原文信息：
- 标题：Berkshire - Past Present and Future
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：2015-02-27
- 链接：PDF
- 中文翻译参考：芒格书院共读群友
- 整理：Ponge
- 校译：
On May 6, 1964, Berkshire Hathaway, then run by a man named Seabury Stanton, sent a letter to its shareholders offering to buy 225,000 shares of its stock for $11.375 per share. I had expected the letter; I was surprised by the price.
1964年5月6日，当时一个叫做西伯利·斯坦顿(SeaburyStanton)的人经营伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司，他向股东发了一封信，提出以11.375元/股的价格回购22.5万股股票。我本来期待着那封信，但却惊讶于这个价格。
Berkshire then had 1,583,680 shares outstanding. About 7% of these were owned by Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”), an investing entity that I managed and in which I had virtually all of my net worth. Shortly before the tender offer was mailed, Stanton had asked me at what price BPL would sell its holdings. I answered $11.50, and he said, “Fine, we have a deal.” Then came Berkshire’s letter, offering an eighth of a point less. I bristled at Stanton’s behavior and didn’t tender.
伯克希尔当时有1,583,680股的流通股，其中大约7%的股份由巴菲特合伙公司持有(BPL)，这是一家由我管理的投资公司，我的所有净资产几乎都在这里。在那个投标书寄给我前不久，Stanton问我，BPL将以什么价格出售其所持股份。我回答说11.5美元。他说："好吧，我们成交"。而后，在伯克希尔的来信件中，价格少了0.125美元(即11.375)。我对Stanton的行为感到愤怒，所以没有同意。
That was a monumentally stupid decision.
这是个极其愚蠢的决定。
Berkshire was then a northern textile manufacturer mired in a terrible business. The industry in which it operated was heading south, both metaphorically and physically. And Berkshire, for a variety of reasons, was unable to change course.
伯克希尔当时是一家陷入困境的北方的纺织品制造商。这个行业正在向南方转移，不论是隐喻的，还是实际上的。由于种种原因，伯克希尔无法做出相应改变。
That was true even though the industry’s problems had long been widely understood. Berkshire’s own Board minutes of July 29, 1954, laid out the grim facts: “The textile industry in New England started going out of business forty years ago. During the war years this trend was stopped. The trend must continue until supply and demand have been balanced.”
这是事实，尽管行业的问题早已被广泛地理解。伯克希尔在1954年7月29日的董事会会议记录中，记录了惨淡的事实："新英格兰地区的纺织业在40年前就开始倒闭。在战争期间，这个趋势暂时停止了。然而，这个趋势势必会持续到供需平衡为止。"
About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing -- both with roots in the 19th Century -- joined forces, taking the name we bear today. With its fourteen plants and 10,000 employees, the merged company became the giant of New England textiles. What the two managements viewed as a merger agreement, however, soon morphed into a suicide pact. During the seven years following the consolidation, Berkshire operated at an overall loss, and its net worth shrunk by 37%.
大约在那次董事会议后一年，两家成立于19世纪的公司，伯克希尔精纺公司(Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates)和哈撒韦制造公司(Hathaway Manufacturing)合并在一起，改为我们现在用的名字。合并后的公司拥有14个工厂和1万名员工，成为新英格兰地区的纺织巨头。然而，两家公司管理层所认为的合并协议很快演变为自杀式契约。在合并后的七年间，伯克希尔的经营整体亏损，账面价值缩水37％。
Meanwhile, the company closed nine plants, sometimes using the liquidation proceeds to repurchase shares. And that pattern caught my attention.
与此同时，公司关闭了九个工厂，有时候会用清算所得去回购股票，这个模式引起了我的注意。
I purchased BPL’s first shares of Berkshire in December 1962, anticipating more closings and more repurchases. The stock was then selling for $7.50, a wide discount from per-share working capital of $10.25 and book value of $20.20. Buying the stock at that price was like picking up a discarded cigar butt that had one puff remaining in it. Though the stub might be ugly and soggy, the puff would be free. Once that momentary pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could be expected.
1962年12月，我通过BPL购买了第一批伯克希尔股票，我预计会有更多的关闭工厂和回购行为。当时股价是7.5美元，相比于10.25美元的运营资本和20.2美元的账面价值有很大的折扣。在这个价格购买股票，就像是捡起别人抛弃的只剩一口的雪茄烟蒂。尽管烟蒂可能又脏又湿，但这口烟却是免费的。然而，一旦享受了这种短暂的愉悦，就再也没有什么值得期待的了。
Berkshire thereafter stuck to the script: It soon closed another two plants, and in that May 1964 move, set out to repurchase shares with the shutdown proceeds. The price that Stanton offered was 50% above the cost of our original purchases. There it was -- my free puff, just waiting for me, after which I could look elsewhere for other discarded butts.
随后伯克希尔正如预想的那样：很快又关闭了另外2家工厂，并在1964年用清算所得回购股票。Stanton提出的报价比我们原始的买入成本高出50％。我免费吸烟蒂的机会正等着我，之后我就可以去别处继续寻找那些被抛弃的烟蒂。
Instead, irritated by Stanton’s chiseling, I ignored his offer and began to aggressively buy more Berkshire shares.
相反，由于恼火于Stanton的欺骗，我无视了他的回购报价，并开始大举买入更多的股票。
By April 1965, BPL owned 392,633 shares (out of 1,017,547 then outstanding) and at an early-May board meeting we formally took control of the company. Through Seabury’s and my childish behavior -- after all, what was an eighth of a point to either of us? -- he lost his job, and I found myself with more than 25% of BPL’s capital invested in a terrible business about which I knew very little. I became the dog who caught the car.
到1965年4月，BPL已拥有392,633股(当时已发行1,017,547股)，在5月初的董事会上，我们正式地接管了公司。通过Seabury和我的幼稚的行为(毕竟，0.125美元，对于我或者他而言，算得了什么？)他丢掉了他的工作，而我发现自己把BPL超过25％的资本投资在一项知之甚少的糟糕生意上。我变成了一只追逐汽车的狗。
Because of Berkshire’s operating losses and share repurchases, its net worth at the end of fiscal 1964 had fallen to $22 million from $55 million at the time of the 1955 merger. The full $22 million was required by the textile operation: The company had no excess cash and owed its bank $2.5 million. (Berkshire’s 1964 annual report is reproduced on pages 130-142.)
由于伯克希尔的经营亏损和股票回购，1964财年末的净资产，已从1955年合并时的5500万美元降到了2200万美元。2200万美元全部都投在纺织业务上：公司没有多余的现金，并且欠银行250万美元。
For a time I got lucky: Berkshire immediately enjoyed two years of good operating conditions. Better yet, its earnings in those years were free of income tax because it possessed a large loss carry-forward that had arisen from the disastrous results in earlier years.
有段时间我很幸运：伯克希尔很快就享受了两年良好的运营状况。更好的是，它在那几年的收益是不需要缴交所得税的，因为它前几年的灾难性运营结果，累积了大量的亏损结转。
Then the honeymoon ended. During the 18 years following 1966, we struggled unremittingly with the textile business, all to no avail. But stubbornness -- stupidity? -- has its limits. In 1985, I finally threw in the towel and closed the operation.
然后蜜月很快就结束了。在1966年之后的18年里，我们在纺织业里艰难挣扎，但却一无所获。但是固执(愚蠢？)是有限度的。1985年，我终于认输了，结束了纺织业的运营。
Undeterred by my first mistake of committing much of BPL’s resources to a dying business, I quickly compounded the error. Indeed, my second blunder was far more serious than the first, eventually becoming the most costly in my career.
我第一个错误是将BPL大部分资本投入到一个濒临倒闭的企业中，但这并未阻止我继续犯错，我快速地加剧了这个错误。事实上，我的第二个错误，要远远比第一个严重，最终成为我职业生涯中代价最高的一个。
Early in 1967, I had Berkshire pay $8.6 million to buy National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), a small but promising Omaha-based insurer. (A tiny sister company was also included in the deal.) Insurance was in my sweet spot: I understood and liked the industry.
1967年初，我通过伯克希尔支付860万美元收购了国民保险公司(NICO)，这是一家位于奥马哈的小型但有前途的保险公司(一个小的姐妹公司也包括在这笔交易中)。保险行业是我的最佳选择：我理解并喜欢这个行业。
Jack Ringwalt, the owner of NICO, was a long-time friend who wanted to sell to me -- me, personally. In no way was his offer intended for Berkshire. So why did I purchase NICO for Berkshire rather than for BPL? I’ve had 48 years to think about that question, and I’ve yet to come up with a good answer. I simply made a colossal mistake.
NICO的拥有者JackRingwalt，是我的老朋友，他想把公司卖给我个人。他提出的报价决不是给伯克希尔公司的。所以，为什么我为伯克希尔而不是BPL收购了NICO呢？我有48年时间去思考这个问题，但我始终没想到好的答案。我只是犯了一个天大的错误。
If BPL had been the purchaser, my partners and I would have owned 100% of a fine business, destined to form the base for building the company Berkshire has become. Moreover, our growth would not have been impeded for nearly two decades by the unproductive funds imprisoned in the textile operation. Finally, our subsequent acquisitions would have been owned in their entirety by my partners and me rather than being 39%-owned by the legacy shareholders of Berkshire, to whom we had no obligation. Despite these facts staring me in the face, I opted to marry 100% of an excellent business (NICO) to a 61%-owned terrible business (Berkshire Hathaway), a decision that eventually diverted $100 billion or so from BPL partners to a collection of strangers.
如果BPL是NICO的收购方，我的合伙人和我将会100％拥有一个好生意，这注定会形成构造现今伯克希尔的基础。此外，在将近二十年时间里，我们的成长将不会受到纺织业中禁锢的非生产性资本的阻碍。最后，我们之后的并购将会由我的合伙人和我完全拥有，而不是还被伯克希尔遗留的股东拥有39%的股份，我们对他们没有义务。尽管这些事实摆在我面前，我还是选择将一家100％好生意(NICO)与一家我拥有61％股份的烂生意(BRK)合并在一起，这个决定最终将约1000亿美元资本从BPL合伙人那儿转移给了一大堆陌生人。
One more confession and then I’ll go on to more pleasant topics: Can you believe that in 1975 I bought Waumbec Mills, another New England textile company? Of course, the purchase price was a “bargain” based on the assets we received and the projected synergies with Berkshire’s existing textile business. Nevertheless -- surprise, surprise -- Waumbec was a disaster, with the mill having to be closed down not many years later.
