the right man to take over and worked with Doug over the years to ensure that no momentum would be lost when the time for change arrived. The Coca-Cola Company will be the same steamroller under Doug as it was under Roberto.
一如他对于公司的关心，Roberto早就安排好接班的问题，他认为Doug Ivester是接手的最佳人选，与他共事多年的经验足以确保在公司领导高层更迭的同时，公司的运作不致受到任何的影响，相信在Doug的领导之下，可口可乐仍能一本初衷勇往直前。
Two years ago, I gave you an update on the five convertible preferreds that we purchased through private placements in the 1987-1991 period. At the time of that earlier report, we had realized a small profit on the sale of our Champion International holding. The four remaining preferred commitments included two, Gillette and First Empire State, that we had converted into common stock in which we had large unrealized gains, and two others, USAir and Salomon, that had been trouble-prone. At times, the last two had me mouthing a line from a country song: "How can I miss you if you won't go away?"
两年前，我曾经就1987到1991年间进行的五项可转换优先股投资做了一番现况报告，在报告出具的当时，我们卖出了冠军国际部分的持股实现小部分的盈利，剩下的四项投资中，吉列与第一帝国早已转换成普通股，并享有高额的未实现盈利，而全美航空与所罗门兄弟则发生严重的经营问题，这两项投资让我不得不哼起一首乡村歌曲的歌词，"要是你不离开，我又怎么会想念你呢？"
Since I delivered that report, all four holdings have grown significantly in value. The common stocks of both Gillette and First Empire have risen substantially, in line with the companies' excellent performance. At yearend, the $600 million we put into Gillette in 1989 had appreciated to $4.8 billion, and the $40 million we committed to First Empire in 1991 had risen to $236 million.
而就在报告发布之后，所有四项投资的价值皆大幅增加，吉列与第一帝国的普通股股价飙涨，与公司的经营基本面一致，截至年底，当初我们在1989年投入吉列的6亿美元已经增值为48亿美元，而在1991年投入第一帝国的4千万美元，则已增值至2.36亿美元。
Our two laggards, meanwhile, have come to life in a very major way. In a transaction that finally rewarded its long-suffering shareholders, Salomon recently merged into Travelers Group. All of Berkshire's shareholders -- including me, very personally -- owe a huge debt to Deryck Maughan and Bob Denham for, first, playing key roles in saving Salomon from extinction following its 1991 scandal and, second, restoring the vitality of the company to a level that made it an attractive acquisition for Travelers. I have often said that I wish to work with executives that I like, trust and admire. No two fit that description better than Deryck and Bob.
在此同时另外两个后半段，也已起死回生，其中所罗门最近决定并入旅行家集团的举动，终于让长久以来饱受苦难的股东获得的回报，伯克希尔所有的股东，包含我个人在内，实在是亏欠Deryck Maughan跟Bob Denham太多了，首先要感谢他们在1991年所罗门爆发丑闻时，拯救公司免于倒闭，之后更让公司恢复以往的活力，使得公司得以风光地嫁给旅行家集团，我常常说，我渴望与我喜爱、信任与崇拜的经理人共事，Deryck与Bob正是这样绝佳的组合。
Berkshire's final results from its Salomon investment won't be tallied for some time, but it is safe to say that they will be far better than I anticipated two years ago. Looking back, I think of my Salomon experience as having been both fascinating and instructional, though for a time in 1991-92 I felt like the drama critic who wrote: "I would have enjoyed the play except that I had an unfortunate seat. It faced the stage."
虽然伯克希尔投资所罗门的最终成果到目前仍未定案，所幸目前的情况要比我两年前预期要好得多，回顾过去，我觉得投资所罗门的经验令人感到刺激有趣同时又具教化意义，虽然我在1991到1992年间的感觉就好象是一个戏迷曾这样写到："要不是因为坐到一个不幸的位子，我就能够好好地欣赏表演了，因为它正对着舞台"。
The resuscitation of US Airways borders on the miraculous. Those who have watched my moves in this investment know that I have compiled a record that is unblemished by success. I was wrong in originally purchasing the stock, and I was wrong later, in repeatedly trying to unload our holdings at 50 cents on the dollar.
