kbuild: control extra pacman packages with PACMAN_EXTRAPACKAGES #1
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ptr1337
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Looks good to me.
Reviewed-by: Peter Jung [email protected]
Introduce a new variable, PACMAN_EXTRAPACKAGES, in the Makefile.package to control the creation of additional packages by the pacman-pkg target. The headers and api-headers packages will be included by default if PACMAN_EXTRAPACKAGES is not set. This changes the previous behavior where headers was conditionally included if CONFIG_MODULES=y. Now, this control is delegated to the user. To disable extra packages, set PACMAN_EXTRAPACKAGES to an empty value: make pacman-pkg PACMAN_EXTRAPACKAGES= or make pacman-pkg PACMAN_EXTRAPACKAGES="" Signed-off-by: Jose Fernandez <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Peter Jung <[email protected]>
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…pinlock_t'
This lock is acquired under irq_desc::lock with interrupts disabled.
When PREEMPT_RT is enabled, 'spinlock_t' becomes preemptible, which results
in invalid lock acquire context;
[ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
swapper/0/1 is trying to lock:
ffff0000008fed30 (&ctl->lock){....}-{3:3}, at: meson_gpio_irq_update_bits0
other info that might help us debug this:
context-{5:5}
3 locks held by swapper/0/1:
#0: ffff0000003cd0f8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __driver_attach+0x90c
#1: ffff000004714650 (&desc->request_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: __setup_irq0
#2: ffff0000047144c8 (&irq_desc_lock_class){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __setup_irq0
stack backtrace:
CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.9.9-sdkernel #1
Call trace:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x60/0x88
meson_gpio_irq_update_bits+0x34/0x70
meson8_gpio_irq_set_type+0x78/0xc4
meson_gpio_irq_set_type+0x30/0x60
__irq_set_trigger+0x60/0x180
__setup_irq+0x30c/0x6e0
request_threaded_irq+0xec/0x1a4
Fixes: 215f4cc ("irqchip/meson: Add support for gpio interrupt controller")
Signed-off-by: Arseniy Krasnov <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]
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syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref while accessing sk2->sk_reuseport_cb in
reuseport_add_sock(). [0]
The repro first creates a listener with SO_REUSEPORT. Then, it creates
another listener on the same port and concurrently closes the first
listener.
The second listen() calls reuseport_add_sock() with the first listener as
sk2, where sk2->sk_reuseport_cb is not expected to be cleared concurrently,
but the close() does clear it by reuseport_detach_sock().
The problem is SCTP does not properly synchronise reuseport_alloc(),
reuseport_add_sock(), and reuseport_detach_sock().
The caller of reuseport_alloc() and reuseport_{add,detach}_sock() must
provide synchronisation for sockets that are classified into the same
reuseport group.
Otherwise, such sockets form multiple identical reuseport groups, and
all groups except one would be silently dead.
1. Two sockets call listen() concurrently
2. No socket in the same group found in sctp_ep_hashtable[]
3. Two sockets call reuseport_alloc() and form two reuseport groups
4. Only one group hit first in __sctp_rcv_lookup_endpoint() receives
incoming packets
Also, the reported null-ptr-deref could occur.
TCP/UDP guarantees that would not happen by holding the hash bucket lock.
Let's apply the locking strategy to __sctp_hash_endpoint() and
__sctp_unhash_endpoint().
[0]:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10230 Comm: syz-executor119 Not tainted 6.10.0-syzkaller-12585-g301927d2d2eb #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024
RIP: 0010:reuseport_add_sock+0x27e/0x5e0 net/core/sock_reuseport.c:350
Code: 00 0f b7 5d 00 bf 01 00 00 00 89 de e8 1b a4 ff f7 83 fb 01 0f 85 a3 01 00 00 e8 6d a0 ff f7 49 8d 7e 12 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 28 84 c0 0f 85 4b 02 00 00 41 0f b7 5e 12 49 8d 7e 14
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b947c98 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8880252ddf98 RCX: ffff888079478000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000012
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff8993e18d R09: 1ffffffff1fef385
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1fef386 R12: ffff8880252ddac0
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f24e45b96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffcced5f7b8 CR3: 00000000241be000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sctp_hash_endpoint net/sctp/input.c:762 [inline]
sctp_hash_endpoint+0x52a/0x600 net/sctp/input.c:790
sctp_listen_start net/sctp/socket.c:8570 [inline]
sctp_inet_listen+0x767/0xa20 net/sctp/socket.c:8625
__sys_listen_socket net/socket.c:1883 [inline]
__sys_listen+0x1b7/0x230 net/socket.c:1894
__do_sys_listen net/socket.c:1902 [inline]
__se_sys_listen net/socket.c:1900 [inline]
__x64_sys_listen+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1900
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f24e46039b9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 91 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f24e45b9228 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000032
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f24e468e428 RCX: 00007f24e46039b9
RDX: 00007f24e46039b9 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f24e468e420 R08: 00007f24e45b96c0 R09: 00007f24e45b96c0
R10: 00007f24e45b96c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f24e468e42c
R13: 00007f24e465a5dc R14: 0020000000000001 R15: 00007ffcced5f7d8
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
Fixes: 6ba8457 ("sctp: process sk_reuseport in sctp_get_port_local")
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=e6979a5d2f10ecb700e4
Tested-by: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Xin Long <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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The lifetime of TCP-AO static_key is the same as the last tcp_ao_info. On the socket destruction tcp_ao_info ceases to be with RCU grace period, while tcp-ao static branch is currently deferred destructed. The static key definition is : DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_DEFERRED_FALSE(tcp_ao_needed, HZ); which means that if RCU grace period is delayed by more than a second and tcp_ao_needed is in the process of disablement, other CPUs may yet see tcp_ao_info which atent dead, but soon-to-be. And that breaks the assumption of static_key_fast_inc_not_disabled(). See the comment near the definition: > * The caller must make sure that the static key can't get disabled while > * in this function. It doesn't patch jump labels, only adds a user to > * an already enabled static key. Originally it was introduced in commit eb8c507 ("jump_label: Prevent key->enabled int overflow"), which is needed for the atomic contexts, one of which would be the creation of a full socket from a request socket. In that atomic context, it's known by the presence of the key (md5/ao) that the static branch is already enabled. So, the ref counter for that static branch is just incremented instead of holding the proper mutex. static_key_fast_inc_not_disabled() is just a helper for such usage case. But it must not be used if the static branch could get disabled in parallel as it's not protected by jump_label_mutex and as a result, races with jump_label_update() implementation details. Happened on netdev test-bot[1], so not a theoretical issue: [] jump_label: Fatal kernel bug, unexpected op at tcp_inbound_hash+0x1a7/0x870 [ffffffffa8c4e9b7] (eb 50 0f 1f 44 != 66 90 0f 1f 00)) size:2 type:1 [] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [] kernel BUG at arch/x86/kernel/jump_label.c:73! [] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI [] CPU: 3 PID: 243 Comm: kworker/3:3 Not tainted 6.10.0-virtme #1 [] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [] Workqueue: events jump_label_update_timeout [] RIP: 0010:__jump_label_patch+0x2f6/0x350 ... [] Call Trace: [] <TASK> [] arch_jump_label_transform_queue+0x6c/0x110 [] __jump_label_update+0xef/0x350 [] __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x3c/0x60 [] jump_label_update_timeout+0x2c/0x40 [] process_one_work+0xe3b/0x1670 [] worker_thread+0x587/0xce0 [] kthread+0x28a/0x350 [] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x70 [] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [] </TASK> [] Modules linked in: veth [] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [] RIP: 0010:__jump_label_patch+0x2f6/0x350 [1]: https://netdev-3.bots.linux.dev/vmksft-tcp-ao-dbg/results/696681/5-connect-deny-ipv6/stderr Cc: [email protected] Fixes: 67fa83f ("net/tcp: Add static_key for TCP-AO") Signed-off-by: Dmitry Safonov <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <[email protected]>
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linkwatch_event() grabs possibly very contended RTNL mutex.