再来一次忏悔，而后我会进入到更让人开心的话题：你能相信我在1975年又收购了另外一家新英格兰地区的纺织企业WaumbecMills公司吗？当然，基于我们获得的资产，以及与伯克希尔现有的纺织业务的预期协同效应，这次收购的价格是个"便宜货"的价格。然而——意外地，意外地——Waumbec是一场灾难，因为几年后工厂就不得不关闭了。
And now some good news: The northern textile industry is finally extinct. You need no longer panic if you hear that I’ve been spotted wandering around New England.
现在有一些好消息了：北方的纺织业终于灭绝了。如果又听到我在英格兰地区闲逛，你就不必再惊慌了。
My cigar-butt strategy worked very well while I was managing small sums. Indeed, the many dozens of free puffs I obtained in the 1950s made that decade by far the best of my life for both relative and absolute investment performance.
当我管理小规模资金的时候，我的烟蒂策略非常的有效。事实上，我1950年代所获得的几十次免费烟蒂，使得那10年成为我人生迄今为止，不管是相对还是绝对投资表现都是最美好的10年。
Even then, however, I made a few exceptions to cigar butts, the most important being GEICO. Thanks to a 1951 conversation I had with Lorimer Davidson, a wonderful man who later became CEO of the company, I learned that GEICO was a terrific business and promptly put 65% of my $9,800 net worth into its shares. Most of my gains in those early years, though, came from investments in mediocre companies that traded at bargain prices. Ben Graham had taught me that technique, and it worked.
然而，纵使是在当时，我也有一些非烟蒂类型的投资，其中最重要的是GEICO保险。多亏了1951年我和Lorimer Davidson的谈话，他是一个很好的人，后来成为了该公司的CEO。从谈话中我得知，GEICO是家极好的公司，并迅速将我9800美元净资产的65％投入到它的股票中。不过，我早年的大部分收益来自于，投资低价交易的平庸公司。本杰明·格雷厄姆教给我这项技能，而且非常奏效。
But a major weakness in this approach gradually became apparent: Cigar-butt investing was scalable only to a point. With large sums, it would never work well.
但这个方法的一个主要缺点逐渐显现出来：烟蒂投资法只能在一定程度上扩大规模。对于大规模资金，它可能永远不会有效。
In addition, though marginal businesses purchased at cheap prices may be attractive as short-term investments, they are the wrong foundation on which to build a large and enduring enterprise. Selecting a marriage partner clearly requires more demanding criteria than does dating. (Berkshire, it should be noted, would have been a highly satisfactory “date”: If we had taken Seabury Stanton’s $11.375 offer for our shares, BPL’s weighted annual return on its Berkshire investment would have been about 40%.)
另外，尽管用便宜的价格购买边缘化的生意，作为短期投资可能很有吸引力，但它们是构造庞大而且持久的企业的错误基础。相比于约会，选择婚姻伴侣显然需要更苛刻的条件(需要指出的是，伯克希尔本来可能是一个非常令人满意的"约会"：如果我们接受了SeaburyStanton提出的11.375美元报价，BPL对伯克希尔投资的加权年化回报率将高达40％。)
It took Charlie Munger to break my cigar-butt habits and set the course for building a business that could combine huge size with satisfactory profits. Charlie had grown up a few hundred feet from where I now live and as a youth had worked, as did I, in my grandfather’s grocery store. Nevertheless, it was 1959 before I met Charlie, long after he had left Omaha to make Los Angeles his home. I was then 28 and he was 35. The Omaha doctor who introduced us predicted that we would hit it off -- and we did.
上天派来查理·芒格打破了我的烟蒂投资习惯，并为建立一家规模巨大且利润丰厚的企业指明了方向。查理在距离我现在所住的地方大约几百英尺的地方长大，年轻时和我一样，在我祖父的杂货店里工作过。然而，直到1959年我才见到查理，那时他早已经离开奥马哈定居洛杉矶了。当时我28岁，他是35。介绍我们认识的奥马哈医生预测我们会一见如故，我们确实如此。
If you’ve attended our annual meetings, you know Charlie has a wide-ranging brilliance, a prodigious memory, and some firm opinions. I’m not exactly wishy-washy myself, and we sometimes don’t agree. In 56 years, however, we’ve never had an argument. When we differ, Charlie usually ends the conversation by saying: “Warren, think it over and you’ll agree with me because you’re smart and I’m right.”
如果你参加过我们的年会，就会知道查理才华横溢，记忆力惊人，观点坚定。我并不真的是思路不清，而且我们有时意见也不一致。然而56年来，我们从未争吵过。当我们意见分歧，查理往往用这句话结束我们的对话："沃伦，再仔细想想，你会赞成我的观点，因为你很聪明，而我是对的。"
What most of you do not know about Charlie is that architecture is among his passions. Though he began his career as a practicing lawyer (with his time billed at $15 per hour), Charlie made his first real money in his 30s by designing and building five apartment projects near Los Angeles. Concurrently, he designed the house that he lives in today -- some 55 years later. (Like me, Charlie can’t be budged if he is happy in his surroundings.) In recent years, Charlie has designed large dorm complexes at Stanford and the University of Michigan and today, at age 91, is working on another major project.
你们大多数人所不知道的是，建筑是查理的爱好之一。尽管查理的职业生涯始于执业律师(那时候时薪为15美元/小时)，但他在30多岁时通过设计并且建造了洛杉矶附近的5个公寓楼项目，赚到了第一桶金。同时，他设计了现在已经居住了55年的房子。(和我一样，如果他对周围环境感到满意，他就不愿意搬家。)在最近几年，查理设计了斯坦福和密歇根大学的大型宿舍楼，如今91岁高龄的他，正在进来另一个重大项目。
From my perspective, though, Charlie’s most important architectural feat was the design of today’s Berkshire. The blueprint he gave me was simple: Forget what you know about buying fair businesses at wonderful prices; instead, buy wonderful businesses at fair prices.
然而在我看来，查理最重要的建筑成就就是设计了今天的伯克希尔。他给我的蓝图很简单：忘记你所知道的以极低的价格买入普通生意；相反地，要以合理的价格买入伟大的生意。
Altering my behavior is not an easy task (ask my family). I had enjoyed reasonable success without Charlie’s input, so why should I listen to a lawyer who had never spent a day in business school (when -- ahem -- I had attended three ). But Charlie never tired of repeating his maxims about business and investing to me, and his logic was irrefutable. Consequently, Berkshire has been built to Charlie’s blueprint. My role has been that of general contractor, with the CEOs of Berkshire’s subsidiaries doing the real work as sub-contractors.
改变我的行为不是一件容易的事(问问我的家人)。没有查理的参与，我已经获得了相当大的成功，所以我为什么应该去听一个从未在商学院呆过一天的律师的话呢？(而我待过三个：宾法沃顿商学院，内布拉斯加商学院，哥伦比亚商学院)。但是查理不厌其烦地对我重复他的商业和投资的箴言，他的逻辑是不可反驳的。因此，伯克希尔是依据查理的蓝图建立的。我的角色是总承建商，而伯克希尔子公司CEO们，则作为分包商做着实际工作。
The year 1972 was a turning point for Berkshire (though not without occasional backsliding on my part -- remember my 1975 purchase of Waumbec). We had the opportunity then to buy See’s Candy for Blue Chip Stamps, a company in which Charlie, I and Berkshire had major stakes, and which was later merged into Berkshire.
1972年是伯克希尔的一个转折年(尽管我偶尔还是会出现滑坡——还记得我1975年收购Waumbec的交易吗)。那时我们有机会为蓝筹印花公司购买喜诗糖果，查理，我和伯克希尔拥有大量蓝筹印花股票，后来并入了伯克希尔。
See’s was a legendary West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed chocolates, then annually earning about $4 million pre-tax while utilizing only $8 million of net tangible assets. Moreover, the company had a huge asset that did not appear on its balance sheet: a broad and durable competitive advantage that gave it significant pricing power. That strength was virtually certain to give See’s major gains in earnings over time. Better yet, these would materialize with only minor amounts of incremental investment. In other words, See’s could be expected to gush cash for decades to come.
喜诗糖果是西海岸一家传奇的巧克力制造商和零售商，当时税前利润约400万美元，而净有形资产仅有800万美元。另外，公司拥有一项资产负债表上从未曾体现的巨大资产：广泛的而持久的竞争优势，赋予它巨大的定价权。这个优势长期几乎肯定会给喜诗糖果带来重大增量收益。更好的是，只需要少量的增量投资，这些增量收益就会实现。换句话说，喜诗糖果有望在未来几十年里，涌现出巨大的现金流。
The family controlling See’s wanted $30 million for the business, and Charlie rightly said it was worth that much. But I didn’t want to pay more than $25 million and wasn’t all that enthusiastic even at that figure. (A price that was three times net tangible assets made me gulp.) My misguided caution could have scuttled a terrific purchase. But, luckily, the sellers decided to take our $25 million bid.
控制喜诗糖果的家族希望要价3000万美元，查理正确地指出它值这个价钱。但我并不想支付超过2500万美元，甚至对2500万美元我也不没有多少热情(三倍于有形资产的价格让我相当为难)。我的错误的谨慎，差一点毁了这桩极好的收购。但是，幸运的是，卖家决定接受我们2500万美元的报价。
To date, See’s has earned $1.9 billion pre-tax, with its growth having required added investment of only $40 million. See’s has thus been able to distribute huge sums that have helped Berkshire buy other businesses that, in turn, have themselves produced large distributable profits. (Envision rabbits breeding.) Additionally, through watching See’s in action, I gained a business education about the value of powerful brands that opened my eyes to many other profitable investments.
迄今为止，喜诗糖果累积税前利润为19亿美元，而它的成长，仅仅需要4000万美元的额外投资。因此喜诗可以分派巨额资金，帮助伯克希尔去购买其他生意，而这些生意本身又产生了巨额可分配利润(像兔子繁殖一样)。另外，通过观察喜诗的交易，我获得了有关强大品牌价值的商业教育，开拓了我的眼光，让我看到了许多其他有利可图的投资机会。
Even with Charlie’s blueprint, I have made plenty of mistakes since Waumbec. The most gruesome was Dexter Shoe. When we purchased the company in 1993, it had a terrific record and in no way looked to me like a cigar butt. Its competitive strengths, however, were soon to evaporate because of foreign competition. And I simply didn’t see that coming.
纵使有了查理的蓝图，自错误收购Waumbec以来，我还是犯了很多错误。最可怕的是收购Dexter鞋业。当我们于1993年收购这家公司时，它有着出色的记录，在我看来全然不像烟蒂股。然而，由于外国的激烈竞争，它的竞争优势很快蒸发了。而我根本没有想到这一点。
Consequently, Berkshire paid $433 million for Dexter and, rather promptly, its value went to zero. GAAP accounting, however, doesn’t come close to recording the magnitude of my error. The fact is that I gave Berkshire stock to the sellers of Dexter rather than cash, and the shares I used for the purchase are now worth about $5.7 billion. As a financial disaster, this one deserves a spot in the Guinness Book of World Records.