另一方面全美航空的重生过程近乎奇迹，熟悉整个投资过程的朋友都知道，个人在这项投资上获得了前所未有的胜利，一开始买进这家公司的股票就是一项错误，后来又反悔打算以半价出售再度犯了第二次的错误。
Two changes at the company coincided with its remarkable rebound: 1) Charlie and I left the board of directors and 2) Stephen Wolf became CEO. Fortunately for our egos, the second event was the key: Stephen Wolf's accomplishments at the airline have been phenomenal.
两项改变促使该公司得以东山再起：1)查理跟我辞去该公司董事的职位，2)斯蒂芬·沃尔夫(Stephen Wolf)接任成为该公司CEO，还好后者才是公司真正能够重生的主因，否则我们的脸可就丢大了，Stephen Wolf的表现对整个航空业而言，可说是意义非凡。
There still is much to do at US Airways, but survival is no longer an issue. Consequently, the company made up the dividend arrearages on our preferred during 1997, adding extra payments to compensate us for the delay we suffered. The company's common stock, furthermore, has risen from a low of $4 to a recent high of $73.
当然全美航空还有很长的一段路要走，不过存活下来应该不是问题，也因此该公司在1997年顺利地偿还积欠我们的优先股股息，还包含延迟付息的额外赔偿，该公司的普通股股价更从原来的4块钱，一举涨到目前73块钱的新高。
Our preferred has been called for redemption on March 15. But the rise in the company's stock has given our conversion rights, which we thought worthless not long ago, great value. It is now almost certain that our US Airways shares will produce a decent profit -- that is, if my cost for Maalox is excluded -- and the gain could even prove indecent.
我们持有的优先股已在3月15日被要求赎回，不过受惠于该公司股价大涨，原本一文不值的转换权现在却变得价值不菲，可以肯定的是我们现在持有的全美航空普通股将为我们创造极高的盈利，当然还要先把我买胃药的钱给算进去。当然，这笔收益有点胜之不武。
Next time I make a big, dumb decision, Berkshire shareholders will know what to do: Phone Mr. Wolf.
下次要是我再度干下什么愚蠢的投资决策，伯克希尔的股东肯定知道该怎么做了，没错，记得打电话给Wolf先生。
In addition to the convertible preferreds, we purchased one other private placement in 1991, $300 million of American Express Percs. This security was essentially a common stock that featured a tradeoff in its first three years: We received extra dividend payments during that period, but we were also capped in the price appreciation we could realize. Despite the cap, this holding has proved extraordinarily profitable thanks to a move by your Chairman that combined luck and skill -- 110% luck, the balance skill.
除了可转换优先股，我们在1991年还通过私募的方式投资了三亿美元的美国运通俗称"Percs"的股票，这种证券基本上算是一种普通股，只不过在投资的前三年我们可以领取一笔特别的股利，条件是期间我们因为股价上涨所带来的资本利得将受到限制，然而即便如此，这笔投资还是因为本人的英明决策而获利不菲，当然其中也包含一些运气的成份，比例约是110%(剩下的才是本人的能力)。
Our Percs were due to convert into common stock in August 1994, and in the month before I was mulling whether to sell upon conversion. One reason to hold was Amex's outstanding CEO, Harvey Golub, who seemed likely to maximize whatever potential the company had (a supposition that has since been proved -- in spades). But the size of that potential was in question: Amex faced relentless competition from a multitude of card-issuers, led by Visa. Weighing the arguments, I leaned toward sale.
根据约定我们的Percs必须在1994年8月以前转换成普通股，而就在前一个月我还一直在考虑是否应该在转换期限到期以前把这项投资给处分掉，当时考量的是虽然美国运通总裁Harvey Golub表现相当优异，他总是有办法将公司的潜力发挥到极致(这点从一开始便不断地获得证明)，只是这种潜能还是面临严重的挑战，那就是美国运通来自于以Visa为首的其它信用卡发卡公司激烈的竞争，在衡量各种利弊得失之后，我还是倾向于把这笔投资提前给处分掉。
Here's where I got lucky. During that month of decision, I played golf at Prouts Neck, Maine with Frank Olson, CEO of Hertz. Frank is a brilliant manager, with intimate knowledge of the card business. So from the first tee on I was quizzing him about the industry. By the time we reached the second green, Frank had convinced me that Amex's corporate card was a terrific franchise, and I had decided not to sell. On the back nine I turned buyer, and in a few months Berkshire owned 10% of the company.