system_wq is not suitable for such work.
Inspired by many noisy syzbot reports.
3 locks held by kworker/0:7/5266:
#0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3206 [inline]
#0: ffff888015480948 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x90a/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
#1: ffffc90003f6fd00 ((linkwatch_work).work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3207 [inline]
, at: process_scheduled_works+0x945/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3312
#2: ffffffff8fa6f208 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: linkwatch_event+0xe/0x60 net/core/link_watch.c:276
Reported-by: syzbot <[email protected]>
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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When ftrace_graph_ret_addr() is invoked to convert a found stack return address to its original value, the function can end up producing the following crash: [ 95.442712] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 [ 95.442720] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 95.442724] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 95.442727] PGD 0 P4D 0- [ 95.442731] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [ 95.442736] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2214 Comm: insmod Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE K 6.11.0-rc1-default #1 67c62a3b3720562f7e7db5f11c1fdb40b7a2857c [ 95.442747] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE, [K]=LIVEPATCH [ 95.442750] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 [ 95.442754] RIP: 0010:ftrace_graph_ret_addr+0x42/0xc0 [ 95.442766] Code: [...] [ 95.442773] RSP: 0018:ffff979b80ff7718 EFLAGS: 00010006 [ 95.442776] RAX: ffffffff8ca99b10 RBX: ffff979b80ff7760 RCX: ffff979b80167dc0 [ 95.442780] RDX: ffffffff8ca99b10 RSI: ffff979b80ff7790 RDI: 0000000000000005 [ 95.442783] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 95.442786] R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffffff8e9491e0 [ 95.442790] R13: ffffffff8d6f70f0 R14: ffff979b80167da8 R15: ffff979b80167dc8 [ 95.442793] FS: 00007fbf83895740(0000) GS:ffff8a0afdd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 95.442797] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 95.442800] CR2: 0000000000000028 CR3: 0000000005070002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 [ 95.442806] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 95.442809] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 95.442816] Call Trace: [ 95.442823] <TASK> [ 95.442896] unwind_next_frame+0x20d/0x830 [ 95.442905] arch_stack_walk_reliable+0x94/0xe0 [ 95.442917] stack_trace_save_tsk_reliable+0x7d/0xe0 [ 95.442922] klp_check_and_switch_task+0x55/0x1a0 [ 95.442931] task_call_func+0xd3/0xe0 [ 95.442938] klp_try_switch_task.part.5+0x37/0x150 [ 95.442942] klp_try_complete_transition+0x79/0x2d0 [ 95.442947] klp_enable_patch+0x4db/0x890 [ 95.442960] do_one_initcall+0x41/0x2e0 [ 95.442968] do_init_module+0x60/0x220 [ 95.442975] load_module+0x1ebf/0x1fb0 [ 95.443004] init_module_from_file+0x88/0xc0 [ 95.443010] idempotent_init_module+0x190/0x240 [ 95.443015] __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5b/0xc0 [ 95.443019] do_syscall_64+0x74/0x160 [ 95.443232] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 95.443236] RIP: 0033:0x7fbf82f2c709 [ 95.443241] Code: [...] [ 95.443247] RSP: 002b:00007fffd5ea3b88 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139 [ 95.443253] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000056359c48e750 RCX: 00007fbf82f2c709 [ 95.443257] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000056356ed4efc5 RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 95.443260] RBP: 000056356ed4efc5 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00007fffd5ea3c10 [ 95.443263] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 95.443267] R13: 000056359c48e6f0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 95.443272] </TASK> [ 95.443274] Modules linked in: [...] [ 95.443385] Unloaded tainted modules: intel_uncore_frequency(E):1 isst_if_common(E):1 skx_edac(E):1 [ 95.443414] CR2: 0000000000000028 The bug can be reproduced with kselftests: cd linux/tools/testing/selftests make TARGETS='ftrace livepatch' (cd ftrace; ./ftracetest test.d/ftrace/fgraph-filter.tc) (cd livepatch; ./test-livepatch.sh) The problem is that ftrace_graph_ret_addr() is supposed to operate on the ret_stack of a selected task but wrongly accesses the ret_stack of the current task. Specifically, the above NULL dereference occurs when task->curr_ret_stack is non-zero, but current->ret_stack is NULL. Correct ftrace_graph_ret_addr() to work with the right ret_stack. Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mark Rutland <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Reported-by: Miroslav Benes <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: 7aa1eae ("function_graph: Allow multiple users to attach to function graph") Signed-off-by: Petr Pavlu <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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With structure layout randomization enabled for 'struct inode' we need to avoid overlapping any of the RCU-used / initialized-only-once members, e.g. i_lru or i_sb_list to not corrupt related list traversals when making use of the rcu_head. For an unlucky structure layout of 'struct inode' we may end up with the following splat when running the ftrace selftests: [<...>] list_del corruption, ffff888103ee2cb0->next (tracefs_inode_cache+0x0/0x4e0 [slab object]) is NULL (prev is tracefs_inode_cache+0x78/0x4e0 [slab object]) [<...>] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [<...>] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:54! [<...>] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN [<...>] CPU: 3 PID: 2550 Comm: mount Tainted: G N 6.8.12-grsec+ torvalds#122 ed2f536ca62f28b087b90e3cc906a8d25b3ddc65 [<...>] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-2 04/01/2014 [<...>] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff84656018>] __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x138/0x3e0 [<...>] Code: 48 b8 99 fb 65 f2 ff ff ff ff e9 03 5c d9 fc cc 48 b8 99 fb 65 f2 ff ff ff ff e9 33 5a d9 fc cc 48 b8 99 fb 65 f2 ff ff ff ff <0f> 0b 4c 89 e9 48 89 ea 48 89 ee 48 c7 c7 60 8f dd 89 31 c0 e8 2f [<...>] RSP: 0018:fffffe80416afaf0 EFLAGS: 00010283 [<...>] RAX: 0000000000000098 RBX: ffff888103ee2cb0 RCX: 0000000000000000 [<...>] RDX: ffffffff84655fe8 RSI: ffffffff89dd8b60 RDI: 0000000000000001 [<...>] RBP: ffff888103ee2cb0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: fffffbd0082d5f25 [<...>] R10: fffffe80416af92f R11: 0000000000000001 R12: fdf99c16731d9b6d [<...>] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff88819ad4b8b8 R15: 0000000000000000 [<...>] RBX: tracefs_inode_cache+0x0/0x4e0 [slab object] [<...>] RDX: __list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0x108/0x3e0 [<...>] RSI: __func__.47+0x4340/0x4400 [<...>] RBP: tracefs_inode_cache+0x0/0x4e0 [slab object] [<...>] RSP: process kstack fffffe80416afaf0+0x7af0/0x8000 [mount 2550 2550] [<...>] R09: kasan shadow of process kstack fffffe80416af928+0x7928/0x8000 [mount 2550 2550] [<...>] R10: process kstack fffffe80416af92f+0x792f/0x8000 [mount 2550 2550] [<...>] R14: tracefs_inode_cache+0x78/0x4e0 [slab object] [<...>] FS: 00006dcb380c1840(0000) GS:ffff8881e0600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [<...>] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [<...>] CR2: 000076ab72b30e84 CR3: 000000000b088004 CR4: 0000000000360ef0 shadow CR4: 0000000000360ef0 [<...>] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [<...>] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [<...>] ASID: 0003 [<...>] Stack: [<...>] ffffffff818a2315 00000000f5c856ee ffffffff896f1840 ffff888103ee2cb0 [<...>] ffff88812b6b9750 0000000079d714b6 fffffbfff1e9280b ffffffff8f49405f [<...>] 0000000000000001 0000000000000000 ffff888104457280 ffffffff8248b392 [<...>] Call Trace: [<...>] <TASK> [<...>] [<ffffffff818a2315>] ? lock_release+0x175/0x380 fffffe80416afaf0 [<...>] [<ffffffff8248b392>] list_lru_del+0x152/0x740 fffffe80416afb48 [<...>] [<ffffffff8248ba93>] list_lru_del_obj+0x113/0x280 fffffe80416afb88 [<...>] [<ffffffff8940fd19>] ? _atomic_dec_and_lock+0x119/0x200 fffffe80416afb90 [<...>] [<ffffffff8295b244>] iput_final+0x1c4/0x9a0 fffffe80416afbb8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8293a52b>] dentry_unlink_inode+0x44b/0xaa0 fffffe80416afbf8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8293fefc>] __dentry_kill+0x23c/0xf00 fffffe80416afc40 [<...>] [<ffffffff8953a85f>] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x1f/0xa0 fffffe80416afc48 [<...>] [<ffffffff82949ce5>] ? shrink_dentry_list+0x1c5/0x760 fffffe80416afc70 [<...>] [<ffffffff82949b71>] ? shrink_dentry_list+0x51/0x760 fffffe80416afc78 [<...>] [<ffffffff82949da8>] shrink_dentry_list+0x288/0x760 fffffe80416afc80 [<...>] [<ffffffff8294ae75>] shrink_dcache_sb+0x155/0x420 fffffe80416afcc8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8953a7c3>] ? debug_smp_processor_id+0x23/0xa0 fffffe80416afce0 [<...>] [<ffffffff8294ad20>] ? do_one_tree+0x140/0x140 fffffe80416afcf8 [<...>] [<ffffffff82997349>] ? do_remount+0x329/0xa00 fffffe80416afd18 [<...>] [<ffffffff83ebf7a1>] ? security_sb_remount+0x81/0x1c0 fffffe80416afd38 [<...>] [<ffffffff82892096>] reconfigure_super+0x856/0x14e0 fffffe80416afd70 [<...>] [<ffffffff815d1327>] ? ns_capable_common+0xe7/0x2a0 fffffe80416afd90 [<...>] [<ffffffff82997436>] do_remount+0x416/0xa00 fffffe80416afdd0 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b2ba4>] path_mount+0x5c4/0x900 fffffe80416afe28 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b25e0>] ? finish_automount+0x13a0/0x13a0 fffffe80416afe60 [<...>] [<ffffffff82903812>] ? user_path_at_empty+0xb2/0x140 fffffe80416afe88 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b2ff5>] do_mount+0x115/0x1c0 fffffe80416afeb8 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b2ee0>] ? path_mount+0x900/0x900 fffffe80416afed8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8272461c>] ? __kasan_check_write+0x1c/0xa0 fffffe80416afee0 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b31cf>] __do_sys_mount+0x12f/0x280 fffffe80416aff30 [<...>] [<ffffffff829b36cd>] __x64_sys_mount+0xcd/0x2e0 fffffe80416aff70 [<...>] [<ffffffff819f8818>] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x218/0x380 fffffe80416aff88 [<...>] [<ffffffff8111655e>] x64_sys_call+0x5d5e/0x6720 fffffe80416affa8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8952756d>] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x3c0 fffffe80416affb8 [<...>] [<ffffffff8100119b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack+0x4c/0x87 fffffe80416affe8 [<...>] </TASK> [<...>] <PTREGS> [<...>] RIP: 0033:[<00006dcb382ff66a>] vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb38225000-6dcb3837e000 22 55(read|exec|mayread|mayexec)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] Code: 48 8b 0d 29 18 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 49 89 ca b8 a5 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d f6 17 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48 [<...>] RSP: 002b:0000763d68192558 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5 [<...>] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00006dcb38433264 RCX: 00006dcb382ff66a [<...>] RDX: 000017c3e0d11210 RSI: 000017c3e0d1a5a0 RDI: 000017c3e0d1ae70 [<...>] RBP: 000017c3e0d10fb0 R08: 000017c3e0d11260 R09: 00006dcb383d1be0 [<...>] R10: 000000000020002e R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 [<...>] R13: 000017c3e0d1ae70 R14: 000017c3e0d11210 R15: 000017c3e0d10fb0 [<...>] RBX: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb38433000-6dcb38434000 5b 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RCX: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb38225000-6dcb3837e000 22 55(read|exec|mayread|mayexec)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RDX: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RSI: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RDI: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RBP: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] RSP: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 763d68173000-763d68195000 7ffffffdd 100133(read|write|mayread|maywrite|growsdown|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R08: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R09: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 file 6dcb383d1000-6dcb383d3000 1cd 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R13: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R14: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] R15: vm_area_struct[mount 2550 2550 anon 17c3e0d0f000-17c3e0d31000 17c3e0d0f 100033(read|write|mayread|maywrite|account)]+0x0/0xb8 [userland map] [<...>] </PTREGS> [<...>] Modules linked in: [<...>] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- The list debug message as well as RBX's symbolic value point out that the object in question was allocated from 'tracefs_inode_cache' and that the list's '->next' member is at offset 0. Dumping the layout of the relevant parts of 'struct tracefs_inode' gives the following: struct tracefs_inode { union { struct inode { struct list_head { struct list_head * next; /* 0 8 */ struct list_head * prev; /* 8 8 */ } i_lru; [...] } vfs_inode; struct callback_head { void (*func)(struct callback_head *); /* 0 8 */ struct callback_head * next; /* 8 8 */ } rcu; }; [...] }; Above shows that 'vfs_inode.i_lru' overlaps with 'rcu' which will destroy the 'i_lru' list as soon as the 'rcu' member gets used, e.g. in call_rcu() or later when calling the RCU callback. This will disturb concurrent list traversals as well as object reuse which assumes these list heads will keep their integrity. For reproduction, the following diff manually overlays 'i_lru' with 'rcu' as, otherwise, one would require some good portion of luck for gambling an unlucky RANDSTRUCT seed: --- a/include/linux/fs.h +++ b/include/linux/fs.h @@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ struct inode { umode_t i_mode; unsigned short i_opflags; kuid_t i_uid; + struct list_head i_lru; /* inode LRU list */ kgid_t i_gid; unsigned int i_flags; @@ -690,7 +691,6 @@ struct inode { u16 i_wb_frn_avg_time; u16 i_wb_frn_history; #endif - struct list_head i_lru; /* inode LRU list */ struct list_head i_sb_list; struct list_head i_wb_list; /* backing dev writeback list */ union { The tracefs inode does not need to supply its own RCU delayed destruction of its inode. The inode code itself offers both a "destroy_inode()" callback that gets called when the last reference of the inode is released, and the "free_inode()" which is called after a RCU synchronization period from the "destroy_inode()". The tracefs code can unlink the inode from its list in the destroy_inode() callback, and the simply free it from the free_inode() callback. This should provide the same protection. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Cc: [email protected] Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]> Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <[email protected]> Cc: Ajay Kaher <[email protected]> Cc: Ilkka =?utf-8?b?TmF1bGFww6TDpA==?= <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Fixes: baa23a8 ("tracefs: Reset permissions on remount if permissions are options") Reported-by: Mathias Krause <[email protected]> Reported-by: Brad Spengler <[email protected]> Suggested-by: Al Viro <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>