因此，伯克希尔为Dexter支付的4.33亿美元很快便归零了。然而，GAAP会计核算却没有很好地反映出我错误的程度。事实是我支付给Dexter卖家的不是现金，而是伯克希尔股票。我用于收购的那部分股票，现在价值大约57亿美元。作为一场金融灾难，理应写进吉尼斯世界纪录。
Several of my subsequent errors also involved the use of Berkshire shares to purchase businesses whose earnings were destined to simply limp along. Mistakes of that kind are deadly. Trading shares of a wonderful business -- which Berkshire most certainly is -- for ownership of a so-so business irreparably destroys value.
我随后犯下的几个错误，还包括使用伯克希尔的股票去购买那些利润注定会衰退的企业。这类错误是致命的。用优秀企业的股票(伯克希尔必然是)去交换普通企业的所有权，会不可挽回地毁灭价值。
We’ve also suffered financially when this mistake has been committed by companies whose shares Berkshire has owned (with the errors sometimes occurring while I was serving as a director). Too often CEOs seem blind to an elementary reality: The intrinsic value of the shares you give in an acquisition must not be greater than the intrinsic value of the business you receive.
当伯克希尔持股的公司犯下这种错误的时候，我们同样会遭受财务上的损失(有时这些错误还发生在我担任董事期间)。CEO们往往对对一个基本现实视而不见：你在并购中所付出的股份的内在价值，不能高于你所获得的公司股份的内在价值。
I’ve yet to see an investment banker quantify this all-important math when he is presenting a stock-for-stock deal to the board of a potential acquirer. Instead, the banker’s focus will be on describing “customary” premiums-to-market-price that are currently being paid for acquisitions -- an absolutely asinine way to evaluate the attractiveness of an acquisition -- or whether the deal will increase the acquirer’s earnings-per-share (which in itself should be far from determinative). In striving to achieve the desired per-share number, a panting CEO and his “helpers” will often conjure up fanciful “synergies.” (As a director of 19 companies over the years, I’ve never heard “dis-synergies” mentioned, though I’ve witnessed plenty of these once deals have closed.) Post mortems of acquisitions, in which reality is honestly compared to the original projections, are rare in American boardrooms. They should instead be standard practice.
我至今没有看到一位投资银行家，在向潜在收购方董事会提交换股收购时，量化这个重要的数学依据。相反地，这些银行家的专注点将放在描述，为收购支付的市场价格的"惯常"溢价上，这是评估收购吸引力的一种绝对愚蠢的方式，或者这个交易是否将会增加收购方的每股收益(它本身应该远非决定性因素)。在努力实现预期的每股收益数字的过程中，气喘吁吁的CEO和他的"顾问们"，常常会想象出一种美妙的"协同效应"。(多年来，作为19家公司的董事，我从未听说过"不协同效应"，虽然我在交易结束后目睹了许多这样的情况)。在美国企业的董事会里，很少会有收购的事后剖析复盘，相反，这一过程应该是标准做法。
I can promise you that long after I’m gone, Berkshire’s CEO and Board will carefully make intrinsic value calculations before issuing shares in any acquisitions. You can’t get rich trading a hundred-dollar bill for eight tens (even if your advisor has handed you an expensive “fairness” opinion endorsing that swap).
我可以向你保证，在我离开后很长一段时间内，伯克希尔的CEO和董事会，在任何发行股票的收购之前，都会仔细地做好内在价值的计算。你不可能用一张100美元的钞票去交换8张10美元的钞票而致富。(即使你的顾问帮你出具了昂贵的"公平交易"的意见来为这种交换背书)。
Overall, Berkshire’s acquisitions have worked out well -- and very well in the case of a few large ones. So, too, have our investments in marketable securities. The latter are always valued on our balance sheet at their market prices so any gains -- including those unrealized -- are immediately reflected in our net worth. But the businesses we buy outright are never revalued upward on our balance sheet, even when we could sell them for many billions of dollars more than their carrying value. The unrecorded gains in the value of Berkshire’s subsidiaries have become huge, with these growing at a particularly fast pace in the last decade.
总的来说，伯克希尔的收购进展顺利，在一些大型收购中做得非常不错。我们对有价证券的投资也是如此。后者在我们的财报上总是以市值计算，所以任何的收益(包括那些尚未实现的投资收益)都会立即反映在我们的资产净值中。但是那些我们完全买断的公司，在我们的资产负债表上从未向上重新估值，即使我们可以以高出账面价值数十亿美元的价格出售它们。伯克希尔子公司中未记录的价值增值已经变得非常巨大，在过去的十年里增速特别快。
Listening to Charlie has paid off.
听查理的话得到了回报。
Berkshire is now a sprawling conglomerate, constantly trying to sprawl further.
伯克希尔现在是个庞大的企业集团(conglomerate)，并且试图进一步扩张。
Conglomerates, it should be acknowledged, have a terrible reputation with investors. And they richly deserve it. Let me first explain why they are in the doghouse, and then I will go on to describe why the conglomerate form brings huge and enduring advantages to Berkshire.
应当承认，企业集团在投资者中名声不佳。这是它们应得的。让我们先解释一下，为什么它们受到冷落，然后我将继续描述，为什么企业集团的形式会给伯克希尔带来巨大且持久的优势。
Since I entered the business world, conglomerates have enjoyed several periods of extreme popularity, the silliest of which occurred in the late 1960s. The drill for conglomerate CEOs then was simple: By personality, promotion or dubious accounting -- and often by all three -- these managers drove a fledgling conglomerate’s stock to, say, 20 times earnings and then issued shares as fast as possible to acquire another business selling at ten-or-so times earnings. They immediately applied “pooling” accounting to the acquisition, which -- with not a dime’s worth of change in the underlying businesses -- automatically increased per-share earnings, and used the rise as proof of managerial genius. They next explained to investors that this sort of talent justified the maintenance, or even the enhancement, of the acquirer’s p/e multiple. And, finally, they promised to endlessly repeat this procedure and thereby create ever-increasing per-share earnings.
自从我进入商界以来，企业集团已经经受了几段非常受欢迎的时期，其中最为愚蠢的一段发生在1960年代末期。那时企业集团CEO的把戏非常的简单：依靠人格魅力，依靠推广宣传，或者依靠可疑的会计操作——经常是三者并用，这些管理者把一个新组建的企业集团股价推升到20倍市盈率，然后迅速发行股票，以10倍左右的市盈率收购另一家公司。它们立即将"权益合并法"(pooling)会计应用于收购，在被收购公司业务没有任何的变化的情况下，但其每股收益却自动地增加了，并将其作为自己管理天才的体现。他们接着对投资者解释说，这种才能证明了，维持甚至提高收购方公司市盈率倍数的的合理性。最后，他们许诺会无尽地重复这一过程，从而创造不断增长的每股收益。
Wall Street’s love affair with this hocus-pocus intensified as the 1960s rolled by. The Street’s denizens are always ready to suspend disbelief when dubious maneuvers are used to manufacture rising per-share earnings, particularly if these acrobatics produce mergers that generate huge fees for investment bankers. Auditors willingly sprinkled their holy water on the conglomerates’ accounting and sometimes even made suggestions as to how to further juice the numbers. For many, gushers of easy money washed away ethical sensitivities.
随着60年代的过去，华尔街对这种把戏的喜爱与日俱增。当这些可疑的策略被用于制造不断上升的每股收益时，华尔街的居民们总是愿意放弃对其暂时的怀疑，特别是当这些把戏产生的企业合并，能为投资银行家们带来巨额费用的时候。会计师们乐于在企业集团的会计报表上泼洒他们的圣水，有时甚至就如何进一步提高这些数字提出建议。对许多人来说，源源不断轻松赚来的钱冲刷掉了他们道德的敏感性。
Since the per-share earnings gains of an expanding conglomerate came from exploiting p/e differences, its CEO had to search for businesses selling at low multiples of earnings. These, of course, were characteristically mediocre businesses with poor long-term prospects. This incentive to bottom-fish usually led to a conglomerate’s collection of underlying businesses becoming more and more junky. That mattered little to investors: It was deal velocity and pooling accounting they looked to for increased earnings.
正是由于不断扩张的企业集团，其每股收益的增加来自于利用市盈率的差异，因此它的CEO不得不寻找低市盈率的公司。当然，这些都是典型的平庸生意，长期前景不佳。在这在糟糕生意中捕鱼的动机，往往使得企业集团的基础业务变得越来越糟糕。这对投资者来说无关紧要：他们希望通过并购速度和合并法会计来增加收益。
The resulting firestorm of merger activity was fanned by an adoring press. Companies such as ITT, Litton Industries, Gulf & Western, and LTV were lionized, and their CEOs became celebrities. (These once-famous conglomerates are now long gone. As Yogi Berra said, “Every Napoleon meets his Watergate.”)
由此引发的并购风暴被盲目崇拜的媒体煽动起来。诸如国际电话电信(ITT)，利顿工业(Litton Industies)，海湾和西方集团(Gulf & Western)和LTV防务集团(Ling-Temco-Vought)等公司受到了追捧，它们的CEO也成了名人。(这些曾经出名的企业集团如今早已不复存在。就像Yogi Berra说的，"每个拿破仑都会遇到他的水门(相对于凯旋门，代指失败)。")
Back then, accounting shenanigans of all sorts -- many of them ridiculously transparent -- were excused or overlooked. Indeed, having an accounting wizard at the helm of an expanding conglomerate was viewed as a huge plus: Shareholders in those instances could be sure that reported earnings would never disappoint, no matter how bad the operating realities of the business might become.
当时，各种各样的会计诡计(其中许多诡计透明的离谱)都被原谅或者忽视了。事实上，让一位会计造假专家执掌一家不断扩张的企业集团，竟被视为一个巨大的优势：在那种情况下，股东可以确信的是，不管企业运营的实际状况变得多么糟糕，报告的收益都不会让人失望。
In the late 1960s, I attended a meeting at which an acquisitive CEO bragged of his “bold, imaginative accounting.” Most of the analysts listening responded with approving nods, seeing themselves as having found a manager whose forecasts were certain to be met, whatever the business results might be.
