The uniqueness of all philosophies of self-interest are but a fraction of any other. In more words, that is because this kind of philosophy is not self-contained, instead required to extract and derive knowledge from other fields of the natural and social sciences alike, in order to put things into practice. Because self-interest can only be realized through personal practice, only the theory and the theoretics of the totality can be understood beforehand, and the self as a finite spatiotemporal concept can self-derive a petty fraction of the theory and theoretics. Specific fractions of the theory and theoretics are selected by the self-interested based on their preferences. This, in and of itself, is a form of prejudice. Moreover, the field of self-interest can never reach the fundamental low level of abstraction because it is one based on the utility of available choice, essentially economics in the individualistic sense, and the utility is always centered around the self.
The philosophy of self-interest is one that leans towards the private and privatization of value. Every philosopher must have reached their destinations in mind and body through the will, the fuel for self-interest to take place. Instead of fostering the language of general truth for the universal understanding, the philosophy of self-interest instead takes direction from the general truth to the self for the self, and also from the specific truth to that same self for that same self. So that is one key difference between these two categories of philosophers, although the philosopher that does not proselytize self-interest may actually be working for a collective interest that they think greatly benefits their self-interest. In the general sense, the lines involved in dualities that are then arbitrarily interpreted by the mind as “hard” or “soft” lines make the philosopher and their morality better understood by their craft of philosophy, not by the benefits bestowed onto them because of their craft. But one that is a philosopher is not strictly one of that one role.
Not to discredit the category of self-interest as a philosophy, but this kind of philosophy indeed serves defeatist purposes to the “love of wisdom", philosophy, if the assumption of “love” or “wisdom” having to be shared is the default requirement for a field to be called a class of philosophy. Self-interest also carries connotations of independence, liberty, and autonomy, which then subjects the rules and beliefs found in knowledge under the self-interested for their existence and decision-making. Philosophies of self-interest, when taught, causes the glorification of the individual. And since the human being arguably has a tendency to already be self-justifying, this tendency going all the way down to the biological immune system, there is a limit to how much the self can further their understanding by directly tending to the self by the internal means of the self. These philosophies cannot grow in and of themselves, only serving as backgrounds of reminder to encourage the individual past the general that bounds all under it.
Technical difficulties exist in the usage of natural language to explain philosophies of self-interest. For one thing, what is the self from one to another? When one thinks that their self somehow can be comprised by thoughts of the external, such as others’ selves, that is when the “self” in self-interest is no longer a direct line from the external projection of one to their internal workings. It is possible for one to inflate their notion of their self to include the lives of others, for that one to claim they know what is best for the other that is part of their conceptualization of their self, in turn morphing the understanding of self-interest as what suits the individual to what suits the individual and their people. Economics play a fundamentally great role in self-interest. If what is best for a specific individual is best for the common good, then what is self versus collective interests? Unfortunately for the language of ideals in explaining the interests of sentient beings, there are inevitable clashes and mergers between the self separated from the remaining world and the self alongside other selves in the same world.
Philosophies of self-interest have a murky aura in their teaching and interpretation. The phrasing, “murky aura”, is carefully selected to describe the kind of replicability and factuality in fields that desire to translate the subjective into the objective, that is, the formulated solution that the practitioner of self-interest wishes to use. This translation of the subjective to the objective is done primarily by the practitioner. And the teacher of self-interest to the student educates by means not entirely forward (murky). Suppose self-interest to be a vital metaphysical aspect of every being. The teacher has the question of putting full effort into educating the student on the teacher’s conceptualization of the self that is then supposed to be used by the student. The student, on the other hand, has the question to take as truth or fallacy any of the teacher’s educative statements on how they should nurture their own self-interest. It cannot be factually stated that only philosophical educations of self-interest can serve the great purpose for continuing legacy. Legacy is a cousin of the lone “self”, separated by degrees minor or major based on the lone self’s measure of accepting the historicism purportedly connected to them. One that proselytizes philosophy may use the language, poetics, and other communicative devices that give off the impression of no disproportional interest from their self for their self. Attempts to build a rational framework of expectations for students from each school of philosophy may very well be folly, especially in terms of self-interest, one that rests on the concept of “choice” more so than “obligation”.
The use of self-interest for one’s purpose always rests on systems, axiomatic principles pieced together for at least a metaphysical construct of reference. Attempting to teach another what is self-interest rests on the principle that can be expressed as, “do what you think or feel fit”. This expression uses loose wording, and opens rational-like pathways for moral relativism, a paradigm of thought that is not entirely confined to the truths of the fundamental, and is thus not at the same centrality of truth as fundamental philosophy that can produce the precision of science. Many will argue that philosophy and ethics can be one and the same, but this is a misconception that has led many down very regrettable roads. Here is a convention: there is philosophy, then mathematics, then physics, chemistry, and biology. Many fields past biology, then there is ethics. So those that claim philosophy and ethics can be one and the same must either believe that their view on ethics is true enough right down to the philosophical level, thus negating any social opposition to their view of ethics, or they must abide by the fundamental in expressing their views in the social context, this abidement granting them the liberty of not having to pose and advance opinion or preference as truth for the proper mannerisms of ethics. The default setting of self-interest being dependent on existing systems, as initially mentioned, means that abstract language to teach one on self-interest cannot start with interests of the self without the relation to something other. The focus on the self as an internalist construct is more so about independent maintenance and development, but both of these independent objectives depend on existing systems of methodology and material, as well. Abstracting the concept of the “self” for expression of these notions’ truths to another has shortfalls in specificities. The abstract can never capture the entire meaning of the “self” in a universal and thorough manner, without the “self” having to be the one responsible for induction to suit their specific forms and movements.
A posit on self-interest that cannot be proven wrong, no matter how unlike the fundamental truth it may be interpreted as, is that communicating to another a conceptualization of the “self” that they should adhere to is already at least one mark off from the centrality of the “self”. It is like the difference between any 0 and any 1; there is a space of 1 in between the two. Another posit, of a plausible nature, is that communication of a conceptualization of self-interest is not precisely about the merging of the “self” with “interest”, instead about the practice of self-interest, not about exactly one of the “self” or “interest”. The “self” should tend to their “interest”, not to something other than their “interest”. But there is a separation in meaning and existence between the “self” and the “interest”, the “interest” only being labeled this term due to factors that include the propensity of the “self” for it. The “self” can be influenced in ways, foreign to their bare state, to develop an interest for something that otherwise would not have occurred. Even in terms of the “self” without the influencer, at least a communicator if not an accepted educator, the “self” is not bound to a steadfast guarantee of conceptualizing their “self” in the same representation for all contexts. Compare notions of self-interest, these notions representing one or more philosophies of self-interest, with other abstract fields of thought. In these other fields of thought, the “self” can put aside their conscious conceptualization of their “self” to comprehend those understandings for replication or constructive utilization. But with the “self”, there are comprehensions of the comprehensions from the “self”, and comprehensions of the image projected from the “self”, and comprehensions of alternative ways of expression, alternative images, for the “self” to project their “self” by their chosen means for their wanted image.
Another origin problem, this one on self-interest. Does the “self” first have to learn about their “interest” through a sequence of events that is their experience, or through trial-and-error unintentionally finds an “interest”? Both of these possibilities are identical in at least half of all ways. Whether by chance or through the deliberation before acceptance, the “interest” becomes a fixation of the “self” to fulfill the “self” by acting in the manner of positive relation to the “interest”. In these two possibilities that comprise the whole of possibilities for the “self” to discover the “interest”, an interest so great the “self” thinks and acts in the direction of it in their belief that it is their “self-interest”, it may reason that the supposed randomness of trial-and-error and the experience are identical in outputting the same preference as discovery to the “self” that then embraces the preference as part of their entire self-interest. The phrasing of this origin problem is not merely for the humorous word play of differences that rest on a fundamental sameness. The fundamental sameness of self-interest in practice cannot be established, and concepts such as “selfishness” and “narcissism” are not constant associations with “self-interest”. The first possibility of the origin problem supposes the “self” to co-exist in the sequence of events. This co-existence is their experience. But in the second possibility, the “self” is described as a pro-active agent in the sequence of events, this sequence of events at least partly consisting of their choice design for the trial-and-error. These characteristic differences then force differing ways of explaining self-interest as a universal force, and practices of self-interest play out in various ways outside of categorization that can capture the specific without categorization that is specific to each specific of the specific. Validation of self-interest, as one or more philosophies, tend to draw connections of likeness between differing practices believed by the practitioners to be in the name of their respective self-interests, and these connections of likeness then converge to singular principles on what self-interest is, practices by selves that each one conducts in and on their respective systems.
Self-interest, a force that depends on the utility of existing systems, perhaps to maintain those existing systems or to improve or to abolish them from affecting the “self”, is something circular and most definitely self-serving if self-contained, coincidentally self-serving if not. But the quality of self-containment is not a consistent variable in outcomes, as a reminding note. The centrality of this concept, self-interest, almost instantaneously radiates outward in different practice by mass selves. There are unclear answers on how self-interest plays a part in socio-economic power dynamics, something very fundamental to human beings, frequently likened to “social creatures” from the antiquity of thought. To distribute the values of power to those in need of those values of power, to retain power in order to grow it and build it for the “self” above all. These objectives ring familiar bells on the dichotomy of control between the state (questionably communist) and the individual (questionably capitalist), a dichotomy that remains on one-sided terms if expressed only in verbal or written language, flimsy and lofty due to the freedom of interpretation, decorative because there is action for construct and then there are words for persuasion. These statements, on power dynamics as something the force of self-interest has to contend with, rather escalated quickly from the realm of something just above the abstract to something not quite exact with words, interpretation, and practice in the mass sentient setting. With escalations such as these, the role of self-interest as the single and active force is not without challenge, for practices stemming from fields such as control theory and decision theoretics become the foremost point of analysis. And through the backtracking that analyses can produce, perhaps self-interest can be narrowed down in the specifics of practice amongst its many hosts. This elaboration has at least provided some proof, through example, that self-interest is in fact not a self-contained field, due to its many outward forms that chooses existing systems to use.
Philosophies of self-interest emphasize to followers principles similar to utilitarian ideals. The concept of “self-interest”, when put into practice, depends on the usage of existing systems, as already stated. And the essential, perhaps the only criteria uniting all that think and act in their way for their “self-interest”, is the utility having to be geared to the “interest”, done by the “self”. Utilitarian thought is almost entirely about the “self” co-existing in the world by acting in a way recognized as proper use of systems, in material or immaterial form, by those systems’ piecewise or holistic components. Utilitarian thought promotes the utility of maximizing output for the “self” given the input, the ideal selection/s in the candidates of systems and system components, and this is an integrational approach that requires sentient living to make use. The sentient being is obliged to be capable of learning about some material or skill, then putting a sort of full effort into utilizing that learned material or skill, and the physical expression of the sentient being as well as their thought generated is frequently connected to the use of their preferred material or immaterial system/s, a synergistic fusing, per se. Utilitarianism is thus quite externalist, that through what is a solution coinciding by construction or existence in the external, there is satisfaction. The paradigm also leans towards the transcendental ideals of sentient beings, namely human beings, being able to be one with the environment, for their cognition to find “happiness” and “comfort” by behaviors of domination of their recognized adversities through satisfying their recognized problems from and of their “self”. Now, on to “self-interest”. With “self-interest”, there is less emphasis on demanding behavior by the “self” to exist, in some way or form, in a “comfort zone”. The “self” pursues the “interest”, but this does not mean that the “self” and the “interest” are not already bound to one another. The “self” can self-understand as “self-interest”, identical in cognition. Whereas with utilitarianism, there are factors (happiness, et cetera) that the “self” somehow thinks are objectives, and thus separated from them in some way, but these objectives are what the “self” yearns and strives for by correcting or maintaining the expression of behavior in line with their route for these objectives. “Self-interest”, in practice, also has objectives, but the objectives do not magnetize the host of the “self” for the “self” to act towards them. A convincing statement is that “self-interest” is self-driven, propelled by the “self” for the “self-interest” thought of by the “self” to be their “self”. However, this should not be interpreted as selflessness, for as already defined, the “interest” of the “self” is what the “self”, itself, is as immortally connected to as what cannot be defined in the scientific terms of the material. Objectives of “self-interest” can change, while “self-interest” is a constant with the freedom of varying outward expression. “Self-interest” is governed by internalist construct, not innately governed by foreign metaphysical or physical forces, and is an element higher in level to “motivation” in the hierarchy of cognition. As for utilitarianism, the paradigm is a stepping stone towards the pragmatic of developing or obtaining solution, typically for the “self”, by conscientious observance and learning of the external world. And with the solution achieved, there is a satisfying sense in their reaching a finalistic goal, in which case, the sensible courses of action and thought for the utilitarian is maintenance of their state by the utility, required by them to be controlled by them, of the solution. Since “self-interest” has objectives, the satisfaction of these objectives is either the solution itself for the “self”, or the approach taken is the solution. But “self-interest” remains, and there is not a universal agreement on how the self-interested can evolve or form new objective. The de-emphasis of external reference to the concept of “self-interest”, in relation to utilitarianism, means that the regulatory patterns used by the “self” for their “self-interest” do not necessarily have to coincide with external material or immaterial.
Manipulative agents such as material, reactions from the material, and other means (“agents”, in this usage) that influence cognition become paramount variables differentiating the expression of one for utilitarian and another for their “self-interest”. The term “interest” in “self-interest” serves as an emphasizer on the “interest” in this concept, as something on top of “motivation” and tied to the “self”, for the “self” to both exist and operate in ways with “interest” so that an “interest” originating from outside the self (other selves) is not in the same lane, and there is only one lane for the “interest” that the “self” can pursue such that the “interest” is immortally connected to the “self”. In utilitarian practice, there is a persistent pressure to achieve an equilibrium, and out of pragmatism, efforts are concentrated around that stationary point reached, the equilibrium. “Self-interest”, on the other hand, encounters more incongruencies in the form of friction between the “self” tied to the “interest” and the situational decisions the “self” is faced with making. The “self”, as self-driven by their “self-interest”, has the liberty to modify the directionality of will for these decisions unideal, not of the form for a reasonable number of transformations to reach the “ideal” that the “self-interest” seeks. But the modification of the will by “self-interest” could, in turn, richochet back to the “self” as something understood as a pathological action, something incorrect and thus malicious against “self-interest”. The “self”, as an agent of their “self-interest”, acts in ways of distinctness to challenges that do not necessarily have to be connected to any objective of the “self-interest”. Utilitarian compromise of the “self” by the “self” taking a particular means to accomplish the objective may also be a possibility for the case of the “self” for “self-interest”. But compromise of the “ideal” by the “self” is rationalized by the self-interested as something similar to forced negotiation. Utilitarian thought only views compromise as forced negotiation when the compromise is of a relatively imposing downward force onto the “self”, since it is more integrationist, whereas integration could be a result of “self-interest” solely through the drive of the “self-interest” for that result, the destination. There is less of the two ends, the “self” and the solution, meeting half-way in initiatives by the “self” for “self-interest” than by utilitarian practice. Thus, utilitarian practice is typically more pre-determined than the self-interested in setting limits, not aspirations.
The broad field of choice is of the abstract unquantifiable not because of the practice of choice in the spatiotemporal setting. The spatiotemporal setting limits the span/s of effecting choice, and the exact degrees of spatiotemporal limitation is one crucial factor for the perception of determinism, something the self-driven “self” with their “self-interest”, in necessary connection to the physical host, has to cooperate with, in order to guard the mortality of the host. There are levels to this cooperation. It starts with co-existing alongside natural law, laws governing any phenomenon that are not subject to the will of the sentient. And then there are activities by sentient beings, through their physicalities stemming from natural law. Further along, there is the practice of non-physical interaction from sentient beings, with purposes such as manipulation of the will belonging to the “self” and socialization with the “self”. Manipulation of the will belonging to the “self”, to clarify, is externally sourced. Changes of the will’s directionality occurs through modification by the “self”’, but this modification if initialized by the external is manipulation. The force of “self-interest” is not bound to be constant or consistent in outward expression, due to the immediate span of choice, free from the spatiotemporal setting, for the “self”. Utilitarian initiatives can fall through or take detours into other initiatives. There is a difference in the manipulability present. “Self-interest” and utilitarianism are partly evident through the expression. But the “interest” to the “self” is of a lower level of difference than the objective/s of the “self”, due to chosen utility, to the “self”. The “interest” and the “self” are separate only in wording, in the context of “self-interest”. But with utilitarianism, there is the “self”, their chosen utility given their span/s of choice, and their objective. The degree of change in expression for the self-interested has a higher potential of difference to that of the utilitarian, one who thinks and acts as a subject of the spatiotemporal setting, although not necessarily for objectives that lie in any spatiotemporal setting. In manipulation, “self-interest” remains as a force but expresses by something not from the original, free from it, due to effects of the external’s changes of the will’s directionality. The self-interested that decides on being utilitarian thinks and acts in ways not of the original to “self-interest”, if manipulated, and thus fails to be utilitarian in the required identity of the original. And the utilitarian that is not one purely with their “self-interest” can also be manipulated, such as through the alterations and demands presented to them in their spatiotemporal setting, although the directionality of the will is still original to the “self-interest”.