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We are hit with a not easily reproducible divide-by-0 panic in padata.c at bootup time. [ 10.017908] Oops: divide error: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 10.017908] CPU: 26 PID: 2627 Comm: kworker/u1666:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-15.el10.x86_64 #1 [ 10.017908] Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR950 [7X12CTO1WW]/[7X12CTO1WW], BIOS [PSE140J-2.30] 07/20/2021 [ 10.017908] Workqueue: events_unbound padata_mt_helper [ 10.017908] RIP: 0010:padata_mt_helper+0x39/0xb0 : [ 10.017963] Call Trace: [ 10.017968] <TASK> [ 10.018004] ? padata_mt_helper+0x39/0xb0 [ 10.018084] process_one_work+0x174/0x330 [ 10.018093] worker_thread+0x266/0x3a0 [ 10.018111] kthread+0xcf/0x100 [ 10.018124] ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50 [ 10.018138] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 10.018147] </TASK> Looking at the padata_mt_helper() function, the only way a divide-by-0 panic can happen is when ps->chunk_size is 0. The way that chunk_size is initialized in padata_do_multithreaded(), chunk_size can be 0 when the min_chunk in the passed-in padata_mt_job structure is 0. Fix this divide-by-0 panic by making sure that chunk_size will be at least 1 no matter what the input parameters are. Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Fixes: 004ed42 ("padata: add basic support for multithreaded jobs") Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Cc: Daniel Jordan <[email protected]> Cc: Steffen Klassert <[email protected]> Cc: Waiman Long <[email protected]> Cc: <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
jfernandez
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When l2tp tunnels use a socket provided by userspace, we can hit lockdep splats like the below when data is transmitted through another (unrelated) userspace socket which then gets routed over l2tp. This issue was previously discussed here: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/[email protected]/ The solution is to have lockdep treat socket locks of l2tp tunnel sockets separately than those of standard INET sockets. To do so, use a different lockdep subclass where lock nesting is possible. ============================================ WARNING: possible recursive locking detected 6.10.0+ torvalds#34 Not tainted -------------------------------------------- iperf3/771 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8881027601d8 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 but task is already holding lock: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(slock-AF_INET/1); lock(slock-AF_INET/1); *** DEADLOCK *** May be due to missing lock nesting notation 10 locks held by iperf3/771: #0: ffff888102650258 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendmsg+0x1a/0x40 #1: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0 #2: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130 #3: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0 #4: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf9/0x260 #5: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10 torvalds#6: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0 torvalds#7: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130 torvalds#8: ffffffff822ac1e0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0xcc/0x1450 torvalds#9: ffff888101f33258 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock#2){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x513/0x1450 stack backtrace: CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 771 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 6.10.0+ torvalds#34 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0 dump_stack+0xc/0x20 __lock_acquire+0x135d/0x2600 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2a0 ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 ? __skb_checksum+0xa3/0x540 _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x35/0x50 ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0 l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x3c/0xc0 dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11e/0x420 sch_direct_xmit+0xc3/0x640 __dev_queue_xmit+0x61c/0x1450 ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130 ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ip_output+0x99/0x120 __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0 ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890 __tcp_send_ack+0x1b8/0x340 tcp_send_ack+0x23/0x30 __tcp_ack_snd_check+0xa8/0x530 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 tcp_rcv_established+0x412/0xd70 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x299/0x420 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1991/0x1e10 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x50/0x220 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x158/0x260 ip_local_deliver+0xc8/0xe0 ip_rcv+0xe5/0x1d0 ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xce/0xe0 ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0 __netif_receive_skb+0x34/0xd0 ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0 process_backlog+0x2cb/0x9f0 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x61/0x280 net_rx_action+0x332/0x670 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 handle_softirqs+0xda/0x480 ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450 do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0xc8/0xe0 ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450 __dev_queue_xmit+0xa48/0x1450 ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130 ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380 ip_output+0x99/0x120 __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0 ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890 tcp_write_xmit+0x766/0x2fb0 ? __entry_text_end+0x102ba9/0x102bad ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __might_fault+0x74/0xc0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x190 tcp_push+0x117/0x310 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x14c1/0x1740 tcp_sendmsg+0x28/0x40 inet_sendmsg+0x5d/0x90 sock_write_iter+0x242/0x2b0 vfs_write+0x68d/0x800 ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10 ksys_write+0xc8/0xf0 __x64_sys_write+0x3d/0x50 x64_sys_call+0xfaf/0x1f50 do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7f4d143af992 Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> e9 01 cc ff ff 41 54 b8 02 00 00 0 RSP: 002b:00007ffd65032058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f4d143af992 RDX: 0000000000000025 RSI: 00007f4d143f3bcc RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007f4d143f2b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4d143f3bcc R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd650323f0 </TASK> Fixes: 0b2c597 ("l2tp: close all race conditions in l2tp_tunnel_register()") Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <[email protected]> Reported-by: [email protected] Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4 CC: [email protected] CC: [email protected] Signed-off-by: James Chapman <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <[email protected]> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
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[why]
Encounter NULL pointer dereference uner mst + dsc setup.