还好我走狗运，就在要做决定的那个月，我正好到缅因州和Hertz租车公司总裁Frank Olson一起打高尔夫球，Frank是一位相当优秀的经理人，因为业务的关系相当熟悉信用卡的行业，所以打从第一洞开始我就一直追问他有关这行业的种种问题，到了第二洞的果岭时，Frank已经让我完全相信美国运通的企业卡是一项绝佳的生意，所以当下我就决定不卖了，等到后九洞时，我更决定加码投资，于是在回来的几个月后，伯克希尔已经拥有该公司10%的股权。
We now have a $3 billion gain in our Amex shares, and I naturally feel very grateful to Frank. But George Gillespie, our mutual friend, says that I am confused about where my gratitude should go. After all, he points out, it was he who arranged the game and assigned me to Frank's foursome.
现在我们光是在美国运通的投资潜在收益就有30亿美元，当然这一切都要感谢Frank，不过我们俩人共同的好友George Gillspie却直说我搞错应该要感恩的对象了，他强调要不是因为他安排这次的球会，并且把我跟Frank放在同一组的话，也不会有今天这样的成果。
In last year's letter, I described the growing costs we incur in mailing quarterly reports and the problems we have encountered in delivering them to "street-name" shareholders. I asked for your opinion about the desirability of our continuing to print reports, given that we now publish our quarterly and annual communications on the Internet, at our site, www.berkshirehathaway.com. Relatively few shareholders responded, but it is clear that at least a small number who want the quarterly information have no interest in getting it off the Internet. Being a life-long sufferer from technophobia, I can empathize with this group.
在去年的年报中，我曾经向各位透露由于邮寄季报的费用大幅增加，同时要将季报寄给那些不是用本名登记的股东有其困难性，所以征询大家是否可以接受直接将季报与年报公布在公司网站上，取代原先印制与邮寄报告的做法，虽然只有少数的股东响应，但长期以来具有科技恐惧症的我很明白还是有少数想要年报信息的股东，不习惯通过网络取得相关的信息，我完全能够体会他们的想法。
The cost of publishing quarterlies, however, continues to balloon, and we have therefore decided to send printed versions only to shareholders who request them. If you wish the quarterlies, please complete the reply card that is bound into this report. In the meantime, be assured that all shareholders will continue to receive the annual report in printed form.
考虑到大幅增加的印刷费用，最后我们还是决定除非股东有特别要求，我们才邮寄印好的季报，所以若你也有意要一份书面的季报，请填写年报上所附的申请表格，同时在此也提醒所有的股东，我们还是会继续邮寄年报给所有的股东。
Those of you who enjoy the computer should check out our home page. It contains a large amount of current information about Berkshire and also all of our annual letters since 1977. In addition, our website includes links to the home pages of many Berkshire subsidiaries. On these sites you can learn more about our subsidiaries' products and -- yes -- even place orders for them.
至于喜欢利用计算机上网的股东们，一定要到我们公司网站的首页看看，里面包含大量有关伯克希尔现况的信息，同时还有1977年到现在为止所有的公司年报，此外网站上还有对旗下其它子公司的网站连结，经由这些网站大家可以更了解子公司的产品信息，有的甚至可以通过网络直接下单购买。
We are required to file our quarterly information with the SEC no later than 45 days after the end of each quarter. One of our goals in posting communications on the Internet is to make this material information -- in full detail and in a form unfiltered by the media -- simultaneously available to all interested parties at a time when markets are closed. Accordingly, we plan to send our 1998 quarterly information to the SEC on three Fridays, May 15, August 14, and November 13, and on those nights to post the same information on the Internet. This procedure will put all of our shareholders, whether they be direct or "street-name," on an equal footing. Similarly, we will post our 1998 annual report on the Internet on Saturday, March 13, 1999, and mail it at about the same time.