在1960年代末期，我参加了一个会议，会议上一位偏爱收购的CEO吹嘘自己"大胆且富有想象力的会计手法"。大多数的分析师听着他的话，都频频点头表示赞赏，认为自己找到了一个无论业务经营结果如何，其预期一定会实现的经理人。
Eventually, however, the clock struck twelve, and everything turned to pumpkins and mice. Once again, it became evident that business models based on the serial issuances of overpriced shares -- just like chain-letter models -- most assuredly redistribute wealth, but in no way create it. Both phenomena, nevertheless, periodically blossom in our country -- they are every promoter’s dream -- though often they appear in a carefully-crafted disguise. The ending is always the same: Money flows from the gullible to the fraudster. And with stocks, unlike chain letters, the sums hijacked can be staggering.
然而，最终十二点的时钟敲响了，一切变成了南瓜和老鼠，再一次地证明，基于一系列的高价股票连续发行的商业模式(就像连锁信模式一样)，最可能的是财富的重新分配，但绝不会创造财富。然而，这两种现象在我们国家周期性的出现(它们是每个倡导者的梦想)，虽然它们往往以精心伪装的骗局出现。结局总是相同的：金钱从轻信者流向行骗者。与连锁信骗局不同，从股票中劫持的金额是惊人的。
At both BPL and Berkshire, we have never invested in companies that are hell-bent on issuing shares. That behavior is one of the surest indicators of a promotion-minded management, weak accounting, a stock that is overpriced and -- all too often -- outright dishonesty.
在BPL和伯克希尔公司，我们从未投资过那些一心想要发行股票的公司。这种行为是以下情况的最可靠的指标之一：一个注重推销的管理层，糟糕的会计原则，高估的股价，以及往往全然地不诚实。
So what do Charlie and I find so attractive about Berkshire’s conglomerate structure? To put the case simply: If the conglomerate form is used judiciously, it is an ideal structure for maximizing long-term capital growth.
那么，查理和我为什么会认为伯克希尔的企业集团结构如此有吸引力呢？简单地说：如果明智地使用企业集团形式，它是实现最大化长期资金增长的理想形式。
One of the heralded virtues of capitalism is that it efficiently allocates funds. The argument is that markets will direct investment to promising businesses and deny it to those destined to wither. That is true: With all its excesses, market-driven allocation of capital is usually far superior to any alternative.
资本主义的一个显著的优点就是能有效地配置资金。因为市场将资金引向有前途的生意中，而拒绝那些注定要倒闭的生意。这是真的：尽管存在过度的行为，但市场驱动的资金配置往往远胜过其他的选择。
Nevertheless, there are often obstacles to the rational movement of capital. As those 1954 Berkshire minutes made clear, capital withdrawals within the textile industry that should have been obvious were delayed for decades because of the vain hopes and self-interest of managements. Indeed, I myself delayed abandoning our obsolete textile mills for far too long.
然而，资本的合理流动往往存在障碍。正如1954年伯克希尔会议记录所清晰体现的那样，由于自私的管理层空虚的期盼，在纺织业中本应及早的资本撤出却被推迟了数十年。事实上，我自己也拖延了很久才放弃了我们过时的纺织厂。
A CEO with capital employed in a declining operation seldom elects to massively redeploy that capital into unrelated activities. A move of that kind would usually require that long-time associates be fired and mistakes be admitted. Moreover, it’s unlikely that CEO would be the manager you would wish to handle the redeployment job even if he or she was inclined to undertake it.
当CEO在一个衰退产业中投入了资本，他很少会选择将资本大规模地重新配置到不相关的业务中。因为这样的行为，往往需要解雇长期的合作伙伴并承认自己的错误。此外，CEO也不太可能就是你希望承担重新配置工作的经理人，即使这个CEO想要承担这项工作。
At the shareholder level, taxes and frictional costs weigh heavily on individual investors when they attempt to reallocate capital among businesses and industries. Even tax-free institutional investors face major costs as they move capital because they usually need intermediaries to do this job. A lot of mouths with expensive tastes then clamor to be fed -- among them investment bankers, accountants, consultants, lawyers and such capital-reallocators as leveraged buyout operators. Money-shufflers don’t come cheap.
在股东的层面，当个人投资者试图在企业和行业之间重新分配资本时，税收和摩擦成本会给他们带来沉重的负担。即使免税的机构投资者在转换资本时也面临比较大的成本，因为他们通常需要中介机构去完成这个工作。此时，无数张昂贵的嘴需要被养活——其中包括投资银行家，会计师，咨询师，律师以及资本配置运营商比如杠杆收购者。资本的重新洗牌可一点也不便宜。
In contrast, a conglomerate such as Berkshire is perfectly positioned to allocate capital rationally and at minimal cost. Of course, form itself is no guarantee of success: We have made plenty of mistakes, and we will make more. Our structural advantages, however, are formidable.
相比之下，像伯克希尔这样的企业集团完全有能力以最低的成本，合理地配置资本。当然，企业形式本身并不能保证会成功：我们犯了无数错误，并且还会犯更多。然而，我们的结构性优势是非常强大的。
At Berkshire, we can -- without incurring taxes or much in the way of other costs -- move huge sums from businesses that have limited opportunities for incremental investment to other sectors with greater promise. Moreover, we are free of historical biases created by lifelong association with a given industry and are not subject to pressures from colleagues having a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. That’s important: If horses had controlled investment decisions, there would have been no auto industry.
在伯克希尔，我们能够在不产生税负或者其他成本的情况下，将巨额资本，从增量投资机会有限的业务中，转移到其他有更大前景的业务中。另外，我们不会因与特定行业的终身联系而产生历史偏见，也不会遭受维护现状符合其既得利益的同伴的压力。这一点很重要：如果马儿控制了投资决策，那么就不会有汽车行业了。
Another major advantage we possess is the ability to buy pieces of wonderful businesses -- a.k.a. common stocks. That’s not a course of action open to most managements. Over our history, this strategic alternative has proved to be very helpful; a broad range of options always sharpens decision-making. The businesses we are offered by the stock market every day -- in small pieces, to be sure -- are often far more attractive than the businesses we are concurrently being offered in their entirety. Additionally, the gains we’ve realized from marketable securities have helped us make certain large acquisitions that would otherwise have been beyond our financial capabilities.
我们拥有的另一个主要优势是，购买好生意的一部分(普通股)的能力。这不是大多数管理层可以采取的活动。在我们的历史中，这种策略选择已被证明是非常有益的；广泛的选择总是使得决策更加明智。股票市场每天给予我们的企业报价(当然只是一小部分)，往往比我们整体收购的报价更具吸引力。此外，我们从股市上实现的收益，帮助我们进行了许多大型收购，否则这些收购将会超出我们的财务能力。
In effect, the world is Berkshire’s oyster -- a world offering us a range of opportunities far beyond those realistically open to most companies. We are limited, of course, to businesses whose economic prospects we can evaluate. And that’s a serious limitation: Charlie and I have no idea what a great many companies will look like ten years from now. But that limitation is much smaller than that borne by an executive whose experience has been confined to a single industry. On top of that, we can profitably scale to a far larger size than the many businesses that are constrained by the limited potential of the single industry in which they operate.
实际上世界是属于伯克希尔的——这个世界提供给我们范围广泛的机会，远远超出大多数企业实际面临的机会。当然，我们仅限于那些我们能够评估其经济前景的企业。这是一个重要的限制：很多企业查理和我都不知道十年后将会如何。但是这种限制远远小于，一位经验仅限于单一领域的高管所承受的限制。除此之外，我们可以有利可图的持续扩大规模，远远超过许多企业，这些企业普遍受到其所在单一行业潜力有限的制约。
I mentioned earlier that See’s Candy had produced huge earnings compared to its modest capital requirements. We would have loved, of course, to intelligently use those funds to expand our candy operation. But our many attempts to do so were largely futile. So, without incurring tax inefficiencies or frictional costs, we have used the excess funds generated by See’s to help purchase other businesses. If See’s had remained a stand-alone company, its earnings would have had to be distributed to investors to redeploy, sometimes after being heavily depleted by large taxes and, almost always, by significant frictional and agency costs.
我前面提到，相比于它适度的资本需求，喜诗糖果产出了大量现金收益。当然，我们很乐意明智地使用那些资本，去扩大我们的糖果业务。但是我们多次扩张的尝试基本上都是徒劳的。所以，在不产生无效税负或摩擦成本的情况下，我们将喜诗糖果产出的多余资金用于收购其他业务。如果喜诗糖果仍然是一家独立的公司，它的巨额收益将不得不分配给投资者以重新配置，有时在巨额税收以后，几乎总是被巨大的摩擦和代理人成本耗尽。
Berkshire has one further advantage that has become increasingly important over the years: We are now the home of choice for the owners and managers of many outstanding businesses.
伯克希尔还有一个近年来变得越来越重要的优势：我们现在是很多杰出企业拥有者和管理者的首选之地。
Families that own successful businesses have multiple options when they contemplate sale. Frequently, the best decision is to do nothing. There are worse things in life than having a prosperous business that one understands well. But sitting tight is seldom recommended by Wall Street. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.)
拥有成功企业的家族，在考虑出售时有多种选择。通常最好的选择是什么都不做。生活中有许多比拥有一个自己非常了解且繁荣的企业更加糟糕的事情，但华尔街很少建议人们呆坐不动(不要问理发师你是否需要理发)。
When one part of a family wishes to sell while others wish to continue, a public offering often makes sense. But, when owners wish to cash out entirely, they usually consider one of two paths.
当一个家庭部分成员想要出售，而另一部分想要继续经营的时候，公开发行股票通常会变得合理。但是，当所有者想要完全地出售，他们通常考虑以下两个途径之一。
The first is sale to a competitor who is salivating at the possibility of wringing “synergies” from the combining of the two companies. This buyer invariably contemplates getting rid of large numbers of the seller’s associates, the very people who have helped the owner build his business. A caring owner, however -- and there are plenty of them -- usually does not want to leave his long-time associates sadly singing the old country song: “ She got the goldmine, I got the shaft. ”
第一个选择是，出售给竞争对手。他们对两家公司的合并可能产生的"协同效应"正垂涎三尺。这类收购者总是考虑解雇出售方的大量员工，也就是那些帮助所有者建立起这个业务的人。然而，一个体贴的所有者(有很多这样的人)，往往不想让他的长期伙伴悲伤地唱古老的乡村歌曲："她得到了金矿，我得到了竖井(不公平对待)"。
The second choice for sellers is the Wall Street buyer. For some years, these purchasers accurately called themselves “leveraged buyout firms.” When that term got a bad name in the early 1990s -- remember RJR and Barbarians at the Gate? -- these buyers hastily relabeled themselves “private-equity.”
