原文信息：
- 标题：1963 Annual Letter to Partners
- 作者：Warren Buffett
- 发表时间：1964-01-18
- 链接：Buffett Partnership Letters 1957-1970
- 中文翻译参考：RanRan
- 整理：孙萧萧
- 校译：
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
810 KIEWIT PLAZA
OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
January 18, 1964
1964 年 1 月 18 日
1963 was a good year. It was not a good year because we had an overall gain of $3,637,167 or 38.7% on our beginning net assets, pleasant as that experience may be to the pragmatists in our group. Rather it was a good year because our performance was substantially better than that of our fundamental yardstick --the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”). If we had been down 20% and the Dow had been down 30%, this letter would still have begun “1963 was a good year.” Regardless of whether we are plus or minus in a particular year, if we can maintain a satisfactory edge on the Dow over an extended period of time, our long term results will be satisfactory -- financially as well as philosophically.
1963 年业绩很好。虽然有的合伙人讲求实际，对今年的收益率很满意，但 1963 年业绩好，不是因为我们的净资产比年初增加了 3,637,167 美元，取得了 38.7% 的收益率。1963 年业绩好，是因为我们把我们的衡量基准道指远远甩在了后面。 就算我们下跌 20%，道指下跌 30%，我一样会说“1963 年业绩很好”。某一年的涨跌不必在意，只要从长期看，我们相对道指能保持适度领先优势，我们就能取得理想的长期业绩，能赚钱，心也不会乱。
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners' results for all full years of BPL's and predecessor partnerships' activities:
下面是道指收益率、普通合伙人分成前合伙基金收益率、全年管理的有限合伙人的收益率、以及合伙基金早年收益率的最新逐年对比情况。
| Year 年份 |
Overall Results From Dow (1) 道指整体收益率 (1) |
Partnership Results (2) 合伙基金收益率 (2) |
Limited Partners’ Results (3) 有限合伙人收益率 (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.7% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year.
(1) 根据道指年度涨跌计算，其中包含股息。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(2) 1957-61 年的数据是之前全年管理的所有有限合伙人账户的综合业绩，其中扣除了经营费用，未计算有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement.
(3) 1957-61 年的数据按前一列合伙基金收益率计算得出，按照当前合伙协议，扣 除了普通合伙人分成。
One wag among the limited partners has suggested I add a fourth column showing the results of the general partner --let's just say he, too, has an edge on the Dow.
有位合伙人和我开玩笑，说怎么不再加一列，普通合伙人的收益率是多少。这么说吧，普通合伙人也跑赢道指了。
The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results based on the preceding table:
下表是累计收益率或复合收益率：
| Year 年份 |
Overall Results From Dow 道指整体收益率 |
Partnership Results 合伙基金收益率 |
Limited Partners’ Results 有限合伙人收益率 |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| Annual Compounded Rate 年化复合收益率 |
10.0% | 27.7% | 22.3% |
It appears that we have completed seven fat years. With apologies to Joseph we shall attempt to ignore the biblical script. (I've never gone overboard for Noah's ideas on diversification either.)
我们已经连续七年大丰收。抱歉了，约瑟 (Joseph)，我们不打算相信圣经中的金科玉律（译注:在圣经故事中，上帝向埃及法老托梦，埃及将迎来七个丰年，随后是七个荒年，约瑟受命在丰年存粮，为荒年做准备）。(我对像诺亚方舟一样分散投资的做法也一直不感冒。)
In a more serious vein, I would like to emphasize that, in my judgment; our 17.7 margin over the Dow shown above is unattainable over any long period of time. A ten percentage point advantage would be a very satisfactory accomplishment and even a much more modest edge would produce impressive gains as will be touched upon later. This view (and it has to be guesswork -- informed or otherwise) carries with it the corollary that we must expect prolonged periods of much narrower margins over the Dow as well as at least occasional years when our record will be inferior (perhaps substantially so) to the Dow.
不开玩笑了。过去几年，我们跑赢了道指 17.7 个百分点。大家一定要注意:根据我的判断，我们不可能长期取得这样的领先优势。只要能长期跑赢道指 10 个百分点就很了不起了，就算领先优势不到 10 个百分点，也能创造惊人的收益，这个我们稍后会讲到。我的判断是主观的，不管我有什么依据，都是主观的。但是我们要清楚，按照我的判断，在很长时间内，我们相对道指的领先优势很可能大幅缩小，甚至有些年可能大幅落后道指，我们必须做好准备。
Much of the above sermon is reflected in "The Ground Rules" sent to everyone in November, but it can stand repetition.
我们每年 11 月份都会给大家发一份“基本原则”(The Ground Rules)，刚才讲的这些道理在基本原则里都有，但是这些道理说多少遍都不过分。
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 -100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed- end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp. and Lehman Corp. manage about $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $25 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the vast majority or other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们一直拿最大的两只开放式股票型基金(股票占 95-100%)和最大的两只分散投资的封闭式股票型基金的业绩，与合伙基金的收益率做对比。它们是 Massachusetts Investors Trust、Investors Stock Fund, Tri- Continental Corp. 和 Lehman Corp.。它们管理着 40 多亿美元的资产，基金行业管理的总资产是 250 亿美元，这四家公司应该能代表大多数基金公司。我认为，这四家基金公司的业绩也能代表资产规模更大的银行信托部门和投资咨询机构。
The purpose or this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index or investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands' annual fees of over $7 million, and this represents a very small fraction of the industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid talent indicates they achieved results slightly less favorable than the Dow.
我想用下面的表格说明，作为衡量投资业绩的指数，道指不是那么容易战胜的。上述四家基金由能力出众的经理人管理，它们每年收取的管理费是 700 多万美元，整个基金行业收取的管理费数额就更庞大了。从这些高薪经理人的打击率 (batting average) 来看，他们的业绩和道指相比略逊一筹。
Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, most partners, as an alternative to their interest in the Partnership would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with investment companies, and I, therefore, feel they offer a meaningful standard of performance.