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
CPU: 4 PID: 917 Comm: sway Not tainted 6.3.9-arch1-1 #1 124dc55df4f5272ccb409f39ef4872fc2b3376a2
Hardware name: LENOVO 20NKS01Y00/20NKS01Y00, BIOS R12ET61W(1.31 ) 07/28/2022
RIP: 0010:drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper]
Code: 01 00 00 48 8b 85 60 05 00 00 48 63 80 88 00 00 00 3b 43 28 0f 8d 2e 01 00 00 48 8b 53 30 48 8d 04 80 48 8d 04 c2 48 8b 40 18 <48> 8>
RSP: 0018:ffff960cc2df77d8 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8afb87e81280 RCX: 0000000000000224
RDX: ffff8afb9ee37c00 RSI: ffff8afb8da1a578 RDI: ffff8afb87e81280
RBP: ffff8afb83d67000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffff8afb9652f850
R10: ffff960cc2df7908 R11: 0000000000000002 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8afb8d7688a0 R14: ffff8afb8da1a578 R15: 0000000000000224
FS: 00007f4dac35ce00(0000) GS:ffff8afe30b00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000010ddc6000 CR4: 00000000003506e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x23/0x70
? page_fault_oops+0x171/0x4e0
? plist_add+0xbe/0x100
? exc_page_fault+0x7c/0x180
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x5e/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026]
? drm_dp_atomic_find_time_slots+0x28/0x260 [drm_display_helper 0e67723696438d8e02b741593dd50d80b44c2026]
compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_link+0x2ff/0xa40 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
? fill_plane_buffer_attributes+0x419/0x510 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
compute_mst_dsc_configs_for_state+0x1e1/0x250 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
amdgpu_dm_atomic_check+0xecd/0x1190 [amdgpu 62e600d2a75e9158e1cd0a243bdc8e6da040c054]
drm_atomic_check_only+0x5c5/0xa40
drm_mode_atomic_ioctl+0x76e/0xbc0
[how]
dsc recompute should be skipped if no mode change detected on the new
request. If detected, keep checking whether the stream is already on
current state or not.
Cc: Mario Limonciello <[email protected]>
Cc: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Rodrigo Siqueira <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Fangzhi Zuo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Wayne Lin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
(cherry picked from commit 8151a6c)
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Aug 11, 2024
In commit 15d9da3 ("binder: use bitmap for faster descriptor lookup"), it was incorrectly assumed that references to the context manager node should always get descriptor zero assigned to them. However, if the context manager dies and a new process takes its place, then assigning descriptor zero to the new context manager might lead to collisions, as there could still be references to the older node. This issue was reported by syzbot with the following trace: kernel BUG at drivers/android/binder.c:1173! Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP Modules linked in: CPU: 1 PID: 447 Comm: binder-util Not tainted 6.10.0-rc6-00348-g31643d84b8c3 torvalds#10 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : binder_inc_ref_for_node+0x500/0x544 lr : binder_inc_ref_for_node+0x1e4/0x544 sp : ffff80008112b940 x29: ffff80008112b940 x28: ffff0e0e40310780 x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000001 x25: ffff0e0e40310738 x24: ffff0e0e4089ba34 x23: ffff0e0e40310b00 x22: ffff80008112bb50 x21: ffffaf7b8f246970 x20: ffffaf7b8f773f08 x19: ffff0e0e4089b800 x18: 0000000000000000 x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 000000002de4aa60 x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 2de4acf000000000 x12: 0000000000000020 x11: 0000000000000018 x10: 0000000000000020 x9 : ffffaf7b90601000 x8 : ffff0e0e48739140 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 000000000000003f x5 : ffff0e0e40310b28 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : ffff0e0e40310720 x2 : ffff0e0e40310728 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff0e0e40310710 Call trace: binder_inc_ref_for_node+0x500/0x544 binder_transaction+0xf68/0x2620 binder_thread_write+0x5bc/0x139c binder_ioctl+0xef4/0x10c8 [...] This patch adds back the previous behavior of assigning the next non-zero descriptor if references to previous context managers still exist. It amends both strategies, the newer dbitmap code and also the legacy slow_desc_lookup_olocked(), by allowing them to start looking for available descriptors at a given offset. Fixes: 15d9da3 ("binder: use bitmap for faster descriptor lookup") Cc: [email protected] Reported-and-tested-by: [email protected] Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jfernandez
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Aug 11, 2024
uevent_show() wants to de-reference dev->driver->name. There is no clean way for a device attribute to de-reference dev->driver unless that attribute is defined via (struct device_driver).dev_groups. Instead, the anti-pattern of taking the device_lock() in the attribute handler risks deadlocks with code paths that remove device attributes while holding the lock. This deadlock is typically invisible to lockdep given the device_lock() is marked lockdep_set_novalidate_class(), but some subsystems allocate a local lockdep key for @Dev->mutex to reveal reports of the form: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.10.0-rc7+ torvalds#275 Tainted: G OE N ------------------------------------------------------ modprobe/2374 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8c2270070de0 (kn->active#6){++++}-{0:0}, at: __kernfs_remove+0xde/0x220 but task is already holding lock: ffff8c22016e88f8 (&cxl_root_key){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x39/0x210 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (&cxl_root_key){+.+.}-{3:3}: __mutex_lock+0x99/0xc30 uevent_show+0xac/0x130 dev_attr_show+0x18/0x40 sysfs_kf_seq_show+0xac/0xf0 seq_read_iter+0x110/0x450 vfs_read+0x25b/0x340 ksys_read+0x67/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x75/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e -> #0 (kn->active#6){++++}-{0:0}: __lock_acquire+0x121a/0x1fa0 lock_acquire+0xd6/0x2e0 kernfs_drain+0x1e9/0x200 __kernfs_remove+0xde/0x220 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5e/0xa0 device_del+0x168/0x410 device_unregister+0x13/0x60 devres_release_all+0xb8/0x110 device_unbind_cleanup+0xe/0x70 device_release_driver_internal+0x1c7/0x210 driver_detach+0x47/0x90 bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xf0 cxl_acpi_exit+0xc/0x11 [cxl_acpi] __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x181/0x260 do_syscall_64+0x75/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e The observation though is that driver objects are typically much longer lived than device objects. It is reasonable to perform lockless de-reference of a @driver pointer even if it is racing detach from a device. Given the infrequency of driver unregistration, use synchronize_rcu() in module_remove_driver() to close any potential races. It is potentially overkill to suffer synchronize_rcu() just to handle the rare module removal racing uevent_show() event. Thanks to Tetsuo Handa for the debug analysis of the syzbot report [1]. Fixes: c0a4009 ("drivers: core: synchronize really_probe() and dev_uevent()") Reported-by: [email protected] Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]> Closes: http://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] [1] Link: http://lore.kernel.org/[email protected] Cc: [email protected] Cc: Ashish Sangwan <[email protected]> Cc: Namjae Jeon <[email protected]> Cc: Dirk Behme <[email protected]> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]> Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/172081332794.577428.9738802016494057132.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