Philosophies of self-interest tend to overlap with studies and practices of ethics, due to the fact that “self-interest” is necessarily existent and then perhaps evident for the practice. And ethics is, as per the wisdom that the human being is a “social creature”, a fixture for the “social” creature of subjectivity before objectivity in their priorities, the fixture as analysis in the form of cross-examinations and introspections relatable to but not required to be related to the natural sciences, since sentient being’s understanding of the natural sciences bears relevance outside of the manuscripts and natural phenomenon as practiced by sentient beings, practices coinciding with natural phenomenon but differing to natural phenomenon by their sole association to sentient will, so will has the effecting autonomy to heed natural phenomenon for the “self-interest”. This last point of natural phenomenon being separate from sentient will is necessary not to promote arguments in duality and beyond. Ethics requires separability of cause-and-effect, through means arbitrary by reference to natural law that then governs natural phenomenon, for comprehending accountable human beings in accountable constructs of human beings; the term “accountable” could be interchanged with “responsible” due to interpretations from “self-interest”. The aims of ethics for the practice of the subject can be phrased as: the demand for satisfactory utility of the entire span of fields, from philosophy through the natural sciences to ethics and also past ethics in the application of ethics in arbitrarily structured format, this being the “law for human beings”.
Through the lens of ethics, the thinking and actions of sentient beings can be what is called “judged” in the form of adjectives that carry more than quantitative meaning, although anything with quantitative meaning can be directly associated with adjectives not under the domain of quantity, so elaboration on this point is needed. Some examples of the thinking and actions of sentient beings can then be argued, in ways convincing to untamed sentiments of “self-interest”, moving the directionality of will for “self-interest”, to be adjectives such as “foolish”, “criminal”, “unruly”, and “dishonest” with great followings for intended results such as great grievances, great inflation of ego, et cetera. In a related field, there is drama, and the structurization of sentient activity, namely the activity of human beings, into that which elicits sentiment is dramatization. Without subjectivity, there can be no ethics. With subjectivity in the form of intense sentiment expressed in outward form by the will, sometimes in opposition to the directionality of origin belonging to the “self-interest”, ethics serves as the field that regulates through the encouragement of introspection alongside outward observation of case studies, in juxtaposition to the form the literary fields take, record and narration for the product being a drama from dramatization. And this is not meant to lead to assumption that ethics does not require recording and narration, only that the centrality of ethics is in regulating human behavior, by the basic internal-external duality mentioned, without the necessity of prescribed consequences as manifested by practices of “law for human beings” that use ethics as a cornerstone. The practice of ethics can use drama, but this particular intersection should not be confusing on the purpose, even though the effects of ethics and drama can converge to be one and the same. Orthodoxically, drama elicits, draws in cognition to produce output from cognition, and ethics is intended to encapsulate the comprehension of behaviors, represented as narrative cover or indisputable truths of phenomenon, for principles of thinking and behavior to be set into place, thus influencing the effects of the will’s directionality onto the “self” because of their “self-interest”. “Self-interest”, in its more outward appearances of sentient thinking and behavior, is undeniably tied to ethics, the connection a cause of varying doubt and conviction through the question for the cause of the “self-interest”.
The previous note made the claim: "without subjectivity, there can be no ethics". Furthering the argument in favor of this claim, a very well-known concept called the "sphere of influence" is used. So without subjectivity, there is no need for ethics because ethics is what is conducted by sentient will to be analyzed by sentient will, namely that of human beings since ethics is anthrocentric, for dualistic judgment of the effects from sentient will. Judgments are necessary because effects by sentient will are of an inferiority to the low-level correctness of the authentic axiom. Effects by sentient will only demand proper utility of whatever authentic axiom. All axioms are authentic in the scope of truth's judgment. However, the adjective "authentic" was derived from "axiom" and placed before "axiom" to emphasize the nature of the axiom, not of an artificial unit or any other unit that can be utilized by the will, not ruling the wanted effects of sentient will. The construct of a sphere of influence is curious with regards to the intention of axiom. One concept is quite clearly the prime unit of human rationale on why spheres of influences are formed: "self-interest". It is self-interest before collective interest, although the critical variable of success may be collective interest. But the measurable quantity of any effecting collective interest would be given a distortion in appearance if it was likened to a single variable in the manner of use for conventional algebraic expressions in mathematics. The collective, meaning the mass of human beings, after reaching consensus on the predominant initiatives, although the specific form and the specific movement of each of the collective does not have to coincide and only required to overlap in judgment of similarity, consists of individuals with self-interests that overlap. This phenomenon, in every case of a united collective, goes back by reason to how the "self" understands the "self" along with "interest" for their "self-interest", understanding that takes into account co-existing selves and self-interests. It is also through the sphere of influence that absurdities are believed, by those of or against the construct. Absurdities are the most farfetched out of the class of believable fallacies, although this may be reasonably put into question out of wordplay and misunderstanding of the word "absurdity". Another case of the technical difficulties in using natural language as the primary tool of explanation. "Absurd" could be "ridiculous", but "ridiculous" could be true, while "absurd" is less in believability than a "half-truth", a concept with a quantitative mark attached to describing a statement in truth. The question of believing a statement or body of statements is a decision by "self-interest" to accept only if the "self" is aligned with its own will in a way that can be visualized as a direct alignment between "self-interest", undetachable from the "self" in any conceptualization, and the will of the "self". The freedom to visualize is the freedom to fabricate on matters such as the intangible, immeasurable by most natural (biological) senses, and especially the immeasurable. To elaborate on a possible route of crafting believability of an absurdity, think of a random human being as being labeled an adjective, and this labeling is upheld by the sphere in the same aura as the believability of an axiom. From there, the sphere of influence operates in the manner of a mechanical system that either does not have to perform frequent introspection or one that does not have introspective capabilities. The human being is claimed to have done some particular things. Because the sphere of influence labeled that particular human being a specific adjective, members of the sphere of influence, in turn, believe the human being to have done those particular things, without anything close to being as real as the direct experience that can be recalled by cognitive instruments of healthy structure, such as human brains.
Subjectivity is a matter for cognition, with two primary bodies of understanding and believing it. This is a duality that adds to the complexity of the duality between the subjective and the objective. The first body is the objective that can be represented as the subjective, for a version of the objective that has the validity of being subject to challenge from sentient will or comparison with alternatives on scales selected by "self-interest". For something to be objective does not necessitate that something to be about the axiom, or for the axiom. The objective, by "self-interest", is a design constructed by the axiom for a wanted truth to be actualized, typically through perceivable action by a sentient being, and the wanted truth is not of the same fundamental as the axiom but something left to chance, probability with no absolute for one outcome, with probability that is intended to be manipulated for the wanted outcome/s by focus of effort on the input of said wanted outcome/s. Design of anything can be interpreted in the subjective by the use of "self-interest" operating on a will of a contrarian comparison to the design. Similarly, the term "style" can be used synonymously with "design". A convention for usage, however, is "design" is for the inanimate material structured by sentience, and "style" is the movement outwardly communicated by "self-interest". In both of these, "self-interest" determines the preference that requires satisfying of axiom/s, although "self-interest" does not need to acknowledge the existence or most accurate (by relativity) expression of the axiom. The axiom exists without usage. The axiom is what existence orbits around. The axiom is one among many in essence, the irreducible and unmanipulable core that is responsible for producing sentient will. Any "use" of the axiom in fact subjects one to being an agent of the axiom, and so any construct made by sentience first has to subject one or more sentient beings to represent the axiom/s. A belief is then given credit to those that uphold the construct, affirming the illusion that with the construct, an arbitrary number of axiom/s can be controlled by supercession of the construct's expression over arbitrary use. Truthfully, the axiom/s cannot be controlled, rather the expression in ways possibly more than by written or verbal communication can be controlled. The action because of "self-interest" is also prone to the illusion of control over the axiom. It is for this reason that sentient "objective" is quite often due entirely to the subjective, the preference by "self-interest" out of the will's directionality. The "objective" is not entirely predictable, outside of demand to sustain the physical host of "self-interest" (nutrition). Subjectivity, through challenge posed by "self-interest" from the will, can also be used to represent the axiom in non-interfering ways with the axiom. The constant existence of the axiom does not require recognition, in accurate forms for action from the axiom, from "self-interest".
The sphere of influence, being a construct that "self-interest" navigates and operates in, practically connected to the spatiotemporal context, has to be thought of as a practice by the decision of "self-interest", given their actionable span/s of choice. This view does assume that those capable of "self-interest" are not deterministic, something debatable. The ancient Thracian Democritus, from a long time ago, offered wisdom on the understanding of the world in the form of the Democritean atom, a precursor notion with virtually no practical application until nuclear science became formalized for engineering purposes in the 20th century. But for fair credit in attribution, it was those of the thinking along Democritus that helped continue the rationalization of individuality right down to the "self-interest", capable of generating the thought and action completely distinct from immediately neighboring self-interests of other selves. There cannot be much misconception from the "self" about the "self-interest" that affects the "self", only the host of the "self", since them two are inextricably connected such that the written form for the "self" is a synonym of the written form for the "self-interest". The objective is where "self-interest" may be undeserving of or misled towards. And the lack of objective exclusive to the "self" is what is sometimes required by the judgment of the collective, in turn expressing the self-guiding axiom of the "self-interest" by affecting the will, in ways such as alteration of the will's directionality. Here is where perception of a particular "self", this written use of "self" meant to consider the "self" as something observable from a third-party perspective, may also be influenced by the judgment of that same "self" in the paradigm of a particular sphere of influence. Judgments of the qualities belonging to a sphere of influence are by use of probabilistic means, and can be misconceived as absolutist or dualist due only to the specific categorical labels considered by judgment. "Transcendence" is a label for "spiritualistic" or "emotive" phenomenon that breaks out of containment, the sphere of influence or something directly connected to the sphere of influence, for timespans not so temporary. The "transcendence" is typically metaphysical when related to "self-interest" as a phenomenon experienced by the host of "self-interest". The containment is usually a mixture of the physical and the metaphysical (immeasurable cognition and other bodily functions belonging to the host of "self-interest") connected to "self-interest". It is the notion of "transcendence", something similar to triumph in the visual depiction of floating or soaring upwards, that is a cornerstone of representing the power of "self-interest" to be victorious in adversarial conditions. Glorifying portrayals of events, historical or entirely fictional, by themes such as corruption, liberation, and rebellion heavily rests on the abstract of floating or soaring upwards in ways obviously physical for the intended effects of eliciting belief that the spiritual sense likewise moves in the same orientation, this being the "transcendence" from the construct, the sphere of influence, unwanted by the "self-interest" for the "self" to exist in or co-exist with. The first layer of activity for the "self-interest" is seldom the last layer in matters of the physical, and activity in the "sphere of influence" is the last layer that "self-interest" is a driver for.
For one to "find a reason" to think some way or do some thing is odd in the phrasing. Of importance more than null is the context, that which is comprised of the immediate spatiotemporal setting perceivable to the senses of the "self-interest", and the cognition from internalist mechanisms responsible for such things as feelings, theories, memories, and forecasts, such that the permutatorial proceedings of the "self-interest", the will, and the motivation, in ascending order of predominant influence with respect to one another, yields the reason as a body attached in some manner to the will and the motivation. The reason, after attachment in this way stated, is a cause for cognition or action. Finding a reason to do something could be translated to a matching of the context with the cause for cognition or action. But this translation lacks in describing the form and execution, typically in linear or linearizable information structures, as well as the aims of the activity that follows reason, equivalently the cause that has to be found for the aims. In the context lies the aims that, if not spatially based, must be forged through a metaphysical interaction. After the cause is established for the aims, the methodological course is produced in degrees of abstractness and specificities, from the "self-interest" that uses information for constructing this course into cognition. Meaning is important in the usage after the recollection of information, and meaning is attached in the form of input into motivation that then works with will for the recollection, out of "self-interest". Meaning is something out of perception, and for sentience to perceive must surely be done only through the will, and information from the perception is passed back through the "self-interest" to the units of cognition for meaning as input into motivation. The methodological course cannot be constructed without meaning, such construction done in ways of the parallels, perpendiculars, complements, variants alongside, and derivatives from in ways of believed compatibilities with the aims from the cause, the reason that was found. So, to "find a reason" is the cause to formulate and use a methodological course of thinking and action. The phrasing can lead to misconception, since to "find a feeling" is a subset of "find a reason", but not the converse.
The Democritean atom can be interpreted as a template with some rather disconcerting implications. The "self" can never be one that cannot be resisted, pushed, or forced in other directions strange by linear comparison. The "self" exists in a greater whole. From a humanist sense, the "self" is directly associated to a host that is a human being. Consider the "self" as being part of the metaphysical control system responsible for the host. To give full credit to the existence of equality and impact to other human beings, the "self" must therefore be represented as one among many other selves. The Democritean atom in antiquity developed to this modern day's understanding of the atom, one of the smallest building blocks of spatiotemporal reality, is associated with the phenomenon of atomic chain reactions. In short, one atom is connected to another atom to another in a particular arrangement, with little chance of there being a void in atoms where an entire subspace is also not void, and the split of one atom into something other radiates impact onto connected atoms that follow suit to their affector atom that split. The atomic chain reaction may be believed as natural because of contemporary understanding of modern reality. But to apply the Democritean atom to the "self" alongside other selves, metaphorically other Democritean atoms, may not suit certain ideologies, especially out of the freedom for chains of events occurring in the analogy of atomic chain reactions. There is a deterioration of control in these chains of events. Of noteworthy characteristic, due to broadness, of these chains of events is that no individual could possibly be responsible for maneuvering and directing the atomic chain reaction, only that the atomic chain reaction could start by any one individual. Perception changes of the "self", of any self, for this matter that is anticipated more often than not according to the qualities of the specific social setting, qualities that cannot all be directly perceived but can be derived from collation processed involved in perception, with varying degrees of accuracy that can only be proved until after the facts directly part of the prediction. Entertaining the analogy of atomic chain reactions in human social settings most definitely has gone on far before the formal discovery, through objective means by metrics of empirical measurement, of the atomic chain reaction phenomenon. That is the only plausible rationale for the longevity of some civilizations, these civilizations' adoption and retention of practices and constructs maladaptive or high-performing, despite the axiomatic nature of the atom that has been and continues to be used as to support one ideal modality of living, known as individualism. And so, the matter of narrating events on human beings, in the context of hierarchy, frequently produce notions on the individual as one that transcended the restrictions of their existence as an impactless atom, or an atom either unconnected to other atoms or one that is unsplittable, for then there cannot be any chain reaction started from it.