我们的投资组合和公募基金迥然不同，我们的投资方法也和它们迥然不同。对于我们的大多数合伙人来说，如果不把资金投到我们的合伙基金中，其他的选择可能就是基金等投资公司，获得与基金类似的收益率，从这个角度来看，我认为与基金对比来检验我们的业绩很有意义。
YEARLY RESULTS 年度业绩
| Year 年份 |
Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont. (2) | Dow 道指 |
Limited Partners 有限合伙人 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.8% | 19.5% | 20.7% | 30.5% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。
(2) From 1963 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62; Estimated for 1963.
(2) 来源:1963 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62。1963 年为估算值。
COMPOUNDED 复合收益率
| Year 年份 |
Mass. Inv. Trust | Investors Stock | Lehman | Tri-Cont. | Dow 道指 |
Limited Partners 有限合伙人 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957-58 | 26.4% | 29.2% | 24.7% | 30.0% | 26.9% | 44.5% |
| 1957-59 | 37.8% | 42.5% | 34.8% | 40.9% | 52.3% | 74.7% |
| 1957-60 | 36.4% | 41.6% | 38.2% | 44.8% | 42.9% | 107.2% |
| 1957-61 | 71.3% | 76.9% | 70.8% | 77.4% | 74.9% | 181.6% |
| 1957-62 | 54.5% | 53.2% | 46.2% | 59.7% | 61.6% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 85.4% | 78.5% | 81.0% | 90.8% | 95.1% | 311.2% |
| Annual Compounded Rate 年化复合收益率 |
9.2% | 8.6% | 8.8% | 9.7% | 10.0% | 22.3% |
The Dow, of course, is an unmanaged index, and it may seem strange to the reader to contemplate the high priests of Wall Street striving vainly to surpass or even equal it. However, this is demonstrably the case. Moreover, such a failure cannot be rationalized by the assumption that the investment companies et al are handling themselves in a more conservative manner than the Dow. As the table above indicates, and as more extensive studies bear out, the behavior of common stock portfolio managed by this group, on average, have declined in concert with the Dow. By such a test of behavior in declining markets, our own methods of operation have proven to be considerably more conservative than the common stock component of the investment company or investment advisor group. While this has been true in the past, there obviously can be no guarantees about the future.
道指是无人管理的指数，读者可能觉得奇怪，这些华尔街大牛拼尽全力，怎么还跑不过道指，连打平都做不到。无可争议，现实就是如此。别以为公募基金跑不赢道指，是因为它们的投资比道指更保守。从业绩对比中可以看出来，也有大量研究结果证实，整体而言，公募基金投资组合中的股票和道指的下跌是同步的。 按照市场下跌时的表现来检验，我们的投资方法比公募基金更保守。过去我们做到了，不保证将来也能做到。
The above may seem like rather strong medicine, but it is offered as a factual presentation and in no way as criticism. Within their institutional framework and handling the many billions of dollars involved, the results achieved are the only ones attainable. To behave unconventionally within this framework is extremely difficult. Therefore, the collective record of such investment media is necessarily tied to the record of corporate America. Their merits, except in the unusual case, do not lie in superior results or greater resistance to decline in value. Rather, I feel they earn their keep by the ease of handling, the freedom from decision making and the automatic diversification they provide, plus, perhaps most important, the insulation afforded from temptation to practice patently inferior techniques which seem to entice so many world-be investors.
我对公募基金的评价可能说得有些重了，但是我只是在讲事实，不是要抨击它们。基金经理在机构的条条框框内要管理几十亿上百亿的资金，只能取得这样的业绩。想要突破条条框框特立独行，太难了。公募基金的业绩自然只能和整体股市亦步亦趋。一般来说，公募基金的好处不是帮助投资者取得更高的业绩，也不是提供更出色的抗跌能力。在我看来，公募基金的意义在于简单方便、省心省力、自动分散。另外，基金可以帮助投资者抵制诱惑，避免落入吞没了大量散户的陷阱。
Now to the pulse-quickening portion of our essay. Last year, in order to drive home the point on compounding, I took a pot shot at Queen Isabella and her financial advisors. You will remember they were euchred into such an obviously low-compound situation as the discovery of a new hemisphere.
又到了最激动人心的内容了。去年，为了把复利的概念讲透，我指出了伊莎贝拉女王 (Isabella) 的错误。大家可能还记得，伊莎贝拉女王以为发现新大陆很赚钱，却不知道这笔投资的复合收益率太低了。
Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000.
很多人在复利这个问题上太蠢了，我打算给大家上一课，这次以艺术界为例。1540 年，法兰西的弗朗西斯一世 (Francis I of France) 花了 4,000 埃居(译注：法国古货币；Ponge补注：ecus翻译为“埃居”，参考的是维基百科相关词条。)买入达芬奇的名画《蒙娜丽莎》。有的合伙人可能不太关注汇率变动，当时的 4,000 埃居相当于 20,000 美元。
If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-tax investment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. That's $1 quadrillion or over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase or paintings qualifying as an investment.
如果弗朗西斯一世头脑清醒，能找到税后收益率 6% 的投资，这笔钱现在就值 1,000,000,000,000,000.00 美元了，这可是 1000 万亿，是美国当前国债的 3000 倍，一切都来自每年 6% 的收益率。相信各位听我讲完，再也不会在家里讨论哪幅画是否值得投资了。
However, as I pointed out last year, there are other morals to be drawn here. One is the wisdom of living a long time. The other impressive factor is the swing produced by relatively small changes in the rate of compound.