第二种选择是，出售给华尔街买家。多年来，确切的说这种收购方自称为"杠杆收购公司"。当这词汇在1990年代获得了恶名，还记得RJR收购案和门口的野蛮人吗？这些买家匆忙地将自己改称为"私募股权"。
The name may have changed but that was all: Equity is dramatically reduced and debt is piled on in virtually all private-equity purchases. Indeed, the amount that a private-equity purchaser offers to the seller is in part determined by the buyer assessing the maximum amount of debt that can be placed on the acquired company.
名字可能已经改变，但本质不变：几乎所有的私募股权收购案中，股权比例大幅减少，债务大幅提高。实际上，私募股权购买方向卖方提供的报价，部分取决于买方对被收购公司所能承受的债务上限的评估。
Later, if things go well and equity begins to build, leveraged buy-out shops will often seek to re-leverage with new borrowings. They then typically use part of the proceeds to pay a huge dividend that drives equity sharply downward, sometimes even to a negative figure.
接着，如果事情进展顺利(债务下降)，股权比例开始回升，杠杆收购机构往往会寻求利用新的借贷来进行再杠杆化。然后他们通常会将部分收益用于支付巨额的债务利息，使得股东权益大幅度减少，有时甚至是负值。
In truth, “equity” is a dirty word for many private-equity buyers; what they love is debt. And, because debt is currently so inexpensive, these buyers can frequently pay top dollar. Later, the business will be resold, often to another leveraged buyer. In effect, the business becomes a piece of merchandise.
事实上，对于许多私募股权买方来说，"股权"是一个讨厌的词汇；他们喜爱的是债务。而且因为目前债务成本如此低廉，这些买方往往愿意支付最高价。接着公司将被转售，通常是卖给另外一个杠杠收购方。实际上公司变成了一件可交易的商品。
Berkshire offers a third choice to the business owner who wishes to sell: a permanent home, in which the company’s people and culture will be retained (though, occasionally, management changes will be needed). Beyond that, any business we acquire dramatically increases its financial strength and ability to grow. Its days of dealing with banks and Wall Street analysts are also forever ended.
伯克希尔提供了希望出售业务的所有者第三种选择：一个永久的家，公司的员工和文化将被保留其中(尽管偶尔也需要更换管理层)。除此之外，我们收购的任何业务，都会大大增强其财务实力和增长能力。它与银行和华尔街分析师打交道的日子也永远地结束了。
Some sellers don’t care about these matters. But, when sellers do, Berkshire does not have a lot of competition.
有些卖家并不关心这些问题。但卖家关心的时候，伯克希尔并没有太多的竞争对手。
Sometimes pundits propose that Berkshire spin-off certain of its businesses. These suggestions make no sense. Our companies are worth more as part of Berkshire than as separate entities. One reason is our ability to move funds between businesses or into new ventures instantly and without tax. In addition, certain costs duplicate themselves, in full or part, if operations are separated. Here’s the most obvious example: Berkshire incurs nominal costs for its single board of directors; were our dozens of subsidiaries to be split off, the overall cost for directors would soar. So, too, would regulatory and administration expenditures.
有时评论员提议伯克希尔剥离部分业务。这些建议毫无道理。作为伯克希尔的一部分，我们的子公司比作为独立的实体要更有价值。其中一个原因是，我们能够立即免税地在企业之间转移资本或投入新的公司。此外，如果业务分开，某些成本会全部或者部分地重复。这里有个最明显的例子：伯克希尔单一的董事会只花费了微不足道的成本；如果我们几十家子公司被拆分，董事会成本将大幅增加。监管和管理成本也是如此。
Finally, there are sometimes important tax efficiencies for Subsidiary A because we own Subsidiary B. For example, certain tax credits that are available to our utilities are currently realizable only because we generate huge amounts of taxable income at other Berkshire operations. That gives Berkshire Hathaway Energy a major advantage over most public-utility companies in developing wind and solar projects.
最后，子公司A有时会因为我们拥有子公司B，而产生重要的税负效率。例如，我们的公用事业公司目前获得了一些税收抵免，仅仅是因为伯克希尔其他公司的运营中产生了巨额的应税收入。这给予了伯克希尔能源公司在开发风能和太阳能项目方面，比大多数公用事业公司具有重大优势。
Investment bankers, being paid as they are for action, constantly urge acquirers to pay 20% to 50% premiums over market price for publicly-held businesses. The bankers tell the buyer that the premium is justified for “control value” and for the wonderful things that are going to happen once the acquirer’s CEO takes charge. (What acquisition-hungry manager will challenge that assertion?)
投资银行家不断地催促着收购方为上升公司支付高于市场价20-50％的溢价，他们获得的薪酬与这些活动直接相关。银行家们告诉收购方，溢价是合理的，因为获得了"控制价值"，以及一旦收购方CEO接管好的事情就会发生。(哪一个渴望收购的经理人会对这一说法提出质疑？)
A few years later, bankers -- bearing straight faces -- again appear and just as earnestly urge spinning off the earlier acquisition in order to “unlock shareholder value.” Spin-offs, of course, strip the owning company of its purported “control value” without any compensating payment. The bankers explain that the spun-off company will flourish because its management will be more entrepreneurial, having been freed from the smothering bureaucracy of the parent company. (So much for that talented CEO we met earlier.)
几年以后，银行家们绷着脸再次出现，同样热切地催促分拆之前收购的公司，以"释放股东价值"。当然，分拆会剥离母公司所谓的"控制价值"，而且不会支付任何赔偿。银行家解释说，分拆后的公司将会蓬勃发展，因为它的管理层将会更具企业家精神，摆脱了母公司令人窒息的官僚作风。(我们早前见到的那位才华横溢的CEO就这么点本事。)
If the divesting company later wishes to reacquire the spun-off operation, it presumably would again be urged by its bankers to pay a hefty “control” premium for the privilege. (Mental “flexibility” of this sort by the banking fraternity has prompted the saying that fees too often lead to transactions rather than transactions leading to fees.)
如果这家剥离后的公司日后希望重新收购分拆的业务，银行家可能会再次催促，其为这一特权支付巨额"控制"溢价。(银行界的这类心理上的"灵活性"促使人们认为，费用往往会导致交易，而不是交易导致了费用。)
It’s possible, of course, that someday a spin-off or sale at Berkshire would be required by regulators. Berkshire carried out such a spin-off in 1979, when new regulations for bank holding companies forced us to divest a bank we owned in Rockford, Illinois.
当然，可能有一天监管机构会要求伯克希尔进行分拆或者出售。伯克希尔于1979年实施了这种分拆，当时针对银行控股公司的新规，迫使我们剥离位于Illinois州Rockford市的一家银行。
Voluntary spin-offs, though, make no sense for us: We would lose control value, capital-allocation flexibility and, in some cases, important tax advantages. The CEOs who brilliantly run our subsidiaries now would have difficulty in being as effective if running a spun-off operation, given the operating and financial advantages derived from Berkshire’s ownership. Moreover, the parent and the spun-off operations, once separated, would likely incur moderately greater costs than existed when they were combined.
然而，自愿分拆对我们而言毫无意义。我们将损失控制价值，资本配置的灵活性，在一些情况下，还好失去重要的税收优势。考虑到源于伯克希尔所有权所带来的运营和财务优势，那些管理我们子公司的出色CEO们，将很难在运营分拆后的业务时发挥同样的作用。另外，母公司和分拆后的公司一旦分离，将可能产生比合并时更高的成本。
Before I depart the subject of spin-offs, let’s look at a lesson to be learned from a conglomerate mentioned earlier: LTV. I’ll summarize here, but those who enjoy a good financial story should read the piece about Jimmy Ling that ran in the October 1982 issue of D Magazine. Look it up on the Internet.
在我离开分拆话题以前，让我们先来看一个从前面提到的LTV企业集团中学到的教训。我将在这儿做总结，但那些喜好金融故事的人应当阅读在1982年10月D-Magazine上发表的有关JimmyLing的文章(网址如下：https://www.dmagazine.com/publications/d-magazine/1982/october/jim-ling/)。
Through a lot of corporate razzle-dazzle, Ling had taken LTV from sales of only $36 million in 1965 to number 14 on the Fortune 500 list just two years later. Ling, it should be noted, had never displayed any managerial skills. But Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who overestimates himself. And Ling had no peer in that respect.
经过一系列眼花缭乱的公司运作，Ling将LTV公司从1965年仅仅3600万美元销售额，提升到了两年后的世界500强第14名。应该指出的是，Ling从未表现出任何的管理技能。但是查理很久以前告诉我说，永远不要低估那些高估自己的人。Ling在这方面是无人能比的。
Ling’s strategy, which he labeled “project redeployment,” was to buy a large company and then partially spin off its various divisions. In LTV’s 1966 annual report, he explained the magic that would follow: “Most importantly, acquisitions must meet the test of the 2 plus 2 equals 5 (or 6) formula.” The press, the public and Wall Street loved this sort of talk.
Ling的策略，他称之为"项目重新部署"(Project Touchdown)，也就是买入一家大公司，然后部分分拆其各个部门。在LTV的1966年度报告，他解释了接下来将要发生的魔法："最重要的是，收购一定要满足2＋2＝5(或6)的公式检验"。媒体，公众和华尔街喜欢这类的讲话。
In 1967 Ling bought Wilson & Co., a huge meatpacker that also had interests in golf equipment and pharmaceuticals. Soon after, he split the parent into three businesses, Wilson & Co. (meatpacking), Wilson Sporting Goods and Wilson Pharmaceuticals, each of which was to be partially spun off. These companies quickly became known on Wall Street as Meatball, Golf Ball and Goof Ball.
在1967年，Ling收购了一家大型肉类加工企业威尔逊公司(Wilson&Co.)，这家公司也有高尔夫设备和药业业务。很快地，他将母公司拆分为三家公司，Wilson肉加工公司(Wilson&Co.),Wilson体育用品公司(Wilson Sporting Goods)和Wilson制药公司(Wilson Pharmaceuticals)，这三家公司都将被部分地分拆独立。这些公司很快被华尔街称为肉球Meatball，高尔夫球Golfball，傻球Goofball。
Soon thereafter, it became clear that, like Icarus, Ling had flown too close to the sun. By the early 1970s, Ling’s empire was melting, and he himself had been spun off from LTV... that is, fired.
不久后，很清楚的是，就像希腊神话的Icarus一样，Ling飞得太靠近太阳了。在1970年代初期，Ling的帝国开始瓦解，他自己也被从LTV中分拆出来，也就是被解雇了。
Periodically, financial markets will become divorced from reality -- you can count on that. More Jimmy Lings will appear. They will look and sound authoritative. The press will hang on their every word. Bankers will fight for their business. What they are saying will recently have “worked.” Their early followers will be feeling very clever. Our suggestion: Whatever their line, never forget that 2+2 will always equal 4. And when someone tells you how old-fashioned that math is --- zip up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to buy stocks at cheap prices.