The practice of self-interest always had and has a curious relationship with social theory. Treat the human in the way of a lone atom, call them an individual but do them as if they were a disconnected part from the whole, for what they are perceived to be after, before, or on top of the social theory applied onto them. Social theory is convenient for self-interest to not acknowledge if some conditions are satisfied. The basic physical demands, food and water, for the host of self-interest are met in full. Then there is the question of socio-economic perception of the host, according to the metrical comparison of expected and actual. Social theory, put into practice by a piecewise selection of all social theory ever conceptualized onto paper or not, is what is essentially the social construct. The concept that is a "social construct", in turn, leads to misconception of its comprehension, and obviously, through its use produces misconceptions. The social construct is not material. The social construct is perception, judgment, and behavior as practiced by the many selves in this world, participated in after any conception of the "self" and through movement, produces change for changes that are more constant than not for the constancy. And this is evident by the material restructurized and methodologies of the mind and body. No social construct can ever be wholesome, by the premise of its effects. A social construct produces effects in the form of spheres of influence. Any sphere of influence rests inside another sphere of influence that could be the identical to the former, depending on the qualities of containment revolving around and intrinsic to it. And any sphere of influence has a fluid quality to it. Perception of a social construct can be objective in the detail of fact, but when preference is required, there is always judgment. In the social setting, the lack of axiom is for no matter that can be entirely of the axiom, and that is why protests of any social construct always have a ridiculous nature to them. To protest something is to decry or denounce by a negativity similar to ridiculing something, as an equating rule in judgments regarding the disapproval of the social construct. Ridicule is to trade perceived absurdity for another statement, most likely the conceptualization of the perceived absurdity which is then absurdity by reduction to the essence, but perhaps the conceptualization is not interpreted as absurd due to its accuracy of the absurdity. Nevertheless, the centrality is absurdity. Disapprovals of social constructs are propelled by the lack of understanding, but to understand something for what it is must be a process of reduction to the axioms known. The issue with this reduction to the axiom is that in practically all social matters, the reduction results in such things as gravity, oxygen, and universally acknowledged economic demands of body and mind, therefore falsely representing all social matters as essentially equal. Attaching the variable of quantity, a practice of an axiom, onto these matters adds more clarity. And then there are descriptors such as adjectives and more lengthy forms of accounting that may have their usage rest completely on arbitrariness. But for the sake of comprehension, every accounting tool of adjective or lengthier forms have references in counterpart or identity of medians and extremums, but with no guarantee of its correct usage by the will of the "self". And thus, social theory does not depend entirely on natural law of axioms because it is attempted understanding, depiction, and replication of preferences in sentient decisions and other qualities for selected spatiotemporal contexts. Social theory advances statements that rest on the preference of subjectivity. In order for the social theory to yield effects greater than cognitive processing of its forms of marketing such as through educative means, meaning the social theory necessarily has to become a fixture for a social construct or even become an entire social construct, certain statements of the social theory have to be treated as axioms, something more than an assumption for the convenience of no effort of proof by interaction or observation. But statements of social theory seldom rest on natural law, so cannot be axioms, certainly processed through cognition can they be recognized as axioms though. The intent of any social theory is to produce artificial axioms that may as well be axioms, always through the will can there be belief in the artificial axiom and designs in accordance with the calculated means for its success and duration in the social setting that is supposed to be a social construct for the social theory.
The word, as used to label the metaphysical, serves as an identifier for that what is labeled. There are limits in pragmatics, outside of the use of the word for cognitive processing, not to underestimate the effect of cognitive processing on the same internalist mechanisms that produces it, let alone the effects of cognitive processing as triggers for measurable biological function that may slip out of the control of the self's will, and for decisions as outward actions. The word then cannot be anymore than a medium, a symbol for interpretation. For an entire society to be able to think and do nothing without words is a society doomed to fail. There is only the translation and transcription. Where is the primal cause that is exactly one unit of smallest difference to the axiom? A society that is heavily reliant on the word cannot be advanced unless there is something under. The previous statement is so obvious that it means nothing for the pragmatics of additional development on top of the present infrastructure that is the utility of knowledge for the methodologies and material constructs. The statement could very well be spun by interpretation for words of analogous assortment, for meanings outside of the bluntness, perhaps something sharp or witty to please the humors, cracking smiles on all of those faces, or something that is a patronizing remark on the follies of introspection that could have taken many years only to miss the mark by many immeasurable distances. Additionally, the statement could be interpreted as a call to deconstruct understanding right down to the axiom, which then would not demand any words to be used, leaving sentient existence little else to do but the predominantly physical. Herein lies more issues with the usage of the word. The word, as used for ultimate consideration, must consider all span/s of possibilities, synonymously any thing that lies in any pair of extrema for the topic/s. Then when the time for action through preference is demanded, this being how the will of the sentient shows itself, the entire span/s cannot possibly be acted on in full. The word is used to produce replication of understanding and awareness of said understanding, but as for the "self", the "self" has always been the one responsible for making use of the word. The "self" does not understand the word without the experience, and the experience cannot happen without the capability of the host belonging to the "self". Capability can be engineered outside of the control of the "self" for the "self". It is themes from this that helped to produced some of the most heartfelt literature and social dynamics, from an emotive perspective. To take the word as a uni-directed meaning that rests on assumptions through interpretation, void of consideration for the directionality of the will that resulted in the use, and the intended effects of that usage, is something personal to the "self". And the "self" that feels obliged to reciprocate does so in ways also perceived to be heartfelt, from an emotive perspective. This is subjectivity that cannot be rationally disputed through attempts to be objective on the immeasurable. The cause for the appearance and the behavior from metaphysical matters, such as interpretation of the word, is something that has to be taken in full after whatever skepticism and inquiries were conducted on the perception, in order for credibility of belief to persist. There is a gap in explanation by the word. Essentially, any interaction between selves produces something like an axiom, specifically an artificial axiom, that serves as a generality for the image of understanding greater than the axiom, the constant. The "self" is understood, through use of the word, by others outside the realm of immediate perception. Presumptions are constructed, expectations are demanded for order. Aristotelian logic used to systematize the metaphysical, a great part of this being the potential, of a sentient being is typically not subjective by intrinsic analyses. The composition of works in Aristotelian logic rely on the axiom, so to dissect the relational arrangements of these words, without the external reference, would directly result in a downward fashion to the axiom, the constant. There would be nothing else to question, only to take the work as a wholesome artificial axiom because it is essentially axiom. Similarly, Aristotelian logic places the word, outside of smallest difference to the axiom, in the way of an orientation alongside the counterpart words to the word. And these words cannot be immediately discredited in and of themselves, because every word is a unit for natural language, the consensus for the mapping of sound or concatenated writing strokes to meaning, although every word could be described in additional words. For these words, references to them, these references found predominantly in the measurable spatiotemporal contexts, are what is required to prove that the word fits, through the discrimination of application. There is an innate imprecision from the preference of word use the "self" has to contend with, and also decisions of quantifying what occurs from the declared artificial axiom, necessarily constructed beforehand, in the degrees of distance, metaphysical in some instances, for the "self" to develop their own truths, of artificial axiom, on top of the constants that do not always require the consideration of the "self", through expression by the "self" on the constants' existences and plausibilities. There is no centrality of the word that is not another word in a self-contained reasoning, what the source of the expressing of Aristotelian logic originally is without application, and this places responsibility onto the "self" for confirmation and belief through their own application.
A major misconception is that individualism is a Western thing, collectivism an Eastern thing. That is how some concepts are explained in the basic sense. In practically every nation, there are icons that are human, not necessarily elevated to anything equal to a demi-god or beyond. Every icon is an individual, so every nation practices individualism to a certain extent. The strict dichotomy is probably necessary to an extent, on top of the existing translation issues, due to there existing additional considerations besides from the elevation of the individual to the status of icon, as requirements for individualism to be present. Then the discussion entirely turns into many topics, with social theory sitting somewhere on top. Human societies of various ideologies "make their people", as confusing as the quotation sounds. A human being is born, but then has to be made by their people? The quotation effects changes onto self-interest. The quotation, when enmeshed into social decision-making, from human being to human being, that is, originally drives self-interest in degrees of changing directionalities and magnitudes. The will remains the same though, as clarification, despite what involvement of the practice of "make their people". Individualism is not always what self-interest is geared to, but it happens for some reasons more often in certain regions only due to the acceptance of the challenge the individual poses, in other regions a continuation of informatic projection (that is what legacy is a part of). For reasons stemming from the dichotomy that must be implicit by generational design, with the freedom by self-interest to explicitly structure and describe for promoting others' understandings through those courses, social and cultural studies are infinite in discussion by the variance of the pertaining information on different peoples having distinction yet equality, through the explicit mention, while the localities of the practices are also unique. To elaborate, it is as if one were to ask 1000 absolutely illiterate but compliant people how they would write the number 7. There would be at least one way, and goes all the way up to 1000. And that is only the initial decision that each illiterate person makes. There are many variables besides from writing the number 7 that serve as topics of such great variance. Regarding the question of compatibilities, no two human beings could possibly turn adversarial against each other if both were tasked with finding out as much about one another based on their roots, their heritage, their present and prior experience on the penalty of unwanted death for their failure through deliberate inadequacy or incompetence. Peace would need to be maintained, until the job is done for one or both. Another peculiar aspect on social and cultural studies is observing how the individual adapts to a changing world, the changes very incongruent and not so cleanly cut based on geographic area. Also in this aspect, so many articles could be written on this as a lone topic that entire libraries would be filled up with nothing but similarities and differences, in the context of localities and globalities, through the accounting of the individual and the individual's collective. There always seems to be expectations for the individual, despite what collectivist policy and arrangements have or were put into place to involve them. Just as types such as misers and vengeance seekers gain a lot of gratification through the suffering of select others, the breaking of the collective or individual expectation has a proportional degree of emotive energy elicited, frequently hysterical and demented when the top and only paradigm is determinism. For these matters, there seldom are answers adequate enough to fulfill perceived inadequacies of empirical accounting, scientific, mathematical, narrative, et cetera, and perhaps even the explanation from religious/political authorities also falls short of quelling the perceived hurt from expectations unmet. Whatever the explanations, the explanations either depend on the use of or rest on the existence of the will. For some things failed or unmet, that would be the doing of the will, much to the chagrin of certain self-interests. When there are mysteries in human decision-making or the material constructs that humans produce to eventually crumble, the remaining mystery irreducible to any more detail or infinitesimal material is caused by the will. That is where the will comes into underlying play. The ideal can be dichotomized into individual and the collective. The individual that lives in the same image before their experience of the ideal must be deluded. Expectations can never be met according to the self-interest of sternness in comparing the actual with the ideal. The actual is more experience of default arbitrariness than what the ideal is portrayed as, and so, must require the correct directionalities of the will for the self-interest in order to be satisfactory to self-interest, outside of the reference to their conceptualization of the ideal. In another possibility for understanding what the individual and the collective really mean, there are the cases of individuals, despite in what society they lived in, to become resolved to their "own path", withdrawing themselves to a reliance on remembering the actuality they have come to believe through their experience of the actual, before paying their attention to any image of ideal. From a rubric that considers these individuals' cognitive states, the individuals would be individualist. But the collective can represent these individuals as collectivists, in order to maintain the notion that said individuals have been fully integrated in the scope of behavior and attitudes. So there are things not mentioned about the individual, in individualistic or collectivistic settings. In certain realities that have produced literary works that reflect back on those realities, some noteworthy dynamics serve as astute examples of the troubles underneath clean-cut dichotomies. There is the guard as the tormentor, or the guard as the traitor, when the guard is an individual designated to act for a collectivistic interest. But seemingly out of nowhere, the guard, out of his own greed and desires foreign to those he is supposed to guard, proceeds on a different economical route of compromise to what is ordered to him to be the fixture, as per the duties declared onto him the guard. The male pronoun is used for the reason of the male being the predominant gender in physical security arrangements. But in a parallel way, human females can do no better. And in the nationalist context, there is the jealous neighbor, the terrible town bullies, and then the foreigners as the secret admirers and worshippers of that specific individual, supposed to always be regarded as an icon, as long as the practice of history goes on. Dynamics such as these show the unexpected that believed loyalties can result in with just the right kind of flux. Self-interest means nothing in some places, supposedly in hyper-collectivist or anti-individualist arrangements; it is the will that is responsible. And this nullification cannot be summarized with just these two labels, "hyper-collectivist" and "anti-individualist", without there being dishonesty. Something the individual with their self-interest, dependent on their will, contemplates either rationally or emotively, at least every so often.
Human beings can be the most insulting there are. There is no way around this statement if considered in the holistic sense. For statements that become reasons such as the one two sentences back, the "self" develops certain behaviors in thinking and action based on the experience. The host of the "self", upon belief that their siblings have been informing on them to the police to keep them broke and terrorized, has other notions of blood. The host of the "self", upon believing that they have been treated like a lab rat for lethal poisons and viruses, places less faith in doctors. The host of the "self", after believing that their internet activity has been sold by their own government to foreign political organizations, becomes a Luddite. The host of the "self", upon being discovered by their elders of their seeking independence, gets their belongings confiscated and labeled a handicapped and crippled piece of trash by their welfare system. The "self" remains with the host after the host is let down and set back by the collective. Perhaps that is the most important merit for the preference of individualism over collectivism. What the human being, as a "social creature", does is meddle and inform, at best, if their skills and expertise are not called for. It is the experience from human being to human being that produces pathological hate for the human, that is what misanthropy is. All cravings of blood not for the meal are part of this long-lasting emotive body. The collective is not a mechanical system from the start. It is not even entirely organic. Through the propensities of the appearance of the human being, leanings become careers and institutions. Women easy on the eyes aim to become whores for the sons of aristocrats. Men of unusual size and strength become icons in big sports. These are merely two examples and they focus entirely on the physical appearance, but through them, the reader can very well gather, by recollection of their own experience, how the humanities portray things and what really goes on in socio-economic policy, with appearances, talents, and governance. Human beings can also be the most helpless, without institutions backing their wars and deceptions. Individuals become slaves before knowing it, from the perspective of psychological acknowledgment. Ultimately, to become upset over another human being's loss is something else outside of the procedures and status, despite what reason for their loss. To adhere to a social system that was designed by human beings, but to somehow have issues with the system at specific points in time?
Sentient intelligence is a social value in practice. It cannot be anything more without relation to other intelligences. There would only be actions and products initiated by sentient intelligence, but the actions and products would merely have occurred or exist as a change onto the physical world. One way to counter the previous statement is promoting the notion of the "self" actually being "self-referential" and "self-justifying" without immunity, but only through the lack of social settings capable of producing challenge in physical or psychological form can this notion be accepted without the longest and most thoughtful intellectual conversations in the whole entire galaxy. Intelligence is a value that, with training and application, becomes refined in the way of metalworking products, but intelligence is not entirely metal. Intelligence becomes the worst thing for sociability when the sentient being has to dedicate virtually all of their efforts to develop the works of their intelligence for propagation, whereas competitors in socio-economically comfortable positions can simply censor them according to the respective construct of prescribed power. These situations must be in the manner of mind slavery for others, in the economic dogma of capitalism where both time and emotions can somehow be quantified into money for the money. The products of intelligence can be replicated, a statement that goes against the whole "knowledge is power" axiom (very questionably), since as already stated, sentient intelligence is a social value and requires relations to the external world to exist in practice of effects with other sentience, and thoughts can be transcribed onto paper and/or machine with a relative degree of inaccuracy, however the idea and the formulae still become present in material form. The knowledge economy is governed by knowledge authorities. That is the structure that self-interest must navigate in order to extract gold, metaphysical or not, from the knowledge economy, hopefully netting something before becoming too demoralized to continue the high road of thought, instead having to resort to the practice, borne from "schools" of pragmatics, as if that resort ever blindly turned an eye to subjective mistakes in the same leniency as the intellectual sphere. There is a relation between knowledge and power, sure. The relation is that knowledge can be both a precursor for obtaining victory for power, and knowledge can also be produced from the power of accurate cognitive direction in problem-solving. This, as a reminder, does not mean that knowledge is power, only somewhere in the equation. The understanding of power typically adopts the forms of broad concepts first, then becomes implemented into the specificities of decorum belonging to human beings under that power. As an example of why knowledge and power is not one and the same, memorize this scenario. A human being, out of their self-interest, believes in sharing and promoting certain knowledges, as a testament to their goodwill, only to get shot in the face. Moral relativism exists in this scenario if and only if the "self" were to remain impartial, thereby granting them the cognitive freedom, out of their will not steadfast in directionality, to think whatever of the event at any point in time or space during their host's remaining existence. Here is another example. The authorities demand a human being use their brain to produce some work, as part of social responsibility to the public. The human being refuses, escapes, and joins a revolt. What kind of intelligence is needed then of them that does not also require "chance"? And what kind of changes would that intelligence produce? The human being only wanted to be left alone. Curiosity closed on the question of demands prescribed by the socially responsible onto sentient intelligence, sentient intelligence is a social value. Intellectual purity is a myth. At best, there is creativity original by the lack of immediate reference, first buried before being cherished by those that no longer have the inconvenience of having to think those thoughts into material form for society, the collective, or whatever. There is already one copy. Then there are institutions for regulatory bureaucracy and big business. What is really the "self" in civilization, with the potential to not have to hunt or farm for a living?