不过，我去年说了，我们可以得到两点启发。第一，活得越长越好。第二，复合收益率很小的差别，最终数字就会产生很大的差距。
Below are shown the gains from $100,000 compounded at various rates:
以下是 100,000 美元按照不同收益率复利累积的结果：
| 4% | 8% | 12% | 16% | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10 Years 10年 |
$48,024 | $115,892 | $210,584 | $341,143 |
| 20 Years 20年 |
$119,111 | $366,094 | $864,627 | $1,846,060 |
| 30 Years 30年 |
$224,337 | $906,260 | $2,895,970 | $8,484,940 |
It is obvious that a variation of merely a few percentage points has an enormous effect on the success of a compounding (investment) program. It is also obvious that this effect mushrooms as the period lengthens. If, over a meaningful period of time, Buffett Partnership can achieve an edge of even a modest number of percentage points over the major investment media, its function will be fulfilled.
显而易见，收益率几个百分点的差距就能左右长期复利投资的最终收益，投资时间越长，这个效应越明显。在相当长的时间内，只要巴菲特合伙基金能适度跑赢大众投资工具几个百分点，我们就尽到了自己的职责。
Some of you may be downcast because I have not included in the above table the rate of 22.3% mentioned on page 3. This rate, of course, is before income taxes which are paid directly by you --not the Partnership. Even excluding this factor, such a calculation would only prove the absurdity of the idea of compounding at very high rates -- even with initially modest sums. My opinion is that the Dow is quite unlikely to compound for any important length of time at the rate it has during the past seven years and, as mentioned earlier, I believe our margin over the Dow cannot be maintained at its level to date. The product of these assumptions would be a materially lower average rate of compound for BPL in the future than the rate achieved to date. Injecting a minus 30% year (which is going to happen from time to time) into our tabulation of actual results to date, with, say, a corresponding minus 40% for the Dow brings both the figures on the Dow and BPL more in line with longer range possibilities. As the compounding table above suggests, such a lowered rate can still provide highly satisfactory long term investment results.
有些合伙人可能会想，为什么没把有限合伙人 22.3% 的复合收益率放在上面的表格里计算一下?22.3% 的复合收益率没扣除所得税，所得税不是合伙基金支付，而是要各位合伙人缴纳。即使扣除所得税，这个复利仍然高得离谱，不能这么算，哪怕初始资金很小。过去七年，道指的复合收益率很高，长期保持下去的可能性很小，我之前也说了，这几年我们跑赢了道指很多，不可能长期跑赢这么多。一言以蔽之，巴菲特合伙基金将来的复合收益率会远远低于现在。如果在业绩对比表格中加上我们下跌 30%、道指下跌 40% 的一年(这种下跌并不少见)，我们和道指的业绩就更贴近长期趋势了。如上述复利表格所示，即使复合收益率降低，我们的长期收益仍能非常令人满意。
At this point I always develop literary schizophrenia. On the one hand, I know that we have in the audience a number of partners to whom details of our business are interesting. We also have a number to whom this whole thing is Greek and who undoubtedly wish I would quit writing and get back to work.
每次写到这部分，我总是左右为难。一方面，我知道有些合伙人对我们投资的细节很感兴趣。另一方面，对很多合伙人来说，这些东西就像天书，他们肯定觉得我最好别写了，还不如赶快工作去。
To placate both camps, I am just going to sketch briefly our three categories at this point and those who are interested in getting their doctorate can refer to the appendix for extended treatment of examples.
为了把所有合伙人都照顾到，我决定只在这部分简单讲讲我们的三类投资，希望研读博士学位的合伙人可以在附录中阅读详细案例。
Our three investment categories are not differentiated by their expected profitability over an extended period of time. We are hopeful that they will each, over a ten or fifteen year period, produce something like the ten percentage point margin over the Dow that is our goal. However, in a given year they will have violently different behavior characteristics, depending primarily on the type of year it turns out to be for the stock market generally. Briefly this is how they shape up:
我们这三类投资的分类标准不是它们的长期投资收益有所不同。在 10 或 15 年时间里，我们觉得每一类都能实现我们的目标，跑赢道指 10 个百分点。但是，具体到某一年，股市行情变动很剧烈，这三类投资的表现也有巨大差别。下面简单介绍一下这三类投资：
“Generals” - A category of generally undervalued stocks, determined primarily by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation on the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But we demand value. The general group behaves very much in sympathy with the Dow and will turn in a big minus result during a year of substantial decline by the Dow. Contrarywise, it should be the star performer in a strongly advancing market. Over the years we expect it, of course, to achieve a satisfactory margin over the Dow.
低估类 (Generals) —— 这类投资是低估的股票，我们主要通过定量分析判断是否低估，但是也非常重视定性分析。一般来说，低估类的投资，几乎看不出来或根本不知道短期内怎么能上涨。低估的股票不光鲜，市场不喜欢。它们唯一的好处就是价格低廉，经过审慎分析可以看出，公司的市值远远低于产业资本所能给予的估值。我再强调一下，虽说定量是第一位的、是根本，定性也很重要。我们喜欢优秀的管理层，我们喜欢好行业，我们希望有一定的“催化剂”刺激不作为的管理层或股东，但是我们要买得值。低估类的表现和道指有很强的同步性，道指大幅下跌时，低估类也会跟着大跌。反之亦然，在市场强劲上涨时，低估类的表现最抢眼。我们认为，长期来看，低估类能实现我们跑赢道指的目标。
“Workouts” - These are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or "inside information" pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. A friend refers to this as getting the last nickel after the other fellow has made the first ninety-five cents. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent annual rates of return. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline, it piles up a big edge for us; during bull markets, it is a drag on performance. On a long term basis, I expect it to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.