金融市场会周期性的脱离现实，你大可以相信这一点。更多的JimmyLing们将会出现。他们看起来和听起来都很权威。媒体将紧盯着他们说的每一个字。银行家们将为他们的生意而战。他们近期说的话将"发挥作用"。他们早期的跟随着将会觉得自己非常明智。我们的建议是：不论他们说什么，永远不要忘记2＋2永远等于4。当有人告诉你这个数学公式如何落伍时，拉上钱包拉链去度假，几年后回来以便宜的价格购买股票。
Today Berkshire possesses (1) an unmatched collection of businesses, most of them now enjoying favorable economic prospects; (2) a cadre of outstanding managers who, with few exceptions, are unusually devoted to both the subsidiary they operate and to Berkshire; (3) an extraordinary diversity of earnings, premier financial strength and oceans of liquidity that we will maintain under all circumstances; (4) a first-choice ranking among many owners and managers who are contemplating sale of their businesses and (5) in a point related to the preceding item, a culture, distinctive in many ways from that of most large companies, that we have worked 50 years to develop and that is now rock-solid.
今天的伯克希尔拥有：1，一个无与伦比的公司组合，其中大多数都有着良好的经济前景。2，一批优秀的经理人，他们几无例外地异常专注于他们所经营的子公司和伯克希尔母公司。3，非凡的收益多元化来源，卓越的财务实力，和大量的流动资金，我们将在任何情况下保持。4，对于许多的所有者和管理者来说，在考虑出售他们的生意的时候，我们公司是他们的第一选择。5，在与上一项有关的方面，一种在许多方面和大多数的大公司不同的文化，我们公司已经努力了50年去发展公司文化，现在已经坚如磐石。
These strengths provide us a wonderful foundation on which to build.
以上这些优势为我们的未来发展奠定了一个美妙的基础。
Now let’s take a look at the road ahead. Bear in mind that if I had attempted 50 years ago to gauge what was coming, certain of my predictions would have been far off the mark. With that warning, I will tell you what I would say to my family today if they asked me about Berkshire’s future.
现在让我们看看前方的道路。请记住，如果我在五十年前试图预测将来发生的事，我的某些预测将会大大偏离目标。有了这个告诫之后，我将会告诉你们，如果今天我的家人问我伯克希尔的未来，我会对他们说些什么。
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First and definitely foremost, I believe that the chance of permanent capital loss for patient Berkshire shareholders is as low as can be found among single-company investments. That’s because our per-share intrinsic business value is almost certain to advance over time.
首先，也是最为重要的一点，我相信，对于耐心的伯克希尔投资者而言，永久性的资本损失的机率，是单一公司投资中最低的。这是因为我们的每股内在商业价值，随着时间推移几乎确定会增加。
This cheery prediction comes, however, with an important caution: If an investor’s entry point into Berkshire stock is unusually high -- at a price, say, approaching double book value, which Berkshire shares have occasionally reached -- it may well be many years before the investor can realize a profit. In other words, a sound investment can morph into a rash speculation if it is bought at an elevated price. Berkshire is not exempt from this truth.
然而，这个乐观的预言伴随着一个重要的警告：如果伯克希尔投资者的买入点异常高，比如价格接近账面价值的两倍，伯克希尔股票偶尔会达到这个水平，那么投资者可能需要很多年才能实现盈利。换句话说，一项明智的投资，如果以高价买入，也可能演变成一种鲁莽的投机行为，伯克希尔也不例外。
Purchases of Berkshire that investors make at a price modestly above the level at which the company would repurchase its shares, however, should produce gains within a reasonable period of time. Berkshire’s directors will only authorize repurchases at a price they believe to be well below intrinsic value. (In our view, that is an essential criterion for repurchases that is often ignored by other managements.)
然而，投资者以略高于公司回购股份的价格水平购买伯克希尔的股票，应当会在一个合理的时期内产生收益。伯克希尔的董事们只会在股价远低于他们认为的内在价值时授权回购。(在我们的观念中，这是回购的基本标准，这个标准经常被其他管理者忽视。)
For those investors who plan to sell within a year or two after their purchase, I can offer no assurances, whatever the entry price. Movements of the general stock market during such abbreviated periods will likely be far more important in determining your results than the concomitant change in the intrinsic value of your Berkshire shares. As Ben Graham said many decades ago: “In the short-term the market is a voting machine; in the long-run it acts as a weighing machine.” Occasionally, the voting decisions of investors -- amateurs and professionals alike -- border on lunacy.
对于那些打算在买入后一两年内出售股票的投资者，无论买入价格如何，我都不能保证。在如此短的时间内，股市的走势变动对于你投资结果的影响，可能比伯克希尔内在价值的变化的影响更重要。就像本杰明格雷厄姆几十年前说的："短期而言，市场是台投票机；长期而言，市场是台称重机"。有时投资者(业余人士和专业人士)的投票决定都近似于神经病。
Since I know of no way to reliably predict market movements, I recommend that you purchase Berkshire shares only if you expect to hold them for at least five years. Those who seek short-term profits should look elsewhere.
由于我不知道如何可靠地预测市场走势，因此我建议，只有你打算持有伯克希尔股票至少五年的情况下，你才应该购买，那些谋求短期利润的人应当到别处看看。
Another warning: Berkshire shares should not be purchased with borrowed money. There have been three times since 1965 when our stock has fallen about 50% from its high point. Someday, something close to this kind of drop will happen again, and no one knows when. Berkshire will almost certainly be a satisfactory holding for investors. But it could well be a disastrous choice for speculators employing leverage.
另一个警告是：不应当借钱购买伯克希尔的股票。自从1965年以来，我们的股价是从高点下跌约50％的情况有过三次。将来某天，这类下跌会再次发生，但没人知道是什么时候。对投资者来说，伯克希尔几乎肯定是一个令人满意的持有标的。但对于使用杠杆的投机者来说，它同样可能是一个灾难性的选择。
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I believe the chance of any event causing Berkshire to experience financial problems is essentially zero. We will always be prepared for the thousand-year flood; in fact, if it occurs we will be selling life jackets to the unprepared. Berkshire played an important role as a “first responder” during the 2008-2009 meltdown, and we have since more than doubled the strength of our balance sheet and our earnings potential. Your company is the Gibraltar of American business and will remain so.
我认为，任何事件导致伯克希尔遭遇财务问题的可能性基本为零。我们将永远为千年的洪水做好准备；事实上，如果它发生了，我们将把救生衣卖给那些没有准备的人。在2008-2009的金融危机中，伯克希尔作为"第一反应者"发挥了重要作用，从那以后，我们的资产负债表强度和盈利能力增加了一倍多。贵公司是美国商业的直布罗陀并将继续如此。
Financial staying power requires a company to maintain three strengths under all circumstances: (1) a large and reliable stream of earnings; (2) massive liquid assets and (3) no significant near-term cash requirements. Ignoring that last necessity is what usually leads companies to experience unexpected problems: Too often, CEOs of profitable companies feel they will always be able to refund maturing obligations, however large these are. In 2008-2009, many managements learned how perilous that mindset can be.
财务持久力要求一家公司在任何情况下保持三个优势：1)庞大且可靠的收入流；(2)大量的流动资产；(3)近期没有重大的现金需求。忽视了最后一条的必要性，常常导致公司遇到意想不到的问题：太多时候，盈利的公司的CEO们感觉他们总是能够偿还到期债务，不论债务规模多大。在2008-2009年，许多管理层认识到这种思维方式有多么危险。
Here’s how we will always stand on the three essentials. First, our earnings stream is huge and comes from a vast array of businesses. Our shareholders now own many large companies that have durable competitive advantages, and we will acquire more of those in the future. Our diversification assures Berkshire’s continued profitability, even if a catastrophe causes insurance losses that far exceed any previously experienced.
以下是我们无论如何将始终坚持的三个原则：首先，我们的收益流是巨大的，并且来自各种各样的业务。我们的股东现在拥有许多具备持续竞争优势的大型公司，我们将在未来收购更多这样的公司。我们的多元化确保了伯克希尔持续的盈利能力，即使一个大灾难导致的保险损失远远超越过去任何一次。
Next up is cash. At a healthy business, cash is sometimes thought of as something to be minimized -- as an unproductive asset that acts as a drag on such markers as return on equity. Cash, though, is to a business as oxygen is to an individual: never thought about when it is present, the only thing in mind when it is absent.
接下来是现金。在一个健康的企业中，现金有时候被认为是需要最小化的东西，作为非生产性资产，会拖累股本回报率等指标。然而，现金对于企业而言，就像氧气对于人一样：当它存在的时候从来不会想它，但当它不存在的时候，脑海中唯一想的就是现金。
American business provided a case study of that in 2008. In September of that year, many long-prosperous companies suddenly wondered whether their checks would bounce in the days ahead. Overnight, their financial oxygen disappeared.
美国企业在2008年提供了一个研究案例。那年9月，许多长期繁荣的公司突然想知道，它们的支票在未来几天是否会被拒付。一夜之间，它们的财务氧气消失了。
At Berkshire, our “breathing” went uninterrupted. Indeed, in a three-week period spanning late September and early October, we supplied $15.6 billion of fresh money to American businesses.
在伯克希尔，我们的"呼吸"不受干扰。事实上，在9月末、10月初的三个周内，我们为美国企业提供了156亿美元的新资金。
We could do that because we always maintain at least $20 billion -- and usually far more -- in cash equivalents. And by that we mean U.S. Treasury bills, not other substitutes for cash that are claimed to deliver liquidity and actually do so, except when it is truly needed. When bills come due, only cash is legal tender. Don’t leave home without it.
我们能够做到这点，因为我们始终保持至少200亿美元的现金等价物，而且通常远多于此。这里我们指的是美国国债，而不是其他声称可以提供流动性，但只有真的被需要的时候才能实际提供流动性的现金替代物。当债务到期，只有现金才是法定货币。没有它寸步难行。
Finally -- getting to our third point -- we will never engage in operating or investment practices that can result in sudden demands for large sums. That means we will not expose Berkshire to short-term debt maturities of size nor enter into derivative contracts or other business arrangements that could require large collateral calls.