The philosophy and the living justify and reinforce each other through symbiotic ties for introspection, application, validation, and evolution. Just as numbers cannot be invented, but the mathematical sciences contain inventions used to rationalize meanings about numbers, the practice of philosophy has never produced "pure reason", that is reason without exemplifying statement, reason that is pure truth as an operation and operator, a systematic rationalizer greater in quality than the boolean. Philosophy, past the rudimentary of the axiom that is unable to be produced and only discoverable or re-discoverable and the empiricism of the natural world, becomes split by perspectives. Each perspective of noteworthy interest is required to argue for non-axiomatic statements of a questionable truthfulness. Certain schools of philosophies promote the idea of some universal thing that is more elaborate than the axiom, yet just as grounded in principle and intrinsic provability as the axiom. But these promotions do, in fact, require believers since quite frequently, only through approved behaviorial approaches can some of these universal ideals be accomplished according to what is deemed right. And some behaviors are intentionally rehearsed by the "self" for what the "self" believes is for the right ideal or whatever. The "self" has the freedom to focus entirely on the "way of living" in order to practice the wanted philosophy. Such emphasis on the practice, the "way of living", over acquiring full memory and awareness of the essence of the philosophy through more formal ways, is quite common for areas in which the written word does not have a strong mark in pushing the student of that particular philosophy. The written word is more of an introductory reference, a note that remains in case of the school's upheaval. The written word simple does not have the adequacy of expressing formulated effective methodologies for all cases of the generic problem/s the philosophy is designed to solve for. Preference for the independence of "practicing" over "studying" the philosophy carries an implication. The "self" is not so much intent on the "love of wisdom" as they are on reaping as much benefit from their own personal use of the specific philosophy they practice. Self-interest takes precedence as the source of objective for the "self" in either the preference of the "practice" or the "study". But the "practice" clearly focuses more on gains for the "self" as a living agent, forced to take up practices of one or more way/s of life to achieve some wanted existential state. The "study", on the other hand, is for the understanding of the "follower", serving as a metric for how well the follower has integrated themself amongst their peers in the same school of philosophy. The practitioner focuses more on their own progress, and all else being equal to the student, sees the improvements in their way of living as indicative of the power of their chosen philosophy. The student, with their strict observance of the philosophy's axioms, does not place as much value on the application, for in their puritanical perspective, any practice perfected relies on the trueness of the axioms relied upon. All perfected practices are perfect by their performances' reference, but not all systematic bodies of thought carry the same quality. The student and the practitioner seldom are completely distinct in their approach to the same philosophy. But the potentials of the student and that of the practictioner eventually diverge to produce two different kinds of characters. The student becomes a teacher of their craft, and the practitioner a master of their living. By some unclear dynamics through the means utilized, the practitioner that has achieved mastery may, in turn, be a poor teacher of the very philosophy they mastered. The emphasis they place on mastering the ways outside of the philosophy's official forms grants them the advantage of greater performance through unorthodox knowledge acquired through the personal experience. But the greater performance is strongly associated with the practitioner's identity, and not entirely with the philosophical prescriptions they were supposed to adhere to as devoted students of the school. In the extreme cases, the practitioner aims for their self-empowerment, for power in excess by relativistic comparison, and the student after becoming a teacher also becomes more dogmatic, loyal to the foundational principles that they were educated under.
The self understands the world by their own references of knowledge and belief. Through the will, self-interest makes the determination, seemingly arbitrary from the perspective of others, of the centralities of perception, and the will of the self stands by those recognized centralities. The centralities consist of those topics the self recognizes as most essential to their understanding of the world. Without one centrality, it is as if an entire column of reality somehow lacks the support to continue making sense to the self. Confidence is eroded, and the self is left to wonder how their personally recognized centrality could possibly be replaced with something else similar to an immoveable axiom, the only way to restore sense and order to something that has become so outlandish without the support of their recognized centrality. Without the centrality, the reference to a source could be perceived as the source, and both the reference and source could be misidentified as extraneous variables. Understanding would not take the form proper to that which involves the self's chosen centrality. There become more ways to understand, due to more pathways unleashed by the lack of structure the centrality would have granted. Minor sidelines become the focus, the epicenter of meaning seemingly caves in from the self's perception as the self's comprehending processes rest on fundamentally different centralities, including the visual foci. What the self chooses to share with other selves is always a fraction of what truths the self believes in. There is no way for anything more than that fraction: besides from the required effort the self needs to expend to make for fuller and fuller explanations, the self has a need to guard beliefs and facts that would be disadvantageous to them if revealed to the other. To complicate the matter of the self's worldview, a collation of information operating in flux to produce multiple images for understanding, based so heavily on the self's recognized centralities, the self dons dualist mechanisms of behaviorial expression and cognitive processing. In virtually all cases, the self dons this duality and seeks to minimize as much opportunity for the other to know the characteristics of the duality in full. The self projects information in uni-directed modalities of comprehension, as to give the impression of a steadfast conviction in belief. The self retains dualist mechanisms for achieving completeness of the ways and forms, at the expense of the traits of purity and singularity that are oftentimes recognized as the most genuine marks of honesty and goodwill. Duality, in historical use by human beings, serves as an overarching symptom of an immune system that operates on the ruthlessness of pragmatism, but could certainly be described in the idealistic terms of what is the predominant and what should be kept in reserve just in case. Duality compensates for the weakness of ideological purity, goes the thinking of many that adopt dualist tendencies into their modus operandi. By the phrase "weakness of ideological purity", take the phrase to mean the implicit restraints placed onto the self, whether due to the certain principles or lack of principles associated with the ideology's practice. The self that decides on using dualist mechanisms still intends to think and act as one in the whole, not one split in two ways by two halves. The robustness in behavior that the self seeks in duality is a result of the will driving self-interest. The pragmatics of compensation is a choice to go down the route of impurity, with the promise of achieving more and retaining more only due to the greater appreciation of ways and forms anti-thetical to one another, but together produces a self dynamic beyond the predictability of purity. The self has many issues to contemplate and handle, from a cognitive perspective, in dualist modus operandi. The will is what gives reminder to the self about their identity, a part of their self-interest. The will is what energizes the self to find difference in others' similar dualist tendencies, while for the self, their self-interest is self-justifying of their dualism.
Self-interest has many attributes, not even of a constant number, variable to the whims of the self's will and the necessitated demands of the spatiotemporal context. Recognizing a thing, out of possible candidates, as a centrality is a preference for the self. Using dualist thought and behavior is a pragmatic choice. These two principles, of choosing centrality/ies and donning duality, no longer become generalizable to any self after the self puts them into their own existential practice. Using these two principles, the self is able to be their own ultimate agent in the acceptance and rejection of outcome. This is different from the statement that the self alone bears the expectation of succeeding or failing at any arbitrarily-defined task. Given the hindrances posed by some spatiotemporal circumstances, it would be reasonably foolish to expect one to be able to succeed at some task. But human beings seldom demand others to do things only because the demands are reasonable. On the contrary, the great prospect of watching a human being fail at something due to the odds stacked against them is what gives some adversaries sheer satisfaction in being witness to that specific kind of failure, typically also narrated back to the audience as foolhardy and hubristic. When the self becomes capable of exercising their own acceptance and rejection of outcomes, based on the centralities that they use in comprehension and judgment, and on the styles of expression in transparency or dishonesty by their dualist modus operandi, the self has a form of control unacquirable by others, yet this control is still vulnerable enough to be manipulable against their self-interest. Incorporating dualist mechanisms and finding new centralities still do not guarantee the self to become an independent agent, even when the question of such basics as food,water, and shelter are not part of the consideration. Unfortunately for those bent on achieving independence for themselves, there are no easy formulae to use for that objective, although many cases of achieving independence rely on certain staples obvious enough for there not be any need to explicitly mention. When the self relies on another, there are some rather predictable routes for outcomes. In the first two routes, the other assumes a regulatory/oversight role of hierarchical power over the self. The other could make "correct" use of a pertaining system to aid in judgments, recommendations, and other advice for the self. The other could also make "incorrect" use of a pertaining system, through discriminatory practices of misapplication and/or preferential application of system functions belonging to a system that otherwise is based on impeccable principle (but those impeccable principles are safeguards for nothing, as it turns out in some cases). In the third route, the other plays along by taking an auxiliary (secondary) role as a helper to the self. The self has a balancing problem to deal with in their involvement of an other into their efforts. The self believes themself to be inadequate, usually by spatiotemporal metrics, to accomplishing objectives that require as much scale as they do perfection. The self can reach a level of perfection, but the perfection is granular, constrained to orbit around the lone source, the self. By involving others, the self has to make due with possible lessening in quality and contentious/mixed agenda, such as collusion, favoritism, hyper-competition, and non-independence. In arrangements of relativity, the self can always be made out (conceptualized, narrated about) to be wrong, foolish, et cetera, by the other's use of statements that employ opinion while being fronted by illusion of fact. The self uses systems by their own strengths and preferences, and another self likewise but with the freedom to not be identical in use. As such, the same system when used differently is an antinomy between any two users of distinct styles and preferences. And that is in regards to only one system. The self becomes one forced to compromise for the greater ideal, when the self can do no things declared important without other accomplices. Compromise does not quite negate the innate righteousness of the self in their preferences. The self, being one with their self-interest above all, this so-called greater ideal, sees fault first in others, considers their self as first in the line of consideration, and is seldom not the last to admit fault. Admission of fault rarely ever makes sense to the self that knows the world can turn hostile against them very quickly, despite of what reason. The self, regardless of their cooperation with others, is a hypocrite after taking up dualist principles. From a singularist perspective, there is no need for duality except for dealing with conflicts of systemic inconsistency and hierarchy from the other, and the self knows how to state this in countless ways out of their self-interest.
What separates the force of self-interest from the practice of pragmatics is the fundamental ground of operation. Pragmatics is merely a body, of indeterminate size, of relational principles (non-axiomatic in other words) for use as a framework in decision-making. Thus, the pragmatic person may have habitually developed their pragmatism to encompass traits such as stoicism, mindfulness in calculation, and avoidance of endeavors recognized as vain and deluded, yet their pragmatism, being an outward practice of expression based on relational principles learned to aid in decisions of specific spatiotemporal circumstances, cannot be a part of their essential existence. This is in stark contrast to the force of self-interest, propelled by the will, for what the host believes is for their own good, the good oscillating somewhere between desiring for the gains of the collective and the gains of the self, as an indisputable form of selfishness. The host, by their self-interest, that vital force inseparable from sentience until death does them part, always has the option to take the pragmatic path, given the condition that the host knows what it means to be essentially pragmatic, instead of making decisions that coincide with increasing the chances of their survival. The pragmatist tends to be an informed decision-maker, so a human being that relies on coincidence to obtain their best possible decision simply cannot be pragmatic due to the chance that they never put any thought or practice into controlling for their self-interest. Those that act by their self-interest are not obliged to act pragmatically, for self-interest is a force that is a primary driver of what is arguably "free will" for human beings, naturally granting human beings the liberty to fight at great costs for their ideals that are coincidentally contrarian to orthodox pragmatic practices. The potential of achievements through pragmatism revolves around mastery of the relative and the relation. For instance, those that operate purely by their self-interest may find themselves lost for direction that yields them gain. Instead of gain, there is loss due to over-consumption, oversensuality, and miscomprehension of the abstract and noble ideal when the ideal is put into objective form. These errors in decision-making are common for those that do not have the experience of contemplating their intrinsic weaknesses that cannot be resolved or ignored through efforts in the same direction, based on the directionality of their will in charge of advancing their self-interest. The individual, with their self-interest, may fall prey to their whim fostered by a will blind to the risks of their being deluded by their ideals. Self-interest, then, cannot be a sole determining force for a human being to understand what their long-term interests of gains are. Within this force of self-interest contains the irrationality of passion and personal belief. Without the guidance of pragmatic thought, those by their own self-interest can only learn the better path through first experiencing costly mistakes, and many of these mistakes cannot be rewinded back to the starting point before the costs have inflicted themselves in the manner of permanence. Pragmatism allows the self the opportunity to understand the means, in abstract and technical forms, that would allow them the greatest probabilities of achieving their vision, their ideal, through the emphasis on choosing the best relative degree for the pertaining issue and maintaining a mindfulness of the relations at play in the problem. The pragmatist seeks to define in terms of specifics, in order to cognitively pave the way before actually pursuing the way. This pre-definition is important in structuring the possibilities and the possibilities' corresponding decisions in a manner superior to resting one's modus operandi purely on the language of ideals, the loftiness of this kind of phrasing inconsiderate of the compromises and technicalities that are sure to come in real-world decision-making and application. Without the ideal, however, the self does not have to share the language and symbolism that transcends the self to integrate the vision and behavior of others. This could, in turn, prove problematic to the self as an agent amongst the collective that requires more than the technical minutiae of satisfying details to persist as a body operating under integrity. For the self with their self-interest, the dual needs to use the ideal to transcend the spatiotemporal mundanity and the pragmatics to set standards and definitions for achievement is a constant balancing act that becomes a factor many times in relevance, by the demands for empirical performance, to the force of self-interest lofty and senseless without the definition of pragmatics and ideals.
The difficulty in generalizing self-interest is due, in notable part, to the plasticity of human behavior given the cultural landscape and spatiotemporal resources available to the self. The connectivities an individual has with their surroundings, a great part of these surroundings being the artificial construct material or immaterial made by other human beings, demand the individual to adapt their styles of expression, to "conform" perhaps, in the same way that a puzzle piece must fit with its neighboring puzzle pieces in order to constitute the whole. The analogy of the puzzle piece is a gross simplification of the complexities that human societies of flux, economically and through other aspects of rapid mobilization, are capable of. But the analogy does imply that the individual is influenced by their society at large, in any directionality of positive (exaggerated) and negative (understated) expression of what their will advocates them to do. Those that are in positions of power relative to their fellow human being may find the decorum of niceties and endless layers of bureaucratic regulation ironically unwholesome because of excess and superficiality. These particular individuals, out of their self-interest to operate in haste and for immediate results impactful in messaging to others of their own power, do not base their actions on the obligation to appease and flatter. Other individuals, based on their socio-economic positioning, may actually have the same vanities and character flaws as those higher in rank to them. These other individuals may also crave power and seek to do harm to those disadvantaged. But ultimately, due to their obligation to remain fixed at their socio-economic positions, they cannot afford to show their faces of wickedness and excess in contradiction by challenge to those higher in rank to them. These broad generalizations of how individuals express themselves due to their socio-economic status, despite the similarities in objectives between their self-interests, is about the human being's utility of their available means as well as their constant need to satisfy hierarchical expectations, as part of their temperance from excess which may upset the order of their society at large. The concept of a "sphere of influence" is of an important reminder on the effecting potency of the individual in their preferences. The sphere of influence acts as a radius of effective power an individual has with respect to their vicinity. Any individual that uses the language of ideals to propagate their own vision onto the rest of the world discovers a harsh lesson in the reality of constraints that contains them because of the spatio-temporal limits, their sphere of influence. Their words of ideals can only go so far without there being misinterpretation. Furthermore, their words of ideals must manifest themselves in forms of examples instead of the purity that is incontrovertible yet also not specified enough to bear actual effect. Through paradigms such as the sphere of influence, what one individual believes is a selfish intrusion, masquerading under the language of ideals, onto themself is according to the definitions of another individual based on their self-interest, for the order, that is, the greater good that is for collective instead of individual gain. The sphere of influence is an abstract structure that allows one individual to impose practices, stemming from their self-interest, and another individual to have to abide by those practices. This abstract structure is, in effect, one of the cornerstone paradigms for understanding the economizing of power according to self-interest, a force that may attempt to supercede in relevance of authority to the self-interests of others, or a force that, through the pragmatism of utmost consideration for the social construct, drives an individual to pretend one way to satisfy their aims of another wanted outcome.
The individual typically likes to project themself as a being of ideals, of those things that cannot be so easily quantified and outside of the ordinariness of the world's materialization. Regardless of what the individual really believes in, the individual that claims to stand by their professed metaphysical bodies of ideals is one that cannot be so conveniently rationalized by someone else. The ideal stands, is the reason, when all else can crumble because of the material impermanence. Stylistic forms of expression the individual takes up, as part of their participation in their respective sphere/s of influence, tend to exude the ideal, first and foremost, because the ideal is about as fundamental as the axiom, yet also serves as a testament to the transcendental nature of the individual past their potential of physical impact. The axiom, being an irreducible component of the body of natural law, serves as the "root" explanation of all natural phenomenon connected to it. The ideal, similarly, is the apex of human desire and human conception of infallibility, and thus serves the individual's constant need to justify the specifics of their possibly contradictory and hypocritical actions; it is the ideal that is fought for, that is to be aspired to, and for this to happen, sacrifices in the form of compromise and errors are inevitable, so goes the thinking of those that explain themselves in terms of their ideals instead of the minutiae of their actions. The sweetest actions, the greatest monstrosities throughout history have been committed in the name of the ideal. It is as if the ideal is a scientific axiom of objectivity for what free will the human has. But truthfully, how much span of free will can the human being have if their thoughts and actions are geared towards the ideal, or rationalized in retrospect as being for the ideal? This question is tricky to answer on the matter of the individual, one with their own self-interest. The will of the individual can be simply for justifying the individual by invocation of the ideal as the impeccable answer of brevity, instead of genuinely believing in the ideal, although the degree of genuine belief in anything, including the ideal, is not the only pre-requisite for leading a life instead of having one's life misguided by the symbols in practice associated with the ideal. Invocation of the ideal is a convenient solution for self-interest: explain away the misdeeds, misgivings, and other errors as something confusingly both unavoidable and necessary to fulfill the ideal through practice. In the usual course of these explanations, it is the practice, after resulting in unideal losses, that constitutes the proof of the individual being one with their self-interest in parallel support for the ideal.