套利类 (Workouts) —— 套利类投资有时间表可循。套利投资机会出现在出售、并购、重组、分拆等公司活动中。我们做套利投资不听传闻或“内幕消息”，只看公司的公告。在白纸黑字上读到了，我们才会出手。套利类投资有时也受大盘影响，但主要风险不是大盘涨跌，而是中途出现意外，预期的进展没实现。常见的意外包括反垄断等政府干预、股东否决、税收政策限制等。许多套利类投资的毛利润看起来很低。一位朋友说，套利类投资是在别人已经赚了 9 角 5 分后，再去赚最后的几分钱。但是，套利投资的确定性高、持有时间短，年化收益率是相当不错的。套利类投资每年贡献的绝对利润比低估类稳定。在市场下跌时，套利类投资积少成多，能给我们带来很大的领先优势;在牛市中，此类投资会拖累我们的业绩。从长期来看，我认为套利类能和低估类一样跑赢道指。
“Controls” - These are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block or stock, controls develop from the general category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing price-wise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company's stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume some degree of, or perhaps complete, control of the company's activities; whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company’s future and the management's capabilities. The general we have been buying the most aggressively in recent months possesses excellent management following policies that appear to make very good sense to us. If our continued buying puts us in a controlling position at some point in the future, we will probably remain very passive regarding the operation or this business.
控制类 (Controls) —— 我们的控制类投资比较少见，但这类投资只要做了，就是大规模的。控制类有的是一开始就通过大宗交易买入，有的是从低估类发展而来的。有的低估类股票，价格在低位徘徊的时间很长，我们能买到很多，实现了部分或完全控股，有能力对公司施加影响，投资就从低估类转到了控制类。这时候，我们根据对公司前景以及管理层能力的评估，决定是采取主动，还是保持相 对被动。最近几个月，我们在大量买入一只低估的股票，这家公司的管理层很优秀，公司的策略也很合理。我们会继续买入，如果将来实现了控股，可能会保持非常被动的状态，不会干预公司的经营。
We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.
我们不愿为了主动而主动。在其他条件一样的情况下，我更愿意放手让别人做。不过，大家可以放心，如果必须采取主动，才能让资本得到合理运用，我们不会袖手旁观。
Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the marketplace.
不管主动还是被动，投资控制类必须做到，投资时就把钱赚到。控制类投资的必要条件是物美价廉。取得控股权后，我们的投资价值几何，就不再取决于经常失去理智的市场报价，而是企业本身的价值。
Our willingness and financial ability to assume a controlling position gives us two-way stretch on many purchases in our group of generals. If the market changes its opinion for the better, the security will advance in price. If it doesn't, we will continue to acquire stock until we can look to the business itself rather than the market for vindication of our judgment.
我们有意愿、有财力实现控股，这样我们低估类中的许多股票可以进退有余。如果市场转而看好，股价会随之上涨。如果市场仍然看淡，我们可以继续买入，最后公司是我们的了，不必再听市场对我们的评判。
Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, re-directing the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit-if it looks at all close, we pass.
衡量控制类的投资收益，至少要看几年时间。按部就班地买入需要时间。另外，可能还要改善管理层、重新配置资本、寻求出售或并购等，控制类中的这些工作都需要时间，所以此类投资不能看几个月，要看几年。因为投入时间长，在控制类投资中，我们要求获利空间一定要大。如果赚不了多少，我们就不做。
Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.
在买入阶段，控制类的表现和道指基本趋同。在末期阶段，控制类的表现和套利类更相似。
As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among the three categories is largely determined by the accident or availability. Therefore, in a minus year for the Dow, whether we are primarily in generals or workouts is largely a matter of luck, but it will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one or many reasons why a single year's performance is of minor importance and, good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.
我说过，在我们的投资组合中，这三类投资的分配主要是见机行事，视投资机会而定。某一年道指下跌时，我们配置的主要是低估类还是套利类有很大的偶然性，但是会对我们与道指的相对业绩产生很大影响。所以说，单独一年的业绩不重要，无论好坏，都别看得太重。
If there is any trend as our assets grow, I would expect it to be toward controls which heretofore have been our smallest category. I may be wrong in this expectation - a great deal depends, of course, on the future behavior of the market on which your guess is as good as mine (I have none). At this writing, we have a majority of our capital in generals, workouts rank second, and controls are third.
要说在我们的资产增长过程中有什么趋势的话，我觉得是控制类投资会有所增加。目前，控制类是三类投资中占比最低的。我说的未必对，到底怎么样，当然还得看将来市场表现如何。至于将来市场如何，你不知道，我也不知道，我也不预测。在写这封信的时候，我们的资金分配情况是，低估类占比最大，套利类第二，控制类第三。
We are starting off the year with net assets of $17,454,900. Our rapid increase in assets always raises the question of whether this will result in a dilution of future performance. To date, there is more of a positive than inverse correlation between size of the Partnership and its margin over the Dow. This should not be taken seriously however. Larger sums may be an advantage at some times and a disadvantage at others. My opinion is that our present portfolio could not be improved if our assets were $1 million or $5 million. Our idea inventory has always seemed to be 10% ahead of our bank account. If that should change, you can count on hearing from me.
我们今年从的初始净资产是 17,454,900 美元。随着资产的迅速增长，总有合伙人担心我们将来的业绩是否会受到影响。到目前为止，合伙基金的规模增长没拖累我们的业绩，而是帮助我们取得了与道指更大的相对优势。不过，请各位不要对我们的长期相对优势寄予厚望。规模大，有时候是优势，有时候是劣势。在我看来，如果我们现在的资产是 100 万美元或 500 万美元，我们当前的投资组合不会得到改善。我们看到的投资机会似乎总是超过我们的银行账户 10%。如果情况有变，我一定会告诉大家。
Susie and I have an investment of $2,392,900 in the Partnership. For the first time I had to withdraw funds in addition to my monthly payments, but it was a choice of this or disappointing the Internal Revenue Service. Susie and I have a few non-marketable (less than 300 holders) securities of nominal size left over from earlier years which in aggregate are worth perhaps 1% of our partnership interest. In addition we have one non- marketable holding of more material size of a local company purchased in 1960 which we expect to hold indefinitely. Aside from this all our eggs are in the BPL basket and they will continue to be. I can't promise results but I can promise a common destiny. In addition, that endless stream of relatives of mine consisting of my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, four aunts four cousins and five nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL directly or indirectly totaling $1,247,190.