最后是我们的第三点，我们永远不会参与可能导致突然需要大额资金的运营或投资活动。这意味着我们不会让伯克希尔暴露在短期债务到期的风险中，也不会签订衍生品合约，或者其他可能需要大量抵押物的业务安排。
Some years ago, we became a party to certain derivative contracts that we believed were significantly mispriced and that had only minor collateral requirements. These have proved to be quite profitable. Recently, however, newly-written derivative contracts have required full collateralization. And that ended our interest in derivatives, regardless of what profit potential they might offer. We have not, for some years, written these contracts, except for a few needed for operational purposes at our utility businesses.
几年以前，我们参与了某些衍生品合约，我们认为这些合约定价严重错误，并且只有很少的抵押品要求。这些已经被证明相当地有利可图。然而，最近新签订的衍生品合约要求提供充分的抵押物。这终结了我们对于衍生品的兴趣，不论它们可能提供何种的盈利潜力。我们已经好几年没有签订这类合约了，除了少数我们的公用事业运营需要的合同。
Moreover, we will not write insurance contracts that give policyholders the right to cash out at their option. Many life insurance products contain redemption features that make them susceptible to a “run” in times of extreme panic. Contracts of that sort, however, do not exist in the property-casualty world that we inhabit. If our premium volume should shrink, our float would decline -- but only at a very slow pace.
此外，我们将不会签订那些客户可以选择取出现金的保险合约。许多人寿保险产品都包含赎回功能，这使得它们在极端恐慌的时期很容易遭到"挤兑"。然而，在我们所经营的财产意外险世界中，这类合同并不存在。如果我们的保费数量下降，我们的浮存金将会减少，但是速度会非常缓慢。
The reason for our conservatism, which may impress some people as extreme, is that it is entirely predictable that people will occasionally panic, but not at all predictable when this will happen. Though practically all days are relatively uneventful, tomorrow is always uncertain. (I felt no special apprehension on December 6, 1941 or September 10, 2001.) And if you can’t predict what tomorrow will bring, you must be prepared for whatever it does.
我们这种保守主义可能会给一些人留下极端的印象，其原因是，人们偶尔地会恐慌，但何时会恐慌则是完全无法预测的。尽管几乎所有的日子都相对无事，但明天总是不确定的。(在1941年12月6日或2001年9月11日，我没有感到特别恐惧)。如果你不能预测明天会发生什么，你必须为无论发生什么做好准备。
A CEO who is 64 and plans to retire at 65 may have his own special calculus in evaluating risks that have only a tiny chance of happening in a given year. He may, in fact, be “right” 99% of the time. Those odds, however, hold no appeal for us. We will never play financial Russian roulette with the funds you’ve entrusted to us, even if the metaphorical gun has 100 chambers and only one bullet. In our view, it is madness to risk losing what you need in pursuing what you simply desire.
一位64岁且计划65岁退休的CEO，在评估1年内发生几率极小的风险时，可能有他自己的特殊计算。事实上，他可能99％的时间都是"正确"的。然而，那些赔率对我们没有吸引力。我们将永远不会用你们托付给我们的资金，玩财务的俄罗斯轮盘，即使这把隐喻的枪有100个枪膛且仅有一发子弹。在我们看来，冒着失去你所需要的东西的风险，去追求你仅仅渴望得到的东西，是愚蠢的。
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Despite our conservatism, I think we will be able every year to build the underlying per-share earning power of Berkshire. That does not mean operating earnings will increase each year -- far from it. The U.S. economy will ebb and flow -- though mostly flow -- and, when it weakens, so will our current earnings. But we will continue to achieve organic gains, make bolt-on acquisitions and enter new fields. I believe, therefore, that Berkshire will annually add to its underlying earning power.
尽管我们保守，但我认为我们每年都能继续增加伯克希尔潜在的每股盈利能力。这并不意味着经营收益每年都会增长，事实远非如此。美国经济将起起伏伏，尽管主要是上涨，当经济衰退的时候，我们当前的盈利也会减少。但是我们将继续取得逐步的收益增长，进行补强收购，并不断进入新的领域。所以，我相信伯克希尔每年都会增加它的潜在盈利能力。
In some years the gains will be substantial, and at other times they will be minor. Markets, competition, and chance will determine when opportunities come our way. Through it all, Berkshire will keep moving forward, powered by the array of solid businesses we now possess and the new companies we will purchase. In most years, moreover, our country’s economy will provide a strong tailwind for business. We are blessed to have the United States as our home field.
在某些年份，收益将会是巨大的，而在其他时候，收益将很少。市场，竞争和机会将会决定何时机会出现在我们面前。总而言之，伯克希尔将由我们现在拥有的一系列坚实的业务，以及我们将收购新业务的推动下继续保持前进。此外，在多数年份里，美国经济将为企业提供强烈的助力。上帝保佑，我们有幸有美国作为主场。
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The bad news is that Berkshire’s long-term gains -- measured by percentages, not by dollars -- cannot be dramatic and will not come close to those achieved in the past 50 years. The numbers have become too big. I think Berkshire will outperform the average American company, but our advantage, if any, won’t be great.
坏消息是，伯克希尔的长期回报率不会很大(以百分比而非美元衡量)，也不会接近在过去50年里取得的水平。规模数字已经变得过于庞大。我想伯克希尔将超越美国普通公司的平均表现，但我们的优势不会太大(如果有的话)。
Eventually -- probably between ten and twenty years from now -- Berkshire’s earnings and capital resources will reach a level that will not allow management to intelligently reinvest all of the company’s earnings. At that time our directors will need to determine whether the best method to distribute the excess earnings is through dividends, share repurchases or both. If Berkshire shares are selling below intrinsic business value, massive repurchases will almost certainly be the best choice. You can be comfortable that your directors will make the right decision.
最终，可能从现在起10-20年的时间，伯克希尔的收益和资本资源将到达一个水平，将使得管理层无法明智地将公司所有收益进行再投资。在那时，我们的董事会将需要决定，分配超额收益最好的方式是通过派发股息，股份回购，还是二者皆有。如果伯克希尔的股份是低于内在商业价值的价格出售，大规模的回购几乎肯定是最佳选择。你可以放心，你的董事会将会做出正确的决定。
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No company will be more shareholder-minded than Berkshire. For more than 30 years, we have annually reaffirmed our Shareholder Principles (see page 117), always leading off with: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” This covenant with you is etched in stone.
没有哪家公司比伯克希尔更加注重股东利益。30多年来，我们每年都会重申我们的股东原则，并总是以此开头：虽然我们的形式是公司制，但我们的态度是合伙制。这个与你们之间的承诺是刻在石头上的。
We have an extraordinarily knowledgeable and business-oriented board of directors ready to carry out that promise of partnership. None took the job for the money: In an arrangement almost non-existent elsewhere, our directors are paid only token fees. They receive their rewards instead through ownership of Berkshire shares and the satisfaction that comes from being good stewards of an important enterprise.
我们有一个知识渊博、以商业为导向的董事会，随时准备履行合伙制的承诺。没有人为了金钱而接受这份工作：在其他地方几乎不存在这种安排，我们的董事仅仅得到象征性的薪酬。相反，他们通过持有伯克希尔股份，以及成为一家重要企业的优秀管理者而获得的满足感，来作为回报。
The shares that they and their families own -- which, in many cases, are worth very substantial sums -- were purchased in the market (rather than their materializing through options or grants). In addition, unlike almost all other sizable public companies, we carry no directors and officers liability insurance. At Berkshire, directors walk in your shoes.
他们和他们的家族所拥有的股份(在很多情况下价值巨大)是从市场中购买的，而不是通过他们的期权或者补助实现的。另外，与几乎所有其他大型上市公司不同，我们没有董事和高管责任险。在伯克希尔，董事们站在你的立场看问题。
To further ensure continuation of our culture, I have suggested that my son, Howard, succeed me as a non-executive Chairman. My only reason for this wish is to make change easier if the wrong CEO should ever be employed and there occurs a need for the Chairman to move forcefully. I can assure you that this problem has a very low probability of arising at Berkshire -- likely as low as at any public company. In my service on the boards of nineteen public companies, however, I’ve seen how hard it is to replace a mediocre CEO if that person is also Chairman. (The deed usually gets done, but almost always very late.)
为了进一步确保我们文化的延续性，我建议我的儿子Howard接替我担任公司的非执行主席。我希望如此的唯一原因是，如果聘用了错误的CEO，并且需要懂事长强制解聘他，改变起来会更加简单。我可以对你们保证，这个问题在伯克希尔出现概率非常低，可能跟任何上市公司一样低。然而，在我为19家上市公司的董事会服务的过程中，我曾见过如果一个平庸的CEO同时还是董事长，要换掉他是多么的困难。(换人通常会完成，但几乎总是非常晚。)
If elected, Howard will receive no pay and will spend no time at the job other than that required of all directors. He will simply be a safety valve to whom any director can go if he or she has concerns about the CEO and wishes to learn if other directors are expressing doubts as well. Should multiple directors be apprehensive, Howard’s chairmanship will allow the matter to be promptly and properly addressed.
如果Howard当选，除了所有董事必须做的工作外，他将不会得到任何报酬，也不会再工作上花费任何时间。如果任何董事对CEO感到担忧，并希望知道其他董事是否也同样表示出疑虑，那么任何董事都可以去找他，他将仅仅成为一个安全阀。如果多个董事表示担忧，霍华德的主席地位将使得此事得到快速和合理地解决。
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Choosing the right CEO is all-important and is a subject that commands much time at Berkshire board meetings. Managing Berkshire is primarily a job of capital allocation, coupled with the selection and retention of outstanding managers to captain our operating subsidiaries. Obviously, the job also requires the replacement of a subsidiary’s CEO when that is called for. These duties require Berkshire’s CEO to be a rational, calm and decisive individual who has a broad understanding of business and good insights into human behavior. It’s important as well that he knows his limits. (As Tom Watson, Sr. of IBM said, “I’m no genius, but I’m smart in spots and I stay around those spots.”)
选择正确的CEO至关重要，这也是伯克希尔董事会中需要花费很多时间的问题。管理伯克希尔主要是一项资本配置的工作，同时还要选择和留住出色的管理人员，来领导我们的运营子公司。显然，这项工作还需要再需要的时候更换子公司的CEO。这些职责要求伯克希尔的CEO是个理性，冷静和果断的人，对商业有着广泛的理解，对人类行为有着深刻的洞察力。同样重要的是，他知道自己的局限性。正如IBM的创始人Tom Watson所说，我不是天才，但我在某些领域很聪明，我会一直留在那些领域。)
Character is crucial: A Berkshire CEO must be “all in” for the company, not for himself. (I’m using male pronouns to avoid awkward wording, but gender should never decide who becomes CEO.) He can’t help but earn money far in excess of any possible need for it. But it’s important that neither ego nor avarice motivate him to reach for pay matching his most lavishly-compensated peers, even if his achievements far exceed theirs. A CEO’s behavior has a huge impact on managers down the line: If it’s clear to them that shareholders’ interests are paramount to him, they will, with few exceptions, also embrace that way of thinking.