Self-interest, as already noted, is driven by the individual's will. But there are some rather important emotive bodies, not yet explicitly named, that influence the will. On the negative end of the spectrum is fear. Fear is a classic irrational influencer of the will. Fear causes one, no matter the amount of information they have or the experiences they have had, to steer themselves, usually in ways not completely uncontrollable by their will, towards routes they have already recognized beforehand as decision sequences for the insane. Of course, fear is not an element that results in universal outcomes for all those that experience it. Many individuals have a seemingly perfect grasp over the influences that fear radiates. But the "power", for lack of a more encapsulating term, that fear exerts onto sentient cognition is most definitely not null, despite the apparent lack of symptoms the individual may express in response to fear. Due to fear, narratives are concocted to rationalize the unknown. Since the unknown cannot be properly rationalized because knowledge of it lacks in truthful substance, the narratives can only be structured to yield answers in the veins of probability or answers that are imprecise due to their reliance on metaphorical reasoning. One whose self-interest operates under fear is equivalently, one that has decided to de-emphasize their faculty of reason to proceed by their preferred answer. The example of the emotive body that is fear makes for a comprehensive discussion on the vulnerabilities of those that operate purely on their self-interest without the guardrails of default reasoning, the only surefire class of decision-making that can yield replicable and rationalizable solutions. The force of self-interest, in unrestrained or undisciplined practices, can be likened to a rabid animal that has lost its ability to recognize and correct its insanity, or to a fiend that has compulsive needs to satisfy their cravings of flesh or inanimate substance. A common question, usually asked with great wonder, is how someone that operates by their self-interest can make decisions so adverse to their livelihood of mind and body, even when there is opportunity of valuable information to make better decisions. This question is usually answered by psycho-analytic means, especially when there is not enough quantitative information to present explanation by the number and the figure. A simple answer rests on how the individual processes fear. By believing in the aura that fear radiates into them, the individual closes their mind to the outlets that would have granted them greater solution through decisions better because the decisions are more informed ones. The will can ward off fear, but could just as well let in fear as an influencer variable of the will, practically a controller of the will. The actualization of success by an individual with their self-interest is oftentimes very dependent on the constituents of their emotive state. There is fear that represses. And then there is confidence that motivates self-interest to proceed in resistive or forward ways. Both fear and confidence are emotive forces that seek to govern the will, by presenting the circumstances of unknown or incomplete empirical knowledge as an illusion in the directions of positivity (inflation as the willfully ignorant motivator of confidence) and negativity (deflation as the repressive fear). In the impartial perspective on the utility of emotive forces, such as fear and confidence, self-interest can be greatly disserviced by these forces' utility in the long run, where objectivity and empiricism yield solutions more durable because of their resting on rational bases, instead of the ephemeral power of spontaneity and personal motivation that these two emotive forces encourage. However, in the grand scheme of the concept of free will, the choice of the individual with their self-interest to rely on the tools of fear and confidence, as makers and breakers of the illusions that drive them to act in any direction of decision, cannot be truly eradicated. Dictates for self-interest to not rely on emotive forces are vain because the choice to let in these forces is an innate part of sentient existence; to conclude, sentient thought and action is not confined to the rules of stoicism.
The narrative is a powerful tool in relation to self-interest. Such power is factually only effective on the cognitive processes of an individual. To clarify though, cognition, being the process that yields the first step to any serious thought or action, cannot be underestimated or overestimated without there also occurring errors in judgment, and judgment gives way to decisions that are impactful to collective perception and physical existences. The narrative changes the individual's perception and perspective. The reason for this occurrence of cause (the narrative) to effect (the changes onto perception and perspective) is simple to understand: the narrative contains centralities for cognition to recognize as motives, objectives, and symbols, and those that believe in the narrative must also perceive things differently enough to accomodate the persuading messages of the narrative. Likewise, the perspective of the believer in the narrative also undergoes changes, evidenced by the believer's language used, the ideals they claim to now uphold, and the methodologies that they feel they have a right to use, all due to the narrative. Some common uses of the narrative are to ascribe constructed objectivity to that which otherwise can only be opinionated on given the facts at disposal, to draw conclusions on the matters that otherwise can only be speculated on due to the missing of vital facts. The narrative fills in the holes of missing information, removes plausible sources of doubt, uses language of collective acceptance or traditionalist practice to advance points by rational-like expression, and offers direction of morality and action to those individuals susceptible to believing the narrative, out of what the individuals believe is for the betterment of themselves based on their self-interest, in which case their will is for advancing the procedures of reactionary follow-up from the narrative. On the use of the narrative for constructive purposes, the self that feels lost or at odds with the course of their life's trajectory can be made to accept the realities of their situation by the perspective embedded in the narrative they have interpreted as fact by their belief. The narrative, for purposes of positive construction, offers an explanation through the reality of purported opportunities for the self to elevate their stature. There is more than grim facts of details, void of implication and causality, that the narrative offers. The narrative can be used to give a sense of righteousness to self-interest, that force that is not dependent on scruples to operate. The narrative, as a tool of positive construction for the self, instills confidence in the self to act by their self-interest, and also to perpetuate fears based on the irrationalities of distortion into those adversarial to the self. In any complex situation, there are many perspectives that can be formed to interpret said situation. The narrative can give a sense of closure to the individual that feels torn by the plurality of contradicting interpretation, through the details selected in the manner of half-truths and other kinds of distortions to validate the individual's sense of their own merit, a positive elevator for their self-interest. Because the narrative is not required to be based on fact, the narrative could always be constructed to push the perspective that suits the desires of the individual's expectations. Without the narrative, self-interest has only facts and interpretations gathered from their perception. There is still yet the question of the proceeding, the objective that should be attempted because of those facts and interpretations. Thus, the narrative removes the self's need to continue their contemplation of morality and reason. And without any further restraints, the self could very well completely act for the implications and means pushed by the narrative, for what they believe is for the best, given their self-interest.
There exist strong relations between the social constructs that human beings create, based on their acceptances and postulations of social theory, and the sphere of influence, how these social constructs operate in radiating manner from agents of the social construct onto other agents of the same social construct, as well as the narrative, one of the prime tools that spheres of influence use to foster belief for what is deemed the appropriate thought and action given a world that rests on probabilities and the elevation of one's judgment over the judgment of others. The social construct of human understanding, devised and practiced by humans, is the apex of human will's conceptualization for order in thought and behavior, both of which have freedoms that are not ordered by natural law, instead a utility of the constants that comprise natural law. The social construct is what gives unifying meaning to phenomenon, for all beings in that construct to participate in for equality of belief, that otherwise would be interpreted by an individual through their own perception, yielding answers that are subjective in the way of opinion to others. Unlike natural phenomena that rests their actualization on the constants that comprise natural law, the human being seems to always have a choice to think or do some thing. There is a lack of default reason, cause-and-effect that is fixed and derived entirely from natural law, in human thought and behavior. In fact, oftentimes, the human being, due to their self-interest, commits some action that is both costly to themself and damaging to others, but then that same human being justifies their action as something within their rights, an expression out of their ethics self-professed as necessary, explanations that really cannot be rationalized in the manner of propositional logic or calculus as being purely "good", as in "optimal", given the resources and the choice available to them. Social values are the first thing to be considered in relations between human beings, the most frequent aspect to be disagreed upon due to the openness in interpreting the artificial axiom, the rule that is not at the same fundamental level as those of natural law yet still declared by human societies to be of the same correctness given the social construct; the quality of openness in interpreting the artificial axiom is itself probably an axiom on par with natural law, due to the many special cases stemming from the sheer number of possibilities from spatiotemporal preference in choice. Conventionally, any science outside of the fundamental hard sciences (that is what natural law is) cannot be anymore than a soft science due to the freedoms of negotiating and formulating the rules in ways arbitrary to nature yet seemingly most fitting for the belief systems that the corresponding society adheres to. Social constructs, especially spheres of influences, are for the purpose of structuring the subjective into the belief of fact. But at their default disposal are not the irreducible axioms, but rules of relativity and agreeableness. Economic concepts such as zero-sum and non-zero sum make themselves very present as ways to form objective and meaning of what is right or wrong, given the finite resources and the ever-present disputability of actions fallible by preference of one over the other in the context of what is universally recognized as vice. Zero-sum decision-making acts as a template for justifying the double-standard: doing what would be unequivocally considered wrong to one's self or one's group (their sphere of influence) is, on the contrary, completely within their rights to inflict upon another, due to such aspects as survivalism, in other words, necessary competition such that the higher moral principles are forced to be ignored in order to tend to the livelihood of the self and their sphere of influence. The narratives that a sphere of influence espouses, these same narratives that the self usually also upholds as part of their belief system, for their self-interest of course, allow for prioritization of certain courses of action and attention (the centralities) that the society is to take. The self, always a servant to their self-interest, must always be keen on the narratives of the social construct they preside in. The narrative is what gives the first impression, by transforming details of mundanity and incredulity alike into the image of preferred symbols and morals to be regarded in the same vein as natural law, although they are borne from the realm of sentient interpretation. The narrative gives the collective unified meanings on the infinitessimal grades of information with respect to the situation/s. For the individual with their self-interest, there are compromises bound for them to participate in, as a stipulation of their membership in the social construct that operates synonymously as one or more spheres of influence. What is truth for the self then, if the truth goes against the noble lie, or the noble's lie? What is "taking the higher road" then, when the agents of a social construct have decided to condemn any individual to damnation here on planet Earth if the individual were to embark on their "higher road" instead of the socially acceptable road? Here in this elaboration on the intersection of the social construct, the sphere of influence, and the narrative, the individual with their self-interest does not have to be a servant only to their self-interest, but also be an agent of plasticity for satisfying the social rules of relativity and agreeableness. And the self, being one with their self-interest, typically takes up the liberty of justifying the compromises they felt forced to make, a stipulation of their membership in the social construct, as something optimal and correct due to and because of their self-interest.
Reasoning by common sense points to the force of self-interest as the metaphysical culprit for a sentient being's selfishness. The sentient being, by their self-interest, has the power to act freely within the constraints of their spatiotemporal setting. The idea that self-interest is a force that naturally leads to one exhibiting selfishness is based, first and foremost, on the host of self-interest being that one, the self, so that all thought and behavior done by that self can naturally be traced back to them, and these efforts are usually to benefit the self out of the pragmatic to prioritize the self above others, even in collectivist societies, perhaps especially in collectivist societies since no one loves the self in these societies as much as the self from their self-interest. Selfishness can be understood by the partitioning of quantity, between the self and others. The selfish value their views above others, and also aspire for power and material value of magnitudes disproportionately for them at others' loss. However, if one's self-interest is the only factor to consider them as a being that is more selfish than not, then claims of their being selfish cannot proceed by any rational argument. Self-interest is the force that could give to others as much as that to the self. In certain constructs, especially in those that operate by non-zero sum, there is actually a pronounced stigmatization of those that disproportionately serve themselves over others. The ideal in these non-zero sum constructs is that of equal distribution, of fair and accurate reciprocity, and of holding the "selfless" act as higher in ethical integrity than the selfish act. On the last point of the "selfless" act, such labeling seldom goes without there being misconception. The "selfless" act is committed by one that still operates by their self-interest. The source that is the driving force for a selfless act is the same as that of the selfish act, namely self-interest. One way to differentiate an action is being selfish as opposed to selfless is by a weighted scheme that takes as variables the qualities of reference from said action to the acting self. Some variables are easier than others to judge on the spectrum of selfless to selfish, such as financial values and material resources. Variables that deal with the metaphysical, however, are subject to interpretation. For example, one that claims to have conducted an action to fulfill their ideal could be classified as being selfless, for they took the action for the ideal that exists outside of their sole existence, in apparent disregard for their existence. However, if the criteria is that one's believed ideals are a part of their self, then one that commits actions for what they claim to be for their ideals is selfish by the direct connection of fulfilling the ideal being coincidentally efforts to fulfill the self. By this strict association of the ideal with the self-interest, the direction of gains intended by the self, regardless of any invoked ideal, is towards the self. As an example, some human beings find a sense of satisfaction in being charitable or empathetic, both of these adjectives being ideals. And although the actions that can be labeled charitable or empathetic are not in complete reference to the self but to the other, the fact that the self finds a sense of satisfaction from the exchange to the other means that the self cannot be logically excluded from being categorized as selfish; the ratio in preferring the self over the other in acts of charity and empathy seldom is ever zero, as in being completely selfless. Such is the fact of sentient existence always necessitating a consideration for the self, out of self-interest, even in exchanges inarguably more selfless than not. There are inexact correlations between the spectrum of selfless to selfish and the spectrum of ideal to pragmatic, and as such, every time there is an attempt to categorically label an individual as being selfless, void of the attribute of selfishness often considered a societal vice, the questions of the involved ideals and pragmatics, as influential forces at play in the social construct as well as the psyche of the individual, have to also be pondered on for wholesome and non-skewed judgment of the individual. In quantitative terms, there is always something that could be quantified as a payoff to the self for acting more so in the interest of their self or the interest of others, both of these routes' efforts spurred by the force of the self's self-interest. The prioritization by the self, through thought and action, for their self or for others still bears the direct link back to the self. To conclude, the self, through their self-interest, does what they feel and think fit, oftentimes. Accurately labeling one as being more selfish or more selfless requires the weighted consideration of the pertaining variables, but even then, there is room for interpretation that is due not only to the whims and objectives of the culture, the collective, but also to the individual judges of character. The arguments for a specific one's self-interest to be a force for their selfish gain have to remain as subjective notions for factual clarity, unless quantification that is complete and accurate in the consideration of variables, in the scope of the partitioning between the self and the others, takes place. Even so, such quantification for social matters on social terms is a matter that takes as precedent in importance the design over the raw facts, those details that require interpretation (through the design) for labeling by social terms.
Self-deprecation consists of acts by the self, naturally counter-intuitive in its rationalization. Why would one place efforts towards debasing their image for the perception by others? Take the concept of self-deprecation a few steps further in the direction of negativity, and interpretation on that individual would quickly shift from their being self-deprecating to their exhibiting a self-hatred or a self-loathing. The individual, in their acknowledgment of their own mortality and finiteness, would not be naturally inclined by their self-interest to deprecate their self. Quantitatively, self-deprecation makes the minor flaw into a sort of irreconciliable difference, the near-perfection into the forever flawed. Self-deprecation is for alteration of one's image that they want to project to the external world, full of other perceptual beings with their own perspectives and methods of interpretation. However, the topics of self-deprecation seldom rest solely with the one deprecating their self. If the insults and mockery of self-deprecation were to be geared entirely against the self, then by common sense, any individual that engages in self-deprecation would, in fact, be committing assassination of their own character. Despite the superficiality of the image individuals and groups attempt to project about themselves to others, the image once tarnished is difficult to restore to the same degree and nature of idealism before the effacement, especially if the source of the effacement persists. Self-deprecation, as something that affects only the self that commits it, would not be practical for self-interest. In practice, self-deprecation works its effects, not contained only to the self that uses it, by appealing to the propensities of others' conceptual identities. The topics of self-deprecation are frequently those categorized as the universal concept, practiced by virtually all societies structured in some form of socio-economic implementation, such as "chivalry", "honor", "honesty", "modesty", "servitude", and "status". As such, when one expresses their self-deprecation by these universal concepts, it is not only them that is referentially impacted by their insult. The thematic broadness of self-deprecation affects all those that abide, in some manner of thought and action, to the universal concept that is either alluded to or explicitly mentioned. Techniques of self-deprecation propagate effect through a few vectors: humor, commonality, and revelation. The indirectness of one using self-deprecation to effect insult onto the other/s has certain advantages to it. For one, the other that is referenced by the insult does not have the basis of substance from the self-deprecating to state that they are being insulted without admitting to their faults alluded to. There cannot be much opportunity to denounce the self-deprecating as one that "stooped low enough" to use ad hominem attacks, for quite literally, the self-deprecating are using themselves as the subject of their insults. What insults perceived by others are due to their interpretation of reference alluding to their own behaviors and way of living, so there must be first acknowledgment from the others that the self-deprecating is indirectly portraying them in some negative light. Comparatively, the use of ad hominem attacks is conventionally viewed as clearly antagonistic due to the qualities of bluntness and sharpness directed at some individual or group, thus giving that individual or group logical justification to denounce the user of ad hominem as clearly belligerent, clearly malicious in spirit of intent. Self-deprecation, besides from being a strategy of indirect criticizing the other based on the other's intersection with the universal concept that they, according to the self-deprecating, have put into grotesque, perverse, and dishonest practice exclusively for their self-interest in utter contempt of all else, also acts as an illusory defense for the self-deprecating. The self-deprecating, out of their need to maintain the appearance of harmlessness (no threat through superiority in quality), uses the strategy of self-deprecation. To avoid accusations from others of their supposedly egoistic ways, coincidentally and intentionally fallible, the self-deprecating insults themselves by way of presenting their conditions and circumstances as half-truths (exaggerations, understatements, derogatory metaphors) leaning towards the negative light, such as inadequacy and stupidity, in order to portray themselves as ones both humble and modest in how they view themselves, not in the way of superior status that is often cause for adversarial envy. Self-deprecation, a deflationary illusion technique of the self onto the self done for their self-interest, is metaphorically something like a double-edged sword. Through the collateralism of simultaneously referencing the self and the other through mocking the other's practice of the universal concepts, the other is also subject to deflationary interpretation by their being insulted. Likewise, the use of self-deprecation, as a metaphorical shield, can also be driven by the self-interested's need to defend their image from claims of egoism and other qualitative personal attacks.