苏茜和我在合伙基金里有 2,392,900 美元的投资。除了每月收到的利息，我第一次提取了资金，如果我还不提取，国税局就要一直失望了。苏茜和我有几只很小的“非有价证券”(股东不到 300 人)，这些投资是早年做的，总价值不到我们在合伙基金权益的 1%。另外，我们还在 1960 年投资了本地的一家公司，这笔投资规模比较大，我们打算永远不卖。我们其余的所有资产都放在巴菲特合伙基金这一个篮子里，将来仍会如此。我保证不了业绩，但可以保证和大家共进退。我们一大家子，包括三个子女、我的父母、两个姐妹、两个姐夫、岳父、四个姑姑、四个表亲、五个侄子侄女，直接或间接持有总计 1,247,190 美元的合伙基金权益。
Bill Scott is also in with both feet, having an interest along with his wife or $237,400, the large majority or their net worth. Bill has done an excellent job and on several or our more interesting situations going into 1964, he has done the majority or the contact work. I have also shoved off on him as much as possible of the administrative work so if you need anything done or have any questions, don't hesitate to ask for Bill if I'm not around.
比尔·斯科特 (Bill Scott) 夫妇也把他们家庭的大部分资产投到了合伙基金里，他们的权益是 237,400 美元。比尔是我的得力助手，我们 1964 年正在做的几笔投资，主要都由他负责联系。我也把大量日常事务交给了比尔处理，各位合伙人如果有事需要办理或者有问题询问，如果我不在，请和比尔联系。
Beth and Donna have kept an increasing work load flowing in an excellent manner. During December and January, I am sure they wish they had found employment elsewhere, but they always manage to keep a mountain of work ship-shape.
贝丝 (Beth) 和多娜 (Donna) 总能高效完成日益增加的工作。12 月份和 1 月份，她们忙得不可开交，肯定会想怎么没找个更轻松的工作，但是无论多忙，她们都能把一切处理的井井有条。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has done their usual excellent job of meeting a tough timetable. We have instructed them to conduct two surprise checks a year (rather than one as in past years) on our securities, cash, etc., in the future. These are relatively inexpensive, and I think make a good deal of sense in any financial organization.
虽然时间紧迫，毕马威会计师事务所一如既往地出色完成了审计工作。以前毕马威会对我们的证券、现金等每年进行一次突击检查，现在我们要求他们每年突击检查两次。这个费用不算高，从事金融业务的公司都该接受这样的检查。
Within the next week you will receive:
各位合伙人下周会收到如下文件：
(1) A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1963 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
(1) 一份包含税收数据的信函，其中列有申报 1963 年联邦所得税所需的所有巴菲特合伙基金信息。请仅使用本信函作为税收申报参考。
(2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1963, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL as well as your own capital account.
(2) 毕马威会计师事务所出具的 1963 年审计报告，其中包含巴菲特合伙基金的运营数据和财务状况以及合伙人资本账户的信息。
(3) A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/64. This is identical with the figure developed in the audit.
(3) 一份由我签署的、证明你于 1964 年 1 月 1 日持有巴菲特合伙基金权益的文件，其中的权益数据与审计报告中列出的数据一致。
(4) Schedule “A” to the partnership agreement listing all partners.
(4) 包含所有合伙人名单的合伙基金协议日程“A”。
Let me know if anything needs clarifying. As we grow, there is more chance of missing letters, a name skipped over, a figure transposition, etc., so speak up if it appears we might have erred. Our next letter will be about July 15th summarizing the first half.
如有疑问，请随时与我联系。随着我们规模的增加，更容易出现信函漏寄、姓名遗漏、数字错位等问题。如果发现我们出错了，请告诉我们。下一封信是上半年总结，各位将在 7 月 15 日左右收到。
Cordially, Warren E. Buffett
沃伦 E. 巴菲特谨上
This situation was a run-of-the-mill workout arising from the number one source of workouts in recent years -- the sellouts of oil and gas producing companies.
这是一笔普通的套利投资，近年来的套利机会主要来自石油和天然气公司卖盘，这就是其中之一。
TNP was a relatively small producer with which I had been vaguely familiar for years.
德州国家石油是一家比较小的石油生产商，很多年前，我就对这家公司有印象。
Early in 1962 I heard rumors regarding a sellout to Union Oil of California. I never act on such information, but in this case it was correct and substantially more money would have been made if we had gone in at the rumor stage rather than the announced stage. However, that's somebody else's business, not mine.
1962 年初，有传言说它要向加州联合石油 (Union Oil of California) 卖盘。我从来不根据传言操作，但是这次传言是真的。要是我听到传言时就买，不是等到公告出来才介入，我们能赚到远远更多的钱。这个钱让别人赚吧，我不赚。
In early April, 1962, the general terms of the deal were announced. TNP had three classes of securities outstanding:
1962 年 4 月初，交易的一般条款公布。当时，德州国家石油流通的证券有三类：
(1) 6 1/2% debentures callable at 104 1/4 which would bear interest until the sale transpired and at that time would be called. There were $6.5 million outstanding of which we purchased $264,000 principal amount before the sale closed.
(1) 利息 6.5% 的债券，赎回价 104.25。卖盘完成前继续支付利息，卖盘完成后赎回。流通的债券有 650 万美元，在交易完成前，我们买入了其中的 26.4 万美元。
(2) About 3.7 million shares of common stock of which the officers and directors owned about 40%. The proxy statement estimated the proceeds from the liquidation would produce $7.42 per share. We purchased 64,035 shares during the six months or so between announcement and closing.
(2) 370 万股普通股，其中高管和董事持有 40%。委托书估算每股清算价值是 7.42 美元。从交易宣布到最后完成的六个月时间里，我们买入了 64,035 股。
(3) 650,000 warrants to purchase common stock at $3.50 per share. Using the proxy statement estimate of $7.42 for the workout on the common resulted in $3.92 as a workout on the warrants. We were able to buy 83,200 warrants or about 13% of the entire issue in six months.