品格是至关重要的：伯克希尔的CEO必须为了公司"全力以赴"，而不是他自己。(我使用男性代词是为了避免笨拙的措辞，但性别不应当决定谁成为CEO。)他情不自禁地为公司赚取远超任何可能需要的金钱。但重要的是，无论是自负还是贪婪，都不能激励他去追求与那些薪酬最丰厚的同龄人相当的薪酬，纵使他的成就远远超过他们。CEO的行为对经理人有着巨大的影响：如果他们清楚知道，对CEO而言股东的利益是至高无上的，他们也会毫无例外地接受这种思维方式。
My successor will need one other particular strength: the ability to fight off the ABCs of business decay, which are arrogance, bureaucracy and complacency. When these corporate cancers metastasize, even the strongest of companies can falter. The examples available to prove the point are legion, but to maintain friendships I will exhume only cases from the distant past.
我的继任者还需要具备一个特别的优势：有能力摆脱企业衰退的基本因素，即傲慢，官僚主义和自满。当这些企业癌症扩散，即使是最强大的公司也会摇摇欲坠。能够证明这个观点的例子非常多，但为了保持友谊，我将仅仅从那些遥远的过去寻找案例。
In their glory days, General Motors, IBM, Sears Roebuck and U.S. Steel sat atop huge industries. Their strengths seemed unassailable. But the destructive behavior I deplored above eventually led each of them to fall to depths that their CEOs and directors had not long before thought impossible. Their one-time financial strength and their historical earning power proved no defense.
在巅峰时期，IBM，通用汽车(GM)，西尔斯(Sears Roebuck)和美国钢铁(U.S.Steel)位居各自行业榜首。它们的实力看上去无懈可击。但是我上文所谴责的破坏性行为，最终导致它们每一个都陷入了其CEO和董事在不久前还认为不可能的境地。事实证明，它们曾经的财务实力和历史上的盈利能力都毫无保护作用。
Only a vigilant and determined CEO can ward off such debilitating forces as Berkshire grows ever larger. He must never forget Charlie’s plea: “Tell me where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” If our non-economic values were to be lost, much of Berkshire’s economic value would collapse as well. “Tone at the top” will be key to maintaining Berkshire’s special culture.
随着伯克希尔规模越来越大，只有一位警惕而坚定的CEO才能够抵御这种削弱的力量。他必须永远不忘查理的请求："告诉我我会死在哪里，这样我将永远不会去那儿"。如果我们丧失了非经济价值(企业文化)，伯克希尔大部分的经济价值也将崩塌。"高层基调"将是保持伯克希尔特殊文化的关键。
Fortunately, the structure our future CEOs will need to be successful is firmly in place. The extraordinary delegation of authority now existing at Berkshire is the ideal antidote to bureaucracy. In an operating sense, Berkshire is not a giant company but rather a collection of large companies. At headquarters, we have never had a committee nor have we ever required our subsidiaries to submit budgets (though many use them as an important internal tool). We don’t have a legal office nor departments that other companies take for granted: human relations, public relations, investor relations, strategy, acquisitions, you name it.
幸运的是，我们未来的CEO们成功所需要的结构已经稳固到位。目前伯克希尔存在的非同寻常的权力下放，是官僚主义的理想解药。从运营的角度看，伯克希尔不是一家大公司，而是一个大公司群。在总部我们从未设立委员会，也从未要求我们子公司提交预算(虽然许多公司将其作为重要的内部工具)。我们没有其他公司认为理所当然的法律办公室或各种：人力关系，公共关系，投资者关系，战略，并购，但凡你想得起来的部门。
We do, of course, have an active audit function; no sense being a damned fool. To an unusual degree, however, we trust our managers to run their operations with a keen sense of stewardship. After all, they were doing exactly that before we acquired their businesses. With only occasional exceptions, furthermore, our trust produces better results than would be achieved by streams of directives, endless reviews and layers of bureaucracy. Charlie and I try to interact with our managers in a manner consistent with what we would wish for, if the positions were reversed.
当然，我们确实有一个积极的审计职能；没道理成为一个积累问题的傻瓜。然而，在不同寻常的程度上，我们相信我们的经理们会以敏锐的管理意识来管理他们的运营。毕竟，在我们收购他们企业之前，他们就是这么做的。此外，除了偶尔的例外，我们的信任产生的结果，相比于一连串的指令，无尽的检查，层层的官僚机构所取得的成绩更好。如果位置颠倒的话，查理和我尝试以我们所希望的被对待的方式，和我们的经理们互动。
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Our directors believe that our future CEOs should come from internal candidates whom the Berkshire board has grown to know well. Our directors also believe that an incoming CEO should be relatively young, so that he or she can have a long run in the job. Berkshire will operate best if its CEOs average well over ten years at the helm. (It’s hard to teach a new dog old tricks.) And they are not likely to retire at 65 either (or have you noticed?).
我们的董事认为，我们未来的CEO们应该来自伯克希尔董事会已经逐步熟悉的内部候选人。我们的董事还认为，新任的CEO应当相对年轻，所以他或她才能够长期工作。如果伯克希尔的CEO们平均领导的时间超过十年，那么伯克希尔将运营的最好。(很难教会一只新狗老把戏。)并且他们也不可能在65岁退休(或者你已经注意到了什么吗？)
In both Berkshire’s business acquisitions and large, tailored investment moves, it is important that our counterparties be both familiar with and feel comfortable with Berkshire’s CEO. Developing confidence of that sort and cementing relationships takes time. The payoff, though, can be huge.
在伯克希尔企业并购和为伯克希尔量身定制的大型投资行动中，重要的一点是，我们的交易对手都必须熟悉伯克希尔的CEO，并对其感到满意。建立这种信任并且巩固关系需要时间。然而，回报可能是巨大的。
Both the board and I believe we now have the right person to succeed me as CEO -- a successor ready to assume the job the day after I die or step down. In certain important respects, this person will do a better job than I am doing.
董事会和我都相信，我们现在有合适的人选来接替我担任CEO，一位准备在我死后或者辞职第二天就接手这份工作的继任者。在某些重要的方面，这个人将做得比我现在做的还要好。
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Investments will always be of great importance to Berkshire and will be handled by several specialists. They will report to the CEO because their investment decisions, in a broad way, will need to be coordinated with Berkshire’s operating and acquisition programs. Overall, though, our investment managers will enjoy great autonomy. In this area, too, we are in fine shape for decades to come. Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, each of whom has spent several years on Berkshire’s investment team, are first-rate in all respects and can be of particular help to the CEO in evaluating acquisitions.
对伯克希尔而言，投资总是非常重要的，将由多位专家处理。他们将对CEO报告，因为他们的投资决策，在很大程度上需要和伯克希尔的运营和收购计划相协调。不过，总体而言，我们的投资经理将享有很大的自主权。在这方面，我们未来几十年将处于良好的状态。Todd Combs和Ted Weschler，他们都在伯克希尔的投资团队工作了多年，在所有方面都是一流的，在评估收购方面能够给予CEO特别的帮助。
All told, Berkshire is ideally positioned for life after Charlie and I leave the scene. We have the right people in place -- the right directors, managers and prospective successors to those managers. Our culture, furthermore, is embedded throughout their ranks. Our system is also regenerative. To a large degree, both good and bad cultures self-select to perpetuate themselves. For very good reasons, business owners and operating managers with values similar to ours will continue to be attracted to Berkshire as a one-of-a-kind and permanent home.
总之，在查理和我离开舞台之后，伯克希尔将被完美地安置。我们有正确的人选，正确的董事们，经理人们以及这些经理人们潜在的继任者。另外，我们的文化深深地根植于他们队伍之中。我们的系统也是可再生的。在很大程度上，好和坏的文化都是自我选择使自己永存。出于很好的理由，那些拥有与我们类似价值观的企业所有者和运营经理人，将继续被伯克希尔作为独一无二的和永远的家所吸引。
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I would be remiss if I didn’t salute another key constituency that makes Berkshire special: our shareholders. Berkshire truly has an owner base unlike that of any other giant corporation. That fact was demonstrated in spades at last year’s annual meeting, where the shareholders were offered a proxy resolution:
如果我没有向另一个让伯克希尔与众不同的关键支持者们致敬，那我就是失职的，他们就是我们的股东。伯克希尔的确拥有一个不同于任何其他大型企业的所有者基础。这个事实在去年年会上得到了充分的证实，当时股东们收到一项代理决议：
RESOLVED: Whereas the corporation has more money than it needs and since the owners unlike Warren are not multi billionaires, the board shall consider paying a meaningful annual dividend on the shares.
决议：鉴于公司拥有的资金超过其所需，并且因为股东们不像巴菲特那样是亿万富翁，董事会应当考虑支付有意义的年度股息。
The sponsoring shareholder of that resolution never showed up at the meeting, so his motion was not officially proposed. Nevertheless, the proxy votes had been tallied, and they were enlightening.
该决议的发起股东从未出席会议，所以他的动议没有被正式地提出。尽管如此，代理决议投票已经被统计完毕，并且富有启发性。
Not surprisingly, the A shares -- owned by relatively few shareholders, each with a large economic interest - voted “no” on the dividend question by a margin of 89 to 1.
由相对少数股东持有，每个股东都有很大的经济利益的A股股东，在分红问题上不出意外地投了"反对票"，比例约89比1。
The remarkable vote was that of our B shareholders. They number in the hundreds of thousands -- perhaps even totaling one million -- and they voted 660,759,855 “no” and 13,927,026 “yes,” a ratio of about 47 to 1.
引人注目的投票是我们B股股东的投票。他们的数量多达数十万，甚至可能超过100万，他们投的反对票数是660,759,855票，赞成票是13,927,026，比例约47比1。
Our directors recommended a “no” vote but the company did not otherwise attempt to influence shareholders. Nevertheless, 98% of the shares voting said, in effect, “Don’t send us a dividend but instead reinvest all of the earnings.” To have our fellow owners -- large and small -- be so in sync with our managerial philosophy is both remarkable and rewarding.
我们的董事们建议投反对票，但公司没有通过其他方式试图影响股东。尽管如此，98％的有投票权的股份实际上投票说，"不要给我们红利，而是将所有收益再投资"。让我们大大小小的股东跟我们的管理哲学保持一致，这既是了不起的，也是非常有益的。
I am a lucky fellow to have you as partners.
有你们做合伙人，我真是个幸运的家伙。
Warren E. Buffett