根据证监会法令的规定，我们必须在每季结束后45天内申报季报，而通过网络公开信息的主要原因之一是我们希望如此重大的讯息可以以完整而不经过媒体消化过滤的方式，在股市收盘后实时地传达给所有关心本公司状况的股东，因此我们决定在往后每季的最后一个周五，今年分别是5月15日、8月14日及11月13日向证监会申报季报，并在当天晚上将相同的信息同步公布在公司的网站上，此举将能够使得伯克希尔所有股东，不管是以本人或挂名的方式持有，皆站在同等的地位之上，另外，我们也预计在1999年3月13日周六将年报公布在网站上，并在同一时间将年报邮寄出去给所有的股东。
About 97.7% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire's 1997 shareholder-designated contributions program. Contributions made were $15.4 million, and 3,830 charities were recipients. A full description of the program appears on pages 52 - 53.
大约有97.7%的有效股权参与1997年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约1,540万美元捐出的款项分配给3,830家慈善机构，详细的名单参阅附录。
Cumulatively, over the 17 years of the program, Berkshire has made contributions of $113.1 million pursuant to the instructions of our shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries, which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our subsidiaries made contributions of $8.1 million in 1997, including in-kind donations of $4.4 million.
大约有97.7%的有效股权参与1997年的股东指定捐赠计划，总计约1,540万美元捐出的款项分配给3,830家慈善机构，详细的名单参阅附录。累计过去17年以来，伯克希尔总计已按照股东意愿捐赠高达1.131亿美元的款项，除此之外，伯克希尔还通过旗下的子公司进行捐赠，而这些慈善活动都是早在他们被我们并购以前就进行数年(除了先前的老板自行本身负责的个人捐赠计划之外)，总的来说，我们旗下的关系企业在1997年总计捐出810万美元，其中包含440万美元等值的物品。
Every year a few shareholders miss out on our contributions program because they don't have their shares registered in their own names on the prescribed record date or because they fail to get the designation form back to us within the 60-day period allowed. Charlie and I regret this. But if replies are received late, we have to reject them because we can't make exceptions for some shareholders while refusing to make them for others.
每年都有一小部分的股东由于没有将股份登记在本人的名下，或是没能在60天的期限内，将指定捐赠的表格送回给我们，而没办法参加我们的指定捐赠计划，对此查理跟我感到相当头痛，不过我们必须忍痛将这些指定捐赠剔除，因为我不可能在拒绝其它不符合规定股东的同时，还破例让这些人参与。
To participate in future programs, you must own Class A shares that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on August 31, 1998, will be ineligible for the 1998 program. When you get the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not get put aside or forgotten.
想要参加这项计划者，必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自己而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在1998年8月31日之前完成登记，才有权利参与1998年的捐赠计划，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，以免被丢在一旁给忘记了。
Woodstock Weekend at Berkshire will be May 2-4 this year. The finale will be the annual meeting, which will begin at 9:30 a.m. on Monday, May 4. Last year we met at Aksarben Coliseum, and both our staff and the crowd were delighted with the venue. There was only one crisis: The night before the meeting, I lost my voice, thereby fulfilling Charlie's wildest fantasy. He was crushed when I showed up the next morning with my speech restored.
今年伯克希尔的Woodstock狂欢节将在5月2日至4日举行，整个大会将在5月4日周一的年度会议召开后落幕，去年的年会在Aksarben体育馆召开，所有的工作人员及参与的来宾对于当天的会场都相当满意，唯一美中不足的是，在年会的前一天，我的嗓子沙哑了，当时几乎要如了查理的愿，只不过隔天当我恢复原本的声音时，在一旁的查理几乎要崩溃。
Last year about 7,500 attended the meeting. They represented all 50 states, as well as 16 countries, including Australia, Brazil, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Singapore and Greece. Taking into account several overflow rooms, we believe that we can handle more than 11,000 people, and that should put us in good shape this year even though our shareholder count has risen significantly. Parking is ample at Aksarben; acoustics are excellent; and seats are comfortable.
去年的股东会总共有7500位股东出席，分别来自全美50州以及包含澳洲、巴西、以色列、沙特阿拉伯、新加坡与希腊等在内的16个国家，我想即使今年我们的股东人数又大幅增加，加上其它几个备用的房间，应该可以容纳超过1.1万名以上的人员参加，会场备有足够的停车位，音效也不错，就连座椅坐起来也很舒服。
The doors will open at 7 a.m. on Monday and at 8:30 we will again feature the world premiere of a movie epic produced by Marc Hamburg, our CFO. The meeting will last until 3:30, with a short break at noon. This interval will permit the exhausted to leave unnoticed and allow time for the hardcore to lunch at Aksarben's concession stands. Charlie and I enjoy questions from owners, so bring up whatever is on your mind.