(3) 650,000 份以每股 3.50 美元买入股票的认股权证。按照委托书估算的 7.42 美元的清算价值，每份认股权可实现 3.92 美元的利润。在六个月时间里，我们买到了 83,200 份认股权，占所有认股权的 13% 左右。
The risk of stockholder disapproval was nil. The deal was negotiated by the controlling stockholders, and the price was a good one. Any transaction such as this is subject to title searches, legal opinions, etc., but this risk could also be appraised at virtually nil. There were no anti-trust problems. This absence of legal or anti-trust problems is not always the case, by any means.
股东否决的风险是零。这笔交易是控股股东谈的，价格很理想。此类交易都要走产权调查、法律意见等流程，这些风险几乎也是零。不存在反垄断的问题。虽然这笔套利不存在法律问题或反垄断问题，但绝对不是所有套利都如此。
The only fly in the ointment was the obtaining of the necessary tax ruling. Union Oil was using a standard ABC production payment method of financing. The University of Southern California was the production payment holder and there was some delay because of their eleemosynary status.
唯一的一个小障碍是必须通过税收裁定。联合石油使用的是标准格式的销售额还款融资方案。（译注：这是一种以资产融资的方式，以销售额的一定百分比还款）融资方案的甲方是南加州大学 (University of Southern California) ，它具有慈善性质，所以有些耽搁。
This posed a new problem for the Internal Revenue Service, but we understood USC was willing to waive this status which still left them with a satisfactory profit after they borrowed all the money from a bank. While getting this ironed out created delay, it did not threaten the deal.
这也是个需要在国税局解决的问题，但是我们知道南加州大学愿意放弃慈善性质，它的钱都是从银行借来的，即使放弃慈善性质，它仍能获得不菲的收益。虽说解决这个问题需要时间，会耽误交易的进度，但是不会影响交易的完成。
When we talked with the company on April 23rd and 24th, their estimate was that the closing would take place in August or September. The proxy material was mailed May 9th and stated the sale "will be consummated during the summer of 1962 and that within a few months thereafter the greater part of the proceeds will be distributed to stockholders in liquidation.” As mentioned earlier, the estimate was $7.42 per share.
4 月 23 日和 4 月 24 日，我们与公司进行了交流，他们估计 8、9 月份能完成交易。5 月 9 日，公司寄出了委托书，其中说这笔交易“将于 1962 年夏季完成，在交易完成后的几个月内，会将大部分收益分配给参与清算的股东。”前面说了，估计是每股 7.42 美元。
Bill Scott attended the stockholders meeting in Houston on May 29th where it was stated they still expected to close on September 1st.
5 月 29 日，比尔·斯科特参加了在休斯顿举行的股东大会，公司在会上还是说预计 9 月 1 日达成交易。
The following are excerpts from some of the telephone conversations we had with company officials in ensuing months:
下面的内容选自我们在接下来几个月里与公司高管通过电话进行的交流：
On June 18th the secretary stated "Union has been told a favorable IRS ruling has been formulated but must be passed on by additional IRS people. Still hoping for ruling in July.”
6 月 18 日，董秘说“联合石油收到了通知，国税局初步裁定通过，但是还要经过审批。公司仍在等待七月份的裁定结果。”
On July 24th the president said that he expected the IRS ruling “early next week.”
7 月 24 日，公司总裁说预计“下周早些时候”会收到国税局的裁定。
On August 13th the treasurer informed us that the TNP, Union Oil, and USC people were all in Washington attempting to thrash out a ruling.
8 月 13 日，公司财务主管告诉我们，德州国家石油、联合石油和南加州大学的人齐聚华盛顿，商讨推动裁定。
On September 18th the treasurer informed us "No news, although the IRS says the ruling could be ready by next week.”
8 月 18 日，公司财务主管告诉我们“国税局的人说了，下周裁定就会出来，现在还没消息。”
The estimate on payout was still $7.42.
估计清算收益仍然是 7.42 美元。
The ruling was received in late September, and the sale closed October 31st. Our bonds were called November 13th. We converted our warrants to common stock shortly thereafter and received payments on the common of $3.50 December 14, 1962, $3.90 February 4, 1963, and 15 cent on April 24, 1963. We will probably get another 4 cent in a year or two. On 147,235 shares (after exercise of warrants) even 4 cent per share is meaningful.
9 月末，裁定收到，10 月 31 日，交易完成。11 月 13 日，我们的债券被赎回。此后不久，我们将认股权转换成股票，我们从普通股获得的偿付金额是 1962 年 12 月 14 日 3.5 美元、1963 年 2 月 4 日 3.9 美元、1963 年 4 月 24 日 15 美分。大概一两年后，我们还会收到 4 美分。对于 147,235 股来说（认股权行权后），每股 4 美分也是不少钱。
This illustrates the usual pattern: (1) the deals take longer than originally projected; and (2) the payouts tend to average a little better than estimates. With TNP it took a couple of extra months, and we received a couple of extra percent.
套利一般都是这样:(1) 交易完成时间比最初预期的要长;(2) 最后偿付的总金额比 估算的略高一些。德州国家石油比预计多花了两个月左右的时间，我们的收益率也比预计大概高了两个百分点。
The financial results of TNP were as follows:
以下是德州国家石油这笔套利的收益情况:
(1) On the bonds we invested $260,773 and had an average holding period of slightly under five months. We received 6 1⁄2% interest on our money and realized a capital gain of $14,446. This works out to an overall rate of return of approximately 20% per annum.
(1) 我们总共买了 260,773 美元的债券，平均持有时间是将近五个月。我们获得了 6.5% 的利息，还实现了 14,446 美元的资本收益。整体年化收益率是 20% 左右。
(2) On the stock and warrants we have realized capital gain of $89,304, and we have stubs presently valued at $2,946. From an investment or $146,000 in April, our holdings ran to $731,000 in October. Based on the time the money was employed, the rate or return was about 22% per annum.