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The queue stats API queries the queues according to the
real_num_[tr]x_queues, in case the device is down and channels were not
yet created, don't try to query their statistics.
To trigger the panic, run this command before the interface is brought
up:
./cli.py --spec ../../../Documentation/netlink/specs/netdev.yaml --dump qstats-get --json '{"ifindex": 4}'
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000c00
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 977 Comm: python3 Not tainted 6.10.0+ torvalds#40
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_get_queue_stats_rx+0x3c/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
Code: fc 55 48 63 ee 53 48 89 d3 e8 40 3d 70 e1 85 c0 74 58 4c 89 ef e8 d4 07 04 00 84 c0 75 41 49 8b 84 24 f8 39 00 00 48 8b 04 e8 <48> 8b 90 00 0c 00 00 48 03 90 40 0a 00 00 48 89 53 08 48 8b 90 08
RSP: 0018:ffff888116be37d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888116be3868 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: ffff88810ada4000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888109df09c0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: ffff88813461901c R11: ffffffffffffffff R12: ffff888109df0000
R13: ffff888109df09c0 R14: ffff888116be38d0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f4375d5c740(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000c00 CR3: 0000000106ada006 CR4: 0000000000370eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __die+0x1f/0x60
? page_fault_oops+0x14e/0x3d0
? exc_page_fault+0x73/0x130
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30
? mlx5e_get_queue_stats_rx+0x3c/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
netdev_nl_stats_by_netdev+0x2a6/0x4c0
? __rmqueue_pcplist+0x351/0x6f0
netdev_nl_qstats_get_dumpit+0xc4/0x1b0
genl_dumpit+0x2d/0x80
netlink_dump+0x199/0x410
__netlink_dump_start+0x1aa/0x2c0
genl_family_rcv_msg_dumpit+0x94/0xf0
? __pfx_genl_start+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_genl_dumpit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_genl_done+0x10/0x10
genl_rcv_msg+0x116/0x2b0
? __pfx_netdev_nl_qstats_get_dumpit+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_genl_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
genl_rcv+0x24/0x40
netlink_unicast+0x21a/0x340
netlink_sendmsg+0x1f4/0x440
__sys_sendto+0x1b6/0x1c0
? do_sock_setsockopt+0xc3/0x180
? __sys_setsockopt+0x60/0xb0
__x64_sys_sendto+0x20/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f43757132b0
Code: c0 ff ff ff ff eb b8 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 41 89 ca 64 8b 04 25 18 00 00 00 85 c0 75 1d 45 31 c9 45 31 c0 b8 2c 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 68 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 41 54 48 83 ec 20
RSP: 002b:00007ffd258da048 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffd258da0f8 RCX: 00007f43757132b0
RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 00007f437464b850 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f4375085de0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc4653600 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00007f43751a6147
</TASK>
Modules linked in: netconsole xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core zram zsmalloc mlx5_core fuse [last unloaded: netconsole]
CR2: 0000000000000c00
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:mlx5e_get_queue_stats_rx+0x3c/0xb0 [mlx5_core]
Code: fc 55 48 63 ee 53 48 89 d3 e8 40 3d 70 e1 85 c0 74 58 4c 89 ef e8 d4 07 04 00 84 c0 75 41 49 8b 84 24 f8 39 00 00 48 8b 04 e8 <48> 8b 90 00 0c 00 00 48 03 90 40 0a 00 00 48 89 53 08 48 8b 90 08
RSP: 0018:ffff888116be37d0 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888116be3868 RCX: 0000000000000004
RDX: ffff88810ada4000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888109df09c0
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000004 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: ffff88813461901c R11: ffffffffffffffff R12: ffff888109df0000
R13: ffff888109df09c0 R14: ffff888116be38d0 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f4375d5c740(0000) GS:ffff88852c980000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000c00 CR3: 0000000106ada006 CR4: 0000000000370eb0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fixes: 7b66ae5 ("net/mlx5e: Add per queue netdev-genl stats")
Signed-off-by: Gal Pressman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Joe Damato <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
jfernandez
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This fixes a NULL pointer dereference bug due to a data race which looks like this: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 33 PID: 16573 Comm: kworker/u97:799 Not tainted 6.8.7-cm4all1-hp+ torvalds#43 Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL380 Gen9/ProLiant DL380 Gen9, BIOS P89 10/17/2018 Workqueue: events_unbound netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work RIP: 0010:cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 Code: 57 41 56 45 89 ce 41 55 49 89 cd 41 54 49 89 d4 55 53 48 89 fb 48 83 ec 08 48 8b 47 08 48 83 7f 10 00 48 89 34 24 48 8b 68 20 <48> 8b 45 08 4c 8b 38 74 45 49 8b 7f 50 e8 4e a9 b0 ff 48 8b 73 10 RSP: 0018:ffffb4e78113bde0 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: ffff976126be6d10 RBX: ffff97615cdb8438 RCX: 0000000000020000 RDX: ffff97605e6c4c68 RSI: ffff97605e6c4c60 RDI: ffff97615cdb8438 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000278333 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffff97605e6c4600 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff97605e6c4c68 R13: 0000000000020000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffff976064fe2c00 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9776dfd40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000008 CR3: 000000005942c002 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x1f/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x15d/0x440 ? search_module_extables+0xe/0x40 ? fixup_exception+0x22/0x2f0 ? exc_page_fault+0x5f/0x100 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? cachefiles_prepare_write+0x30/0xa0 netfs_rreq_write_to_cache_work+0x135/0x2e0 process_one_work+0x137/0x2c0 worker_thread+0x2e9/0x400 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xcc/0x100 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x30/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: CR2: 0000000000000008 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- This happened because fscache_cookie_state_machine() was slow and was still running while another process invoked fscache_unuse_cookie(); this led to a