大门会在周一早上7点开放，在8点半会播放由我们的财务官Marc Hamburg精心制作具世界级水准的伯克希尔电影短片供大家欣赏，中午休息半小时，让精疲力尽的人可以去吃点东西，整个会议将一直进行到下午3点半，查理跟我很喜欢大家提出的各种问题，所以记得准备好你要问什么。
Berkshire products will again be for sale in the halls outside the meeting room. Last year -- not that I pay attention to this sort of thing -- we again set sales records, moving 2,500 pounds of See's candy, 1,350 pairs of Dexter shoes, $75,000 of World Books and related publications, and 888 sets of Quikut knives. We also took orders for a new line of apparel, featuring our Berkshire logo, and sold about 1,000 polo, sweat, and T-shirts. At this year's meeting, we will unveil our 1998 collection.
再一次我们在会场外大厅备有伯克希尔各式各样的产品供大家选购，虽然我不是特别的用心，去年我们再度打破记录，总共搬走了2,500磅的糖果、1,350双的鞋子以及价值超过75,000美元的世界百科全书与相关出版品，外加888组由旗下子公司Quikut所生产的小刀，同时我们也接受预订一种新款的服装，上面印有伯克希尔的Logo，结果总计卖出1,000件各式polo衫、毛衣与T恤，在今年的股东会，我们还将推出1998年全新系列产品。
GEICO will again be on hand with a booth staffed by star associates from its regional offices. Find out whether you can save money by shifting your auto insurance to GEICO. About 40% of those who check us out learn that savings are possible. The proportion is not 100% because insurers differ in their underwriting judgments, with some favoring drivers who live in certain geographical areas and work at certain occupations more than we do. We believe, however, that we more frequently offer the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all comers. In the GEICO informational material that accompanies this report, you will see that in 38 states we now offer a special discount of as much as 8% to our shareholders. We also have applications pending that would extend this discount to drivers in other states.
GEICO保险公司再度会派出地区最优秀的业务员，在会场设立摊位，接受股东询问有关汽车保险的信息，记得去看看你是否能在汽车保险费上省一笔钱，我们估计至少有40%的股东可以因此而节省不少保费，我之所以没说100%的原因在于，每家保险业者对于风险的估计都不同，有些保险公司对于居住于某些特定地区的居民与从事某些特定职业的客户有偏好，不过我仍然坚信我们提供给一般民众的费率通常都低于其它全国性的业者，在随年报附赠的GEICO保险资料中，大家将可以看到我们提供给来自全美38州股东最高8%的折扣费率，至于其它州的股东也接受开放申请取得不等的折扣。
An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with this report explains how you can obtain the card you will need for admission to the meeting. We expect a large crowd, so get plane, hotel and car reservations promptly. American Express (800-799-6634) will be happy to help you with arrangements. As usual, we will have buses at the larger hotels that will take you to and from the meeting and also deliver you to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and the airport after its conclusion. You are likely, however, to find a car handy.
后面附有股东会开会投票的相关资料，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订机位与住宿，美国运通(电话800-799-6634)将会很高兴为您提供相关安排服务，如同以往，我们会安排巴士接送大家往返各大旅馆与会场之间，并在会后接送大家到内布拉斯加家具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场，当然你可能会觉得如何有一辆车就更方便了。
NFM's main store, located on a 75-acre site about a mile from Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays, and noon to 6 p.m. on Sundays. During the period from May 1 to May 5, shareholders who present NFM with the coupon that will accompany their meeting ticket will be entitled to a discount that is otherwise restricted to its employees.