Continuing on with the discussion from part 34, self-deprecation can be categorized as antagonistic techniques, one that literally but insincerely attacks the self for actually attacking an other based on the universal concept's reference to them. As already mentioned, the objective of those that practice self-deprecation is rarely to assassinate their own character, and the criticizing power of such practices must therefore transfer over by negative light onto others based on their commonalities with the concepts expressed by the self-deprecating. Any antagonistic action employed by the self is, by defaults resting on questionable notions such as moral relativism, challengeable by interpretation subjecting said actions into the realm of doubt on their correctness. There is the classic saying, "two wrongs do not make a right", rather simple to understand from an arithmetical perspective, although such wisdom has never produced any conclusive righteousness of both ends in the longevity of time. Despite the inherent freedoms (the default autonomies of the individual life) that the self of any individual is granted in their thinking and taking action, there are some principles that can reliably predict how an individual would appear and actually behave as an antagonist for their self-interest of domination or maintaining power with respect to another. The self, by their self-interest, acts by relativity to the existing power dynamics that contain them. One that is part of the rule over sentient beings, for example, must take care to not appear as excessively cruel and prejudiced, for these appearances that may in actuality be true do build rationale for resistance to the rule. It is for this reason that the self, if put into positions of consolidated power and privilege over others, outwardly restrains their offenses not only because the social system they are put in charge of already does the work of brutal oppression and elegant persuasion of those unruly, but also because of such things as the risk of their losing to the challenger as grounds for their deposition. The infrastructure that these selves are in official control of also grants them the metaphorical tentacles to inflict impact much more than by their direct hands. Frequent courses of action for the ruler/s forced to deal with sentient beings viewed as problematic are via "playing things with class", meaning to do things as elegant as possible by their capabilities, such that their flaws in their practice of power are not conveniently traceable by others that would then reproduce evidence that posits the treachery of the ruler/s. On the converse, the self that is part of a challenger movement to those officially part of the rulership is not beholden to the pragmatic of outward restraint. In the spectrum of liberation to conservation, the self as a challenger is undeniably part of the liberation. There is a status quo that the self, as a challenger, feels that they must challenge, as part of their own rights, thus straying from the path of conservation to be the first-mover in offense against the status quo. From the perspective of the challenger self, the conservation has disserviced them. They, by their self-interest, have the questionable liberty of seeking retribution for this disservice, so by whatever means they think necessary to inflict as much destabilizing offense that they feel fit, for "the ends justify the means", their self-interest is the force behind their challenge to the status. The perplexity of understanding the self, when they are in the role of a challenger instead of a ruler, revolves around the perceived flaws they are attempting to correct. The system of the status quo does not suit the self, based on the beliefs generated from their self-interest. Self-justifying selves would therefore reason, whatever flawed means they used and are to use to antagonize the adversary in charge of their social construct and all the miseries wrought onto them, pale in the relativity of comparison to the qualitative flaws of the rulership and their erroneous abuses. Self-interest, as a force for the non-total self, being subject to the conditions of the default social construct, oscillates between acting as a controller of circumstances (rulership), possibly verging on despotic behavior if not "unquestionable" dictatorship, to being an agent of outward offense when they are a challenger to the rulership. The objective remains the same for the political self, regardless of their being the ruler or the challenger: power. Obtaining if not retaining power in their wanted form.
The artificial axiom can never be on the same low-level of natural instantiation as the axiom, the unit of source for the cause, the indisputable principle of the natural world, a world that behaves and appears less natural by the constructs and mannerisms devised and adhered to by sentient beings, based on their will. These constructs and mannerisms do reason to be arbitrary because of the premise that they can exist or be actualized because of natural law, but they are based on reasoning very unlike the indisputability of natural law, in the way of abidement to the axiom's constant dynamic and the universal formula for the cause, such as the condition/s that consistently activate the axiom's actualization. There is no inherent consistency in the actualization (execution, usage) of the artificial axiom; the artificial axiom is a design by sentience to be used for the orders and constructs established by sentience. Any principle past the hard sciences, and especially past economic principles of finiteness and zero-sum, into the realm of cooperation as non-zero sum is an artificial axiom devised by an impure combinatorial fusing of socially acceptable views, still requiring the voluntary will to be actualized, and the indisputable natural. The artificial axiom does not automatically act, as in autonomous systems that rely on consistency in the makings of their automation as effect from the cause that moves them. There is will involved in order for the artificial axiom to bear relevance. Without the will of sentience, the artificial axiom fails to remain relevant, forgotten and metaphorically tossed aside into the abysses of the nullified obsolete. Some examples of human practices are necessary to shed light on the notion of the artificial axiom not being automatic. Money is not automatically distributed to those in poverty, but the state, based on the will of its people, could take the effort to. Poverty is strongly associated with vice, encouraging crimes such as robbery and murder for capital, and as such, any developed society recognizes poverty as a chief detriment, against every one's self-interest. Yet, those in poverty are not automatically given enough capital to persist in the way of affording housing or food, just because there is the artificial axiom declared by human beings that poverty must be eradicated. Additional effort, outside of verbal and written declaration of this artificial axiom, must be enacted in order for those in poverty to receive the capital they so desperately need to meaningfully continue to survive. Another example is privilege to the individual, privilege granted to the individual on legal basis. Privilege is not guaranteed to the individual, despite the legal basis, synonymously artificial axioms. The individual must maintain both the knowledge that they have certain privileges in defense from the unrightful intrusion by others, and also to express their privilege as a fixture of their existence to others. Sentient will is involved in erecting and maintaining privilege. On a similar note, it is through the lack of will for reason and the pursuit of happiness that plunges individuals and societies alike into the despair of lowliness relative to their fellow human being. One key operational characteristic separates the axiom, a constituent of natural law, and the artificial axiom. The axiom serves as the irreducible and unpreventable principle, such that if a condition fitting to the axiom were to occur, this condition being the cause, then naturally, the effect borne from the axiom's application onto the cause occurs. There is no sentient will involved that can deter the effect from the cause. A human being, for example, hit in the heart by a multitude of high-caliber bullets has no chance of survival, despite their unquantifiable will to live. The cause (the multitude of high-caliber bullets) bears the effect of this human being's death, due to the axioms of kinetics and biological mortality from brute force. The artificial axiom, on the other hand, relies on a different category of causality chain. There is the cause, that is the human thought, action, and/or appearance, and then there is the sentient will necessary to connect the cause to the effect prescribed by the artificial axiom. With no will to connect the cause to the prescribed effect, the cause of human effort or appearance does not automatically (with no need for sentient will) lead to said effect. And the self, in general, focuses their will for their self-interest. If the self believes their self-interest does not benefit much by their will's application into connecting the artificial axiom's cause to the effect, then there is a strong chance they will do nothing, or even prevent the prescribed effect from actualizing due to the cause. The artificial axiom makes for many questions on the concept of free will. It is constructed based on the premise of the interests of many selves, a collective self-interest, envisioned by supporters to be a fixture for the sphere of influence they all participate in. But the artificial axiom is semi-automatic, at most. The application of "free will" is used in cases that invoke the artificial axiom, where the dichotomies of proposition and opposition to the prescribed effect become matters phrased in terms of choice for self-interest, in tandem with the interests of the involved other selves.
Self-interest is one force, the vital force immortally connected to the self, for the self cannot cease in one form without the corresponding self-interest attached also ceasing in that same form, that is obviously not self-contained, proven by the points made from the beginning of this text until this point. The courses of action taken and the thinking done by every sentient being can all be traced back to the force of self-interest. In mathematical terms, this tracing is not a one-to-one mapping. Self-interest is indeed responsible for all phenomena expressed by every sentient lifeform, based on their will susceptible to misguidance, from external stimuli, and operational malfunction via their own limbs and bodily organs. For the sake of the self, the will must always be aligned with what they believe to be their self-interest, if the self were intent on their wanted outcome. The objective self is always intent on the outcome; this is a safe assumption for this kind of self since their true objective first cognitively constructed by them is supposed to be executed to their wanted degrees of success, lest they are either lying to themself about the destinations they intend to arrive at or they are, in fact, incapable, such that their stated objective is not even minutely feasible, so they are actually not an objective self but a deluded idealist of a self. The self is by default, as an agent of change in ways attributed on the spectrum enclosed by ordinariness and radicality, torn between the ideal of maximizing their potential (inherent talents and nurtured skills) and satisfying the pragmatic of being a fellow equal amongst different equals of other selves. This simple characterization of the duality between this specific ideal and this specific pragmatic is merely a stub, to clarify, a baseline convention. Practices labeled either pragmatic or ideal do require a certain coherence of the self with their surroundings, with other selves in contexts of competition and cooperation, and what is "pragmatic" or "ideal" is incontrovertibly connected to the demands, of arbitrary source, onto the self. The demands are a crucial determinant in the actualities of pragmatism and idealism for the self's quantifiable gains. And the demands, placed onto the self, cannot always be borne from the self's lone self-interest, void of influence from the interests of other selves. This terse statement is yet another rephrasing and proof of the self, as in the human self, having to play the role of the "social creature", a label of truth constant to them so long as there are at least two selves in contact with one another.
The category called "mannerism" plays a rather important part in human behavior. The usage of this term, "mannerism", should not be interpreted strictly as the artistic style from 16th century Italy. Truthfully, mannerism is much more than that, and although the 16th century Italians did indeed effectively capture and reproduce many messages, through their artistic depictions on the concept of mannerism, these successes are culturally relative in the scope of human societies spanning the globe. The proceeding discussion on mannerism is entirely about the general principles of mannerism in relation to self-interest, and does not make any further mention of this Western European nation, Italy, no matter its significance as a region since the beginning of history. The mannerist is a conservative agent in a few important aspects. The mannerist has references to replicate and thus adhere to. These references have been established through the historicity of styles that the mannerist's society has either retained or adopted. References include the custom, the ideological traits of the culture, and the archetypes for each socio-economic class' preferred behavior, this constituting definitive traits to recognize manner. The mannerist believes in restraining their will to act by impulse, in favor of the form that has been taught to them, then repeatedly expressed to them as the preferred pose of behavior and thinking that they should seldom divert away from. The mannerist, as an agent of change, can only go so far as reform rather than outright revolt. For the mannerist, there is already a reference to achieve the ideal in practice. Whatever societal change they are attempting is for the purpose of guiding their society back to the decorum of the manner. As such, the mannerist, in their objective to reform, is also categorically a moralist, albeit one with greater concern for cultural relativity over the universal good, more so than an ideologue with a singleminded vision of actualizing on their ideals by willfully blinding themselves to the cost, the cost being a great consideration for the mannerist tied to their moral in a world where relativity is invoked to counter resistance against what is deemed the necessary vice. The mannerist always attempts to avoid being put into the light of relativity, for this kind of light would place doubt on their preferences for the decorum, and this doubt then carries over to their qualitative character of being comprehended by others. The perception by the self of their surrounding mannerism is almost entirely correlated, in the sense of a deterministic mapping, to how the mannerism affects their self-interests. If the self were to, for instance, not be welcomed as a participant to certain organizations since although they may practice the manner of those organizations, they do not possess the inherent attributes that position them to benefit from the manner, then the possibility of the self rejecting the mannerism becomes greater. From their self-interest, the mannerism is a legitimized roadblock that restricts the wanted actualization of potential from the self. Conformity is the default decision of the mannerist; the mannerist presents themself in the accepted forms of attitudes and appearances, these being the references. These references of the practiced attitudes and appearances have taken on an idealism through valuation by the respective social sphere/s of influence. The mannerist's solution for the question of behavior, this consisting of acts in great part for appearance, and the entirety of the appearance is comprised of these references, the form out of many possibilities that serves as the best realism of practicing the ideal. Mannerism values the perceived appearance of the sentient being as the centrality of all evidence for judgment. The manners are the artificial axioms in mannerism, understood to be not as a choice to prefer but analogically, something very much like the gold standard out of the possible span of material goods, that is, the optimal, the discovered best that should be valued higher than the practices of the self if the self is positionally incapable of the manners. The mannerist, being one that comprehends other human beings by reliance on their perception of the human beings' appearances, uses the practice of correspondence theory in order to label particular appearances in divisions of dichotomy and greater dimension. This reliance is, in turn, ripe for vulnerability in accurate judgment: not all phenomena can be captured by perception, and this tenet naturally presupposes that not all human appearance, through behavior and pose, can be registered by perception. Furthermore, mannerism is pre-deterministic, similar to how proper mathematical problems already have solutions and only require a critical mind trained in quantitative techniques in order for the answers to be revealed, the ideal from the righteous practice. Mannerism can act as an effective front for deception and abuses of power. These two issues of mannerism can be reduced to errors in judgment by the practice of correspondence theory. In application of correspondence theory, the manner, that is the attitude and/or appearance, signifies a positive ideal, in other words, a virtue or moral infallible by conceptual integrity, yet inclined towards faultiness by practice, but through the trial-and-error, the manner emerges as the best practice of the positive ideal. Expressing the manner is reasoned as expressing the good, the ideal by the best realism. The manner is a mark of high civilization, something reasoned to have been adopted on the premise that it is good (the only reason why the manner was adopted). The manner is a defense against particular possibilities available to the sentient being with the constant problem of having to deal with their impulses, vices in great portion when related to the ideal standing of the manner. In other words, the manner that becomes a fixture for social acceptability represses particular potentials of behavior in human beings. But from a fatalistic perspective, the potential is still there, and the potential must still manifest (actualize) itself (that is the "natural" course of the span of existence for the potential). In terms of prevention, mannerism values the manner but does not guarantee prevention of action chains labeled as vice. The potential for these alternatives still manifest itself, in the shadows rather than the light that the mannerist society of official standing thinks they have sole ownership of. The manner could still serve as a mask to hide the motive, and in this aspect, deception through pretense and impostor usage branches out into prevalent issues in mannerist society. Acquiring education in the manner is a socio-economic privilege, but education of any kind is, first and foremost, instruction. Through the communication of instruction used to grow awareness of the manner's existence and to nurture its practice, the one performance trait that can be measured is the expression, not the understanding of acceptance for the reasoned virtue that produced the manner in the first place. In a general but related sense, there is the frequent rationale that the principle can be easily taught, but the choice to accept the moral as a fixture for sentient decision is a question of the individual's acceptance. The mannerist is an exteriorist: the exterior of the pose in the style of the manner is what takes priority, since internalist rationales as well as the trial-and-errors have already produced the solution that is the manner, the most appropriate. The self, as a functioning member in human societies, is recognized by the attribute of the roles and responsibilities they must play. To exemplify, the self in servitude to an organization recites phrases promoted by the organization, dresses and poses in ways representative of the organization. The self, if belonging to an elite class, uses language the elite class uses, subscribes to the same channels, buys the same products, all this indicative of conformity. A parallel description can be made for the self of a middle or low socio-economic class. However, to clarify, mannerism is the representation of the respective civilization's cultural hallmark. There are elitist elements attached to mannerism. The self, by default connected to a physically separate being, does not inherit knowledge of the manner, only perhaps a compass of morality that accepts the manner. The style is a cultural design, and so too must be the manner because the manner is a preferred style for the conceptual ideal it is to represent. Self-interest, as a force for the will of the human being, synonymously the "social creature", has the tendency to choose mannerism over their own originality, when the objective is to represent rather than discover, to uphold the legacy rather than re-design, and to value the group identity that practices the manner over the identities of others. Mannerism challenges the self's independent choice, free from the prescriptions set forth by the manner. Thus, the self may discover that their adherence to the manner, although conducive to their greater social acceptance, results in deficits of their individuality and possibly their authenticity, measured by their cognitive and emotive connection to the vessel of their body, since the expression of potential possible from the inherent strengths of the individual is not maximalized, even ignored and forgotten, when there is little alignment between the manner and the individual trait.