(2) 我们通过股票和认股权实现了 89,304 美元的资本收益，目前还有一小笔大概价值 2,946 美元的收益没实现。从 4 月份投资 146,000 美元起，我们中间陆续投入，到 10 月份，投资总额是 731,000 美元。根据资金投入的时间计算，年化收益率是 22% 左右。
In both cases, the return is computed on an all equity investment. I definitely feel some borrowed money is warranted against a portfolio of workouts, but feel it is a very dangerous practice against generals.
在这笔套利中，我们买债券和股票用的都是自有资金。我认为，在一个套利投资组合中，完全可以借一部分钱，但是我觉得，在低估类投资中，借钱非常危险。
We are not presenting TNP as any earth-shaking triumph. We have had workouts which were much better and some which were poorer. It is typical of our bread-and-butter type of operation. We attempt to obtain all facts possible, continue to keep abreast of developments and evaluate all of this in terms of our experience. We certainly don't go into all the deals that come along -- there is considerable variation in their attractiveness. When a workout falls through, the resulting market value shrink is substantial. Therefore, you cannot afford many errors, although we fully realize we are going to have them occasionally.
这里以德州国家石油为例，不是想说明我们取得了多么了不起的胜利。我们有比这笔套利更成功的，也有不如它的。德州国家石油是我们基本的套利投资中的一个典型案例。在套利类投资中，我们尽可能了解所有情况，持续跟踪最新进展，根据我们的经验评估方方面面。我们肯定不是有交易就去做套利，不是每笔交易都有钱赚。参与套利，如果交易泡汤，市值会严重缩水。所以说，虽然我们很清楚会有做错的时候，但做套利投资是犯不起错的。
This situation started as a general in 1956. At that time the stock was selling at $18 with about $72 in book value of which $50 per share was in current assets (Cash, receivables and inventory) less all liabilities. Dempster had earned good money in the past but was only breaking even currently.
这笔投资是 1956 年作为低估类开始的。当时，它的股价是 18 美元，净资产 72 美元，流动资产(现金、应收账款和存货)减去所有负债是 50 美元。登普斯特曾经是一家很赚钱的公司，但是在我们买入时，它只能维持盈亏平衡。
The qualitative situation was on the negative side (a fairly tough industry and unimpressive management), but the figures were extremely attractive. Experience shows you can buy 100 situations like this and have perhaps 70 or 80 work out to reasonable profits in one to three years. Just why any particular one should do so is hard to say at the time of purchase, but the group expectancy is favorable, whether the impetus is from an improved industry situation, a takeover offer, a change in investor psychology, etc.
定性分析是负面的(行业竞争激烈，管理层平庸)，但是从数字上看太有吸引力了。经验表明，买入 100 只这样的股票，在一到三年之内，其中七八十只能实现不错的收益。买入的时候，很难说哪只就能涨，只知道整个组合的前景良好。促使组合中个股上涨的因素很多，可能是行业状况好转、收到收购要约、投资者心理变化等等。
We continued to buy the stock in small quantities for five years. During most or this period I was a director and was becoming consistently less impressed with the earnings prospects under existing management. However, I also became more familiar with the assets and operations and my evaluation of the quantitative factors remained very favorable.
此后五年里，我们每次只能买到很少，但一直在买这只股票。这五年里，我担任了公司的董事，越来越不看好现有管理层领导下的盈利前景。在此期间，我也对公司的资产和经营状况有了更深的了解，通过定量分析，我仍然认为这家公司很便宜。
By mid-1961 we owned about 30% or Dempster (we had made several tender offers with poor results), but in August and September 1961 made, several large purchases at $30.25 per share, which coupled with a subsequent tender offer at the same price, brought our holding to over 70%. Our purchases over the previous five years had been in the $16-$25 range.
1961 年中期，我们持有登普斯特 30% 的股份(我们几次提出收购要约，都无功而返)。1961 年 8 月和 9 月，我们以每股 30.25 美元的价格完成了几笔大宗交易，随后以相同的价格提出了收购要约，我们的持股达到了 70% 以上。在之前五年里，我们的买入价格在 16 美元到 25 美元之间。
On assuming control, we elevated the executive vice president to president to see what he would do unfettered by the previous policies. The results were unsatisfactory and on April 23, 1962 we hired Harry Bottle as president.
取得控股权后，我们将副总裁提升为总裁，为他解除公司先前策略的束缚，看他能否带来转变。结果还是没起色。1962 年 4 月 23 日，我们聘请哈里·博特尔 (Harry Bottle) 出任总裁。
Harry was the perfect man for the job. I have recited his triumphs before and the accompanying comparative balance sheets speak louder than any words in demonstrating the re-employment of capital.