占地75英亩的内布拉斯加家具店主馆距离会场约1英里远，营业时间平日从早上10点到下午9点，周六从早上10点到下午6点，周日则从中午开到下午6点，在5月1日到5日期间，股东持随股东开会通知单附赠的点券到内布拉斯加家具店购买各类商品，将可获得员工价的优惠。
Borsheim's normally is closed on Sunday but will be open for shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 3rd. Last year was our second-best shareholder's day, exceeded only by 1996's. I regard this slippage as an anomaly and hope that you will prove me right this year. Charlie will be available for autographs. He smiles, however, only if the paper he signs is a Borsheim's sales ticket. Shareholders who wish to visit on Saturday (10 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.) or on Monday (10 a.m.-8 p.m.) should be sure to identify themselves as Berkshire owners so that Susan Jacques, Borsheim's CEO, can make you especially welcome. Susan, I should add, had a fabulous year in 1997. As a manager, she is everything that an owner hopes for.
平时周日不营业的波仙珠宝，特地在5月3日股东会当天会为股东与来宾开放，从中午开到下午6点，去年在周六股东会前一天，我们缔造了历史次佳的记录，仅次于1996年，我认为去年的下滑有点反常，所以希望大家都能前来共襄盛举，证明我的看法的对的，查理会在现场接受大家的签名，当然大家如果拿波仙的发票给他签，他会更高兴，另外选择在前一天或后一天前往参观的人，记得表明伯克希尔股东的身份，相信波仙的总裁Susan Jacques会给各位最热情的接待，有一点我必须特别说明的是，Susan在1997年表现相当优异，她实在是所有老板心目中最理想的专业经理人。
On Sunday afternoon we will also have a special treat for bridge players in the mall outside of Borsheim's. There, Bob Hamman -- a legend of the game for more than three decades -- will take on all comers. Join in and dazzle Bob with your skill.
另外在周日天下午我们也会在波仙珠宝店外面的大厅举办一场桥牌大赛，现场桥牌界的传奇性人物Bob Hamman也将出席，接受各路英雄好汉的挑战，记得来参加，秀秀你的牌技给Bob看看。
My favorite steakhouse, Gorat's, opens one Sunday a year -- for Berkshire shareholders on the night before the annual meeting. Last year the restaurant started serving at 4 p.m. and finished about 1:30 a.m, an endurance trial that was the result of taking 1,100 reservations vs. a seating capacity of 235. If you make a reservation and then can't attend, be sure to let Gorat's know promptly, since it goes to great effort to help us and we want to reciprocate. You can make reservations beginning on April 1st (but not before) by calling 402-551-3733. Last year I had to leave Gorat's a little early because of my voice problem, but this year I plan to leisurely savor every bite of my rare T-bone and double order of hash browns.
我个人最爱的Gorat's牛排馆为了伯克希尔股东年会破例在周日开门营业，去年为了消化1100位预订的席次，只有235个座位的Gorat's牛排馆从下午四点开始营业，一直到半夜一点半，所以已经预订座位的人，要是临时无法光临，请记得一定要打电话取消订位，因为Gorat's如此尽心尽力的为我们服务，这是我们可以给他们最起码的回报，今年该餐厅从4月1号开始接受预订(电话402-551-3733)，去年由于我的喉咙有问题，所以必须提早离开，但今年我一定会到Gorat's好好享用我最喜爱的丁骨牛排加上双份的牛肉丸。
After this warmup, Charlie and I will head for the Dairy Queen on 114th, just south of Dodge. There are 12 great Dairy Queens in metropolitan Omaha, but the 114th Street location is the best suited to handle the large crowd that we expect. South of the property, there are hundreds of parking spaces on both sides of the street. Also, this Dairy Queen will extend its Sunday hours to 11 p.m. in order to accommodate our shareholders.
吃完牛排后，查理跟我还会赶到位于道奇街114号的冰雪皇后冰淇淋摊，在整个奥马哈地区总计有12家冰雪皇后，但是114街却是最适合接待大量群众的地点，在店的两旁有好几百个停车场供大家使用，同时该店也会延长假日营业时间到晚上11点，以接待所有前往光顾的伯克希尔股东。
The 114th Street operation is now run by two sisters, Coni Birge and Deb Novotny, whose grandfather put up the building in 1962 at what was then the outer edge of the city. Their mother, Jan Noble, took over in 1972, and Coni and Deb continue as third generation owner-managers. Jan, Coni and Deb will all be on hand Sunday evening, and I hope that you meet them. Enjoy one of their hamburgers if you can't get into Gorat's. And then, around eight o'clock, join me in having a Dusty Sundae for dessert. This item is a personal specialty -- the Dairy Queen will furnish you a copy of my recipe -- and will be offered only on Shareholder Sunday.