fscache_cookie_lru_do_one() call, setting the FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD flag, which was picked up by fscache_cookie_state_machine(), withdrawing the cookie via cachefiles_withdraw_cookie(), clearing cookie->cache_priv. At the same time, yet another process invoked cachefiles_prepare_write(), which found a NULL pointer in this code line: struct cachefiles_object *object = cachefiles_cres_object(cres); The next line crashes, obviously: struct cachefiles_cache *cache = object->volume->cache; During cachefiles_prepare_write(), the "n_accesses" counter is non-zero (via fscache_begin_operation()). The cookie must not be withdrawn until it drops to zero. The counter is checked by fscache_cookie_state_machine() before switching to FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_RELINQUISHING and FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_WITHDRAWING (in "case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_FAILED"), but not for FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_LRU_DISCARDING ("case FSCACHE_COOKIE_STATE_ACTIVE"). This patch adds the missing check. With a non-zero access counter, the function returns and the next fscache_end_cookie_access() call will queue another fscache_cookie_state_machine() call to handle the still-pending FSCACHE_COOKIE_DO_LRU_DISCARD. Fixes: 12bb21a ("fscache: Implement cookie user counting and resource pinning") Signed-off-by: Max Kellermann <[email protected]> Signed-off-by: David Howells <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] cc: Jeff Layton <[email protected]> cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] cc: [email protected] Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>
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Aug 17, 2024
…/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.11, round #1 - Use kvfree() for the kvmalloc'd nested MMUs array - Set of fixes to address warnings in W=1 builds - Make KVM depend on assembler support for ARMv8.4 - Fix for vgic-debug interface for VMs without LPIs - Actually check ID_AA64MMFR3_EL1.S1PIE in get-reg-list selftest - Minor code / comment cleanups for configuring PAuth traps - Take kvm->arch.config_lock to prevent destruction / initialization race for a vCPU's CPUIF which may lead to a UAF
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When of_irq_parse_raw() is invoked with a device address smaller than the interrupt parent node (from #address-cells property), KASAN detects the following out-of-bounds read when populating the initial match table (dyndbg="func of_irq_parse_* +p"): OF: of_irq_parse_one: dev=/soc@0/picasso/watchdog, index=0 OF: parent=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, intsize=2 OF: intspec=4 OF: of_irq_parse_raw: ipar=/soc@0/pci@878000000000/gpio0@17,0, size=2 OF: -> addrsize=3 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0 Read of size 4 at addr ffffff81beca5608 by task bash/764 CPU: 1 PID: 764 Comm: bash Tainted: G O 6.1.67-484c613561-nokia_sm_arm64 #1 Hardware name: Unknown Unknown Product/Unknown Product, BIOS 2023.01-12.24.03-dirty 01/01/2023 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0xdc/0x130 show_stack+0x1c/0x30 dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x84 print_report+0x150/0x448 kasan_report+0x98/0x140 __asan_load4+0x78/0xa0 of_irq_parse_raw+0x2b8/0x8d0 of_irq_parse_one+0x24c/0x270 parse_interrupts+0xc0/0x120 of_fwnode_add_links+0x100/0x2d0 fw_devlink_parse_fwtree+0x64/0xc0 device_add+0xb38/0xc30 of_device_add+0x64/0x90 of_platform_device_create_pdata+0xd0/0x170 of_platform_bus_create+0x244/0x600 of_platform_notify+0x1b0/0x254 blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x9c/0xd0 __of_changeset_entry_notify+0x1b8/0x230 __of_changeset_apply_notify+0x54/0xe4 of_overlay_fdt_apply+0xc04/0xd94 ... The buggy address belongs to the object at ffffff81beca5600 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-128 of size 128 The buggy address is located 8 bytes inside of 128-byte region [ffffff81beca5600, ffffff81beca5680) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page:00000000230d3d03 refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1beca4 head:00000000230d3d03 order:1 compound_mapcount:0 compound_pincount:0 flags: 0x8000000000010200(slab|head|zone=2) raw: 8000000000010200 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffffff810000c300 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000200020 00000001ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffffff81beca5500: 04 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffff81beca5580: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc >ffffff81beca5600: 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffffff81beca5680: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffffff81beca5700: 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== OF: -> got it ! Prevent the out-of-bounds read by copying the device address into a buffer of sufficient size. Signed-off-by: Stefan Wiehler <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Rob Herring (Arm) <[email protected]>
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Lockdep reported a warning in Linux version 6.6: [ 414.344659] ================================ [ 414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ 414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda torvalds#6 Not tainted [ 414.346221] -------------------------------- [ 414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ 414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: [ 414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ 414.351751] lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.352218] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60 [ 414.352769] __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60 [ 414.353289] sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0 [ 414.353829] sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270 [ 414.354338] blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170 [ 414.354807] __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0 [ 414.355335] blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0 [ 414.355847] __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30 [ 414.356367] scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830 [ 414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state [ 414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda torvalds#6 Not tainted [ 414.346221] -------------------------------- [ 414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage. [ 414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes: [ 414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at: [ 414.351751] lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.352218] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60 [ 414.352769] __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60 [ 414.353289] sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0 [ 414.353829] sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270 [ 414.354338] blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170 [ 414.354807] __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0 [ 414.355335] blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0 [ 