哈里是这份工作的最佳人选。我之前盛赞过哈里取得的成绩，不必多说，请看下面资产负债表的前后对比，资本重新配置的成果一目了然。
| 11/30/61 | 7/31/63 (unaudited) （未经审计） |
|
|---|---|---|
| Cash 现金 |
$166,000 | $89,000 |
| US Gov’t Securities – at cost 美国政府债券（成本法） |
$289,000 | |
| Other marketable securities – at market (which exceeds cost) 其他可供出售证券（市价法，高于成本） |
$2,049,000 | |
| Total Cash and Securities 现金和证券合计 |
$166,000 | $2,436,000 |
| Accounts receivable (net) 应收账款（净值） |
$1,040,000 | $864,000 |
| Inventory 存货 |
$4,203,000 | $890,000 |
| Prepaid expenses, etc. 预付账款等 |
$82,000 | $12,000 |
| Current Assets 流动资产合计 |
$5,491,000 | $4,202,000 |
| Other Assets 其他资产 |
$45,000 | $62,000 |
| Net Plant and Equipment 厂房和设备净值 |
$1,383,000 | $862,000 |
| Total Assets 资产合计 |
$6,919,000 | $5,126,000 |
| Notes Payable 应付票据 |
$1,230,000 | |
| Other Liability 其他负债 |
$1,088,000 | $274,000 |
| Total Liabilities 负债合计 |
$2,318,000 | $274,000 |
| Shares outstanding 流通股本 |
60,146 | 62,146 |
| Net worth 净资产 |
$4,601,000 | $4,852,000 |
| Total liabilities and net worth 负债和净资产合计 |
$6,919,000 | $5,126,000 |
Harry:
哈里:
(1) took the inventory from over $4 million (much of it slow moving) to under $1 million reducing carrying costs and obsolescence risks tremendously;
(1) 把存货从 400 多万美元(大多数是周转率极低的)降低到 100 万美元以下，极大地降低了存货持有成本和淘汰过时的风险。
(2) correspondingly freed up capital for marketable security purchases from which we gained over $400,000
(2) 释放出资本，我们将其用于投资有价证券，获得了 40 多万美元的收益。
(3) cut administration and selling expense from $150,000 to $75,000 per month;
(3) 将销售和管理费用从每月 150,000 美元降低到 75,000 美元;
(4) cut factory overhead burden from $6 to $4.50 per direct labor hour;
(4) 将工厂营运成本从每直接工时 6 美元降低到 4.5 美元;
(5) closed the five branches operating unprofitably (leaving us with three good ones) and replaced them with more productive distributors;
(5) 关闭了五家不赚钱的分公司(保留了三家赚钱的)，用效率更高的分销商取而代之;
(6) cleaned up a headache at an auxiliary factory operation at Columbus, Nebraska;
(6) 整顿了内布拉斯加州哥伦布市经营混乱的一家配件工厂;
(7) eliminated jobbed lines tying up considerable money (which could be used profitably in securities) while producing no profits;
(7) 砍掉了消耗大量资金，却不能贡献利润的承包工程业务(释放出的资金可以投资证券获利);
(8) adjusted prices of repair parts, thereby producing an estimated $200,000 additional profit with virtually no loss of volume; and most important;
(8) 调整了维修配件的价格，在不影响销量的情况下，增加了超过 200,000 美元的利润;
(9) through these and many other steps, restored the earning capacity to a level commensurate with the capital employed.
(9) 最重要的是，通过包括上述措施在内的努力，让登普斯特恢复到与投入资本相称的盈利能力。
In 1963, the heavy corporate taxes we were facing (Harry surprised me by the speed with which he had earned up our tax loss carry-forward) coupled with excess liquid funds within the corporation compelled us to either in some way de-incorporate or to sell the business.
1963 年，一方面，哈里恢复登普斯特盈利能力的速度比我预想的快得多，我们很快就用完了税损结转，需要缴纳巨额税款，另一方面，登普斯特公司有大量流动资金用不完，我们别无选择，只能想办法把公司注销或卖出去。
We set out to do either one or the other before the end of 1963. De-incorporating had many problems but would have, in effect, doubled earnings for our partners and also eliminated the problem of corporate capital gain tax on Dempster securities.
我们着手在 1963 年末之前解决这个问题。注销公司很麻烦，但是我们的合伙人可以多获得一倍的收益，而且不用为登普斯特持有的证券缴纳资本利得税。
At virtually the last minute, after several earlier deals had fallen through at reasonably advanced stages, a sale of assets was made. Although there were a good many wrinkles to the sale, the net effect was to bring approximately book value. This, coupled with the gain we have in our portfolio of marketable securities, gives us a realization of about $80 per share. Dempster (now named First Beatrice Corp. - we sold the name to the new Co.) is down to almost entirely cash and marketable securities now. On BPL's yearend audit, our First Beatrice holdings were valued at asset value (with securities at market) less a $200,000 reserve for various contingencies.
我们最初谈了几笔交易，都是快谈到最后时没谈妥。几乎到了最后一刻，我们达成了一笔出售资产的交易。虽说我们对这笔交易里的很多细节并不满意，但是整体来说，我们大概获得了净资产的价值。加上我们通过有价证券投资组合获得的收益，我们实现的价值是每股 80 美元。登普斯特(已更名为 First Beatrice Corp.，我们将登普斯特商标出售给了新公司)现在几乎只剩下现金和有价证券了。在巴菲特合伙基金的年末审计中，我们持有的 First Beatrice 的估值方法是用资产价值(以市价计算证券价值)减去 200,000 美元储备金。
I might mention that we think the buyers will do very well with Dempster. They impress us as people of ability and they have sound plans to expand the business and its profitability. We would have been quite happy to operate Dempster on an unincorporated basis, but we are also quite happy to sell it for a reasonable price. Our business is making excellent purchases -- not making extraordinary sales.
顺便说一句，我认为买方会把登普斯特经营得很好。他们是很有能力的人，对于将来如何拓展业务和提升盈利能力，制定了完善的计划。无论是以非法人的形式经营登普斯特，还是以合理的价格卖出去，我们都很乐意。我们在投资中追求的是买得好，不是卖得好。
Harry works the same way I do -- he likes big carrots. He is presently a limited partner of BPL, and the next belt-tightening operation we have, he's our man.
哈里和我一样，我们都喜欢丰厚的奖赏。他目前已经是巴菲特合伙基金的有限合伙人，下次我们再有需要瘦身的公司，就会派哈里上阵。
The Dempster saga points up several morals:
从登普斯特的故事里，我可以得到以下两点启示:
(1) Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy.
(1) 我们所做的投资需要耐心。有的投资组合里都是股价高飞、人见人爱的股票，我们根本不买这些股票。在热门股风头正劲时，我们的投资可能看起来乏善可陈。
It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, why we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum.
对于我们看好的股票，在我们买入时，它们的股价几个月甚至几年呆滞不动，对我们来说是好事。所以说，要给我们足够的时间，才能看出来我们的业绩如何。我们认为这个时间至少是三年。
(2) We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improve our results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.”
(2) 我们不能透露我们正在做的投资。把我们的投资说出去，提高不了我们的收益，还可能给我们带来严重损失。包括合伙人在内，无论是谁问我们是否看好某只股票，我们都会援引“宪法第五修正案”保持沉默。