114街的分店目前由Coni Birge与Deb Novotny两姊妹所经营，系由她们的祖父于1962年在当时还是市中心外围的现址创立，在1972年由她们的母亲接手经营，Coni与Deb则是第三代的经营者，Jan、Coni及Deb在周日晚上将会在现场为大家服务，希望大家可以去和她们见见面，若是大家挤不进Gorat's的话，也可以尝尝两姊妹亲手做的汉堡，八点整我将会出现享用我喜欢的冰风暴圣代，这是个人特调的秘方，当然你也可以要求冰雪皇后照我的配方给你来一份，这可是只有在股东会当天才对外提供的独家秘方。
The Omaha Royals and Albuquerque Dukes will play baseball on Saturday evening, May 2nd, at Rosenblatt Stadium. As usual, your Chairman, shamelessly exploiting his 25% ownership of the team, will take the mound. But this year you will see something new.
在前一天5月2日周六晚上，Rosenblatt体育馆将会有一场奥马哈皇家队对Albuquerque Dukes队的比赛，一如往年厚颜无耻的我会利用拥有该球队25%的特权，站上投手丘担任首发，不过今年我保证各位一定会有新的感受。
In past games, much to the bafflement of the crowd, I have shaken off the catcher's first call. He has consistently asked for my sweeping curve, and I have just as regularly resisted. Instead, I have served up a pathetic fast ball, which on my best day was clocked at eight miles per hour (with a following wind).
过去几年，可能是受到现场观众喧闹声所影响，我总是不顾捕手对我所做出的暗号，虽然他一直要求我投出拿手的变化曲球，但我总是极力反抗，结果总是投出软趴趴的快速球，最快的球速也不过是每小时8英里(这还是在顺风的情况下)。
There's a story behind my unwillingness to throw the curve ball. As some of you may know, Candy Cummings invented the curve in 1867 and used it to great effect in the National Association, where he never won less than 28 games in a season. The pitch, however, drew immediate criticism from the very highest of authorities, namely Charles Elliott, then president of Harvard University, who declared, "I have heard that this year we at Harvard won the baseball championship because we have a pitcher who has a fine curve ball. I am further instructed that the purpose of the curve ball is to deliberately deceive the batter. Harvard is not in the business of teaching deception." (I'm not making this up.)
其实我之所以不愿意投曲球背后有极大的隐情，大家或许知道，Candy Cummings在1867年发明曲球的时候，曾在国家联盟引起极大的效应，这种球路使得他每个球季至少可以赢得28场胜投，但是这样的投球方式也立刻引起最高当局的严厉批评，当时的哈佛校长Charles Elliott对外宣称，我听说今年哈佛棒球队靠着一位专门投曲球的投手赢得冠军，有人还告诉我，这种曲球基本上是一种欺骗打者的行为，我必须说的是，哈佛从来不教人这种骗人的勾当。
Ever since I learned of President Elliott's moral teachings on this subject, I have scrupulously refrained from using my curve, however devastating its effect might have been on hapless batters. Now, however, it is time for my karma to run over Elliott's dogma and for me to quit holding back. Visit the park on Saturday night and marvel at the majestic arc of my breaking ball.
而自从我知道Elliott校长的教诲之后，我就一直小心翼翼地避免使用到我这种杀人无数拿手的曲球，不过现在已经到了忍无可忍的地步了，我决定再度使出我的杀手锏，周六晚上大家记得光临球场，让你们见识一下我这魔球的威力。
Our proxy statement includes information about obtaining tickets to the game. We will also provide an information packet describing the local hot spots, including, of course, those 12 Dairy Queens.
股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得球赛入场的门票，里面同时包含一本旅行小手册，介绍本地热门的旅游景点，当然也包括12家冰雪皇后在内。
Come to Omaha -- the cradle of capitalism -- in May and enjoy yourself.
欢迎大家在5月莅临资本主义的摇篮奥马哈，也预祝大家玩得愉快。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦·巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席
February 27, 1998
1998年2月27
Footnotes
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All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.
(在年报中所有的数据都适用于伯克希尔A级普通股，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股只拥有A级普通股经济利益的1/30) ↩