414.355847] __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30 [ 414.356367] scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830 [ 414.356863] scsi_io_completion+0x177/0x1610 [ 414.357379] scsi_complete+0x12f/0x260 [ 414.357856] blk_complete_reqs+0xba/0xf0 [ 414.358338] __do_softirq+0x1b0/0x7a2 [ 414.358796] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0 [ 414.359262] sysvec_call_function_single+0xaf/0xc0 [ 414.359828] asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x1a/0x20 [ 414.360426] default_idle+0x1e/0x30 [ 414.360873] default_idle_call+0x9b/0x1f0 [ 414.361390] do_idle+0x2d2/0x3e0 [ 414.361819] cpu_startup_entry+0x55/0x60 [ 414.362314] start_secondary+0x235/0x2b0 [ 414.362809] secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b [ 414.363413] irq event stamp: 428794 [ 414.363825] hardirqs last enabled at (428793): [<ffffffff816bfd1c>] ktime_get+0x1dc/0x200 [ 414.364694] hardirqs last disabled at (428794): [<ffffffff85470177>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x47/0x50 [ 414.365629] softirqs last enabled at (428444): [<ffffffff85474780>] __do_softirq+0x540/0x7a2 [ 414.366522] softirqs last disabled at (428419): [<ffffffff813f65ab>] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0 [ 414.367425] other info that might help us debug this: [ 414.368194] Possible unsafe locking scenario: [ 414.368900] CPU0 [ 414.369225] ---- [ 414.369548] lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait); [ 414.370000] <Interrupt> [ 414.370342] lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait); [ 414.370802] *** DEADLOCK *** [ 414.371569] 5 locks held by kworker/u10:3/1152: [ 414.372088] #0: ffff88810130e938 ((wq_completion)writeback){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x357/0x13f0 [ 414.373180] #1: ffff88810201fdb8 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x3a3/0x13f0 [ 414.374384] #2: ffffffff86ffbdc0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00 [ 414.375342] #3: ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0 [ 414.376377] #4: ffff888106205a08 (&hctx->dispatch_wait_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1337/0x1ee0 [ 414.378607] stack backtrace: [ 414.379177] CPU: 0 PID: 1152 Comm: kworker/u10:3 Not tainted 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda torvalds#6 [ 414.380032] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 414.381177] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0) [ 414.381805] Call Trace: [ 414.382136] <TASK> [ 414.382429] dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 [ 414.382884] mark_lock_irq+0xb3b/0x1260 [ 414.383367] ? __pfx_mark_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 [ 414.383889] ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0 [ 414.384373] ? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10 [ 414.384903] ? graph_lock+0xcf/0x410 [ 414.385350] ? save_trace+0x3d/0xc70 [ 414.385808] mark_lock.part.20+0x56d/0xa90 [ 414.386317] mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110 [ 414.386791] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 414.387320] lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.387901] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 [ 414.388422] trace_hardirqs_on+0x58/0x100 [ 414.388917] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50 [ 414.389422] __blk_mq_tag_busy+0x1d6/0x2a0 [ 414.389920] __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x761/0x9f0 [ 414.390899] blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1780/0x1ee0 [ 414.391473] ? __pfx_blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x10/0x10 [ 414.392070] ? sbitmap_get+0x2b8/0x450 [ 414.392533] ? __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x210/0x9f0 [ 414.393095] __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xd99/0x1690 [ 414.393730] ? elv_attempt_insert_merge+0x1b1/0x420 [ 414.394302] ? __pfx___blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x10/0x10 [ 414.394970] ? lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460 [ 414.395456] ? blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00 [ 414.395986] ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10 [ 414.396499] blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x109/0x190 [ 414.397100] blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x66e/0xa00 [ 414.397616] blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x614/0x2030 [ 414.398244] ? __pfx_blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x10/0x10 [ 414.398897] ? writeback_sb_inodes+0x241/0xcc0 [ 414.399429] blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x65/0x80 [ 414.399957] __blk_flush_plug+0x2f1/0x530 [ 414.400458] ? __pfx___blk_flush_plug+0x10/0x10 [ 414.400999] blk_finish_plug+0x59/0xa0 [ 414.401467] wb_writeback+0x7cc/0x920 [ 414.401935] ? __pfx_wb_writeback+0x10/0x10 [ 414.402442] ? mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110 [ 414.402931] ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 414.403462] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.404062] wb_workfn+0x2b3/0xcf0 [ 414.404500] ? __pfx_wb_workfn+0x10/0x10 [ 414.404989] process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0 [ 414.405546] ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10 [ 414.406139] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x101/0x2a0 [ 414.406641] ? assign_work+0x19b/0x240 [ 414.407106] ? lock_is_held_type+0x9d/0x110 [ 414.407604] worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160 [ 414.408075] ? __kthread_parkme+0x62/0x210 [ 414.408572] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0 [ 414.409168] ? __kthread_parkme+0x13c/0x210 [ 414.409678] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.410191] kthread+0x33c/0x440 [ 414.410602] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.411068] ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80 [ 414.411526] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 414.411993] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30 [ 414.412489] </TASK> When interrupt is turned on while a lock holding by spin_lock_irq it throws a warning because of potential deadlock. blk_mq_prep_dispatch_rq blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_alloc_driver_tag blk_mq_tag_busy -> tag is already busy // failed to get driver tag blk_mq_mark_tag_wait spin_lock_irq(&wq->lock) -> lock A (&sbq->ws[i].wait) __add_wait_queue(wq, wait) -> wait queue active blk_mq_get_driver_tag __blk_mq_tag_busy -> 1) tag must be idle, which means there can't be inflight IO spin_lock_irq(&tags->lock) -> lock B (hctx->tags) spin_unlock_irq(&tags->lock) -> unlock B, turn on interrupt accidentally -> 2) context must be preempt by IO interrupt to trigger deadlock. As shown above, the deadlock is not possible in theory, but the warning still need to be fixed. Fix it by using spin_lock_irqsave to get lockB instead of spin_lock_irq. Fixes: 4f1731d ("blk-mq: fix potential io hang by wrong 'wake_batch'") Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <[email protected]> Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <[email protected]> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected] Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <[email protected]>
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