Self-interest, although self-driven through the will, as the force from one's will that is one layer above the one's motivation, can be manipulated. The reason for this manipulation is due to the directionality of the will being manipulable. By simple logic, the change in the input (the will) necessarily changes the output (qualities of self-interest such as the objectives). Some may argue that motivation is dependent on the will, instead of the converse that this text supposes. The semantics of language allow there to be differences in defining motivation and the will. The reason why this text places the will as dependent on motivation is due to the catalytic power of motivation. Motivation is a sort of metaphysical predecessor fuel for all actionable decisions made by the self. The will may be what is responsible for the self to decide on an option, out of their self-interest. But without the motivation, the will lacks an inherent drive to proceed with for executing the decision. Plants, for example, have the will to grow once their seed has sprouted. But the growth of the plant is purely physical, the growth of fibers into stems and branches connected to the root. Why would the plant not develop locomotion, or produce the fruits of different species, or naturally merge with other plants instead of competing for resources of soil and water? The plant does not do any of these things in the previous question, because the motivation of the plant propels its will to express development as growth in the formula that motivation is already definitively attached to. The growth is for the form of the plant's species. In biological terms, motivation would be equated to the biological code of RNA and DNA, so that if the potential is there, there is a determinism at play that does not allow development of the life past a threshold of divergence. Motivation is not equivalent to the biological code of RNA and DNA, but the similarity is mentioned to differentiate the determinism of motivation from that of will. The will can be directed towards one thing but through its use, something else emerges, so there is the discrepancy between the expected and actual; how the actual can be rationalized as the outcome from determinism is an argument to be made by the fatalist. This difference between the expected and the actual is due to one or more of three culprits: the will as something confused by the associated self, the self-interest as misguided by the use of the will in a directionality improper towards the expected, or the motivation is not there for the will of wants and desires converged into expectation unmet. Then according to this text's description, when the terms "will" and "motivation" are swapped for one another's definition, the "will" is a dependency for "motivation". One point of confusion on "self-interest", "will", and "motivation" is the cognitive awareness by the self of these forces. The self always has a conceptualization of their self-interest, although they might not know the consequences of acting on what they comprehend to be their self-interest. It can be argued that no one knows the future in absolute detail, after all. As for the will, the will has no mind to decide things by its lone existence as a force. The material of animate and inanimate is what contains the force of will; on a related note, the will as one single force is dispersed in the way of arbitrary splits of economy between all material. The will, being mindless, exists in modalities of directionalities, and can be used by the self as a metaphysical propellant of a force. But the motivation is very similar, at least, to the deterministic qualities of the corresponding self, hence why the simile of the biological code of RNA and DNA was used to help describe this force. In common usage, when one is said to be "motivated" for something or to do something, by the factuality of this text's description, it is the directionality of will that has been geared towards that something. However, without the motivation that is responsible for the capability, in addition to the physical requirements, the possibility of attaining or achieving that something can never actualize. Any discussion of metaphysics attempts to define the intangible concept universally recognized by any human being as phenomena they feel or think. Due to experience belonging to the individual, attempts to define metaphysics always fail to reach the specific that can be universally agreed on, but as for a group or a couple of human beings, agreement is more easily reached, due to the simple reason of less minds for less conflict in specifying definition on the same concept. With this acknowledgment in mind of the shortfalls of understanding the metaphysical in concrete (ironic, is it not) terms, the conceptualization of the hierarchical structure, of metaphysical existence, with self-interest being on top of the will on top of motivation is correct by the definition provided in this section, and correctness is an unanswered question for any detail outside the confines of this section. This here would be an example of the shortfalls of Aristotelian logic: to systematize an understanding, by use of terms independently defined, does indeed suit the purposes of conceptual understanding, but there are specifics of conditions and details in practical settings unacknowledged or incomprehensible due to the limits of a priori reasoning, so that only the anticipation of a reasonable span of possibilities can be correct in moving forward to experiencing the actual. So too is any conceptualization of self-interest. There are accurate abstractions of self-interest that provide some modicum of understanding. However, the details either occurred by chance of coincidence fitting in example for the abstract, have not occurred yet so there can only be the prejudice of expectation for the particular details to occur, or somehow produce too many possibilities to be of any valuable meaning (meaning is singular or at least a unified body of sorts, by the way). Self-interest acts in uncountable ways for uncountable appearances and effects, and there appears to be no proof, by the default of generality, on the theoretical availabilities for an agent to manipulate another's self-interest for some other alternative in the spectrum/s of uncountable possibilities.
The artificial axiom has the weakness of not being in complete alignment with the inevitable of the axioms for natural law. From a geometric perspective, the artificial axiom rest at least one step on top of the axiom. There can be a parallel in the "positioning" of the artificial axiom on top of the axiom, for there to be a "synergy" between the constancy of nature and the preference of action in the construct of the artificial axiom, albeit this is still an attempt to amplify the fundamental, such amplification resulting in not growing any fundamental but choosing a form to propagate a misconstrued fundamental. In the logic of geometric representation, attempting "positioning" of the artificial axiom towards the perpendicular with respect to the axiom is a counter against unauthorized occurrence of the axiom. The artificial axiom depends on the sentient usage or occurrence of the axiom to exist in material or action. The sole appearance of the artificial axiom in use reasons to be arbitrary. Why, there are many steps in sentient thought and action in order for the artificial axiom to have come about in not only existence but also acceptance of it as a rule. For one to understand why the artificial axiom is a part of the decision-making by the sentience surrounding them, the knowledge of the corresponding circumstances, in temporal spans relative to the point/s in time of the artificial axiom's usage, and sentient decisions in relation to those corresponding circumstances are pieced together in a fashion that attempts to use pure logic. Due to the many steps above the axioms of natural law that the artificial axiom presides on, there can be multiple, maybe innumerable, causality chains for why the artificial axiom came into sentient usage. Even if all causality chains are correct by logical construct, the preference for a subset of all of these chains excludes certain truths then. But to consider each causality chain as being pertinent as rationales for cause-to-effect, there is the potential for there to be too many chains for the utility of the rationales to be used in any ways other than deterministic or probabilistic preference. This is a mathematical description for the prejudice of accepting and rejecting equal rationales, logical constructs, to explain the chosen style, form, and nature belonging to the artificial axiom. The artificial axiom is arbitrary by judgment strictly on the impression of use, the observer's awareness of context being incomplete. Through the events transpired in a relevant span of time, in the space of the artificial axiom's use, these events having an arbitrariness in and of themselves by the perspectives of non-determinism, such that the alternative perspective of determinism on these events does not include the readily available reason of incontestable standing, the statement that the logical constructs used to rationalize the existence and validity of the artificial axiom is constantly questionable, in turn, advances the default state as an undeniable truth. In complex cases that deal with plurality, there is no readily available evidence to support any conjectured cause-to-effect. Lack of clarity on the cause of the artificial axiom is due to appearance being the first aspect registered by cognition, then the appearance as the effect from an ascertained cause that may serve or served the dual purpose of an effect from a different cause. Upheld reason for the birth and continuing usage of the artificial axiom is that of belief in cases of more than one causality chain, or where the validity of any causality chain for explanation fails the test of correctness outside of the coincidence for favorable occurrence. Belief, of course, is not equivalently the reason of truth. But from the cognition of self-interest, the truth is that the self chooses to understand and prefers how to understand, with the chance for this understanding to overlap with misunderstanding where there is an actual not understood. By frequency of the attributes from transpired events, the artificial axiom came into existence as rationale from sentience on matters such as the "solution" to the "problem", the "help" for the "solution", the "moral utility" of the "problem, et cetera. For instance, thievery is a universal vice recognized by societies. The label of thievery denotes vice on the default of fairness, justice, and equality. To steal something is to produce a void of loss to at least one other sentient being. If stealing became prevalent, modalities of living that rely on ownership and accountability would be threatened. No average sentient being would desire to be a victim of theft. So the artificial axiom of prohibiting thievery is one that uses the idea of loss in property as unfairness by breaking of the rule, the artificial axiom. But the artificial axiom cannot be guaranteed to reach a usage more absolute in frequency than not, without consideration for the spatiotemporal dependencies. The artificial axiom, in social settings, many times works by the moral of reciprocity: what one does to another will be returned to that one by the another, in kind. The moral of reciprocity makes up half of the concept of moral relativism because of its equivalency of one action/appearance for another, by the metric of similarity. The other half is contradiction and hypocrisy. Despite the relativity in the moral of reciprocity, this principle that also acts as an artificial axiom for other artificial axioms helps to convolute the original chain/s of reason, if any of validity can be found, because it depends on social acceptances in practice. The acceptance is what counts much more in the social realm of cooperation rather than the reason of truth; it can be argued that any reason of truth can only happen on phenomena entirely causes from the axioms of natural law, but the advancement of sentient will "above" the axiom, capable of deciding on choice, must go on. For an artificial axiom to be regarded identically as an axiom of natural law, there then must be an understanding between two or more sentient beings to act by that prescription. Only then can the artificial axiom appear to be one of producing effect from the cause without there being discernible, perhaps forced or insincere, effort of at least one sentient being's will, unreliable, inconsistent in availability. The overlap between economics and decision theory also happens to produce questions on how the self, how any self, perceives and upholds the artificial axiom subjected onto them. Economic thought usually veers towards the quantitative in the format of tables that illustrate the gains and losses that occur to a decider, the self in this discussion, if they were to make a decision in the context of specific conditions such as the decisions by other selves. In this focus on the decision that actualizes based on the reason of gains and losses, efforts to rationalize cause and use by decision revolve around these gains and losses, nothing more. Said gains and losses do have reasons for their occurrence, by the way. Exclusive consideration of these gains and losses to decide means that the reasons for their being do not have to be known by the decider. The artificial axiom that takes precedence over virtually all others, in economic decision theory quantified, is that of leveraging gains for the self and possibly loss for the other, in situations of inevitable loss. Many artificial axioms are violated in such leveraging, the weighing out of choice a compromise with the potential to fulfill self-interest at the loss of consistent adherence to these artificial axioms.
Self-interest of the self, in the predominant setting of sociality, should not be interpreted as independent in cause-and-effect, the will to do something possible necessarily meaning that that possibility manifests itself, if only because the will is of "the people", in the rhetoric of fairness by default. Additionally, the hierarchical model written of in this text, self-interest dependent on the will dependent on the motivation, does imply that an arbitrary human being, no matter how accurate the directionality of their will for their want, is required to have the appropriate motivation for them to move on to success. Physically, psychologically, genetically; the items in this list of three are some main categories in rationales on why the will of want does not always manifest the want in the existence of the spatiotemporal context. The model raises other questions besides from the one on its semantic correctness. Here is one on the model's definition of motivation, in practice. Suppose that there is the possibility that one human being has the motivation, the innate power, to want something, a want that extends outside of self-contained desire, but another human being does not have the motivation to. Could it be that there is a fundamental difference, possibly concerning that of the physical immeasurable, between these two human beings to have motivations for different wants? If so, the self's honest conceptualization of their identity of wants and self-image can be traced back to motivation as a source. Sexuality, for instance, is believed by many to be due to genetic (innate) factors, the motivation (by the model's definition of its hierarchy) instead of the self-interest responsible for expression and suppression of sexuality. Shifting focus, the artificial axiom is important in analyzing failures to reach the outcomes sought by self-interest. Despite the metaphorically great distance between the artificial axiom and the axiom in processes of actualization, the artificial axiom does become a concern greater in psychological impact to the self of any society developed past the basics of providing food, water, shelter. Even these basics become subject to artificial axioms of fairness and justice. The artificial axiom tames moral ambiguity, gives instruction for virtually any sentient decision, given the being's knowledge of the artificial axiom, of course, and other benefits to the "social fabric", comprised of the "social creature" that all selves, each connected to an individual human body, are and the material needed to support their ways of life. The social contract, a concept defined some time ago, is essentially a body of artificial axioms, argued to grant benefit to the individual self if the self were to follow the instructions passed to them through these artificial axioms. Human societies, once in great control of their destiny, free from constant natural disasters, the predation by carnivorous beasts inclined to dominate them if not for their tools forged and evolved over many centuries, develop the liberty to not be so narrowly focused on activity so closely revolving around the axiom of natural law, although the axiom of natural law may be poorly understood and instead accredited to their deities. This is not stating that human societies, once developed past a certain point, regress to unscientific, unmethodological beasts that only desire an incomplete inkling in operational knowledge of the axiom. Instead, the opposite can be what takes place. Human societies, having developed some advancements for their control over what would have been the fate of their demise or other undoings, are driven by the collective interest of self-interest to develop new methodologies that use the axiom and explore phenomena to exact the unknown of other axioms. However the results turn out, the will of want not always coming into fruition, as already stated, the availability of the exact knowledge of the axiom is potential untrapped for self-interest to continue on in directions dependent on that knowledge, that is, scientific discovery and engineering. The artificial axiom can be one of decorum, the rule of conduct and the preferred appearance as the impression of desirably enacting principle, this being "mannerism". An attribute on practices of mannerism, valuable enough to mention, is that the effect that is the appearance of the human being, through their action and speech, is usually without question on the cause of this effect where the mannerist is coincidentally one blindly accepted at face value by surrounding sentient beings. The self, being a societal member beholden to a social contract of sorts, is predictable at least in their actions, but as to their thoughts of desires and deliberation, questions remain. The artificial axiom influences the self to be a cooperating agent in their surroundings. Morality, etiquette, all turned into decisions made by self-interest yet constantly under the influence in some methodological way by the artificial axiom. Another aspect that makes the artificial axiom so effectively influential on the self, part of a society no longer completely and closely revolving around the axiom of natural law, is that the artificial axiom is usually the default way of thinking and behaving that they are born into. For their own self-interest, downsides great to their relativity in standing by the artificial axiom would logically have to occur for them to reject the artificial axiom while still a member of that society. Social unrest, social movements, social upheaval. These social phenomena are what occurs when certain artificial axioms are revolted by many selves. As for the self, their subscription to the artificial axiom is purely a question for their self-interest. In sociological and cultural terms, this subscription is a disproportionate variable in judgments of their civility.
Deficits become present in the use of any artificial axiom. The artificial axiom is one that inadvertently promotes mimicry by certain sentient beings of others in order to demonstrate the corresponding proper practice; but the artificial axiom of following as virtue is instead direct. Preferably, authentic usage of the artificial axiom, an independent propensity for the artificial axiom instead of mimicry, where the positive influence for the proper use logically assumes one or more sources of influence can work effect by the negative influence, a swaying of the will for self-interest to operate towards different ends in matters where conclusive effects as endings are necessary, is the ideal. The workings of the economical human being, by the lone self and collective, with a tendency to value efficiency over the expensive rigor frequently labeled unnecessary and thus stupid, rely on mimicry to certain degrees in all forms of thought and labor in the social setting. Language is taught from parent and teacher to child, prototypes of engineered products are copied and refined towards the perfection of an enhanced image derived from an original, and wise sayings are passed from one another through word of mouth and/or writing. Understanding is not a universal formula of a process. Understanding is reached through the spontaneity from the self's cognition of recognizing and expressing the principle of an apparent. This is an originalist ideal: if one were truly capable in their independence of thought and action, they should be the one responsible for achieving the understanding without the guide of hints and other supplements. Alternatively, understanding can be reached through efforts additional to the successful imitation by one initially ignorant on the matter. Imitation of the process is heavily reliant on the rote memorization, the experience of the visual to act in appearance for the effect of product material or not, in the likeness of the source used for imitation. If self-interest does not take a keen interest, a "magnetism", towards the axiomatic construct of the imitated process, more comprehensive than that of directly describing the appearance of this process, in the independent language of the self for the exactness of the actual, then self-interest naturally does not understand the entirety, the cause that results in the effects constituting the process they are mimicking. In fact, if the influence of the feedback the self receives on their conduct of the process is of an importance more than their understanding, the self is not motivated (in the categorization of one or the other) by the external, in other words. Their motivation, although possessing the potential so that the posssibility is there, thereby utilizes the differing capability of metaphorically shutting the door to the possibilities of understanding by effort of self-interest, from the will. The motive of a sentient being is the primal mark, invisible yet evident through exemplifying expression, of their attempted determinism involving themself and possibly others. The term "motive", in the context of a deciding someone and an action they are supposed to do or an action purportedly linked to them, is a word for the "cause" of that someone to do or have done the action. In this text's construct that is the dependencies of self-interest, the will, and the motivation, in descending order of dependence, self-interest is responsible for the "motive", while without the proper motivation for a specific "motive", there would be none, so to speak, limited in existence to the realm of will of unattainable desire. The "motive", as an aspect of self-interest, encourages the self to strive to succeed for the wanted outcomes in relation, and is equivalently the preferred cause of choice by a human being. The "motive" is one thing, then, and the actual possibly suiting the motive, this reasoning identical to the will being one thing and the wanted actualization another, simply because both of these statements draw the hard line between the self with their self-interest, their will, their motivation and the actual, the phenomena inevitable and the constructs that persist because of the axiom's instantiation and the artificial axiom's use that may include instantiation of the axiom. The specificities of the context and the context's appropriate methodologies for the pertaining problem require solving issues of knowledge and adequately fitting execution by that knowledge. Incompetence and willful failure, two labels for these requirements. Consider the artificial axiom of "reciprocity". The reciprocal, while easy to comprehend in mathematics as the singular process of swapping a fraction's numerator and denumerator for one another's position, becomes subject to interpretation by the self. Is reciprocity simply mimicking, imitating, or mocking as the response that is what is believed to be the appropriate action to another existence or action? This would have an easiness in positive correlation to the complexity of what is to be reciprocated. Reciprocity, as an objective of "equaling" out matters, or perhaps "negating" all of a category, in practice would have to be quantified, so that the practice of "reciprocating" can be analyzed. Would reciprocation mean anything if not for the magnitude quantified, deliberately for a certain mark to send a certain message in excess, lack, or equality to the reciprocated reference? Or can reciprocating be something else other than the metaphorical "mirror reflection"? An appropriate response unlike what was to be responded to. Each of these two ways of reciprocating is an artificial axiom, and then there is the question of magnitude for every need to reciprocate. A few sentences back, the synonyms "mimicking", "imitating", and "mocking" were used in the same sentence to lend way to another observation, that on natural language of human beings. In terms of efficiency, there is no need for any synonym to exist in any language. But language is not entirely focused on the efficiency (similarly, neither does the artificial axiom). Any word adopted into a language takes on nuanced differences in meaning with their synonyms, if there are any. In realms of difference in meaning outside of the word's definition, the context by which one synonym is used instead of another could have been due to the decision of a play on words or a humorous implication on the situation being discussed. Synonyms are clear indicators of the practice's plurality by human beings, analogously, the variance in attire as the artificial axiom of demand for appropriate clothing, the greeting of welcome as the artificial axiom of showing appropriate politeness, et cetera. The artificial axiom is but a metaphysical body of meaning, requiring the use of a shared natural language between two human beings for their conjunctive understanding of similar, ideally identical, bearing. It is then to state, with confidence, that the meaning of the artificial axiom is essentially an individual's definition, a metaphysical construct directly or through influence a product from self-interest. Self-interest modifies the official definition, gives "new life" to the word, to the artificial axiom as a body of meaning frequently expressed in words, and perceives the exemplifying image of the artificial axiom according to the constituents of the self's cognition. From context to context, self-interest transforms the definition of the artificial axiom, demanded for use, into other forms to fit for acceptance; this is how rationalization of the questionable, required an answer, works. Transformative processes, from the "fundamental" definition of the artificial axiom, for arbitrary usage could demand said definition to be altered in order to fit for the form, the "ideal" and whatnot. Artificial axioms, as being individuals' definitions, are rules collectivist to some particular degrees. The appearance of the collective adhering to the artificial axiom, maybe even so much to be interpreted as religious fervor, is deceptive to the observer fixated on the "total" before their senses. Self-interest, the self, is the unit for constructing the appearance of the collective, maybe successfully even fostering a metaphysical (spiritual) unity more unbreakable than any material construct. And so, the artificial axiom is instantiated in the variable ways of spottiness and totality, with respect to consistency of effect from causes identical in principle to that described by the artificial axiom, by "social creatures", human beings.
The artificial axiom is not always probabilistic in effect. For the clarity of distinction between what is inevitable as is, and what can become a consistency very much identical to the inevitable by the will for action fitting to the effect from the cause specified by the artificial axiom, the artificial axiom is identified as "artificial", natural so much as there is consistency in the use. The artificial axiom, in its lone existence, is clearly a disconnected metaphysical body of meaning. But the artificial axiom in practice, in constructs built using many artificial axioms in specific arrangements, how the instantiation of one axiom naturally leads way to the instantiation of another axiom in aspects such as conditional defense and necessary amplification, becomes ever more important in situations where the relevant axioms of natural law are subject to the ruling construct comprised of artificial axioms. These particular situations, tighty controlled by certain sentient beings, make the appearance and additionally the effect very convincing demonstration of the determinism by use of artificial axiom. For an axiom of natural law to "be subject to" an artificial axiom, a capable life form, technically one or more sentient beings have a virtually entire control over the instantiation of the axiom. The corresponding artificial axiom for this axiom of natural law consists of statements on the instantiation of the axiom. For example, only specific cases of causes specified by the artificial axiom can produce the effect of instantiating the axiom. This implies that the mechanisms by which to instantiate the artificial axiom are regulated by one or more sentient beings, whose rule over the mechanism is via artificial axiom. Capably obeying the instruction of the artificial axiom does indeed send deterministic impressions to observers, brought into consequence not from the indiscriminate axiom, instead from the will of accepting the artificial axiom as a rule of behavior to such a degree for there to be no measurable doubt, hesitation, or failure to do the part (the effect from the occurred cause) on the treatment of the artificial axiom. Artificial axioms manifest themselves in many common ways for societies. A person's job salary is fixed within a span of values, so that there is no way for them to afford anything exceeding the possible span of monetary value, without that person having to obtain money from causes not their job. The capability to purchase something, such as a service, allows one to improve their material belongings or their physical state of existence, such improvements clearly measurable by applying metrics of axioms. The necessary sustenance of food for the physical well-being of a person, possibly denied to them through the successful implementation of the artificial axiom connected to a regulated axiom, under the reign of particular sentient beings capable of instantiating the axiom at their own command. The notion of control is purely logical with respect to machines invented and produced by human beings. The machines can be analyzed to a relative completeness in understanding by the physical attributes, thus measurable by one or more of the basic five senses or through a device that can relay precise measures back to the five senses, predominantly taking the form of the sentient being's vision capturing the information of quantity and visual. Due to this understanding of the machine made by human beings, the machine used that breaks could be logically analyzed according to the direction of reversing the construction, the breakdown of the machine into relevant constituents interconnected for the functioning of the machine, with the interconnections themselves being additional culprits for the machine's failure. The human being, capable of logical reasoning appropriate for this machine, would have no deterrents in their way of correctly detailing the machine's issues, given the condition that the machine's breaking does not result in other breakings since this would be a potentially unascertainable chain of breaking. But on the matter of the human being accurately relaying the machine's issues to others, that is something that can be answered only with the knowledge of that human being's self-interest in relation to the machine and its issues, such as financial and political motives. Distribution of reasoning on the logical, thus arriving at answers unquestionable without deception or ignorance at play, to others is at the mercy of the self-interests of those with knowledge of that reasoning. But the knowledge of the cause for a machine's failure is not always able to be known, and this does spell limits on that of reasoning where information is missing or distorted; the causality is not just one causality chain but many, or the causality is conceptually a network of convoluted, changeable, and unpredictable layout in effects. One can see the limitations of reasoning on artificial intelligence programs, if capable of decisions past the monitoring in path-like and arithmetic-like patterns by a human being. The common automobile, on the other hand, being constructed for the predominant purpose of efficient spatial locomotion, with additional amenities coming later past the inventions that birthed it, is much simpler to analyze for fault: there are less causality chains, less possible outputs from the automobile independent from its surroundings changeable through its locomotion. The limitation of reasoning about advanced artificial intelligence programs serves as an effective analogy for the limitation of understanding the human being's internalist mechanisms, intangible and not readily measurable through the outward expression of convenience and opportunity. And artificial intelligence programs are constructed by human beings well aware of the building blocks for the programs. Artificial intelligence programs lack complexities from unknown constituents; the scale of their structure and the dependencies of their operation, such as large datasets, produce misconceptions in calculative analysis to compensate. Misconceptions of human biology, on the other hand, predominantly are due to the unknowns, possibly unique to certain individuals. The artificial axiom desired to be implemented in ways to guarantee appropriate effect, in light of these limitations of reasoning, is done so by sentient beings intent on control in the instantiation of related axioms. Consequences, in the nature of undesireable effect to violators, take the form of correspondent artificial axioms for the particular artificial axioms specified not to be violated. These correspondents could be instantiated in forms painful, mentally and/or physically, to those that dare ignore the intruction of the artificial axiom. Deprivation and incarceration are two designs for the consequential anti-violator artificial axiom. By designs such as these, in practice widely enforced, human beings of societies that have passing proficiency in control of the axiom's occurrence, then find themselves to be regulated by artificial axioms and thus mainly obey these instructions as if they were nature itself, but to be accurate, this is habit becoming second-nature. The human being somehow stabilizes and improves their behavior where will works to act for that behavior, and the result is the artificial axiom takes on a naturalness much deeper than the appearance, such that the will required to actualize the artificial axiom's effect from the occurrence of a cause is placed into action by self-interest similar to machine work, unquestioning, without consideration for the specifics of variables possibly candidates to pose exception. Self-interest works in ways not entirely knowable into principles by observation, for there is preference and undesireable consequence becoming a duality for the plurality in expression by multiple self-interests not in alignment with one another. When the appearance, without veil, of many sentient beings is so consistent in detail regarding artificial axioms, one would state that the beings are in complete agreement on those conditions.
Sentient beings, without the artificial axiom, go mad at one another out
of the individuals' preferences, not judged to be fitting. There is no
objectivity, no metric to prove the mark of the practice (circularly, the
proof would be by the metric), albeit the practice may not be subject to
the mortalities and consequences of the axiom independently invoked without
a sentient being's intentional action, allowing for dispute to go on, as
ceaselessly as the material energy and feudal spirit allows. When the
artificial axiom comes into existence by perceivable representation of
its metaphysical meaning, there is still chance for disagreement. But the
basis of such disagreement is different: in the first context, no rule
exists and the contenders are so to one another so that they can establish
the rule, and the second context is that of the question of agreement on
the established rule (the artificial axiom). It is a difference that is
nuanced in comparison to marked polarity, but its mention stresses the
importance of the existence of the predominant or the official rule with
the alternative, that of relative resistance. The artificial axiom, in
this description's use, has the meaning of a rule greatly accepted, not
one held by exactly one specific sentient being. Suppose that any sentient
being can declare an artificial axiom for a specific matter. And these
artificial axioms, in relation to one another, can not only be on a spectrum
of pedantic detail to accepting broadness, they can also be greatly contrary
to one another by structuring decision-making into exactly one or the other.
A lack of commonality is the defining trait of this specific matter's effects
from these sentient beings, due to at least one of the two, the differing causes
and differing effects, between each artificial axiom's statement. Scant use
of the artificial axiom, correspondingly a scant economy of sentient will
for this use, makes the artificial axiom a minority rule, perhaps lesser
than that, an individual's rule. Complication on conclusively generalizing
an artificial axiom, by the practices that stem from it, is due to another
aspect, the individual whose actions (the evidence through expression)
are rationalized only by attributing their actions to artificial
axioms. And the recognition of a prevailing artificial axiom for a
group of sentient beings relies on a passing frequency in the accurate
attribution of the group's particular independent actions, manifested
as appearance, physical movement, or speech, to the artificial axiom
(the cause). The artificial axiom as a rule connected to the decision-making
faculty of an individual, for their self-interest above their profits of finance,
social influence, or political power in the cases of idealistic individuals,
has vulnerabilities in its actualization. The poetry that narrates tragedy,
according to the reason of rhythm, often takes a microscopic interest in
the specifics of only a few human beings, and translates the actual events
that occurred into the interpretation for the expression of the sentimentality,
the universal concepts each and every human being knows and cares about but
in their own way, the ephemeral existence, the injustices of default and
throughout that span, amongst other topics. What makes poetry susceptible
to inaccuracy is not the fiction disjoint from the fact. The directions
of the messages, the directionality of the basis for the poem as a holistic
structure, the craft of persuasion at work, and the arrangement of communication
to elicit sentiment from the consumer are all culprits for this inaccuracy,
in both interpretation by the consumer and the intended motives for the
work. On a related note, the fact that is mentioned for an agenda in conflict
to or reinforcing of a situation is also not without the bias of motive,
hence there is this note as a justifying reason for one preferring
fiction or nonfiction, but this point does mislead, through parallelism,
for advocacy of a completely free consumer market, where the consumer can
buy anything because of an inherent justification according to the justice
of fiction or nonfiction being free to prefer. Rewinding focus back to the
matter of poetics of tragedy, to state that there are artificial axioms at
play, believed by some, is accurate. Another accuracy, for matters where
tragedy is achieved not by the loss through inanimate phenomena but by
the work of one or more sentient beings is responsible for the grimness, is
that these artificial axioms' use, and additionally their existence, is
challenged on the premise of a wanted purity in use of these same artificial
axioms, the practice being wrongful, or due to contrasting artificial axioms.
If matters of literary tragedy were explained not via the application of
artificial axiom, then a roughly equal understanding can be achieved by noting
the whims of certain individuals running contrary to those designated as
antagonists, by the basis of a goodness assigned to those favored in narration
but not by narrative fate, and these antagonists characteristic of idiocy,
lunacy, and conventional sin. But this roughly equal understanding is not
comprised of the rule, equivalently the principle, of reason, but of judgment
on what is good or bad and other labeling schematics, thus being at least one
layer above the description via artificial axiom; there can be no judgment
without the experience of perception or a blind choice. Tragedy is one
category of suffering, and suffering is a topic very widely discussed
because, for the human being, it is a universal concept. Transcendentalism
is one broad field of thought that has attempted to alleviate suffering
by sentient beings who, upon finding stability in certain environments
and labors, become disgruntled with the metaphysical maze of artificial
axioms, alleged by them to dictate their decisions, restricting their
freedoms to actualize on objectives of their self-interests. For the
metaphorical fact though, the "metaphysical maze of artificial axioms"
does grow a symbiotic binding to the motives of self-interest, how self-interest
becomes a force not to reach potential or to freely express, on the penalty
of financial loss or defamation of reputation. And these penalties do not
even directly invoke the axiom of natural law, instead somewhere along the
way after facing these penalties, the lucky coincidences from the axiom's
occurrence are not there, quite the contrary to be honest. The nearness to
or a possession of a physical resource deprived, perception by the public
encouraged to take up means through instantiating select axioms for physical
impact, et cetera. A terse translation of transcendentalism's spirit is that the
artificial axiom really has no meaning if not accepted, and why should the
artificial axiom be accepted if its agents only produce pain through meaning,
if it only encourages unwanted physical violence (yes, this would be
instantiations of axioms of natural law) or cognitive distress, in which
the loss in control of decision-making leads to negative effects from
the axiom? The transcendentalist can also be called a utilitarian that
has chosen not to be a utility for or to utilize certain artificial axioms,
on basic premises such as the artificial axioms being deterrents to the
pursuit of happiness, destroyers of the paradise, when there is the apparently
better choice of "transcending" the system comprised of artificial axioms,
run by those uncaring and selfish themselves, to meet the universal ideal
through personal experience. The concept of liberated freedom, this being
labeled words such as "autonomy" and "independence", is one component in a
comprehensive illumination of self-interest, and does speak to the selfishness
capable by the self.